Real jurors' understanding of the law in real cases

A survey of 224 Michigan citizens called for jury duty over a 2-month period was conducted to assess the jurors' comprehension of the law they had been given in the judges' instructions. Citizens who served as jurors were compared with a base line of those who were called for duty but not selected to serve, and with those who served on different kinds of cases. Consistent with previous studies of mock jurors, this study found that actual jurors understand fewer than half of the instructions they receive at trial. Subjects who received judges' instructions performed significantly better than uninstructed subjects on questions about the procedural law, but no better on questions about the substantive (criminal) law. Additionally, jurors who asked for help from the judge understood the instructions better than other jurors. Since the results replicate previous research using simulated trials, this study provides evidence for the generalizability of earlier work to actual trials.     

Instructing jurors

This field experiment examines the advantages and disadvantages of two jury instruction procedures: instructing the jury prior to the evidence portion of the trial and providing the jury with a written copy of the judge's instructions to take with them to their deliberations. The presence or absence of both procedures was randomly assigned to 34 civil and 33 criminal trials in Wisconsin circuit courts. Following the trials, questionnaires were administered to judges, lawyers, and jurors. Overall, the findings do not provide any support for the hypotheses that written instructions would help the jurors to recall the judge's instructions, that they would increase the jurors' satisfaction with the trial, or that they would shorten the trial. The written copy did appear to reduce disputes among jurors about the judge's instructions. No evidence was found to support the notion that written instructions would reduce the amount of time that juries devoted to the evidence, that they would lengthen deliberations, or that they would place excessive demands on the resources of the court. The findings also did not support the hypotheses that preliminary instructions would assist the jurors with recall of the judge's instructions or the evidence, or that they would reduce juror confusion about the trial procedure, but did support the hypotheses that preliminary instructions would assist the jurors with following legal guidelines in their decision making and would increase the jurors' satisfaction with the trial process. No evidence was found to support the hypotheses that preliminary instructions would be an impractical procedure or that they would place excessive demands on the judge.Northwestern University     

Attitudes,anger, and nullification instructions influence jurors’ verdicts in euthanasia cases

Courts have historically avoided informing jurors about their nullification power (i.e. the power to return a not-guilty verdict when their conscience demands it but the law directs otherwise), fearing that such knowledge would prompt disregard for the law and reliance on attitudes and emotions rather than evidence. We investigated jurors’ inclination to nullify the law in a morally ambiguous case of physician-assisted suicide, testing the impact of euthanasia attitudes on case judgments as well as moderators and mediators of that effect. Mock jurors with pro-euthanasia attitudes were overall less likely to vote guilty than anti-euthanasia jurors, especially when they were given jury instructions informing them of jurors’ power to nullify. Nullification instructions also exacerbated the effect of jurors’ attitudes on anger, disgust, and moral outrage toward the defendant – emotions that mediated the effect of attitudes on verdicts. We also tested the impact of incidentally induced anger on jurors’ reliance on their attitudes rather than the law, given anger’s propensity to increase certainty and heuristic processing. Anger enhanced mock jurors’ reliance on their attitudes under certain conditions. Theoretical and practical implications for understanding juror decision-making are discussed.     

Life or death decisions

The penalty phase deliberation experiences of capital jurors guided by the “special issues” sentencing instructions were investigated. These instructions ask jurors to consider three specific issues to determine whether a defendant should receive a sentence of life imprisonment or the death penalty: whether the crime was committed deliberately; whether there is a probability that the defendant would pose a continuing threat to society; and whether the conduct of the defendant was unreasonable in light of any provocation on the part of the victim. In-depth interviews with 27 jurors explored the organization of the penalty deliberation, the topics discussed, influential factors in the decision-making process, the impact of sentencing instructions, the importance of the possibility of parole, and the stress associated with capital jury service. Jurors relied heavily on sentencing instructions to guide their deliberations and to determine their responsibilities. Future dangerousness and the possibility of parole were critical considerations in deciding between life and death. Although jurors found the capital trial to be stressful, most believed that the life or death decision should be made by jurors. Findings are discussed in light of constitutional concerns about the administration of the death penalty.     

They know not what they do: Unguided and misguided discretion in Pennsylvania capital cases

Interviews with capital jurors demonstrate that jurors base their decisions on incorrect assumptions regarding the early release of defendants, decide the punishment prematurely, and fail to understand jury instructions. The 74 interviews from the Pennsylvania portion of the Capital Jury Project add insights into the cumulative and relative impact of these three problems with jurors' decision making. Every juror demonstrated at least one of these shortcomings. Underestimating the length of a life sentence was related to considering death the only acceptable punishment and prematurely deciding on death, and the most strongly related to voting for death.     

Death penalty beliefs and jurors' responses to aggravating and mitigating circumstances in capital trials

Two studies explored the relationship between attitudes toward the death penalty and support for or rejection of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in a capital trial. Jurors serving on jury duty voluntarily completed questionnaires in the jury lounge. In Study 1, jurors strongly opposed to the death penalty were significantly more receptive to mitigating circumstances than were the remaining jurors. In Study 2, jurors who would have been excluded for their opposition to the death penalty under theWitherspoon standard were significantly less receptive to aggravating circumstances than were the other jurors. It is suggested that the present system of death qualification in capital cases results in biases against the interest of the defendant at all stages of the trial process—jury selection, determination of guilt, and sentencing.     

Lesser-included offenses

The positions taken by prosecutors and defense lawyers on proposed jury instructions on lesser-included offenses provide evidence that juries do not follow the law strictly. This paper develops a simple model of expected utility to predict how jurors make their decisions. The model explains a stylized fact that is inconsistent with the idea that juries always follow the law, namely why prosecutors often object to giving the jury the option of a lesser-included offense. We use the model to evaluate the law concerning jury instructions on primary and lesser-included offenses.     

The entrapment defense

Most American jurisdictions follow either asubjective or anobjective approach to the entrapment defense. In order to test some of the differences between the two approaches, student jurors viewed a videotaped cocaine trial and were presented with either subjective test or objective test instructions. The admission of prior conviction evidence was also varied. The jurors deliberated, returned a verdict, and then completed a questionnaire that measured their understanding of the instructions and trial facts. Results show that, first, juror comprehension of the principal features of the objective test is very poor. It is suggested that an effort be made to simplify instructions describing the objective test. Should simplification not improve comprehension, it is argued that the judge, not the jury, should decide the entrapment defense when the objective test is used. Second, admission of a prior conviction has a significant impact on verdicts in the subjective test condition, but not in the objective test condition. This finding suggests that the subjective test instructions are effective in encouraging jurors to use prior convictions as evidence of guilt. The content of the objective test instruction may also account for part of the difference in impact. Jurors in the objective test condition were instructed not to take the defendant's predisposition into account, and a substantial minority of the jurors under-stood this aspect of the instruction.     

Effects of Judicial Instructions and Case Characteristics in a Mock Jury Trial of Battered Women Who Kill

This study examined the effects of judicial instructions on the outcome of a mock jury trial that involved a woman who pleaded self-defense after killing her abusive spouse. Jurors were instructed to adopt either an objective or a subjective standard of reasonableness when reaching a verdict. Within objective/subjective instruction conditions, half of the juries viewed a case in which the woman killed her abuser while he was attacking her (confrontational) and the remaining half viewed a case in which she killed him while he was asleep (no confrontation). Juries in the subjective conditions returned significantly more not guilty verdicts than jurors in the objective conditions. At the individual juror level, participants hearing subjective instructions were significantly more likely to rate the defendant as not guilty than jurors given objective instructions when the abuse was nonconfrontational.     

Perceptions of older adult jurors: the influence of aging stereotypes and jury laws

ABSTRACT

The present study examined younger (18–30 years, N?=?100) and older adults’ (66–89 years, N?=?100) responses to a jury duty questionnaire assessing perceptions of jury duty, their capability to serve, and the capability of older adults to serve. We also explored perceptions of the senior jury opt-out law (a law that allows those over a certain age (e.g. 65 years) to opt-out of jury duty). We assessed why participants believe this law is in place and experimentally examined if informing older adults about this law impacted their jury questionnaire responses. Results demonstrated that older adults were significantly more likely to want to serve compared to younger adults; however, younger adults provided lower capability ratings of older adult jurors compared to older adults. Younger adults’ open-ended explanations for these ratings indicated negative aging stereotypes (i.e. in part, believing that older adult jurors are less capable because of declining health and biased beliefs). Older adults also had a significantly lower rate of agreement with the senior jury opt-out law. Although informing older adults about this law did not impact their perceptions of themselves as potential jurors, it did enforce more negative attitudes towards older adult jurors as a whole.     

Comprehending life and death matters

Modern capital jurisprudence places special significance on judicial instructions to guide the discretion of the capital jury in reaching a penalty phase decision. Yet, previous social science research has raised doubts about the extent to which judicial instructions are generally understood by jurors and questioned their utility in producing intended effects. The present study measured the comprehension of the capital sentencing instruction employed in California. Data suggest widespread inability to define accurately the central concepts of aggravation and mitigation in use in virtually every state that currently has a death penalty statute, as well as the inability to distinguish properly the sentencing significance of the enumerated factors jurors are directed to use in reaching their life and death verdicts. In addition, an inordinate focus on the circumstances of the crime—to the exclusion of other potentially important factors—was identified, as well as special problems in comprehending the crucial concept of mitigation in constitutionally required ways.We would like to thank Suzanne Ban, Cori Nardello, and Maryanne Tagavilla for assistance in transcribing and content-analyzing the data.     

The Bottom Line: The Effect of Written Expert Witness Statements on Juror Verdicts and Information Processing

Mock jurors recruited from jury rolls were either not given written statements of expert witnesses' direct testimony or were provided with such statements before or after the presentation of that testimony. Presentation of the statements before the testimony and cross-examination provided jurors with a schema that allowed them to distinguish more effectively among the claims of four differentially worthy plaintiffs because they processed more probative evidence than other jurors. Jurors in receipt of written statements before the testimony found the evidence to be more comprehensible than other jurors. Jurors provided with written statements following testimony and cross-examination were able to differentiate between the most and least severely injured plaintiffs, whereas jurors not in receipt of any written statements were unable to differentiate among any of the differentially worthy claimants. The limitations of this case management technique and of the study are discussed.     

Measuring damages for lost enjoyment of life: the view from the bench and the jury box

Civil jury instructions are inconsistent in defining what constitutes noneconomic damages, which may include pain, suffering, disability, disfigurement, and loss of enjoyment of life (LEL), among other injury sequelae. This inconsistency has been manifested recently in court decisions that have considered whether LEL should be treated as a separate element of noneconomic damages, distinct from pain and suffering. This paper reviews the case law on this issue and also describes a jury simulation experiment. Mock jurors awarded damages after they received instructions on noneconomic damages in which LEL was (1) not identified as a distinct element of damages; (2) defined as an element of damages distinct from pain and suffering, but participants awarded a single amount for noneconomic damages; or (3) defined as a distinct element of damages, and participants awarded separate amounts for LEL and pain and suffering. Instructions about LEL resulted in larger awards, but only when mock jurors also made a separate award for that element of damages.     

The Swedish jury system in press cases: An offspring of the English trial jury?

In the area of press freedom the English influence has for more than 200 years been strongly felt in Sweden. The introduction of a jury system in press cases in 1815 was clearly inspired by the English example. The Swedish variant had, admittedly, some strange features but it was nonetheless, in essence, a jury. Thus it should, historically and systematically, be looked upon as an offspring of the English trial jury.

Since 1815 the Swedish jury has grown more ‘English’ in some respects. Those greater similarities notwithstanding, there are still important differences between the two systems. At least two of the differences are the result of Swedish innovations.

In 1949 the Swedes in the new Freedom of the Press Act included a provision, stating that the court of first instance not only may but must review a verdict of conviction. If also the court convicts and, consequently, fixes the penalty, the defendant can always take the case at least to the appropriate court of appeal. Thus, there is a double‐check or even a triple‐check against an unwarranted conviction. From the defendant's point of view the Swedish jury system can be described as fool‐proof.³⁵

In 1949 the Swedes also introduced a new method of choosing the jury. The jurors are drawn by lot but not, as in England, with the electoral register as the starting point but from a panel chosen by politically elected councils. Furthermore, one third of the jurors must be present or former lay assessors. Through that method of selecting the jurors the Swedes have reasonably counteracted the traditional charges that juries are ignorant or confused or both. On the other hand, the Swedish system may be sensitive to political influence on the administration of justice since the composition, not exactly of this or that jury but of the whole panel, is the indirect result of political elections. However, once more, unwarranted convictions are almost certainly reversed by the courts.

With their method of choosing the jurors the Swedes also avoid a problem which has, in recent years, caused considerable disquiet in Great Britain ‐ jury vetting. The ancient practice of ‘Stand by for the Crown’ is still a reality in English courts. How often the prosecution uses its right to influence the composition of juries by vetting proposed jurors is not known. However, the practice has caused serious concern among lawyers. ‘The fear of “packed” juries is still with us’, to quote an expert in the field, John F. McEldowney.³⁶

The Swedish jury in press cases is certainly not the most important or the best known offspring of the English trial jury ‐ that is, of course, the American jury. However, the Swedish jury has survived for more than 165 years and is still going strong. It is quantitatively of modest significance ‐ there are in ‘normal’ years no more than a dozen cases in the country. However, the jury has an umbrella effect outside the printed media, i.e. what you are allowed to say in a newspaper or in a book you can almost certainly say at a public meeting or on a stage.

In recent decades the Swedish jury has shown a considerable capability of development. It has approached the English model on some points while, at the same time, making innovations on others. It is possible that Sweden during the 1980s may somewhat expand the jury system within the area of free speech, i.e. outside the printed media.     

Permitting Jury Discussions During Trial: Impact of the Arizona Reform

A field experiment tested the effect of an Arizona civil jury reform that allows jurors to discuss evidence among themselves during the trial. Judges, jurors, attorneys, and litigants completed questionnaires in trials randomly assigned to either a Trial Discussions condition, in which jurors were permitted to discuss the evidence during trial, or a No Discussions condition, in which jurors were prohibited from discussing the evidence during trial according to traditional admonitions. Judicial agreement with jury verdicts did not differ between conditions. Permitting jurors to discuss the evidence did affect the degree of certainty that jurors reported about their preferences at the start of jury deliberations, the level of conflict on the jury, and the likelihood of reaching unanimity.     

The Effects of Limiting Punitive Damage Awards

In response to concerns that jury awards in tort cases are excessive and unpredictable, nearly every state legislature has enacted some version of tort reform that is intended to curb extravagant damage awards. One of the most important and controversial reforms involves capping (or limiting) the maximum punitive damage award. We conducted a jury analogue study to assess the impact of this reform. In particular, we examined the possibility that capping punitive awards would cause jurors to inflate their compensatory awards to satisfy their desires to punish the defendant, particularly in situations where the defendant's conduct was highly reprehensible. Relative to a condition in which punitive damages were unlimited, caps on punitive damages did not result in inflation of compensatory awards. However, jurors who had no option to award punitive damages assessed compensatory damages at a significantly higher level than did jurors who had the opportunity to do so. We discuss the policy implications of these findings.     

Estimating Juror Accuracy,Juror Ability,and the Relationship Between Them

This article advances a method based on standard test theories and measurement models to determine correct verdicts for jury trials, and to estimate juror accuracy, juror ability, and trial difficulty (and the relationships among them). With five vignette cases and 1,318 juror eligible adults as the subjects, the model consistently identified verdicts that accorded with the judge’s instructions on the law as correct. With the correct verdicts, the strength of the relationship between juror accuracy and juror ability was found to be substantial. These findings suggest that the assumption of equivalent accuracy of jurors underlying the Condorcet’s jury theorem (Condorcet, Essai sur l’Application de l’Analyse a la Probabilite des Decisions Rendues a la Pluralite des Voix, Paris, 1785) may be untenable for general cases where jurors of diverse dispositions and abilities serve together; and that the role of juror ability in determining the accuracy of legal decisions could be more significant than that of attitudes and values because, unlike attitudes and values, ability could affect juror’s legal decisions regardless of the type of the case.