British Policy and the Ruhr Crisis 1922-24

This article provides an overview of British policy during a defining episode in the interwar period — the Ruhr crisis of 1923-4. The author assesses the external considerations influencing Britain's policy (especially the roles of France, Germany, and the United States), and also explores the processes of foreign policy making within Britain's complex bureaucratic system. In particular, the relationship between the Foreign Office and the Treasury is analyzed and its impact on European policy assessed. The article challenges traditional views of British policy at this time, concluding that it was far more complex, but also far more limited and constrained, than previous studies would suggest.     

'Far too dangerous a gamble'?1 British intelligence and policy during the Chanak crisis, September-October 1922

In considering the role of intelligence in the events that culminated in the 1922 Chanak crisis, particular attention is given to the extent to which intelligence assessments of Turkish Nationalist troop strengths influenced British decisions. Key political figures included Lloyd George, Lord Curzon, Winston Chuchill, and Austen Chamberlain, as well as military officers such as General Harington and Admiral Brock, and the diplomat Sir Horace Rumbold. It concludes that the final armistice, signed at Mudania, met British objectives, but only after running too high a risk.¹Harington to Maurice, 8 Jan. 1923, 23 April 1923, Maurice 3/2.     

The British consulate-general in Hanoi, 1954-73

Traditionally, there has been a rigid distinction made between British consular and diplomatic missions abroad: the former is concerned largely with trade, visas and the more mundane tasks of foreign representation, while the latter deals with the glamorous political world of interstate relationships at the highest level. As a general rule of thumb this may be true, but in accepting unequivocally this notion one overlooks those instances where a significant political role has been played by consulates. This article examines one such instance and in doing so raises questions relating to diplomatic and consular relations, disguised embassies, political reporting and the importance of experienced onsite personnel.     

Separated by the Atlantic: The British and de Gaulle, 1958-1967

The British and French held divergent views from the late 1940s on relations with the United States and on the development of European integration. Differences between the two countries caused particular strain once General Charles de Gaulle returned to power in 1958. The clash that ensued between British and French policies towards the Atlantic Alliance and Europe during his presidency is the subject of this article. It suggests that while the British were unable to overcome de Gaulle's resistance to their membership of the EEC, Britain's fortunes in Europe were nevertheless improved by the Wilson government's response to de Gaulle's actions in the Atlantic Alliance.     

The peripatetic career structure of the British diplomatic establishment, 1919-39

The first part of this article examines the development of the career structure of the British diplomatic establishment after the reforms of 1919-20, arguing that the peripatetic career identified with the prewar Diplomatic Service became increasingly common for all members of the new amalgamated service between the two world wars. The average length of posting to an overseas mission or one of the geographical departments in London seldom exceeded three years or so. The second part of the article then speculates on the impact of the peripatetic career on the effectiveness of the British diplomatic establishment, suggesting that it had both postive and negative impacts.     

The peripatetic career structure of the British diplomatic establishment, 1919-39

The first part of this article examines the development of the career structure of the British diplomatic establishment after the reforms of 1919-20, arguing that the peripatetic career identified with the prewar Diplomatic Service became increasingly common for all members of the new amalgamated service between the two world wars. The average length of posting to an overseas mission or one of the geographical departments in London seldom exceeded three years or so. The second part of the article then speculates on the impact of the peripatetic career on the effectiveness of the British diplomatic establishment, suggesting that it had both postive and negative impacts.     

The Danzig Question in British Foreign Policy, 1918-1920

Among the many and often bitter territorial disputes following the collapse of Germany and Russia in Central and Eastern Europe — to mention only the questions of Vilna, Memel, Teschen, or Lemberg — the problem of the Polish sea access was particularly explosive and became the most vexing territorial problem of the whole conference. This paper examines the question of Danzig and the lower Vistula within the context of contradicting Polish, German and Western, mainly British ambitions and preferences. The author shows that the proclamation of the Free City of Danzig and the creation of the Polish Corridor, dividing Germany into two parts, was a compromise not liked in Warsaw and Berlin and one the British, always fearing fatal repercussions to future stability, only considered to be the lesser choice of evils.     

Eisenhower, the British and the security of Hong Kong, 1953-60

This article is an examination of Hong Kong's importance within British-American security arrangements in the Far East during the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower. Archival evidence indicates that the Eisenhower Administration accepted a greater deal of commitment to the defence of Hong Kong during the 1950s — a period of significant hostility between the United States and the People's Republic of China. To understand this policy evolution in the broader context, this study evaluates the differences in British and American attitudes towards China during the 1950s and the effect of this on US policy towards Hong Kong.     

Heirs of the King-Makers: The British Embassy in Athens, 1951-61

This article examines the role and position of the British Embassy in Athens, as a test case of a diplomatic mission facing strains because of a bitter regional dispute, the Cyprus crisis. In the mid-1950s Whitehall decided that the retention of Cyprus was necessary for British policy in the Middle East, even at the cost of sacrificing relations with Greece. Thus the Embassy's recommendations were constantly being ignored in Whitehall, while its relations with the Greek authorities were growing worse. After 1957, the new Ambassador, Sir Roger Allen, focused on British cultural influence and on Britain's role in tying Greece more solidly to the West. The 1959 Cyprus settlement and the 1961 visit of the Greek Prime Minister to London marked the most important successes of this more flexible approach.     

The British government and the sale of arms to the lesser European powers, 1936-39

This article considers sales of British arms in the prelude to the Second World War, during the end of last Baldwin government, and the Chamberlain government, which had political as well as commercial motivations. Particular attention is paid to the leading British arms manufacturer, Vickers-Armstrong, and sales to Portugal, Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Poland. There was often a concern that a failure to procure British arms would lead countries to turn to Germany and Italy. The interest in meeting these requests often conflicted with growing domestic defence needs for the same equipment. The conclusion is drawn that Britain ultimately failed to inspire potential allies with sufficient confidence to commit themselves to Britain.     

The British government and the sale of arms to the lesser European powers, 1936-39

For much of the nineteenth century, Canadian education-related international activities resided outside the realm of traditional diplomacy. This situation was exacerbated by Canada's colonial link with Great Britain. Obstacles that prevented educationalists from playing a more substantive role in diplomacy were local, imperial, and ecclesiastical in origin. Educational activities were also a tool in the service of governments in the era between the zenith of British Imperialism in the 1890s and the founding of the United Nations in 1945. In the post-1945 era there was greater collaboration between the federal Ministry of External Affairs and provincial ministries of education. Education also emerged in the late twentieth century as part of the new diplomacy. A flowering of new international governmental organizations dedicated to furthering creative diplomacy brought new energy to this field.     

Invading Europe: The British army and its preparations for the Normandy campaign, 1942-44

Some scholars claim that collective security always fails. This article analyses a case where it succeeded. When Belgians rebelled against Dutch rule in the early 1830s, all five great powers agreed no fewer than four times to threaten or to use force against one or both sides. Why? Drawing extensively on diplomatic correspondence from Austrian, German and Russian archives, I show that the Concert of Europe functioned as a security regime, helping the powers to agree. Great power consensus broke down when Britain and France imposed a peace settlement on the Dutch in 1832. Yet the Belgian case—like Iraq's 1991 expulsion from Kuwait—shows that collective security can sometimes succeed against cross-border aggression.     

British and Italian Imperial Rivalry in the Mediterranean, 1912-14: The Case of Egypt

Although it is known that serious imperial rivalry between Britain and Italy in the Mediterranean only began in the Fascist period, this article argues that Italian expansionism had already begun to pose a threat to British interests in the Mediterranean in 1912 following Italy's colonization of Libya. While the Italian state was still militarily and financially weak at this time, an Italian private financial institution, the Banco di Roma, engaged in a number of ventures in Egypt that led to complications in state-to-state relations. The article shows that the seeds of Anglo-Italian antagonism were sown in the hostile climate of the Egyptian-Libyan border through a series of incidents in the period between 1912 and 1914.