Technology investment, bargaining, and international environmental agreements

If countries are to engage in international environmental cooperation, they must bargain over the distribution of gains. When future bargaining over pollution abatement is expected, how should a country decide on public technology investments to reduce the domestic cost of pollution abatement? I find that while countries tend to underinvest because they fail to internalize the global benefits of new technology, the magnitude of the problem depends on a country’s bargaining power. Powerful countries underinvest less frequently, because they expect to reap most of the global benefits from new technology in the international negotiations. I also investigate the effectiveness of a simple reciprocal technology agreement. I find that it can help solve the underinvestment problem, and this beneficial effect is particularly pronounced in the case of powerful countries. These findings imply that changing the bargaining protocol on climate change to the benefit of powerful countries may help secure the necessary technology investments.     

Equity, international trade and climate policy

The literature of welfare-maximising greenhouse gas emission reduction strategies pays remarkably little attention to equity. This paper introduces various ways to consider efficiency and equity simultaneously. Lower (higher) discount rates lead to higher (lower) emission reduction. Higher (lower) inequity aversion leads to higher (lower) emission abatement, unless one also considers the negative effects of OECD emission reduction on the exports of developing countries; in that case, the effect of inequity aversion is ambiguous. In the absence of international co-operation, higher (lower) risk aversion leads to lower (higher) emission abatement. With international co-operation, the effect of risk aversion is ambiguous because the higher risk aversion gives more weight to poorer regions and poorer generations. We analyse four ways to introduce compassion in a non-cooperative setting. If observed development aid is a guide, international altruism is small and has little impact on optimal emission control. If countries act as if they 'feel' but not 'physically experience' the climate impact of the most vulnerable country, optimal emission reduction increases, but not substantially so. However, if countries actually have to pay for the damage done, they would prefer to reduce their emissions to much lower levels. Finally, if countries pay as much for emission reduction as other countries suffer from climate change, (that is, if climate policy restores the income distribution to what it would have been without climate change), emissions are rapidly cut to very low levels.     

Fisheries management in Jamaica,international perspectives

Abstract

This paper examines Jamaica's efforts to implement of the conservation and management provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), bearing in mind that prior to 1982 there was an existing legal framework that sought to address issues relating to fisheries management. More specifically, the paper looks at the issues related to the conservation and management of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks under UNCLOS and subsequent agreements negotiated under the auspices of UNCLOS. It also addresses the problems Jamaica faces with the conservation and management of Queen Conch (Strombus Gigas), in particular, the UNCLOS provisions regarding access to such resource, taking into account the limitations to such access as regulated by the Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES).     

Personality,socioeconomics and crime: An international comparison

Abstract

Data from 37 countries were collected that permitted exploratory analysis of national profiles in terms of personality dimensions: psychoticism (P); extraversion (E); and neuroticism (N) and four socioeconomic indices: gross domestic product (GDP); human development index (HDI); economic growth (EG); and family size (FS) and their relationship to rates of criminal activity. Findings indicated that the socioeconomic indicators did correlate with national crime patterns. High crime nations were more likely to be the richer, industrialised countries having smalles average family size. Personality variables proved more elusive. P surprisingly was not correlated with incidence of crime rather E appeared mast closely linked to rate and type of crime. Findings are discussed in terms of measurement error and possible explanatory mechanisms.     

国际合同"契约自由"的冲突法规制 --国际合同的自体法

肇始于16世纪的"意思自治"理论,标志着合同准据法理论发展的里程碑,即客观论向主观论的发展,特别是以意思自治为主、辅之以最密切联系原则的合同自体法理论的提出,更是将合同准据法理论推向一个前所未有的高度,它一改过去合同法律适用的机械性做法,强调尊重当事人自主意识,并将契约当做一个整体来看待,体现了国际私法合同法律适用的潮流和趋势.