再论入世后的政府职能调整

本文认为 ,入世是政府行为 ,不论是WTO的基本规则 ,还是发达国家应对经济全球化的“行政管理现代化”运动 ,都表明入世对政府职能定位与配置的冲击直接而强烈。为此 ,我国政府职能调整应从以下三方面入手 :一是重视国际组织对政府职能设置与配置的影响 ;二是对政府与市场、企事业单位、社会中介组织的关系除了从管理与被管理、服务与被服务的角度理解外 ,还应从彼此互补、互动的角度来理解 ;三是我国政府职能调整应该而且必须顺应世界行政改革潮流     

中国加入WTO与政府职能转变

中国加入WTO,经济将进一步全球化,经济体制将全方位市场化,我国面临的竞争将越来越激烈.因此,政府职能要适时转变,并要促使其进行多方面、深层次的转型.     

Understanding the role of technology in reducing corruption: a transaction cost approach

Prior research suggests that computerization of government services can help reduce corruption involved in government transactions, but there is no clear understanding of the process through which computer‐mediated transactions reduce corruption. We attempt to fill this gap by using a transaction cost economics framework, and argue that uncertainty and asset specificity associated with government transactions allow bureaucrats to act opportunistically and demand bribes. Therefore, those computerization initiatives that reduce uncertainty and asset specificity of government services lead to lowered perceptions of corruption. Our findings, based on a survey of 101 managers of domestic and multinational enterprises in India, support our hypotheses. We also compare the websites of Indian government organizations with European government websites on the dimensions of transparency and interactivity, and find that the Indian websites do not provide as much interactivity as the European websites. Our multi‐method study offers important theoretical and practical insights on effectively using technology to reduce corruption. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Local government consolidations: The impact of political transaction costs

Local government in Norway comprises a large number of small municipalities. Cost efficiency can be improved by consolidating local authorities, and central government has designed a framework to stimulate voluntary mergers. Existing theories suggest that political transaction costs will impede consolidations. (1) Generous grants compensate diseconomies of scale. Central government has promised small municipalities that grant levels will be maintained, but policy promises may not be credible. (2) Property rights to local revenues are nullified when consolidations have been implemented. High-revenue municipalities will therefore go against merger with a poorer neighbor. (3) A consolidated local council may be composed of different political parties, and it may therefore pursue other policies than an existing council. Expected changes in party strength can lead municipalities to oppose a proposed consolidation. (4) Senior politicians are less likely to support mergers, particularly if they come from small polities. We offer an explicit test of these propositions based on data for Norwegian local government. Elected politicians and administrative leaders are more interested in consolidating when efficiency gains are large. Local revenue disparities and to some extent dissimilar party preferences are significant impediments to voluntary mergers. Additionally, smaller municipalities are often prepared to sacrifice some efficiency gain to remain independent polities.     

The problem of regulatory arbitrage: A transaction cost economics perspective

Regulatory arbitrage, or the ability of financial firms to circumvent or neutralize rules, is a classic problem of financial regulation. This article draws on transaction cost economics (TCE) to reformulate this old problem, thus defining regulatory arbitrage as a contracting hazard arising from interactions between the regulator and regulated firms, given bounded rationality and opportunism. Following standard TCE, the article first characterizes the implicit regulatory contract in finance, focusing in particular on the mobile and elastic nature of regulated actors and financial assets as well as the contested utility of financial innovation. It is then argued that this incomplete and hazard-prone regulatory bargain must be matched with a governance structure that both adapts to unforeseen circumstances and avoidance strategies and copes with radical uncertainty about the welfare consequences of financial innovation. To that end, the article discusses how a governance structure here termed “relational regulation” might facilitate such ex post governance under uncertainty.     

Electoral competition and the oversight game: A transaction cost approach and the Norwegian experience

Abstract. The central question addressed by this article is whether the absence of active competition changes the forces that shape the institutional landscape at the parliamentary level, and thereby the landscape itself. Based on a transaction cost approach, the study investigates whether the bolstering of parliamentary oversight procedures occurs in situations in which there is no credible alternative to the incumbent government, and whether opposition impotence contributes to the development of oversight institutions. The article argues that the strengthening of parliamentary oversight procedures is most likely to occur when there is a minority government but the opposition MPs are not in a position to form or envisage a credible alternative. An analysis of changes in oversight arrangements in Norway during 1993—1996 strongly supports this argument.     

The contractual nature of budgeting: A transaction cost perspective on the design of budgeting institutions

Viewing budgets as contracts, transaction cost theory focuses on the costs of negotiating and enforcing the myriad political agreements by which policymakers allocate the government's resources. This essay provides an overview of transaction cost theory and its implications for the design of budgeting institutions. It contrasts the behavioral premises (bounded rationality and opportunism) of the transaction cost approach with those of more traditional budgetary theories, and examines whether commitment and agency costs have structured budget actors' institutional choices. Investigation of the usage of key budget instruments- entitlements, multi-year appropriations, and tax expenditures - suggests that Congress has been more discriminating in its institutional choices than is commonly supposed. Sensitivity to the importance of transaction costs would increase the effectiveness of budget reforms.     

The role of political parties: An analysis based on transaction costs

This paper explores the proposition that political parties reduce the ‘transaction costs’ of electoral participation. Political parties provide a low cost signal of a candidate's policies and personal characteristics and, in this way, reduce voters' information costs. With reference to ‘transaction cost economics’, political parties offer an ‘implicit contract’ between voters and politicians and thereby reduce the scope for opportunism by politicians. This impact on transaction costs is important in any evaluation of public policy towards political parties.     

The metropolitan area of Monterrey in the year 2020

The author discusses possible future trends in economic development and urbanization in the city of Monterrey, Mexico. Information is provided on metropolitan growth from 1940 to 1995; population size and growth rate; extension of the urban area; deconcentration; and projections according to land use.     

North Korea: a year into the reign of Kim Jong-un

A year after the death of Kim Jong-il and the ascension of his son Kim Jong-un, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea appears to be more stable than many had predicted. The new leader has consolidated his authority and rebalanced power among key institutions, but his reforms have not gone nearly far enough if North Korea is to escape its poverty trap.     

论习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想进“概论”课堂

习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想进"概论"课堂,既是学习研究宣传贯彻党的十九大精神的需要,也是高校思想政治理论课落实党的十九大精神"进课堂、进教材、进头脑"的要求。习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想进"概论"课堂需要处理好知识性与思想性、理论性与趣味性、引导性与互动性的关系。习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想进"概论"课堂可以从以下几个方面着手:普及政治常识,凸显思想经典;注重理论教学,增加知识趣味;坚持引导为主,加强师生互动。     

Thorns among the roses: A year of the socialist experiment in France

The election of President Mitterrand in May 1981 promised a new era of social and economic reform. The Socialist appeal to national solidarity sought a consensus to promote social justice and to revive the economy. After an initial period of grace during which a number of reforms were implemented, the government encountered increasing difficulties, partly caused by the international economic situation but also due to a failure to win business confidence and to the inconsistencies of its own policies. In consequence, the government was forced to introduce a range of deflationary and austerity measures which put the whole of its reforming strategy in question.