布卢姆儿童智力发展曲线的由来及证伪

本研究通过严密细致的模拟实验来评价布卢姆的儿童智力发展曲线。结果表明：由于人的智力发展在很大程度上是非随机的过程,安德生的以随机实验为根据的重叠公式不适合用于计算机的智力发展,因此,以安德生的重叠公式为根据的布卢姆的智力发展曲线从本质上说是错误的。     

论我国基因信息不知情权的确立

基因信息对健康状况具有强烈的预测性,出于诸种原因当事人未必想知晓基因信息.为充分尊重自我决定权,比较法上承认权利人享有基因信息不知情权.基因信息不知情权指权利人有权预先决定是否接受基因信息的披露,其核心要义为“知情拒绝权”.基因信息不知情权旨在保障权利人对基因信息的自主控制,在我国隐私权与个人信息区分规制的立法模式下,...     

Rectification of the Register – Prospective or Retrospective?

In Gold Harp v MacLeod the Court of Appeal considered paragraph 8 of Schedule 4 of the Land Registration Act 2002 and interpreted this provision to mean that the priority between mistakenly de‐registered interests and registered interests can be altered following rectification. The court can give the de‐registered interest the priority which it ‘would have had’ but for the mistake. In other words, it allows for retrospective rectification. This case note concludes that this is the correct interpretation of paragraph 8 and of the words ‘for the future’. However, it argues that the current range of options available to the court in terms of rectification are producing uncertainty, and that a better approach may be to rely on the priority provisions in sections 28 and 29.     

论制定专门的行政改革推进法——行政改革法治化的一条崭新进路

在学界，行政改革法治化问题通常采用一种“法制跟追式”的研究追路。但是这种思路具有天然的缺陷，它无法化解行政改革面临的正当性危机，也无益于行政法治的耩建，因此有必要在科学发展观的指引下转换思路。在行政改革的条件下谋求法律规范的确定性与适应性的动态和谐，最优选择是制定专门的《行政改革推进法》，以一种整体性的推进机制来引领、规范和保障行政改革的正常进行。     

论“署名权”应改为“保护作者身份权”

我国现行著作权法中规定的"署名权,即表明作者身份,在作品上署名的权利"与我国著作权法第三次修订草案送审稿中曾拟定的"署名权,即决定是否表明作者身份以及如何表明作者身份的权利"的表述,都以偏概全,名不副实。其实署名权是表明作者身份权的下位概念,表明作者身份权又是保护作者身份权的下位概念。建议在我国著作权法第三次修改中,将"署名权"改为"主张作者身份和反对损害作者身份的权利"的保护作者身份权。我国著作权法中的著作人身权应当由保护作者身份权、保护作品完整权与发表权共同构成。     

论监督型民事抗诉制度的回归及路线

我国民事抗诉制度始终身处救济型的定位,既有悖于检察机关的法律监督者身份,也使抗诉的现实功用一路下滑,终至角色尴尬、权能虚化的境地。为从根本上逆转这一颓势,改革应以监督型抗诉替代救济型抗诉为基本方向,实施策略则是在纯粹的法律监督导向下重塑抗诉制度。如此,抗诉的事由首先将被限于程序违法和国家利益、社会公共利益受损;其后,检察机关理当自主地行使监督权,拥有独立提起抗诉和迳行启动再审审理的能力和权力;最后,检察机关的参与造成了再审审理的对象及主体结构上的特殊,有必要另设与之相宜的独立抗诉再审程序。     

A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) About the "Costs" of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of "Lost" Arrests

The controversy over a "good faith mistake" exception to the exclusionary rule and the 1982 National Institute of Justice study of the effects of the rule in California have focused attention on the "costs" of the rule. This article reviews the NIJ study and seven other relevant studies and concludes that the NIJ study's claim that the rule has a "major impact" on the disposition of felony arrests is misleading and exaggerated. California data show that prosecutors reject only 0.8% (8 in 1,000) of felony arrests because of illegal searches. The effect of the rule is concentrated in drug cases in which the rejection rate by prosecutors is 2.4% (not 30%, as suggested by the NIJ study), but the rejection rate for non-drug arrests is less than 0.3%, and the rate is even lower for violent crimes. Even if one looks at the cumulative effect of the rule through all stages of the felony process in California, only about 2.35% of felony arrests are lost because of illegal searches, and this is a high-side estimate based on potentially atypical samples. Moreover, studies of "lost arrests" have not differentiated between arrests resulting from bona fide crime investigations and arrests that resulted from arbitrary searches or arrests that were made to seize contraband, for harassment, or for purposes other than obtaining a conviction. The author concludes that available data show the cost of the rule is marginal, especially in view of the ambiguous nature of the lost arrests. Moreover, it is doubtful that a good faith mistake exception would save any substantial proportion of the arrests lost following illegal searches. In particular, an exception for searches conducted under an improper warrant would save only a negligible proportion of lost arrests.     

Improving the Comprehensibility of a Canadian Police Caution on the Right to Silence

Modifications to a Canadian police caution on the right to silence were made in an attempt to increase its comprehensibility. University participants were asked to imagine themselves in an arrest and interrogation situation in which they were either innocent or guilty. It was hypothesized that participants who received the modified caution would score significantly higher on measures of comprehension than those who received the standard caution. Results indicated that comprehension was significantly higher among those that received the modified caution and that those with higher comprehension scores were more likely to exercise their right to silence. These findings suggest that clarifying and standardizing how a detainee’s rights are communicated will lead to better comprehension and greater protection against false or coerced confessions.     

Trial and Error at the End of Life--No Harm Done?

English law gives the competent patient the right to refuselife-saving medical treatment, either contemporaneously or inan advance directive, and a physician commits a battery whentreating a patient who validly refused treatment. However, withregard to the details of a physician's liability, many questionsremain unanswered, and it is not at all clear under what circumstancesa patient's tort action for unwanted life-saving treatment willsucceed, and what remedies would be available to the patient.The article suggests that a physician should be liable in batteryfor administering life-saving treatment, even if he/she haddoubts about the validity of the patient's treatment refusal,unless a defence of reasonable mistake can be established. Furthermore,in case of a battery which resulted in keeping the patient alive,the patient should not only be able to claim nominal damages,but general and special damages, including mental and physicalpain and suffering caused by the prolongation of the patient'slife, should equally be available.     

Webster and the fundamental right to make medical decisions

Members of the American Medical Association, the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, American Academy of Pediatrics, American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, American Fertility Society, American Medical Women's Association, American Psychiatric Association, and the American Society of Human Genetics have submitted an "amici curiae" brief in support of the appellees of "Webster." The brief did not endorse or oppose the view that the state's interest in fetal health is compelling as fetal viability. Instead, the brief said that: 1) everybody has the right to make medical decisions without the state interfering "up to the point where the state's compelling interest arises;" and 2) even after a compelling interest comes up, state rules must go along with good medical practices. Because some provisions of the Missouri law were not consistent with good medical practice, these provisions were not constitutional. The fetal viability testing requirement would increase risks to the woman and fetus without providing substantial information on viability. The counseling ban would prevent doctors from giving necessary information to pregnant women so that they could make informed decisions. The 1st section of the brief discussed "the medical background of pregnancy and abortion." The earliest age at which a fetus can survive has remained unchanged since "Roe." The medical complications and adverse health effects are fewer from than from childbirth. Abortions have become safer. The brief said that the "right of privacy" is broad enough so that a woman could decide whether or not to end her pregnancy. In "Roe," the Court found that if a woman was going to make a choice about pregnancy, this was the same as other private decisions which are protected in the Constitution. Individual medical decision making is "deeply rooted" in US "history and tradition." Accepted principles are reflected in the fact that the patient has a right to make these decisions based on the "liberty component of the Due Process Clause." Section 188.029 of the Missouri Law would make a doctor do certain tests for fetal viability. They would have no medical value, in most cases, and put a risk on the health of the mother. It was not related to any goal of the state, and was, therefore, unconstitutional. Section 188-205 of Missouri law - which says a doctor can't consult unless the mother's life is endangered was also unconstitutional.     

Confronting Religion: Veiled Witnesses,the Right to a Fair Trial and the Supreme Court of Canada's Judgment in R v N.S.

The Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R v N.S. is significant because the majority seems to endorse an understanding of confrontation that assumes a defendant's right to a fair trial is imperilled by a witness who seeks to give evidence while wearing the niqab. The case is of interest because it permits reflection upon the interrelationship between the right to a fair trial and the right to confront witnesses enshrined in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Given that the European Court of Human Rights conceptualises confrontation in epistemic terms, it is argued that it would be unlikely to find that a conviction based upon evidence from a niqab‐wearing witness would infringe the right to a fair trial. This note examines the value of demeanour evidence and whether the majority in R v N.S. was correct that the abrogation of the ability to assess demeanour evidence necessarily undermines trial fairness.     

Foreword: can Glucksberg survive Lawrence? Another look at the end of life and personal autonomy

In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court declined to find a right to physician-assisted suicide ("PAS") in the Constitution. Not a single Justice dissented. One would expect such a ruling to be quite secure. But Lawrence v. Texas, holding that a state cannot make consensual homosexual conduct a crime, is not easy to reconcile with Glucksberg. Lawrence certainly takes a much more expansive view of substantive due process than did Glucksberg. It is conceivable that the five Justices who made up the Lawrence majority--all of whom still sit on the Court--might overrule Glucksberg. For various reasons, however, this seems improbable. Unlike the situation with respect to the pre-Lawrence era, Glucksberg does not stigmatize any politically vulnerable group. When there is no democratic defect in the political process, there is much to be said for courts deferring to reasonable legislative judgments. Moreover, unlike the developments preceding Lawrence, there has been no emerging awareness of a right or liberty to enlist the assistance of a physician in committing suicide. No state supreme court has found a right to PAS in its own state constitution. Nor, in the decade since Glucksberg, has any state legislature legalized PAS. And attempts have been made to do so in some twenty states. In addition, various considerations might cause a court to balk at constitutionalizing PAS for the terminally ill. Such a right is not easily cabined. If personal autonomy extends to the time and manner of one's death, why doesn't it also apply whenever a competent person believes that death is better than continued life? Once the right to PAS is grounded on self-determination or personal autonomy in controlling ones own life and death, it no longer seems plausible to limit it to the terminally ill. Why should people who have to endure pain, suffering, or indignity for a much longer time than the terminally ill (often defined as those with six months or less to live) be denied this right? The argument made by many proponents of PAS that the right to forgo medical treatment and the right to PAS are merely subcategories of the same broad right is not convincing. Most of the two million people who die every year in this country do so in hospitals and long-term care institutions and do so after a decision to forgo life-sustaining treatment has been made. If medical treatment could not be rejected, vast numbers of patients would be at the mercy of every technological advance. (For example, Nancy Cruzan could have been kept alive in her persistent vegetative state for thirty years.) Allowing a patient to die at some point is a practical condition upon the successful operation of medicine. The same can hardly be said of PAS.     

Right to die,euthanasia, and community sentiment

Three questions guide this research: Would nullifications occur in active euthanasia cases where the right to die is asserted? What sentiments would the community express, and how would those sentiments relate to nullifications? What variables would best predict verdict? Mock jurors offered reasons for their verdicts for four cases where all elements of first degree murder appeared to be satisfied. The cases varied thecompetency of the patient, theintent of the patient—if the wish to die was expressed, and whether a living will was present, and whether the defendant soughtcourt approval. Sizable nullifications (25% not guilty verdicts) and partial nullifications (39% guilty to lesser offenses) resulted. Some subjects viewed this as not a legal matter, but a private matter; others acknowledged the law's place, but viewed the law's position as wrong; still others nullified by using a common sense rather than a legal definition ofmalice. In this life-and-death matter, black letter law and common sense justice were not only far apart, but, in the eyes of some, irreconcilably so.     

简析《物权法》不动产登记机关的赔偿责任

《物权法》规定,房地产登记机关囚登记错误,给他人造成损害的,登记机构应当承担赔偿责任。但适并没有具体说明申请程序,责任性质和对损害赔偿的责任标准。就这些问题,笔者提出了一些的意见。登记机关如果登记错误,登记的权利状态不符合申请人提交的申请材料中的所请求的状态。审查的准则包括正式审查的立法和实质性审查。对损害赔偿责任的确定应取决于赔偿责任的构成要素,包括的主要内容和行为因素,此赔偿责任的标准应适用过错责任的原则。     

人类基因财产权的确立——争议和实践

理论和实践界关于人类基因财产权存在一定争议。实质保障人的自由意志,真正体现人格尊严,是对人类基因确立财产权的道德和法理依据。对基因财产权的确立,可以促进生物科技的发展,最终造福于人类。建立人类基因财产权,从法制角度,需要在立法、司法领域明确权利内容和权利实现方式。在法制相对不健全的情形下,私人主体的契约安排是合理的补充和救济方式,具有重要的实践意义。     

Litigating life and death.

In cases involving the "right to die," courts are faced with the agonizing task of developing legal standards governing termination of an incompetent patient's medical treatment. In this Article, Professor Rhoden criticizes the two dominant approaches courts have developed--the "subjective" and "objective" tests--and proposes that these standards be abandoned for a legal presumption in favor of family decisionmaking. She maintains that the "subjective" test, which requires the family to provide clear proof that termination of treatment is what the incompetent would have chosen, is often unworkable because a patient's character traits, and even her prior statements about medical treatment, seldom rise to the evidentiary level that courts purport to require. Similarly, she argues that the "objective" test, which requires the family to prove that the burdens of the patient's life, measured in terms of pain and suffering, clearly and markedly outweight its benefits, dehumanizes patients by suggesting that only their present, physical sensations count. Professor Rhoden suggests that the subjective and objective tests are not nearly as distinct as courts have made them. She argues that the rigidity of these legal standards reflects courts' acceptance of the medical profession's presumption in favor of continued treatment, a presumption that places a heavy burden on families seeking to terminate treatment. Drawing on the special qualifications of families as decisionmakers in such cases, Professor Rhoden proposes that courts recognize a presumptive right of families to exercise discretion over treatment decisions. Such a standard would recognize that, although doctors and others can readily prove that terminating the treatment of a patient who can still enjoy life is wrong, it is very hard for families to meet the current standards, which essentially require them to prove that termination is right.     

Movement Litigation and Unilateral Disarmament: Abortion and the Right to Die

Detractors have long criticized the use of courts to achieve social change because judicial victories tend to provoke counterproductive political backlashes. Backlash arguments typically assert or imply that if movement litigators had relied on democratic rather than judicial politics, their policy victories would have been better insulated from opposition. We argue that these accounts wrongly assume that the unilateral decision by a group of movement advocates to eschew litigation will lead to a reduced role for courts in resolving the relevant policy and political conflicts. To the contrary, such decisions will often result in a policy field with judges every bit as active, but with the legal challenges initiated and framed by the advocates' opponents. We document this claim and explore its implications for constitutional politics via a counterfactual thought experiment rooted in historical case studies of litigation involving abortion and the right to die.     

民族自治地方政府推行开放式决策的路径

民族自治地方政府重大事项决策需要由"封闭式决策"转向"开放式决策",这既是保障广大少数民族地区群众的知情权、参与权、表达权、监督权的需要,更是民族自治地方政府实现决策民主化、科学化和法治化的必由之路。要在民族自治地方成功推行开放式决策,一方面要借鉴发达地区成功的决策经验,另一方面要结合本民族地区的实际,探索适合民族自治地方政府的开放式决策之路。     

“三权分置”下土地经营权的物权塑造

农村土地"三权分置"的目标是构建新型农业经营体系,发展适度规模经营。为此,须对土地经营权进行物权塑造。其途径是在土地承包经营权之上,通过合同与登记创设"次级土地承包经营权"。次级土地承包经营权在物权法定意义上仍然是一种"土地承包经营权",权利人对土地享有占有、使用和收益的权利,可将该权利设定抵押或作其他法律处分。根据《不动产登记暂行条例》,应将次级土地承包经营权纳入"法律规定需要登记的其他不动产权利",作为土地承包经营权的负担在登记簿中加以记载,并颁发不动产权属证书。     

The right to die: state courts lead where legislatures fear to tread

The right to die may be among the most legally complex and culturally sensitive areas of civil rights to emerge in our time. The thorny issues associated with a terminally ill individual's right to self-determination, and the disposition of individuals who are incompetent to make right to die decisions for themselves, promises to keep all parties involved - health care professionals, medical ethicists, families, lawyers, judges, and state legislators -busy for some time to come. To this point, the state courts have taken the lead in the right to die debate, while the state legislatures have tended to drag their collective feet. This article lays the case law groundwork for right to die decision making, then goes on to assay the legislative responses to the issue that have been rendered in the fifty states.