The Argument from Transnational Effects II: Establishing Transnational Democracy

This article continues with a discussion of what the author calls the argument from transnational effects. It says that supranational or transnational forms of integration, in particular market integration, are desirable on account of democracy itself. National democracies find themselves thereby forced to confront and to internalise the externalities that they cause for each other. A fortiori, democracy becomes supposedly emancipated from the confines of the nation state. This article examines the argument critically at a general level. The situation under consideration concerns all cases in which, regardless of whether there is movement or not, the acts of one democracy adversely impact on the interests of others. The article tries to identify instances where the harm is tied to a failure of representation in a transnational context and not caught by the harm principle, broadly understood. In order to calibrate the argument's scope the article resorts to the principle of universalisation. The guiding intuition is that so long as the act of one democracy is morally justified on the basis of this principle, the argument from transnational effects does not apply. Hence the argument is of no avail where the impact of one democracy on another is perfectly legitimate. This would be the case, for example, when the effects are too insignificant to require any debate. Determining the range of legitimate impact is a core question of transnational constitutional law. Any such determination presupposes mutually shared interest definitions. More often than not, however, the relevant interest definitions underlying universalisation are debatable. Therefore, it appears to be inevitable, at first glance, to have relations of transnational interdependency matched by transnational democratic processes. The article then goes on to identify three different types of universalitation with reference to what can be regarded as their respective anchor. Simple universalisation is based upon shared interest definitions. Reflexive universalisation involves common views of oneself (and others). Self‐transcending universalisation is grounded in the desire to live in a free society. Reflexive universalisation requires to extend mutual sympathy. From this perspective, transnational democratic processes are tantamount to nation‐building. However, one would commit a sentimentalist fallacy if one were to conclude that mutual sympathy in and of itself engenders an expansion of mutual responsibility. The article argues that with regard to the third type of universalisation the institutionalisation of transnational democratic procedures cannot be justified. It would threaten to undermine various conceptions of a free society. It is argued that for the sake of the realisation of equal citizenship the argument from transnational effects actually needs to endorse the existence of bounded democratic communities. Unbounded transnational democracy would exercise an adverse effect on citizenship. It also turns out that the argument from transnational effects, in its uncorrected form, remains haunted by the dilemma that the type of democracy that is envisaged by it becomes easily absorbed by administrative processes. The article concludes that the argument from transnational effects, correctly understood, has a more modest import than its proponents would have us believe. Rather than supporting the release of democracy from its national bounds, it helps to explain why the co‐existence of bounded democratic polities remains essential to equal citizenship. More forceful versions of transnational integration graft onto political societies elements that are not genuinely democratic and strangely reminiscent of different forms of rule. These are forms of rule that Aristotle would not have called ‘political’, for they do not involve the exercise of power by equals over equals.     

National Constitutional Courts in supranational litigation: A contextual analysis

The article examines the role of national constitutional courts in supranational litigation. It firstly illustrates their value and situates well‐known judicial doctrines affecting their jurisdiction in the context of the normative claims, policy agenda and institutional framework promoted by the European Union. Against this background, it gauges the potential of national constitutional courts in countering the process of intergovernmental and technocratic encroachment of national constitutional democracies characterising the most recent evolutionary stages of the European integration process. It is claimed that constitutional courts are in the position of reinforcing, resisting or correcting Union measures with a detrimental impact on national constitutional principles. After having identified in correction the approach more coherent with their constitutional mandate, the article highlights a disturbing paradox: in remaining faithful to their constitutional role, constitutional courts contribute to the sustainability of a comprehensive institutional setting corroding the idea of constitutional democracy on which they are premised.     

Referendums and the Political Constitutionalisation of the EU

Abstract:  This article argues that European integration has triggered a dual constitutionalisation process in Europe. One is the revision of national constitutions to accommodate the integration project at the national level. The other is the construction of transnational rules to regulate novel inter-state relationships at the European level. EU referendums are contextualised in such a duel constitutionalisation process. At the domestic level, EU referendums handle the debates on national constitutional revision. At the transnational level, these popular votes ratify supranational constitutional documents. The article comparatively analyses three types of EU referendums—membership, policy and treaty referendums—according to this analytical framework, exploring the campaign mobilisation of voters, national governments, and transnational institutions, and examining the legal and political interaction between referendums and European integration. A key finding is that, as the dual constitutionalisation process deepens and widens, entrenched domestic players and restrained transnational actors are under increasing pressure to 'voice' themselves in EU referendums.     

宪政视角下的听证权初探

听证权是一种从宪法正当程序和其他基本权利中推导出的宪法性权利,是保障其他权利实现的权利,是人民实现当家作主的一种程序性权利。听证权的制度化建立在主权在民的深厚法理基础之上,集中体现了控制国家权力和保障人权的宪政理念,它能够加快民主决策、民主管理和民主监督的宪政化步伐,对实现社会正义、形成宪政秩序具有极其重要的作用,因而是宪法实施的重要制度机制。     

Constitutional Review in the Mega‐Leviathan: A Democratic Foundation for the European Court of Justice

The European Court of Justice (ECJ) serves, among other things, as a constitutional court for the EU. This means that it possesses the legal right to strike down both EU and national laws it deems irreconcilable with treaty provisions. In the present article, we shall draw on Hans Kelsen's theory of democracy to argue that the ECJ's competence to review and invalidate legislation is, in fact, indispensable for the democratic legitimacy of the EU's legal system as a whole.     

Civil Society and the Re-imagination of European Constitutionalism

Abstract: The twin concepts of constitutionalism and democracy, which offer a complex template for the structural organisation of a polity, can be understood in terms of a dialectic of complementary but competing values, values represented by responsiveness to an existing order and innovation towards a potentially new order. Recognising this necessarily dynamic relationship, an essentialist reading of a constitutionalisation of the demos is abandoned, and an examination of the extent to which the dialectic can credibly or legitimately be played out in a supranational ‘community’ and in the context of an emerging transnational civil society can be undertaken. Rather than seeking credibility or legitimacy through the rationalisation of a community by an ethical consensus as in some forms of republicanism and communitarianism, the dialectic opens up the norms and boundaries of the polity and leads to an understanding of the ‘community’ in less rigid and more diffuse, even plural, terms. Once understood in this way the possibility emerges for legitimacy to be pursued through a public sphere enlarged by a context‐transcending constitutional discourse mediated by transnational civil society. Alternatively the normative ‘openness’ of the polity might be prioritised and with it the uncertainty/fluidity of the constitutional arrangement itself; in this way the legitimate pursuit of constitutionalism is understood in terms of a never‐ending agonistic struggle or experimental practice.     

A European Constitutional Patriotism? The Case Restated

Abstract:  Especially since the failure of the European Constitutional Treaty, the idea of a European constitutional patriotism has become subject to ever more intense criticism. This article argues that many of the criticisms of the idea of a European constitutional patriotism have been based on philosophical misunderstandings (both of the notion of constitutional patriotism as such, and of the role it could play in Europe) or rely on implausible empirical claims. Accordingly, the normative idea of constitutional patriotism is first clarified; second, the article discusses some of the most common normative and empirical traps when trying to 'transfer' constitutional patriotism from a domestic nation-state context to the supranational level, as well as the tendency to overburden constitutional patriotism with expectations of solidarity and deliberative democracy; third, an EU-specific post-sovereign, pluralist version of constitutional patriotism is defended against critics who see even such a vision as insufficiently sensitive to value pluralism and cultural diversity.     

Quasi-National European Identity and European Democracy

Democracy may well be the primary virtue of political systems. Yet European politics is marked by a democracy deficit that will not disappear spontaneously. While legal and political theory on this issue is dominated by supporters of civic institutionalism and constitutional republicanism, liberal nationalists seem to be split. They justify the civic nationhood of member states, but they shrink away from the idea of a European people. This essay claims that a quasi-national conception of European identity can be conducive to the rise of a democratic political union of Europe. It discusses the mechanisms and rules for Europeanization of the sense of equal dignity and solidarity. This approach to supranational identity is explicitly instrumental and orientated towards the long run. However, the main liberal objections against it can be countered.     

The dangers of constitutional identity

This article purports to expose the dangers of the concept of constitutional identity – a doctrine shaped by apex state courts to shield areas of the national legal systems from the influence of European law. First, the article overviews the use of the concept of constitutional identity in the case law of national and supranational courts, mapping the growing expansion of this doctrine. Second, the article seeks to reconstruct the genealogy of the concept of constitutional identity, tracing its legal origins. Third, the article advances a normative criticism of the concept of constitutional identity, explaining how the doctrine suffers from an incurable lack of determinacy, which inevitably results in arbitrariness in its use. Moreover, the article points out how the practical use of a defensive concept such as constitutional identity is poised to weaken, if not undermine tout court, the process of European integration.     

The Dual Nature of Law

The argument of this article is that the dual‐nature thesis is not only capable of solving the problem of legal positivism, but also addresses all fundamental questions of law. Examples are the relation between deliberative democracy and democracy qua decision‐making procedure along the lines of the majority principle, the connection between human rights as moral rights and constitutional rights as positive rights, the relation between constitutional review qua ideal representation of the people and parliamentary legislation, the commitment of legal argumentation to both authoritative and non‐authoritative reasons, and the distinction between rules as expressing a real “ought” and principles as expressing its ideal counterpart. All of this underscores the point that the dual nature of law is the single most essential feature of law.     

'Solange, chapter 3': Constitutional Courts in Central Europe—Democracy—European Union

Abstract: Soon after the accession of eight post‐communist states from Central and Eastern Europe to the EU, the constitutional courts of some of these countries questioned the principle of supremacy of EU law over national constitutional systems, on the basis of their being the guardians of national standards of protection of human rights and of democratic principles. In doing so, they entered into the well‐known pattern of behaviour favoured by a number of constitutional courts of the ‘older Europe’, which is called a ‘Solange story’ for the purposes of this article. But this resistance is ridden with paradoxes, the most important of which is a democracy paradox: while accession to the EU was supposed to be the most stable guarantee for human rights and democracy in post‐communist states, how can the supremacy of EU law be now resisted on these very grounds? It is argued that the sources of these constitutional courts’ adherence to the ‘Solange’ pattern are primarily domestic, and that it is a way of strengthening their position vis‐à‐vis other national political actors, especially at a time when the role and independence of those courts face serious domestic challenges.     

Eclipse of the Constitution {Europe Nouveau Siècle}

The Court of Justice of the European Union has come to adopt a peculiar mode of balancing, revolving around a set of ‘general principles of law’, which results in key social rights at the core of the postwar constitutional settlement no longer being sheltered from review by reference to supranational economic freedoms. It is submitted that this does not only imply a kind of ideological restyling of European law, as noted in the literature but, more fundamentally, the erosion of Europe's composite constitutional architecture (at once European and national) resulting from playing down social rights qua ‘constitutional essentials’. As the new jurisprudence ‘obscures’ Europe's constitutional constellation, it is submitted that the Court should rule under the constitution and not over it.     

Constitutional Pluralism Revisited

This essay revisits the theory of constitutional pluralism. This theory was first developed in the EU context as a way of understanding and defending the absence of a broadly agreed source of final authority in the relationship between national and supranational (EU) legal systems and their respective appellate courts in the context of the significant increase in supranational jurisdiction around the time of the Maastricht Treaty 25 years ago. The essay argues that the theory of constitutional pluralism remains relevant today, in particular offering better explanatory and justificatory accounts of the EU than any of the singularist (or monist), holist or federalist alternatives. Its continuing relevance, however, depends on a more explicit focus on the political underpinnings of the legal and judicial dimensions of constitutional pluralism than has typically been the case in the literature, and on more detailed consideration of the preconditions, forms and limits of constitutional initiative in the contemporary phase of unprecedented challenge to the legitimacy of the EU.     

BREXIT,democracy and the rule of law

This article employs the image of the antisyzygy, the yoking of opposites, as an analytical tool to understand the dynamic and unresolved tensions built into the very idea of the European Union. It describes the EU as a forming a supranational constitutional space which does not supersede nation states, but instead seeks to preserve their specific identities while promoting and protecting the fundamental values they are called upon to embody as liberal constitutional democracies. The article then critically examines constitutional developments in the UK subsequent to its decision to leave the European Union and suggests that, paradoxically, it may have been the European Union which held the post-War post-imperial United Kingdom together and, without it and outside it, we may anticipate the UK's imminent dissolution into its original constituent nations – Brexit leads inexorably to BreUK-up.     

Multiple Sovereignty: On Europe's Self-Constitutionalization and Legal Self-Reference

This article focuses on theoretical reflections on sovereignty and constitutionalism in the context of the globalization and Europeanisation of the nation states, their politics, and legal systems. Starting from a critical assessment of the Kelsen-Schmitt polemic, the author claims that sovereignty needs to be analysed by the sociological method in order to disclose its current structural differentiation. The constitution of society may be imagined as the multitude of self-constituted and functionally differentiated social subsystems. The constitutional pluralism argument subsequently reconceptualizes sovereignty as socially differentiated and divided between specific subsystems. The EU's differentiated constitutional domain and the paradox of divided sovereignty are used as examples of profound structural and semantic changes in contemporary national and transnational societies. While the sovereign nation-state institutions have become marginalized in political structures of European societies, the self-constitutionalization of the functionally differentiated EU legal system proceeds by internalizing the concept of divided sovereignty and using it semantically as its mode of self-reference.     

Constitutional Comparisons by A Supranational Court in Flux: The Privy Council and Caribbean Bills of Rights

This article examines how the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council makes constitutional comparisons between ‘related’ constitutions that are or were within its jurisdiction, deploying its own precedents, as a pragmatic method of resolving idiosyncratic questions that arise across multiple constitutions. In particular, it considers the Committee's approach to the longstanding question of the interpretation of the opening section of Caribbean constitutional bills of rights, which has far reaching implications for the scope of constitutional protection of human rights. The JCPC's answer over time to this question reveals the fault lines for this supranational constitutional court as its jurisdiction peters out yet remains. The gaze of comparativism is very harsh as older constitutions are evaluated in light of newer ones and also as fossilised constitutional interpretations presented in earlier JCPC cases where the Committee no longer has jurisdiction are given new life in contemporary cases.     

Constitutional Referendums: A Theoretical Enquiry

In recent decades the use of referendums to settle major constitutional questions has increased dramatically. Addressing this phenomenon as a case study in the relationship between democracy and constitutional sovereignty, this article has two aims. The first is to argue that these constitutional referendums are categorically different from ordinary, legislative referendums, and that this has important implications for theories of constitutional sovereignty. Secondly, the article suggests that the power of these constitutional referendums to re-order sovereign relations raises significant normative questions surrounding the appropriateness of their use. The article engages with these normative questions, enquiring whether the recent turn in republican political theory towards deliberative democracy may offer a model through which sufficiently democratic referendum processes can be constructed.     

The Cocoon of Power: Democratic Implications of Interinstitutional Agreements

Abstract:  This article assesses Interinstitutional Agreements (IIAs) in terms of democratic theory. It starts from the premise that democratic rules as developed in the national context may be used as a yardstick for supranational governance as well. Thus, parliamentarisation of the Union is defined as an increase in democracy, although relating problems such as weak European party systems, low turnouts, and remoteness are not to be neglected. The article evaluates several case studies on IIAs in this vein and asks whether they strengthen the European Parliament or not, and why. It arrives at conclusions that allow for differentiation: empowerment of the European Parliament occurs in particular when authorisation to conclude an IIA stems from the Treaty or from the power that the European Parliament has in crucial fields such as the budget and is willing to use for this purpose. Success is, however, not guaranteed in every case, and is sometimes more symbolic than real. However, a democratic critique must also stress negative consequences of IIAs in terms of responsivity, accountability, and transparency.     

“法律3.0时代”背景下的“法治中国”

按照时间顺序和发展内容，可以对现代法制进行三个阶段的划分，分别用“法律1．0时代…法律2．0时代”和“法律3．0时代”来标识。当代世界，以各国的国家法、国与国的国际法和区域一体化的超国家法为三种法律形态，已经步入“法律3．0时代”。三种形态共存构成了全球法律复杂多样的面貌，三者之间的互动使得其中任一类型法律的属性、存在和运行，都会直接受到其他两个的作用和影响。我国目前面，临从“法律1．0时代”到“法律3．0时代”三重任务叠加的情形。向内，这指向从民主与法制到“法治中国”的全面建设；向外，这意味着应对、合作、参与全球性的法律秩序建设，其中包括法律规则制度、甚至原则理念的竞争。     

在社会分裂中求得政治稳定——李帕特协商联合民主理论评述

以思考如何在存在社会分裂的国家中保持政治稳定为目的,本文首先讨论了李帕特提出的区别于英美多数主义民主的协商联合民主理论,然后重点借助宪法实例分析该理论的特征与制度实践形式,并在全面比较荷兰、比利时和瑞士三国在实践协商联合民主不同成败结果的基础上,对在分裂社会中求得政治稳定的前提条件、宪法设计应当注意的事项进行了讨论.