Developing countries and international organizations: Introduction to the special issue

We describe four megatrends since the end of the Cold War that relate to developing countries: a greater share of the global economy; more accessible technologies, particularly in communication; breakthroughs in global cooperation in tackling basic human needs; and the evolution of a complex set of problems in spite of the progress. We then examine potential political economy channels that might hinder the ability of international organizations to adapt to the new realities. Introducing the articles to the special issue, we argue for four distinct variables that affect the behavior and character of international organizations: power, norms, preferences, and problems.     

Informal governance and participation in non-democratic international organizations

This article uses the informal governance framework to elucidate the connection between regime transition and participation in regional international organizations (IOs). In particular, this study focuses on non-democratic regional IOs and examines the empirical case of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). We investigate how the level of regime transition of each CIS member state affects its participation in the CIS. The paper utilizes an original dataset that contains information regarding the number of CIS-related agreements that have been signed by each CIS member state during the 1991–2010 time period, which can be used to measure the level of participation of each state in the CIS. We find that states with a lower level of democratization and a higher level of marketization are more likely to participate in agreements within the CIS. The paper contributes to the wider application of informal governance framework by demonstrating the usefulness of these theories for understanding the nature and dynamics of regional IOs, such as the CIS.     

Trade and investment: Introduction to the special issue

This special issue focuses on a variety of political-economy questions on trade and investment and is guided by a shared understanding that trade and investment processes can no longer be studied in isolation from each other. Three articles provide new insights into the study of the design of preferential trade agreements and effects thereof, two of which focus on the politically salient issues of non-trade concerns. A third one investigates which export sectors win from improved market access opportunities, in order words, how gains from trade are distributed. Two articles study the World Trade Organization’s dispute settlement system. One contribution is unpacking the role of the most important and influential firms and investors in affecting US behavior in WTO disputes, a second contribution studies how leadership changes in democracies and autocracies have different effects on dispute behavior. Finally, the special issue includes a new study on how the shadow economies in developing states are affected by the integration into the world economy (trade and investment) and by policy programs of the International Monetary Fund.     

Principal-agent problems in international organizations

The paper provides a framework for analysing control problems in international organisations and reviews the disparate evidence from a public-choice perspective. Most examples concern the European Union, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the International Labour Organisation. International organisations suffer from principal-agent problems more than other public or private organisations do because the chain of delegation is more extended. As survey evidence demonstrates, the actors in international organisations do not share the preferences of the citizens because they have vested interests, and the citizens believe that they have least influence at the international level. The paper argues that national and international parliaments, the national governments and international supervisory boards or courts cannot solve the principal-agent problem due to severe information cost and weak or distorted incentives. JEL codes H79 · H11     

Strengthening the citizens' role in international organizations

Today's international organizations are characterized by a fundamental deficit in democracy. We therefore propose institutional measures to increase the direct participation possibilities of the citizens in international organizations. In order to reduce the number of citizens involved in decision-making to a manageable size, a representative sample of trustees is selected using a random mechanism. The trustees are given the right to launch initiatives and to vote in referendums on issues related to an international organization's constitution. They can also recall executives when they are dissatisfied with their behavior. No specific changes to the organization of these entities, especially their executive function, are proposed. Rather, the executives of international organizations must obey the constitutional changes adopted by the trustees. The proposal gives international organizations democratic legitimacy. Moreover, the executives are subjected to the control of the citizens of the member states, which induces better responsiveness to the preferences of the people, as well as higher organizational efficiency. JEL codes D72 · 019     

Crisis of governance: Devising strategy to counter international organized crime

This article presents a five‐part strategy to combat International Organized Crime (IOC). First, it establishes the need for ongoing assessments: what is known and what needs to be known about IOC, as well as what opportunities exist to influence its operations? Second, the US must establish a clear‐cut and annunciated policy and strategy that draws on the resources of its many relevant agencies as well as international cooperation. Third, the US should endeavour to lead an international effort to enhance law enforcement. Fourth, law enforcement alone will be inadequate. Containing and neutralizing IOC will require disruption activities as well. Fifth, there is a need for private‐sector education programs to prevent successful criminal enterprises.     

Leading by design: Informal influence and international secretariats

This article tests three hypotheses concerning the influence of international secretariats in world politics. This is a topic that has so far received limited systematic attention by IR theorists, who have tended to regard secretariats as bit players in global affairs. Drawing on institutional design literature, I develop a detailed theoretical explanation for both secretariat leadership and state mastery of international organizations. Because powerful actors anticipate channels for informal influence when designing secretariats, they seek to maximize formal bureaucratic autonomy. I assess the explanatory power of this theory through an analysis of negotiations over the design of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). A detailed archival investigation reveals that powerful countries, led by the United States, sought to maximize the autonomy of the UNEP secretariat. Developing countries, which expected to exert less informal influence on the new secretariat, sought to ensure strong intergovernmental control over UNEP’s secretariat. Since UNEP has been a frequently cited example of secretarial leadership and initiative, finding that the UNEP secretariat’s ability to act autonomously was in significant part determined by past institutional design choices holds relevance for theory development.     

涉台国际环境的新特点

与以往相比,近年来涉台国际环境显现出两个突出的特点:其一,涉台国际环境更加错综复杂;其二,涉台国际环境更有利于防止、遏制"台独".这两个特点紧密联系在一起,而且在很大程度上互为表里.涉台国际环境是复杂的,依然存在台湾当局推行"务实外交",搞"一中一台"的某些空间.但这些因素没有也不可能改变涉台国际环境有利于防止、遏制"台独"的基本特点.     

The structure of the international telecommunications regime in transition: A network analysis of international organizations 1

This paper examines the structure of the international telecommunications regime in terms of networks of social interaction and institutional affiliation among international actors. Social interaction and overlapping membership data of 69 international telecommunications organizations in the Yearbook of International Organizations 1994/1995 are analyzed to describe the social structure of the international telecommunications system through network analysis. The analysis reveals a center‐periphery structure with the Western industrial countries at the center and the less developed countries at the periphery. The international telecommunications system is also regionally structured suggesting influence by geopolitical and cultural proximity. The results indicate that inter‐governmental global organizations such as the ITU and UNESCO play intermediate and coordinating roles at the central linking‐pin positions (or cut‐points) in the international telecommunications regime. In summary, this research shows that transitional trends in international telecommunications have affected the interaction patterns of international actors.     

Trust in international organizations: An empirical investigation focusing on the United Nations

The literature on social capital has strongly increased in the last two decades, but there still is a lack of substantial empirical evidence about the determinants of international trust. This empirical study analyzes a cross-section of individuals, using micro-data from the World Values Survey, covering 38 countries, to investigate trust in international organizations, specifically in the United Nations. In line with previous studies on international trust we find that political trust matters. We also find that social trust is relevant, but contrary to previous studies the results are less robust. Moreover, the paper goes beyond previous studies investigating also the impact of geographic identification, corruption and globalization. We find that a higher level of (perceived) corruption reduces the trust in the UN in developed countries, but increases trust in developing and transition countries. A stronger identification with the world as a whole also leads to a higher trust in the UN and a stronger capacity to act globally in economic and political environment increases trust in the UN.

Self-legitimation in the face of politicization: Why international organizations centralized public communication

International organizations (I0) have centralized their public communication to a large extent over recent decades by undertaking a broader codification of communication tasks as well as a departmentalization of these tasks within units of IO bureaucracies. The paper provides the first systematic analysis of this important development in institutional design using a novel data set on the organization of public communication in 48 IOs between 1950 and 2015. It identifies self-legitimation as a key driver of centralization in the face of increased levels of politicization, that is, public awareness and activism directed at IOs. Empirically, the study suggests that the centralization of public communication significantly increases as transnational civil society organizes and gains access to IO decision-making. Further, politicization in terms of contentious activism and public scandals substantially accounts for varying levels of centralization across IOs.     

Public support for the international economic organizations: Evidence from developing countries

Public opinions regarding the international economic organizations (IEOs; the IMF, World Bank, and WTO) are understudied. I contrast five lines of argument using a multi-country survey of developing countries, focusing on evaluations of the economy, skills, gender, and ideology and measures of involvement with the organizations themselves. At the individual level, respondents have negative views if they have negative views of the state of the economy. More educated respondents are more likely to have negative views of the IEOs. Women are more likely to have positive views of the IEOs than men. National levels of engagement with the IEOs also affect public evaluations of them. Evaluations of the state of the economy are more influential determinants of IEO evaluations in states that receive IMF and World Bank loans, as well as in states that are active in WTO dispute resolution.

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Assessing international aid for local governance in the Western Balkans

This article investigates the impact of international efforts to cultivate effective and authoritative local governing institutions in the Western Balkans, a prime testing ground for democratization aid to post-war states. It explores three hypotheses, each of which argues that a particular approach of international actors toward domestic officials best improves the quality of local governance. The study's gathering of interview and survey data from field-based actors enables it to evaluate local government reforms' impact on domestic communities. This investigation arrives at three findings. First, in the view of Western Balkan peoples, local governance reforms do not produce benefits when they are either imposed or ignored by international authorities. Secondly, reforms produce benefits for local communities when they are designed to meet domestic concerns. More specifically, reforms valued by local communities are designed in ways that respond to domestic, rather than international, concepts of good local governance that emphasize socioeconomic aspects and produce tangible benefits. Well designed reforms also include significant aid targeting local governance that is coupled with the promise of a larger political settlement that is attractive to powerful domestic elites and contingent on clearly articulated local governance reforms. Thirdly, such aid best characterises European Union efforts only in Macedonia.