The fallacy of the autonomous celebrity activist in international politics: George Clooney and Mia Farrow in Darfur

Celebrities have been accused of oversimplifying the conflict in Darfur, of exaggerating the number of people killed and of cursorily labelling it the ‘first genocide of the 21st century’. Celebrity activists have also been criticized for advocating drastic measures like military intervention, and for aggressively pursuing the fulfilment of arrest warrants by the International Criminal Court at the expense of quiet diplomacy and reconciliation, ultimately making matters worse. This article examines the role of two Hollywood celebrities—Mia Farrow and George Clooney—in Sudan's ‘messy war’. It claims that most proponents and critics of celebrity activism overestimate the role that these two individuals played. Clooney and Farrow did not act alone but were latecomer adherents to a transnational advocacy network (the Save Darfur Coalition) and their role was more in strengthening than in altering messages.     

Civil War Victory and the Onset of Genocide and Politicide

Why do some governments engage in genocide and/or politicide? A common explanation for such government-sponsored mass killing is that civil war provides governments both the incentive and opportunity to eradicate their enemies during the fighting. However, many episodes of genocide and politicide begin once the fighting has ended. I argue that when the civil war ends with a clear victor the winning party is more likely to engage in mass killing than if the conflict ends through negotiated settlement or other inconclusive manners, since the victorious party does not fear armed resistance while they eliminate dissidents throughout the country. Moreover, I posit that the government will be more likely to engage in politicide rather than genocide, as politicide eradicates the leader’s political enemies across cross-cutting segments of the population, whereas genocide only destroys certain communal groups. Statistical examination of all post-civil war periods between 1955 and 2009 supports my argument.     

A Review of: “Devin R. Springer,James L. Regens,and David N. Edger. Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad. Stephen Vertigans (with contributions from Donncha Marron and Philip W. Sutton). Militant Islam: A Sociology of Characteristics,Causes, and Consequences. David Aaron. In Their Own Words: Voices of Jihad.”

Chinese arms sales to Africa have increased in recent years. In a region beset by conflict and unstable regimes, and where arms sales are a significant and positive predictor of an increased probability of political violence, this is inherently problematic. The sale of weaponry to a regime in Khartoum caught up in an alleged “genocide” in Darfur, the awkward appearance in 2008 of a Chinese ship loaded with weapons bound for Mugabe's Zimbabwe off the coast of eastern Africa, and the recent exposure in 2011 that Chinese arms companies offered to sell around $200 million worth of arms to Muammar Gaddafi's regime are emblematic of an issue in Africa's political violence that needs analysis. This article seeks to discuss the rationale behind China's arms sales to Africa and the effect that they have had on political violence in recipient countries. It also provides an analysis of the supply-and-demand circumstances of Chinese arms transfers to Africa, Beijing's attempts to control such transfers, and evidence that Chinese policies on proliferation are (slowly) evolving.     

Humanitarian Intervention After Iraq: Legal Ideals vs. Military Realities

The theory of humanitarian intervention has received new attention since the humanitarian crises of the 1990s and the United States’ becoming the world's sole superpower. The actual practice of humanitarian intervention, however, has declined. It is difficult to forge the political will for it when the countries composing the global organizations that could provide the political legitimacy disagree on an intervention, and with so few countries—mainly the United States and Great Britain—capable of providing the required expeditionary forces. Moreover, the Afghanistan and Iraq wars have diminished the United States’ political will, military capability, and diplomatic credibility to conduct future humanitarian interventions. In particular, those wars precluded its intervention in the current genocide in Darfur. Regional bodies such as the African Union may be the only entities that can, with aid and training, undertake effective interventions.     

Forms of Civil War Violence and Their Consequences for Future Public Health

Previous research concerning the relationship between conflict and public health finds that countries emerging from war face greater challenges in ensuring the well-being of their populations in comparison with states that have enjoyed political stability. This study seeks to extend this insight by considering how different civil war conflict strategies influence post-conflict public health. Drawing a distinction between deaths attributable to battle and those fatalities resulting from genocide/politicide, we find that the magnitude of genocide/politicide proves the more effective and consistent predictor of future rates of disability and death in the aftermath of civil war. The implications of this research are twofold. First, it lends support to an emerging literature suggesting that important distinctions exist between the forms of violence occurring during civil war. Second, of particular interest to policymakers, it identifies post-civil war states that have experienced the highest rates of genocide/politicide as the countries most in need of assistance in the aftermath of conflict.     

Interests over norms in western policy towards the Caucasus: How Abkhazia is no one's Kosovo

The potentially numerous cases of ‘genocide’ around the world can now invoke the precedent of NATO's use of military force for humanitarian purposes against Serbia in spring 1999. Such a claim was suggested by Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze over Georgia's disputed former autonomous republic of Abkhazia. The conflict over this former ‘Soviet Riviera’ again demonstrates the constraints behind gaining accurate information on the causes and consequences of a conflict. Particularly, it illustrates the difficulty of determining what constitutes ‘genocide’ and against whom, as both the Abkhaz and the displaced Georgians make such claims. On that basis, each party can expect ‐ and equally fear ‐ a NATO‐style military intervention. In the event, even if both sides view themselves as victims of ‘genocide’ and entitled to such intervention, Western perceptions of strategic interests in the Caucasus prevent this scenario. The determination of injustices, quite apart from their redress, goes unanswered.     

Bosnia on the Border? Republican Violence in Northern Ireland During the 1920s and 1970s

Unionist politicians have argued that Republican political violence on the Irish border, during both the partition of Ireland and more recent Northern Ireland conflict, constituted ethnic cleansing and genocide against the Protestant/Unionist community in those areas. These views have been bolstered by an increasingly ambivalent scholarly literature that has failed to adequately question the accuracy of these claims. This article interrogates the ethnic cleansing/genocide narrative by analysing Republican violence during the 1920s and the 1970s. Drawing from a wide range of theoretical literature and archival sources, it demonstrates that Republican violence fell far short of either ethnic cleansing or genocide, (in part) as a result of the perpetrators’ self-imposed ideological constraints. It also defines a new interpretive concept for the study of violence: functional sectarianism. This concept is designed to move scholarly discussion of political and sectarian violence beyond the highly politicised and moral cul-de-sacs that have heretofore characterised the debate, and has implications for our understanding of political violence beyond Ireland.     

A porous humanitarian shield: The laws of war,the red cross,and the killing of civilians

An important literature examines the attempts by the international community in inducing or coercing conflict parties in civil wars to refrain from committing atrocities against the civilian population. We examine in this article whether a non-governmental actor, the distinctively neutral and independent International Committee of the Red Cross, whose mission includes the promotion of humanitarian law and the protection of the civilian population, has such a restraining effect on the conflict parties. Our results suggest that the more time has passed since the ratification of the relevant Geneva Conventions and Protocols, the larger is the risk of civilian victimization. We cannot find evidence that the ICRC’s presence in conflict zones and the seminars it conducts to spread humanitarian law make a crucial difference. Case studies of Bosnia and Darfur indicate that shaming strategies and thus a relatively unusual instrument for the traditionally neutral actor did not abate the killings; the statistical evidence in the form of Granger causality tests rather show that the killing and harming precedes the naming and shaming.     

Yesterday's victims,today's perpetrators?: Considerations on peoples and territories of the former Ottoman empire 1

This article seeks to place the conflict in present‐day Bosnia within a historical context. It does this by comparison with other areas within the former Ottoman empire, particularly where emerging national movements have contended for, the same territory. Ethnic cleansing and genocide have resulted on several occasions. But victims have ‐ usually on a smaller scale ‐ also become perpetrators. Part of the problem, it is argued, is the very concept of the nation‐state, which demands people‐homogeneity and, therefore, either the forcible assimilation or removal of competing ‘national’ groups. A rethinking founded on pluralism, diversity and federal structures is posited as the best hope for the future avoidance of such conflicts.     

Failed aid: how development agencies are neglecting and marginalising Rwandan genocide survivors

This Viewpoint argues that international development aid agencies have failed adequately to address the rights and needs of genocide survivors in Rwanda. It illustrates that genocide survivors remain impoverished and marginalised, and that development aid agencies only tangentially, if at all, acknowledge their vulnerability and take steps to empower them to realise their rights. It provides examples of aid programmes that are reaching genocide survivors and urges development aid agencies in Rwanda to design and implement programmes explicitly for genocide survivors.     

教会政治与卢旺达大屠杀

在1994年卢旺达大屠杀中,卢旺达基督教教会深深地卷入了这场血腥暴行。教堂成为主要的杀戮场之一,许多教会的神职人员甚至直接参与了对图西人的屠杀。教会之所以支持大屠杀,原因在于从历史上看教会就与国家政权保持密不可分的关系,并且种族歧视和斗争就存在于教会内部。此外,在内战和民主运动兴起的这样一个特殊历史时期,就像政府官员企图利用大屠杀作为保持权力的手段一样,教会也利用大屠杀作为打击竞争对手、应对内部民主化挑战的重要手段。卢旺达大屠杀的实例说明,推进教会民主化的斗争已经成为非洲大陆政治改革运动的重要组成部分。     

Mind the Gap: Civilian Protection and the Politics of Peace Operation Design

Protecting civilians from conflict and atrocities has become a major focus of governments, the UN, and activists. Yet peace operations—the main policy instrument for directly shielding civilians from violence—vary widely in how well they are designed to do so. One much-maligned problem is a gap between a force's ambitions to protect civilians and its physical resources for doing so. Missions plagued by these ambitions–resources gaps gesture toward protecting civilians but are not designed to do so effectively. They can also worsen civilian suffering. This article explores the politics behind these gaps, focusing on the role of powerful states—especially major Western democracies—in creating and facilitating them. It argues that ambitions–resources gaps represent a form of organized hypocrisy that helps political leaders balance competing normative and material pressures to protect civilians while limiting costs and risks. Case studies of France's Operation Turquoise in Rwanda and US support for the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in Darfur support the argument.     

A Review of: “Jarret M. Brachman. Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice.”

ABSTRACT

The genocide perpetrated by the Khmer Rouge between 1975 and 1979 appears as one of the most totalitarian manifestations of political violence in the 20th century. This article explores the ideological framework constructed by the Khmer Rouge, and looks into whether and how this influences and motivates individual low-level cadres in their participation. Our findings show that toxification as a genocidal ideology was present in the Khmer Rouge discourse, and provided a lens of legitimacy for individuals to engage in acts of violence. But such a genocidal ideology was not a motivating factor for individual perpetrators in the Cambodian genocide. This research forwards the comparative investigation of the Khmer Rouge genocide in Cambodia as an important case of genocide, both at the societal and individual levels, as well as the general study of toxification as a genocidal ideology.     

Rwanda: Beyond ethnic conflict'

This paper ¹ explores some of the reasons for the failure of the international community to act decisively in preempting the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. These are rooted both in long-distant history and in the dynamics of post-Cold War international politics. Drawing on a decade of experience in Central Africa, the author looks critically at the widely accepted explanations of the genocide and its aftermath as 'simply tribal fighting', and considers the role of external agents - journalists and aid agencies alike - in fostering this view. The paper ends with a reflection on the complex challenges posed by 'reconciliation' in the wake of the genocide.     

International Intervention and the Severity of Genocides and Politicides

This study examines the effectiveness of overt military intervention in slowing or stopping the killing during ongoing instances of genocide or politicide. Six alternative hypotheses regarding the potential effects of intervention on genocide/politicide severity are tested in a cross-national longitudinal analysis of all ongoing genodices or politicides from 1995 to 1997. The results suggest that interventions that directly challenge the perpetrator or aid the target of the brutal policy are the only effective type of military responses, increasing the probability that the magnitude of the slaughter can be slowed or stopped. Impartial interventions seem to be ineffective at reducing severity, and interventions to challenge the perpetrator do not make matters worse for the targets of genocide or politicide. The findings are consistent with recent arguments that attempts to prevent or alleviate mass killings should focus on opposing, restraining, or disarming perpetrators and/or removing them from power.     

The Tamil people's right to self-determination

This article provides an overview of the crisis in Sri Lanka and states why an armed conflict has developed in the northern and eastern parts (north-east) of the country. The Tamils' accusations—of discrimination, denial of the right to self-determination, abrogated agreements and violations of international human rights and humanitarian law amounting to genocide by successive Sri Lankan governments—are supported by specific evidence given by international human rights and legal experts, international human rights non-governmental organizations and other relevant entities. The democratic parliamentary efforts and the non-violent resistance struggle of the Tamil people prior to the outbreak of war are traced over several decades. The article includes an outline of social and law and order achievements in the north-east under the de facto administration of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and concludes with some current international dimensions of the situation.     

The Deterrent Effects of the International Criminal Court: Evidence from Libya

ABSTRACT

The International Criminal Court (ICC) was designed to try the worst war criminals for crimes against humanity, genocide, and other instances of mass human suffering. By providing a permanent, international mechanism to hold perpetrators of mass human rights abuse accountable, the ICC is also meant to be a deterrent—to prevent potential genocidaires from committing systematic human rights abuses in the first place. But what if the effect is actually quite the opposite? While advocates of international justice have made conjectures about the effect of the ICC on stopping human rights abuses, the existing scholarship does not empirically test assumptions about the relationship between international criminal justice and violence. This article outlines the causal mechanisms by which the ICC could affect ongoing violence and tests these assumptions using event count models of the relationship between the ICC and the level of violence against civilians in Libya during the 2011 crisis. These analyses suggest that the ICC’s involvement in conflict does have a dampening effect on the level of mass atrocities committed. The results also call for a broad and sustained research agenda on the effect of international accountability efforts on ongoing violence.     

Funding development in Rwanda: the survivors' perspective

Why has the humanitarian world already forgotten the people of Rwanda? And why do the survivors of the Rwandan genocide continue to be sidelined, particularly those women who were raped and deliberately infected with HIV/AIDS in a campaign of systematic sexual violence? The focus of humanitarian organisations shifted from Rwanda after 1994, and these women – most of whom have to maintain their households alone – are needlessly dying because they have no access to treatment. Humanitarian and development efforts will not achieve lasting benefits without better coordination and the ability to act on lessons learned.     

Majoritarian democracy and globalization versus ethnic diversity?

While some types of democracy can sustain ethnic and cultural diversity, others can clearly undermine it. In The Dark Side of Democracy, Michael Mann argues that extreme crimes like genocide and ethnic cleansing tend to occur, or at least be legitimized, within a majoritarian democracy framework. This article broadens Mann's approach in two directions: first, it confirms that majoritarian democracy in plural societies can provide the pre-existing institutional context where conflict, nationalism and exclusion can thrive, eventually degenerating into self-destruction. Second, it focuses on the tendency by some governments to turn to patriotism and populism as sources of legitimacy at a time when the latter appears to be crumbling. In addition, the article questions both the ‘democratic peace’ and the ‘failed democratization’ approaches for their reliance on an ideal type and fixed notion of democracy, arguing that the latter has been weakened by neoliberal globalization, particularly as it interacts with the legacy of pre-existing forms of majoritarianism. The article concludes that these forces need to be studied simultaneously in order to have a broader picture of the contemporary weakening of democratic practices and institutions within some nation-states.