The Arguments from Coherence: Analysis and Evaluation

In this article, the theory of argumentation set out by theDutch scholars Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst is broughtto bear in subjecting the general form of the argument fromcoherence to a critical analysis. First, a distinction is broughtout between two basic kinds of argument from coherence: in oneuse this argumentative structure occurs as a sequence of twoarguments establishing that a standpoint constitutes a particularinstantiation or a inherent quality of the system it will becomepart of (symptomatic argument); in the other use we have a mainsymptomatic argument supported by a subordinate argument appealingto instrumental considerations (pragmatic argument). It is thenclaimed that arguments from coherence are complex types of argumentation,structured at various argumentative levels, where the premisesmust be taken together to yield an adequate defence of the conclusion(coordinative argumentation). Finally, an evaluative assessmentis made as to whether arguments from coherence can serve acceptablyas tools for settling disputes: it will be maintained that wecan generally welcome these argumentative structures as soundand fully acceptable provided we are aware of the interpretivediscretion their use entails.     

An Automated System for Argument Invention in Law Using Argumentation and Heuristic Search Procedures*

Abstract. A heuristic search procedure for inventing legal arguments is built on two tools already widely in use in argumentation. Argumentation schemes are forms of argument representing premise‐conclusion and inference structures of common types of arguments. Schemes especially useful in law represent defeasible arguments, like argument from expert opinion. Argument diagramming is a visualization tool used to display a chain of connected arguments linked together. One such tool, Araucaria, available free at http://araucaria.computing.dundee.ac.uk/ , helps a user display an argument on the computer screen as an inverted tree structure with an ultimate conclusion as the root of the tree. These argumentation tools are applicable to analyzing a mass of evidence in a case at trial, in a manner already known in law using heuristic methods ( Schum 1994 ) and Wigmore diagrams ( Wigmore 1931 ). In this paper it is shown how they can be automated and applied to the task of inventing legal arguments. One important application is to proof construction in trial preparation ( Palmer 2003 ).     

The Strategic Use of Formal Argumentation in Legal Decisions

In legal decisions standpoints can be supported by formal and also by substantive interpretative arguments. Formal arguments consist of reasons the weight or force of which is essentially dependent on the authoritativeness that the reasons may also have: In this connection one may think of linguistic and systemic arguments. On the other hand, substantive arguments are not backed up by authority, but consist of a direct invocation of moral, political, economic, or other social considerations. Formal arguments can be analyzed as exclusionary reasons: The authoritative character excludes—in principle—substantial counterarguments. Formal arguments are sometimes used to conceal value judgements based on substantial arguments. This paper deals with reconstructing problems regarding this strategic use of formal arguments in legal decisions, with a focus on linguistic argumentation.     

Critical Remarks on Robert Alexy's "Special-Case Thesis"*

Abstract
In this paper the author criticizes the way Robert Alexy reconstructs the relationship between legal and practical reasoning. The core of Alexy's argumentation (Alexy 1978) is considered the claim that legal argumentation is a "special case" of general practical discourse. In order to question this claim, the author analyzes three different types of argument: (1) that legal reasoning is needed by general practical discourse itself, (2) that there are similarities between legal argumentation and general practical discourse, (3) that there is a correspondence between certain types of argument in general practical discourse and in legal argumentation.**     

佩雷尔曼新修辞学的论式系统

佩雷尔曼新修辞学恢复了古典论式理论的荣耀。新修辞学论式系统是对不确定条件下推理形式的分析，虽然这些推理形式是实践中不可或缺的，但笛卡尔时代以来一直被逻辑学家和知识理论家所忽视。论式是新修辞学论辩理论的核心。在新修辞学的论式系统里，亚里士多德“更可取的”topoi被用作与价值和价值层级相关联的推理前提——论证的出发点，因而与涉及推理形式的其他辩证推理发挥不同功能。新修辞学的论式在论辩中既生成说服力，也展现合理性；既与听众及其文化环境相联系，也通过论式的相反形式与论辩攻防相联系。新修辞学的论式，尤其是“准逻辑”论式与法律论证关系密切，对法律论证的辨识、结构分析、论证构建和批评有重要意义。     

法律的道德论证——一个语言哲学的视角

对法律进行道德论证会遇到“明希豪森困境”和“休谟问题”的干扰,语言学规则为法律论证提供了一种新的可能,虽然语言学论证中也会有诸如概念含义过于复杂等困难,但是,作为一种不同于传统法律论证理论,其所提供的解释视角和评判标准则是很有价值的。     

修辞论证的方法——以两份判决书为例

修辞在法官论证中的作用十分重要。在具体论证中,法官往往充分利用唤起情感的修辞技巧,并且在判决书中修辞对论证具有构成性意义。此外,无论是修辞论证所重视的共识还是论证本身所反映的实践合理性,其合理性基础均是语用学规则。     

三段论推理在法律论证中的作用探讨

司法三段论这一近代以来占主导地位的法律推理模式,当今的法学家对其提出了诸多批判,法律方法论亦由此从总体上实现了向法律论证理论的转换。但是,三段论推理本身的合理价值依然应当予以承认。在法律论证中,形式方法仍然具有无可替代的作用。法律论证的逻辑有效性对于实际的论证活动依然是个比较重要的评价标准。足见三段论推理在法律论证理论中具有重要意义。可以说,演绎模式的说理规则表达了对于法律论证最低限度的理性要求。在事实与规范相互对应的法律适用观念下,三段论推理继续在法律论证,尤其是在内部证立当中发挥作用。     

法律论证理论中的证明证据和证成

法律论证理论是实践论辩理论的一个局域性的论证类型。法律论证的实质是论辩。法律论证中的证明和证据概念强调合法性。法律论证的一个重要概念是证成,它分为内部证成和外部证成两种证成形式,这些证成是由若干规则、公式和原则来构成的,用以在法律论证中获得健全的实践理性。     

What is the Theory Legal Argumentation For?

The paper aims to present the legal theories of legal argumentation constructed in the last century, organised into two groups: the precursors (Viehweg, Perelman and Toulmin) and the authors of the standard theory (MacCormick and Alexy). Then, some criticisms about all these conceptions are presented. And finally, an outline of a theory of legal argumentation is made, capable of overcoming some of the previous criticisms. The fundamental idea for this is to build a very abstract concept of argumentation that could then allow various interpretations or conceptions of legal argumentation. From here, one would be in a position to find an answer to the three main argumentative questions raised by legal practice: how to analyse an argument, how to evaluate it, how to argue.

     

新修辞学理论的基本立场——以佩雷尔曼的“普泛听众”概念为中心

佩雷尔曼的新修辞学理论对法律论证理论的发展影响深远。其核心概念，即作为言说者之主观思维构造的“普泛听众”，具有一种固有而不可化解的内在紧张关系。因为它所指涉的理性概念取决于言说者所内化了的社会、语言和文化视角下的世界观要素以及所涉及的生活领域内的特殊知识兴趣。一方面，“普泛听众”的概念暗含了法律论证的不确定性和开放性，因此位于各种版本的明证和非理性立场之间；另一方面。它坚持的是一种实用主义导向的真理共识论。     

Substantive rules of argumentation for value judgment in civil law: In the context of academic practice of civil law in China

Value judgment is at the core of civil law. This paper explores how scholars of civil law reach mutual understanding and consensus on specific value judgment by rational discussion in the context of multiple value orientation. Based on a brief evaluation of the theory of legal argument and with the basic value consensus of Chinese civil law scholars as the premise, this paper proposes two substantive rules of argumentation for scholars of civil law to discuss value judgment: First, a strong of equal treatment should be carried out in the absence of sufficient and justified reasons or otherwise; Second, the freedom of civil subject should not be restrained in the absence of sufficient and justified reasons or otherwise. To reach mutual understanding, and on the basis of that to reach new consensus on specific value judgment further, scholars of civil law should base their discussions on substantive rules of argumentation for value judgment, follow rules and forms of argumentation as procedural techniques, and apply proper methods of argumentation. This paper also explores the application of substantive rules of argumentation on two specific value judgment issues of civil law scholars.     

法律论证中的权威与正确性——兼论我国指导性案例的效力

法律论证既需要运用权威理由,也需要运用实质理由来证立法律命题。法律渊源是最重要的权威理由,它通过说明法律命题之来源的方式来证明后者的初步有效性。制定法与先例构成了法律论证之权威性框架的主要部分,制定法属于规范权威,而先例属于事实权威,它们在司法裁判中一般只需被指明。同时,法律论证的正确性宣称决定了法律论证也必须运用有效的实质理由,即对法律命题内容的正确性进行证立。这种论证既可以是法律体系内的论证,也可以是超越体系的论证。法律论证旨在于平衡权威与正确性,其中权威论证具有初步的优先性但并非不可推翻,权威性的强度与相关正确性论证的负担成正比。以此来分析,我国的指导性案例介于规范权威与事实权威之间,它的效力是一种"准制度拘束力"。     

Does Legal Semiotics Cannibalize Jurisprudence?

Does Duncan Kennedy successfully cannibalize jurisprudence? He attempts to do it by demonstrating the inexistence of rightness in legal argumentation. If there is no right legal argument, then there is no right answer in adjudication, adjudication is not a rational enterprise and legal doctrine cannot be said to be a science. It can be shown that skepticism is self-defeating. Duncan Kennedy can avoid self defeat only because he actually believes in a lot of legal arguments. His thesis that judges decide questions of policy without any methodology that distinguishes them from legislators does not hold. Judicial reasoning is subject to constraints that do not affect legislators. It must be based on the sources of law and is limited by rules of procedure. Even when the judges have ‘interstitial’ legislative powers they are, unlike the legislator, bound to fit the system and their decisions are considered in procedure from the perspective of the right answer doctrine. The only work that can convincingly refute the skeptic argument against legal science is the reconstruction of jurisprudence as a scientific enterprise. Such work is beyond the scope of any single paper. The article aims to give some inspirations for such a task.     

Pragmatic Maxims and Presumptions in Legal Interpretation

The fields of linguistic pragmatics and legal interpretation are deeply interrelated. The purpose of this paper is to show how pragmatics and the developments in argumentation theory can contribute to the debate on legal interpretation. The relation between the pragmatic maxims and the presumptions underlying the legal canons are brought to light, unveiling the principles that underlie the types of argument usually used to justify a construction. The Gricean maxims and the arguments of legal interpretation are regarded as presumptions subject to default used to justify an interpretation. This approach can allow one to trace the different legal interpretive arguments back to their basic underlying presumptions, so that they can be compared, ordered, and assessed according to their defeasibility conditions. This approach allows one to understand the difference between various types of interpretive canons, and their strength in justifying an interpretation.     

A Formal Model of Legal Argumentation

Abstract . The paper gives a formal reconstruction of some fundamental patterns of legal reasoning, intended to reconcile symbolic logic and argumentation theory. Legal norms are represented as unidirectional inference rules which can be combined into arguments. The value of each argument (its qualification as justified, defensible, or defeated) is determined by the importance of the rules it contains. Applicability arguments, intended to contest or support the applicability of norms, preference arguments, purporting to establish preference relations among norms, and interpretative arguments are also formalised. All those argument types are connected in a unitary model, which relates legal reasoning to the indeterminacy of legal systems, intended as the possibility to develop incompatible defensible arguments. The model is applied to permissive norms and normative hierarchies, and is implemented in a Prolog program.     

The Burden of Argumentation in Legal Disputes

Abstract. Juristic argumentation must in normal cases lead to a positive conclusion. The adoption of the rules of the burden of argumentation is, therefore, necessary. It is the task of the normative theory of juristic argumentation to formulate and to justify these rules., The rules of the burden of argumentation are constitutive rules. They do not impose duties or obligations to justify, but they state under what conditions a thesis counts as justified. The basic problem lies in the second-order justification, that is, in the justification of the rules of the burden of argumentation. Their rational justification is a precondition for rational juristic discourse.     

The Special Case Thesis and the Dual Nature of Law

In this article, I take up two arguments in favor of the discursive model of legal argumentation: the claim to correctness argument and the dual nature thesis. The argument of correctness implies the dual nature thesis, and the dual nature thesis implies a nonpositivistic concept of law. The nonpositivistic concept of law comprises five ideas. One of them is the special case thesis. The special case thesis says that positivistic elements, that is, statutes, precedents, and prevailing doctrines, are necessary for law in order to achieve legal certainty. Without this, law would not be as perfect as it could possibly be. But it says, at the same time, that this alone would not be enough to fulfill the claim to correctness. The claim to correctness refers not only to the real dimension of law, defined by statutes, precedents, and prevailing doctrines, but also to its ideal dimension, defined, first and foremost, by justice. The special case thesis is my oldest thesis. It has remained an essential element of my system over the years. Its connection with four other theses—the Radbruch formula, the human rights thesis, the idea of deliberative democracy, and principles theory—does not change this at all. On the contrary, this connection has lent greater strength to the special case thesis.     

推理与解释：寓于其中的法律思维

法律解释与法律推理是两种相对独立的法律方法,它们对法治建设有着不同的意义。法律解释的功能是要充分展示法律文本的各种可能意义,而法律推理则强调结论的必然得出。由于二者都强调根据法律进行解释或推理,因而拥有大体相似的思维走向,但作为不同的方法却有着许多细微的区分。正是这些既相互联系又有区别的方法(如法律发现、法律解释、法律论证、价值衡量、法律推理等)构成了法律方法论体系。当我们对这些法律方法有了深入系统的了解后,方法论向本体论的转向就水到渠成了。     

Taking the Law Seriously: On Political Science and the Role of Law in the Process of European Integration

Abstract: The interdisciplinary discourse on European law seems paradoxical. While the editors of this Journal plead for a contextual jurisprudence, political scientists are discovering the importance of law for the integration process. This article explores the merits and problems of both of these shifts¹. On the one hand, it points to implicit assumptions of legal arguments that need to be contrasted with the insights of political sciences into mechanisms of integration processes and the functioning of inter-governmental bargaining - and is thus to be read as an appeal for a 'contextual' jurisprudence. On the other hand, it argues that political science analyses, even when they take the legal dimension of European integration into account, tend to rely upon an instrumentalist view of the legal system which fails to acknowledge the Law's normative logic and discursive power. This theoretically complex argument is exemplified first by an analysis of the tensions between the legal supranationalism of the European Court of Justice and the German Constitutional Court's defence of national constitutionalism, already intensively discussed in this Journal². What the article adds is an extension of the constitutional debate to the economy. It argues that Europe cannot, and should not, be based upon a dichotomous structure of (national) political rights and (European) economic liberties.