Germany and the Eurozone Crisis: Between Hegemony and Domestic Politics

This paper explores Germany’s centrality to the outcome of the eurozone crisis. It argues that the eurozone crisis has led Germany’s ordo-liberal principles to trump its other longstanding commitment – i.e. to European integration. These two principles are explored in order then to shed light on how they have played out during the crisis. German centrality has created high expectations for it to provide leadership. Exploring hegemony conceptually and in practice, it is argued that international legitimacy and increasing domestic constraints have limited a leadership role. Indeed, it is argued that it is the domestic political situation that explains why ordo-liberalism has trumped pro-Europeanism. Ordo-liberal emphasis on stability culture has provided a valuable strategic resource for securing German objectives within the eurozone while satisfying the requirements of domestic politics.     

The Role of Experts in the European Union's Research Policy

This research analyzes the role of experts in the European Union's policy‐making process. Focusing on the field of research policy, this study seeks to probe how expert participation in the Open Method of Coordination informs policy decisions. The paper reports on an analysis of the expert group in the European Internationalization Strategy in Science and Technology. Our analysis reveals the dynamics of expert participation at the micro level, as it identifies who these experts are, how they are appointed, and in what ways expert knowledge gets used in policy making.     

The Eurozone crisis and the European corporate elite: bringing corporate actors into focus

This paper uses a framework referred to as the ‘corporate reconstruction of European capitalism theory of integration’ to analyse the European Union’s response to the Eurozone crisis. Most political economy analyses of the Eurozone crisis have focused on political leaders, clashes between creditor and debtor member states and public opinions in analysing the handling of the crisis. This paper focuses instead on the input of corporate actors. It is argued that both the setting up of the European Monetary Union (EMU) and the handling of its crisis were congenial to corporate preferences. Europe’s nascent corporate elite was concerned with eliminating currency risk when the EMU was set up and therefore did not push for fiscal federalism. When the flawed architecture of the Eurozone transformed that currency risk into sovereign credit risk, corporate preferences adapted and now favoured fiscal liability pooling and ultimately the setting up of a fiscal union.     

Lack of European Identity and the Failure of the Eurozone

Since late 2007, the Eurozone has been embroiled in a crisis that has seen GDP per capita stagnate, public debt soar, and unemployment reach record levels. This article argues that the Eurozone crisis will inevitably force fundamental changes in the structure of the EU. The only way to make the Eurozone work is through deeper fiscal integration of Eurozone economies. Yet wholesale fiscal integration cannot be achieved in the near term, due to the fact that EU citizens continue to identify more with their own nationalities than with Europe as a whole. The Eurozone economies of southern Europe will, therefore, continue to flounder, leading to further anti‐EU sentiment. Anti‐EU sentiment may eventually increase up to the point where one or all of these countries leave the Eurozone or the EU altogether. These propositions are supported with arguments from economic theory, and are bolstered by evidence from surveys and opinion polls.     

Mission Evolution: The United States Forest Service's Response to Crisis

After a long history as a bureaucratic success story, the United States Forest Service (USFS) found itself embroiled in crisis beginning in the late 1980s. This study examines the factors that led up to the crisis, arguing that the agency had become captured by its own core technologies. Historically, the USFS was successful in adapting to changes in its environment by employing its traditional management procedures. However, attempting to incorporate the northern spotted owl issue with its traditional core technologies threw the subsystem into crisis, during which the agency lost control over its management activities. Today, the USFS is attempting to adapt to the changes brought about by the political conflict of the era.     

A Conservative Revolution: The Electoral Response to Economic Crisis in Ireland

Abstract

The 2011 election in Ireland was one of the most dramatic elections in European post-war history in terms of net electoral volatility. In some respects the election overturned the traditional party system. Yet it was a conservative revolution, one in which the main players remained the same, and the switch in the major government party was merely one in which one centre-right party replaced another. Comparing voting behaviour over the last three elections we show that the 2011 election looks much like that of 2002 and 2007. The crisis did not result in the redefinition of the electoral landscape. While we find clear evidence of economic voting at the 2011 election, issue voting remained weak. We believe that this is due to the fact that parties have not offered clear policy alternatives to the electorate in the recent past and did not do so in 2011.     

The European Parliament and the Commission Crisis: A New Assertiveness?

This article examines two claims made about the "Commission crisis" of 1999: first, that the accountability of the Commission to the European Parliament (EP) was significantly increased; and, second, that the model of parliamentary government in the European Union (EU) was advanced by events in 1999. In analyzing the crisis and its consequences, this article focuses upon the powers of dismissal and appointment, and what these powers reveal about the capacity of the EP both to hold the Commission responsible for its collective and individual actions and to influence its policy agenda. If a parliamentary model is to develop in the EU, the negative parliamentary powers of censure and dismissal have to be balanced by the positive powers of appointment and enhanced executive responsiveness. On both counts—dismissal and appointment—the 1999 "Commission crisis" did not point to the clear and unambiguous dawning of a "genuine European parliamentary democracy."     

Border Controls as a Dimension of the European Union's Counter-Terrorism Policy: A Critical Assessment

This article critically examines the use and effectiveness of border controls in the European Union (EU)'s counter-terrorism policy. It shows that the EU has made substantial progress towards achieving the objectives that it had set for itself in this policy area, but has not managed to fulfil all of them, and certainly not by the deadlines originally set. It further argues that, contrary to their usual depiction in EU official documents, these border control measures make a limited contribution to the actual fight against terrorism, whilst having some negative effects. From that viewpoint, the fact that the EU has failed to meet all of its objectives in the use of border controls for counter-terrorist purposes may paradoxically be seen as a positive outcome.     

Second Thoughts on Europe's "Third Level": The European Union's Committee of the Regions

The Maastricht Treaty provided for a consultative Committeeof the Regions to bring the European Union's "third level" intothe deliberation of legislation. It began to operate in early1994. This article assesses its creation and recent activityagainst the expectations and demands that were expressed atthe outset, looking in turn at the representative, advisory,and symbolic functions the new body can perform. What emergesis a largely symbolic body that suffers from entrenched internaldivisions and functional overreach in the absence of any realinfluence on the Union's policymaking process. The danger isa downward spiral of progressive obscurity and the frustrationof its members' aspirations.     

Contested governance: The new repertoire of the Eurozone crisis

The austerity policies that EU policymakers adopted in response to the Eurozone crisis are often criticized as the product of institutionalized neoliberal ideas. This critique has merits, but tends to overlook institutional changes that do not neatly conform to well demarcated neoliberal ideas considered as “switchmen,” “paradigms,” or “blueprints.” This article offers an alternative reading of the Eurozone's institutional evolution that bridges pragmatist scholarship with cognitive and social psychology. The Eurozone crisis saw the emergence of a new and contested repertoire of governance. Policymakers agreed that “stronger governance” was necessary, but they struggled over how to perform that repertoire. This contest ultimately produced institutional changes that typically mixed austerity and unconventional policies. The advantage of thinking about ideas in terms of repertoires that actors perform is to afford a more granular view of institutions as sites of individual cognition, collective innovation, and political contestation.     

The State of American Federalism, 2001-2002: Resilience in Response to Crisis

The past year has been one of repeated shocks to governmentand the larger society. Terrorist attacks in New York City andWashington, D. C., the burst of the dot.com bubble in the stockmarket, a wave of corporate scandals, and a slowdown in theeconomy posed severe problems for officials of all governmentsin the federal system. The combined effects of the war on terrorismand the economic turmoil forced federal policymakers to createnew agencies and to enact new policies. State and local governmentsalso responded to the multiple shocks with a variety of initiatives,often independent of Washington. Instead of a move toward centralizationthat might have been predicted as a consequence of the seriousshocks, all elements of the American federal system demonstrateda capacity and energy to marshal resources in a time of urgency.     

The Radical Sources of the Crisis in West European Communist Parties

The wave of radicalism that swept through Europe from the late 1960s did not pass the communist parties by but struck them with particular force. Evidence of this impact can be found in a study of the social composition of congress delegates, and from recent accounts of the experiences of the communist parties during the 1970s. The story of this trauma over one decade requires us to rethink the notion of Eurocommunism. What emerges from such a reconsideration is a distinction between a process of modernization on which many communist parties have embarked in the post-war period, and particularly since 1956, and a 'new member' factor which characterized the radical surge of the 1970s. This 'new member' factor brought a new style of militancy into the communist parties which challenged their traditional norms. This radicalism raised the fortunes of the communist parties during the 1970s, but it also brought about the crisis of the end of the decade. Whilst it has been responsible for the destruction of the crisis period, it has also provided the ideas and the forces for possible new strategies.     

Preferences for International Redistribution: The Divide over the Eurozone Bailouts

Why do voters agree to bear the costs of bailing out other countries? Despite the prominence of public opinion in the ongoing debate over the eurozone bailouts, voters' preferences on the topic are poorly understood. We conduct the first systematic analysis of this issue using observational and experimental survey data from Germany, the country shouldering the largest share of the EU's financial rescue fund. Testing a range of theoretical explanations, we find that individuals' own economic standing has limited explanatory power in accounting for their position on the bailouts. In contrast, social dispositions such as altruism and cosmopolitanism robustly correlate with support for the bailouts. The results indicate that the divide in public opinion over the bailouts does not reflect distributive lines separating domestic winners and losers. Instead, the bailout debate is better understood as a foreign policy issue that pits economic nationalist sentiments versus greater cosmopolitan affinity and other‐regarding concerns.     

State‐Building and the European Union's Fight against Corruption in the Southern Caucasus: Why Legitimacy Matters

This article asks under which conditions the state‐building efforts of external actors in areas of limited statehood are likely to be effective. We argue that the legitimacy of the specific norms promoted by external actors among local actors is crucial for their success in strengthening state capacities. International efforts need to resonate with prevalent social norms. To substantiate this argument, we focus on the European Union's (EU) anticorruption programs and their implementation in one of the most corrupt regions in the world, the Southern Caucasus. We show that legitimacy can explain why the EU's fight against corruption helped reduce corruption in Georgia but not in Armenia. In both countries, political elites could selectively use anticorruption programs as an instrument against political opponents, using enhanced state capacities to stabilize the incumbent regime. Only in Georgia, however, was the fight against corruption facilitated by sustained domestic mobilization for anticorruption policies that added pressure on political elites “from below.”     

Crisis and Response: Treasury Cash Balance Crisis in Thailand 1980-1982

The author traces the treasury cash balance crisis in Thailand from 1980-1982 and finds that the crisis was a result of economic, political and technical factors. The world recession had a significant impact on revenues, as did the inability of the government to accurately project revenues. Politically, budget participants evaded prescribed procedures and resorted to emergency spending, which resulted in expenditures beyond budget planning. The Thai government resorted to borrowing, spending cuts, adjusting corporate tax payments and increasing taxes to cope with the crisis. The author calls for legal reforms to limit discretionary spending.