A Śaiva Theory of Meaning

The Pauṣkara briefly discusses the meaning-expressing nature of śabda (constituted of phonemes, varṇa) and the means to the cognition of word and sentence meaning. According to this dualistic Śaiva Tantra, meaning is denoted by nāda, a capacity of varṇas. Varṇas also are the means to the cognition of meaning through a capacity (saṃskāra) manifested in them. Although the meaning-denoting capacity is natural to varṇas, the relation of words (which are nothing but groups of varṇas) with objects is fixed by convention. This article translates and analyzes the relevant passages from the sixth and eighth chapters. Certain arguments of plagiarism levelled against the eighth chapter of the Pauṣkara are examined in the concluding part of the article.     

Reconciling dualism and non-dualism: three arguments in Vijñānabhikṣu’s Bhedābheda Vedānta

The late 16th century Indian philosopher Vijñānabhik?u is most well known today for his commentaries on Sā?khya and Yoga texts. However, the majority of his extant corpus belongs to the tradition of Bhedābheda (Difference and Non-Difference) Vedānta. This article elucidates three Vedāntic arguments from Vijñānabhik?u’s voluminous commentary on the Brahma Sūtra, entitled Vijñānām?tabhā?ya (Commentary on the Nectar of Knowledge). The first section of the article explores the meaning of bhedābheda, showing that in Vijñānabhik?u’s understanding, “difference and non-difference” does not entail a denial of the principle of contradiction. The second shows how the relation between the individual soul (jīva) and Brahman can be understood as a relation of part and whole. The third section discusses Brahman as cause of the world, and Vijñānabhik?u’s particular formulation of Brahman as “locus cause” (adhi??hānakāra?a). Understanding these arguments enables us to appreciate how Vijñānabhik?u’s Difference and Non-Difference Vedānta is a credible alternative to the Advaita Vedānta schools prevalent in northern India in the late medieval period, and how in his later works Vijñānabhik?u built upon this Difference and Non-Difference metaphysical framework to argue for the unity of Vedānta, Yoga, and Sā?-khya philosophies.     

Otherness in the Pratyabhijñā philosophy

Idealism is the core of the Pratyabhijñã philosophy: the main goal of Utpaladeva (fl. c. 925–950 AD) and of his commentator Abhinavagupta (fl. c. 975–1025 AD) is to establish that nothing exists outside of consciousness. In the course of their demonstration, these ?aiva philosophers endeavour to distinguish their idealism from that of a rival system, the Buddhist Vijñānavāda. This article aims at examining the concept of otherness (paratva) as it is presented in the Pratyabhijñā philosophy in contrast with that of the Vijñānavādins’. Although, according to the Pratyabhijñā, the other subjects are not ultimately real since all subjects are nothing but limited manifestations of a single absolute subject, the fact that we are aware of their existence in the practical world has to be accounted for. The Vijñānavādins explain it by arguing the we infer the others’ existence. The Pratyabhijñā philosophers, while refuting their opponents’ reasoning as it is expounded in Dharmakīrti’s Santānāntarasiddhi, develop a particulary original analysis of our awareness of the others, stating that this awareness is neither a perception (pratyak?a) nor an inference (anumāna), but rather a guess (ūha) in which we sense the others’ freedom (svātantrya).     

Vedic Language and Vaiṣṇava Theology:Madhva’s Use of Nirukta in his Ṛgbhāṣya

This article explores the way in which Madhva (1238–1317), the founder of the Dvaita Vedānta system of Hindu thought, reformulates the traditional exegetic practice of nirukta or “word derivation” to validate his pluralistic, hierarchical, and Vaiṣṇava reading of the Ṛgvedic hymns. Madhva’s Ṛgbhāṣya (RB) is conspicuous for its heavy reliance on and unique deployment of this exegetical tactic to validate several key features of his distinctive theology. These features include his belief in Viṣṇu’s unique possession of all perfect attributes (guṇaparipūrṇatva) and His related conveyability by all Vedic words (sarvaśabdavācyatva). Such an understanding of Vedic language invokes the basic nirukta presupposition that words are eternally affiliated with the meanings they convey. But it is also based onMadhva’s access to a lexicon entitled Vyāsa’s Nirukti with which his critics and perhaps even his commentators seem to be unfamiliar.While the precise status of this text is the subject of ongoing debate, Madhva’s possession of special insight into the sacred canon is established in part by his unique claim to be an avatāra of the wind god Vāyu and a direct disciple of Viṣṇu Himself in the form of Vyāsa₁. Thus, Madhva’s use of nirukta invokes his personal charisma to challenge not only conventional understandings of the hymns but traditional exegetic norms. Madhva’s provision of an alternative tradition of nirukta provoked sectarian debate throughout the Vijayanagara period over the extent to which one could innovate in established practices of reading the Veda. Articulating the Veda’s precise authority was a key feature of Brahmin debates during this period and reflects both the empire’s concern with promoting a shared religious ideology and the competition among rival Brahman sects for imperial patronage that this concern elicited. By looking at how two of Madhva’s most important commentators (the 14^th-century Jayatīrtha and the 17^th-century Rāghavendra) sought to defend his niruktis, this article will explore how notions of normative nirukta were articulated in response to Madhva’s deviations. At the same time, however, examining Madhva’s commentators’ defense of his niruktis also demonstrates the extent to which Madhva actually adhered to selected exegetic norms. This reveals that discomfort with Madhva’s particular methods for deriving words stemmed, in part, from a more general ambivalence towards this exegetical tactic whose inherent open-endedness threatened to undermine the fixity of the canon’s very substance: its language. Vyāsa’s Nirukti is one of several ”unknown sources” cited in Madhva’s commentaries whose exact status continues to be debated. Some scholars (e.g. Rao, Sharma, Siauve) maintain that these texts are part of a now lost Pāṅcarātra tradition that Madhva is attempting to preserve. This may be true for many of these citations. However, in addition to claiming to be both an avatāra of Vāyu and Viṣṇu-as-Vyāsa’s student, Madhva states in several places (e.g., VTN 42, RB 162) that the canon has suffered loss during transmission and that only Viṣṇu can reveal it in its entirety. Thus, it is possible that Madhva intends texts like Vyāsa’s Nirukti to be viewed as part of an ongoing and corrective revelation, a notion that is compatible with many Vaiṣṇava traditions (Halbfass, 1991: 4).     

What similes in Sāṃkhya do: a comparison of the similes in the Sāṃkhya texts in the Mahābhārata, the Sāṃkhyakārikā and the Sāṃkhyasūtra

In Sāṃkhya similes are an important means to communicate basic philosophical teachings. In the texts similes are frequently used, especially in the Sāṃkhya passages in the Mahābhārata, in the Sāṃkhyakārikā and in the Sāṃkhyasūtra. This paper compares the similes in these three texts and analyses changes in the philosophy as revealed in the similes. A comparison of the similes of Sāṃkhya texts produced over more than one thousand years reveals changes in the emphasis in this philosophical system. The purpose of the similes in the Sāṃkhya passages of the Mahābhārata is to produce an intuitive understanding of the separateness of puruṣa and prakṛti. The similes are designed to lead the listener to understand this basic dualism. In the Sāṃkhyakārikā the most difficult issues are the relationship between prakṛti and puruṣa and the idea of prakṛti working for the salvation of puruṣa. One whole chapter of the Sāṃkhyasūtra is devoted to similes.     

A case of Vyākaraṇic oxymoroṇ: the notion of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Anvarthasaṃjñā</Emphasis>

The anvartha-sa?jñā compound associates two contradictory terms: anvartha, which means “[used] in conformity with his [etymological/first] meaning”, and sa?jñā which implies the idea of a convention; it therefore appears to be quite intriguing. The question is: is it relevant to focus on this contradiction or is it only a false problem? The aim of this paper is to answer the above question and this implies to grasp somewhat better the use of this notion by the Pā?inian grammarians. To do so, the author has studied the main texts of the Pā?inian tradition, having in mind the following questions: did the Pā?inian grammarians deal with this notion and, if so, in what terms? Did they perceive the contradiction raised by the association of the terms anvartha and samjñā? The study will show that this contradiction is only a false problem: according to the Pā?inian grammarians quoted above, even when a sa?jñā is provided with an etymological/first meaning and its bearer (or one of its properties) is partly described by this meaning, this sa?jñā belongs, above all, to the domain of convention.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Anyathākhyāti</Emphasis>: A Critique by Appaya Dīkṣita in the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Parimala</Emphasis>

In this paper, the problem of illusory perception, as approached by the Nyāya and Advaita Vedānta schools of philosophy, is discussed from the standpoint of the Parimala. This seminal work belonging to the Bhāmatī tradition of Advaita Vedānta was composed in the sixteenth century by the polymath Appaya Dīk?ita. In the context of discussing various theories of illusion, Dīk?ita dwells upon the Nyāya theory of anyathākhyāti, and its connection with jñānalak?a?apratyāsatti as a causal factor for perception, and closely examines if such an extraordinary (alaukika) perception is tenable to explain illusory perception. He then proceeds to point out the deficiencies of this model and thereby brings to the fore the anirvacanīyakhyāti of Advaitins as the only theory which stands scrutiny.     

Studies in Dhāraṇī Literature I: Revisiting the Meaning of the Term <Emphasis Type="Italic">Dhāraṇī</Emphasis>

The Mahāyāna Buddhist term dhāraṇī has been understood to be problematic since the mid-nineteenth century, when it was often translated as “magical phrase” or “magical formula” and was considered to be emblematic of tantric Buddhism. The situation improved in contributions by Bernhard, Lamotte and Braarvig, and the latter two suggested the translation be “memory,” but this remained difficult in many environments. This paper argues that dhāraṇī is a function term denoting “codes/coding,” so that the category dhāraṇī is polysemic and context-sensitive. After reviewing Western scholarship, the article discusses dhāraṇī semantic values and issues of synonymy, the early applications of mantras, the sonic/graphic background of coding in India extended into Buddhist applications, and the soteriological ideology of dhāraṇīs along with some of its many varieties.     

Locating Humour in Indian Buddhist Monastic Law Codes: A Comparative Approach

It has been claimed that Indian Buddhism, as opposed to East Asian Chan/Zen traditions, was somehow against humour. In this paper I contend that humour is discernible in canonical Indian Buddhist texts, particularly in Indian Buddhist monastic law codes (Vinaya). I will attempt to establish that what we find in these texts sometimes is not only humourous but that it is intentionally so. I approach this topic by comparing different versions of the same narratives preserved in Indian Buddhist monastic law codes. This is a revised version of a paper presented at the XVth Congress of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, Atlanta, Georgia, USA, June 23-29, 2008. I wish to acknowledge financial assistance from the Arts Research Board, McMaster University.     

The Descent of Power: Possession,Mysticism, and Initiation in the Śaiva Theology of Abhinavagupta

This paper surveys the key terms śaktipāta and samāveśa (both of which refer to religious experience) in the primary sources of Tantric Śaivism over several centuries of textual development, building up a theory as to their range of meanings. It specifically focuses on their usage by Abhinavagupta (Kāshmīr, 10th century) by presenting a complete translation of chapter 11 of his Tantrasāra. The paper thus serves to (a) illuminate the nature of spiritual experience and the qualifcations for religious praxis in Śaivism, (b) give insight into the worldview of the Tantric Śaivas, and (c) help in pinpointing a specific and significant issue in the phenomenological study of religion generally. An earlier version of this paper has been published in a somewhat different form in Evam: Forum on Indian Representations vol. 4, published by Samvad India, New Delhi, India. This paper could not have been written without two years of intensive study with Professor Alexis Sanderson of All Souls College, Oxford, whose scholarship has proved essential in advancing my understanding of Śaivism. Also very helpful was Dr. Somadeva Vasudeva, now of Columbia University, whose database and encyclopedic knowledge have been invaluable. The germ of the idea for this article was suggested to me when Professor Paul Muller-Ortega (University of Rochester) first pointed out to me the passage beginning at MVT 2.14.     

The Problem with Pretending: Rāmānuja’s Arguments Against <Emphasis Type="Italic">Jīvanmukti</Emphasis>

In his Brahmasūtrabhāṣya 1.1.4, Rāmānuja argues that the knowledge of the liberated person precludes ignorance and its effects, and therefore precludes the possibility of jīvanmukti (embodied liberation). The Advaitin replies that the knowledge of the liberated is consistent with a certain kind of karma that prolongs embodiment, hence jīvanmukti is possible. In his Bhagavadgītābhāṣya 2.12, however, Rāmānuja points out that even if the jīvanmukta (embodied liberated person) still experiences appearances, he does not count them as reasons for acting, and therefore does not act. Hence Rāmānuja’s objection to jīvanmukti is both conceptual and practical, and it is the practical problem that is the more difficult to resolve.     

Knowledge of Brahman as a solution to fear in the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa/Br̥hadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad

In The Varieties of Religious Experience, William James suggests that the human experience of a fundamental and existential uneasiness can be found at the core of most religious traditions, and that these traditions constiute essentially a proposed solution to this uneasiness. The present investigation focuses upon the notion of uneasiness, particularly fear, and its solution in the early Hindu tradition. Through a close examination of textual expressions of both desire and fear from the R̥gveda, the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, and the Br̥hadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, it is proposed that “liberation” in the early Upaniṣadic period, or at least the precursor to the traditional notion of liberation, actually meant freedom from fear, rather than freedom from karma or saṁs̥ra. The Br̥hadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad suggests that the origin of duality is desire, and duality necessarily results in fear. By relinquishing the sorts of desires so frequently expressed in the earlier vedic literature, together with an understanding of the essentially non-dual relationship between the ātman and brahman, a state of complete freedom from fear (abhaya) may be achieved.     

Unraveling the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Kāvyaprakāśa</Emphasis>: Jayadeva Pīyūṣavarṣa’s idiosyncratic sequence of topics in the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Candrāloka</Emphasis>

In his twelfth century alaṃkāraśāstra, the Candrāloka, Jayadeva Pīyūṣavarṣa reverses the sequence of topics found in Mammaṭa’s Kāvyapr-akāśa, an earlier and immensely popular work. With such a structural revisionism, Jayadeva asserts the autonomy of his own work and puts forth an ambitious critique of earlier approaches to literary analysis. Jayadeva investigates the technical and aesthetic components of poetry in the first part of the Candrāloka, prior to his formal semantic investigations in the latter half of the text, thus suggesting that aesthetic evaluations of poetry beneficially inform scientific investigations of language. Jayadeva’s organization of his chapters on the semantic operations, moreover, intimates that the study of suggestive and metaphoric functions of language clarifies our understanding of denotation, which is conventionally understood to be the primary and direct path of verbal designation.     

Illumination,Imagination, Creativity: Rājaśekhara,Kuntaka, and Jagannātha on <Emphasis Type="Italic">Pratibhā</Emphasis>

Sanskrit poeticians make the visionary faculty of pratibhā a necessary part of the professional poet’s make-up. The term has a pre-history in Bhartṛhari’s linguistic metaphysics, where it is used to explain the unitary perception of meaning. This essay examines the relation between pratibhā and possible theories of the imagination, with a focus on three unusual theoreticians—Rājaśekhara, Kuntaka, and Jagannātha Paṇḍita. Rājaśekhara offers an analysis of pratibhā that is heavily interactive, requiring the discerning presence of the bhāvaka listener or critic; he also positions pratibhā in relation to Bildung (vyutpatti) and practice. For Kuntaka, pratibhā, never an ex nihilo creation by a poet, serves as the basis for the peculiar forms of intensified insight and experience that constitute poetry; these may also involve the creative scrambling and re-articulation of the object in terms of its systemic composition. At times, Kuntaka’s pratibhā comes close to a strong notion of imaginative process. But the full-fledged thematization of the imagination, and of pratibhā as its support and mechanism, is best seen in the seventeenth-century debates preserved for us by Jagannātha. A link is suggested between the discourse of poetic imagination in Jagannātha and similar themes that turn up in Indo-Persian poets such as Bedil.     

Gender at Janaka’s Court: Women in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad Reconsidered

The female characters in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad have generally been interpreted by scholars in two opposing fashions: as fictional characters whose historicity can be dismissed or as representative of actual women in ancient India. Both of these interpretations, however, overlook the literary elements of this text and the role that these female characters play within the larger philosophical debate. This paper is an analysis of the various women who appear in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka and their role in this text. Close attention is paid to their characterizations, their relationship to the doctrine discussed, and their functions in the larger narrative structure. The paper concludes with a discussion about the relationship of narrative to history and fundamental problems with the “woman question” based on this text.     

Monks Who Have Sex: Pārājika Penance in Indian Buddhist Monasticisms

In the study of Buddhism it is commonly accepted that a monk or nun who commits a pārājika offence is permanently and irrevocably expelled from the Buddhist monastic order. This view is based primarily on readings of the Pāli Vinaya. With the exception of the Pāli Vinaya, however, all other extant Buddhist monastic law codes (Dharmaguptaka, Mahāsāṅghika, Mahīśāsaka, Sarvāstivāda and Mūlasarvāstivāda) contain detailed provisions for monks and nuns who commit pārājikas but nevertheless wish to remain within the saṅgha. These monastics are not expelled. Rather, they are granted a special status known as the śikṣādattaka. In this paper I explore the rules. concerning pārājika penance and the śikṣādattaka with specific regard to monastic celibacy. Given that five out of six extant law codes recognise this remarkable accommodation to the rule of celibacy, I argue that we must look to Vinayas other than the Pāli Vinaya if we are to arrive at a nuanced and representative view of Indian Buddhist monasticism.

Grant me chastity and continence, but not yet. Augustine of Hippo (354–430 C.E.)

     

The Tiruttoṇṭar Tiruvantāti of Nampi Āṇṭār Nampi

This paper presents an English translation from the original Tamil of the canonical Saivite hagiographical work, the Tiruttoṇṭar Tiruvantāti of Nampi Āṇṭār Nampi. The date of this work is disputed, but it was probably composed at some point between 870 and 1118 CE. This classical Tamil poem gives in summary form the lives of the sixty three Saivite saints of the sixth to ninth centuries known as the Nāyaṉmār, or Tiruttoṇṭar (“holy servants”, sc. of the Lord Siva). The paper also includes an Introduction, setting out the context of the poem and its place in the Saivite literary tradition from which the Saiva Siddhanta philosophy subsequently developed, and Notes which explain the mythological and other references which the poem contains.     

Bhartṛhari and Maṇḍana on Avidyā

The concept of avidyā is one of the central categories in the Advaita of Śaṇkara and Maṇḍana. Shifting the focus from māyā, interpreted either as illusion or as the divine power, this concept brings ignorance to the forefront in describing duality and bondage. Although all Advaitins accept avidyā as a category, its scope and nature is interpreted in multiple ways. Key elements in Maṇḍana’s philosophy include the plurality of avidyā, individual selves as its substrate and the Brahman as its field (viṣaya), and the distinction in avidyā between non-apprehension and misapprehension. A closer investigation shows that Maṇḍana is directly influenced by Bhartṛhari’s linguistic non-dualism in developing the concept of avidyā. This study also compares other key constituents such as vivartta and pariṇāma that are relevant to the analysis of avidyā. As the concept of counter-image (pratibimba) emerges as a distinct stream of Advaita subsequent to Maṇḍana, this study also compares the application of pratibimba in the writings of Bhartṛhari and Maṇḍana.     

The Realism of Universals in Plato and Nyāya

It has become commonplace in introductions to Indian philosophy to construe Plato’s discussion of forms (εἶδος/ἰδέα) and the treatment in Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika of universals (sāmānya/jāti) as addressing the same philosophical issue, albeit in somewhat different ways. While such a comparison of the similarities and differences has interest and value as an initial reconnaissance of what each says about common properties, an examination of the roles that universals play in the rest of their philosophical enquiries vitiates this commonplace. This paper draws upon the primary texts to identify the following metaphysical, epistemological, semantic and soteriological roles that universals play in the philosophy of Plato and of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika:

Metaphysical: causal of the existence of x Metaphysical: constitutive of the identity/essence of x Epistemological: cognitively causal (i.e. of the cognition of one over many) Epistemological: epistemically causal (i.e. of knowledge of x) Semantic: necessary condition of speech and reason Epistemological: vindicatory of induction (Nyāya only) Metaphysical: explanatory of causation (Nyāya only) Soteriological: cathartic contemplation (Plato only)

These roles provide us with motivations or reasons to believe that universals exist. As we examine these motivations, we find pressures mounting against our assimilating Platonic forms and the universals of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika in the discourse about common properties. It is especially when we appreciate the utterly different contribution that universals make in securing our highest welfare that we realize how Plato and the two sister schools are not so much talking somewhat differently about the same thing, but talking somewhat similarly about different things. This better understanding of this difference in these philosophies opens a route for our better understanding of their unique contributions in the ongoing dialogue of philosophy.