伊拉克权力移交面临挑战

伊拉克局势从4月份以来发生了重大变化,美军遭到逊尼派和什叶派激进武装力量大规模的武装反抗,反抗美军占领的武装冲突从费卢杰和纳杰夫两地很快蔓延到伊拉克许多城市,仅仅4月份一个月就导致约140人美军死亡,成千上万伊拉克平民死伤.     

The Plots that Failed: Intelligence Lessons Learned from Unsuccessful Terrorist Attacks Against the United States

While much of the focus of terrorism research is on successful terrorist attacks, the most significant lessons for terrorism prevention may come from examination of terrorist plots and attacks that do not succeed. This article analyzes 176 terrorist plots against American targets that have been thwarted or otherwise failed during the past 25 years. It considers what kinds of intelligence and security measures are most useful in counterterrorism, and argues that the conventional wisdom about why intelligence fails—because analysts and agencies are unable to “connect the dots”—is wrong. Most plots, especially domestic terrorist plots, are not foiled through imaginative analysis, but through conventional law enforcement efforts and aggressive domestic intelligence collection that reveal to authorities just what the plotters are up to.     

Terrorist sympathizers in The Netherlands

Abstract

The following remarks are excerpted from the 1987 Annual Conference on Domestic and International Terrorism sponsored by the Anti‐Defamation League of B'nai B'rith and the Leon and Marilyn Klinghoffer Foundation of the Anti‐Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, in cooperation with the Institute for Studies in International Terrorism at the State University of New York (SUNY) and the U.S. Global Strategy Council. The meeting was held on December 14, 1987 in Washington, D.C., and chaired by Professor Yonah Alexander of State University of New York and The George Washington University.     

Archetypal Terrorist Events in the United States

This research presents a typology of terrorist events rather than the more common typologies of terrorist groups and ideologies. Archetypal analysis, a quantitative methodology to identify pure types, was used with data in START's Global Terrorism Database to identify archetypal attacks in the United States. A set of seven archetypal events was identified including abortion bombings, poisonings, Aryan hate, hostage-taking, fire/bomb for damage, assassination, and the catastrophic Big Bad. These archetypes may be useful for training and exercising for events with additional potential value for developing theory of terrorist events.     

Methodological Triangulation in the Analysis of Terrorist Networks

The conceptualization of terrorist groups as networks is increasingly common to terrorism studies, although methods of analysis vary widely. Contrary to common understandings, the integration of computational and qualitative methods is possible even with limited (small-n) data. The triangulation of different methods can produce insights overlooked by the use of any single method and validate findings across methods. This article demonstrates some of the possibilities for integrating qualitative and quantitative methods for network analysis using Raffaello Pantucci's recent article, “The Tottenham Ayatollah and The Hook-Handed Cleric: An Examination of All Their Jihadi Children.”     

Challenges for Effective Counterterrorism Communication: Practitioner Insights and Policy Implications for Preventing Radicalization,Disrupting Attack Planning,and Mitigating Terrorist Attacks

Growing concerns about small-scale, low sophistication terrorist attacks, and the difficulties they present for security services, make public coproduction of security increasingly necessary. Communication to ensure that the public(s) is aware of the role they can play will be central to this. This article, based on interviews with thirty expert practitioners, explores challenges associated with communication designed to prevent radicalization, interdict attack planning and mitigate the impacts of a terrorist attack in the United Kingdom and Denmark. The interplay between these challenges and the contemporary terrorist context are analyzed, highlighting that new, or adapted, communications and approaches may be necessary.     

Strategic Change in Terrorist Movements: Lessons from Hamas

Existing literature is weak in explaining strategic change among terrorist movements, especially regarding the question of why these organizations often switch between contesting the external enemy, usually the government or the occupying power, and the internal arena in which they compete against fellow rebel groups. A rebel force facing diminishing returns from a formerly successful tactic with no equally effective tactical substitute in sight is likely to switch from conflict against a government to achieve dominance in the rebel camp. The terrorist movement will switch from the external to the internal arena even if such substitution compromises the overall goals of the rebel camp. The following article explores these dynamics in Hamas's strategy in the latest round of conflict between the movement and Israel.     

The Politics of Negotiating the Terrorist Problem in Indonesia

Although Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) is a pan-Southeast Asia jihadi network, it has been able to headquarter itself in Indonesia, where it has also been able to find the lion's share of its recruits. This article finds that there is little support for hardline Islamic political movements, or even violent jihadi groups, from the wider population. Yet at the same time the public is skeptical about the existence of an international terrorist problem. Not only is there general denial amongst the Indonesian population but Indonesia's political leaders have had to tread carefully on the issue. Indonesia has had a degree of success in denting the JI network but confronting terrorism on the whole is fraught with political difficultiesnotably the impression that the war on terrorism might be a plot to weaken the Islamic world.     

Influence in Terrorist Networks: From Undirected to Directed Graphs

A methodology for converting terrorist networks from undirected graphs to simplified directed graphs (or digraphs), and mapping the flow of influence in them, is described. It is based on an “influence assumption”—that important persons with more links influence less important persons with fewer links. This methodology, which was previously used to analyze the structure of influence relationships in Communist-bloc countries and the international system, is illustrated by its application to two terrorist networks constructed after 9/11. In the second more complex network, the hierarchy sheds light on the leadership and likely terrorist cells embedded in the network. Refined data and alternative assumptions about influence could provide additional insights into the structure of terrorist networks.     

Fatah al-Islam in Lebanon: Anatomy of a Terrorist Organization

The objective of this study is to provide through an in-depth investigation of the Fatah Al-Islam organization, emergence, programs, and external links, and the inner operation of this underground Salafi-jihadi group. By divulging secret confession statements to the public, it has uncovered many of the mysteries that surrounded the evolution and goals of the group. On the other hand, and more important, it has examined the application of certain conventional approaches to the study of terrorist behavior. The findings, based on the biographies of FI terrorists, seem to negate much of the advanced explanation about political violence. Economic destitution, poverty, lack of education, young age, and marital disruption for instances do not determine adherence to the group. Members of the jihadi group of FI stem from a diversified occupational background, not lacking in education, mature, married, and influenced by various motivations, specifically religious dogma.     

From Ocalan to Al Qaida: The Continuing Terrorist Threat in Turkey

The most recent terrorist attacks in Turkey suggest a new phase in the country's war against terrorist groups. Although the PKK has largely been neutralized as a major threat to internal stability, the continued existence of other militant organizations--particularly Islamist groups who appear to be cooperating with elements of al Qaida--suggests continued security problems for the government.‐