A line already drawn: the case for voluntary euthanasia after the withdrawal of life-sustaining hydration and nutrition

When life-sustaining hydration and nutrition is withheld from an incompetent and immobile patient like Terri Schiavo, death comes to the patient by dehydration within about two weeks. Americans should be permitted to arrange for euthanasia at that point, as opposed to merely dehydrating to death, and should be able to incorporate their desire for euthanasia into an advance directive. A state constitutional right of privacy could provide the legal avenue permitting effectuation of such a choice.     

The alleged distinction between euthanasia and the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment: conceptually incoherent and impossible to maintain

Richard Epstein, in his book Mortal Peril, supports euthanasia and assisted suicide and rejects the distinction between them and withdrawal treatment. In this essay, Professor Orentlicher argues that Epstein is correct in finding no meaningful moral distinction between euthanasia and treatment withdrawal, examines the reasons why the distinction has persisted in American jurisprudence, and explains why the distinction has eroded. Epstein also concludes in his book that there is no constitutional right to euthanasia or assisted suicide. Professor Orentlicher's response is that constitutionality is not the appropriate inquiry; rather, the better question is whether to recognize a right to assisted suicide once a right to euthanasia in the form of terminal sedation already exists. He answers this question in the affirmative, arguing that assisted suicide enhances patient welfare and reduces risks of abuse in a world with euthanasia.     

Privacy principles,risks and harms

The protection of privacy is predicated on the individual's right to privacy and stipulates a number of principles that are primarily focused on information privacy or data protection and, as such, are insufficient to apply to other types of privacy and to the protection of other entities beyond the individual. This article identifies additional privacy principles that would apply to other types of privacy and would enhance the consideration of risks or harms to the individual, to groups and to society as a whole if they are violated. They also relate to the way privacy impact assessment (PIA) may be conducted. There are important reasons for generating consideration of and debate about these principles. First, they help to recalibrate a focus in Europe on data protection to the relative neglect of other types of privacy. Second, it is of critical importance at a time when PIA (renamed ‘data protection impact assessment’, or DPIA) may become mandatory under the European Commission's proposed Data Protection Regulation. Such assessment is an important instrument for identifying and mitigating privacy risks, but should address all types of privacy. Third, one can construct an indicative table identifying harms or risks to these additional privacy principles, which can serve as an important tool or instrument for a broader PIA to address other types of privacy.     

隐私权概念的再界定

隐私权在我国虽然已经得到广泛承认,但是关于其边界等问题仍然存在争议,需要继续研究。隐私权固然存在宪法上的基础,但是主要属于民事权利的范畴。它的具体属性应当是具体人格权而非一般人格权,而且应当在我国未来的《人格权法》中得到规定。隐私权主要包括生活安宁和私人秘密两个方面,未来隐私权的内容也应当以此为基础进行发展和扩张。个人信息资料权不宜纳入隐私权的范畴,它是相对独立于隐私权的一种权利。     

在惩罚犯罪与保障人权之间：关于监听的法律思考

监听是世界各国为应付犯罪形势的新变化而发展起来的一种高技术化、高隐密性的强制侦查措施，其出现对于侦查机关打击和惩罚犯罪发挥了极其重要的作用。但是另一方面，监听的采用又严重侵犯了公民隐私权，因此，各国都对监听的采用规定了严格的法律程序，以防止侦查机关滥用监听，过度分割公民权利。我国刑事诉讼立法上对监听缺乏明确规定，这不利于保障公民人权，应当加以改进。     

配偶权、忠实义务与隐私权保护——承认配偶权前提下的分析

隐私权是一种具体的人格权,是绝对权,配偶权是一种身份权利,是相对权,其权利内涵不包含忠实义务,法律对配偶权的救济只能是禁止一方把意志强加于另一方.因此,不能以侵犯配偶权为由否认侵权人的隐私权,不能以侵权人违背了道德准则而否认其应受隐私权保护.法律可以对婚外性行为予以调整,但配偶权的设置并不能完成这一任务.     

隐私权制度中的权利冲突

现代社会,隐私权日益成为一项重要的人格权。基于隐私权概念的不确定性和法律的局限性,隐私权与其他权利的冲突不可避免。解决的方式有立法和司法两种。其中司法中的利益衡量方法发挥着重要作用。从类型化研究来看,隐私权与表达自由的冲突主要通过司法途径解决,而隐私权与知情权的冲突则主要通过立法途径解决。     

论公众人物及其隐私权

公众人物是指在一定时间和空间范围内具有重要影响，并且与社会公众利益有关从而为该时空范围内的人们所广泛知晓和关注的人物。其判断标准有两个：一是社会知名度，二是与社会公共利益相关。由隐私权的基本权利性质决定，公众人物作为社会大众中的一员享有隐私权是无可争议的，公众人物的隐私权理应受到相应的法律保护。并且，基于公众人物隐私权不同于普通公民隐私权的特性，应当加大对公众人物的隐私权的保护力度。     

论中国公众人物隐私权的构建

自隐私权概念产生时起,人们就已经开始在把握隐私权设立目的的基础上区分不同主体所享有的隐私权。研究公众人物隐私权,应以权利属性为基础去判断权利的主体、客体等要件,并认真分析该项权利在法律制度中的形式和地位。公共利益是确定公众人物隐私权要件的根本标准,比例原则是建构公众人物隐私权制度的基本准则。     

Moving from voluntary euthanasia to non-voluntary euthanasia: equality and compassion

Abstract.  The recent Dutch law legalising active voluntary euthanasia will reignite the euthanasia debate. An illuminating method for evaluating the moral status of a practice is to follow the implications of the practice to its logical conclusion. The argument for compassion is one of the central arguments in favour of voluntary active euthanasia. This argument applies perhaps even more forcefully in relation to incompetent patients. If active voluntary euthanasia is legalised, arguments based on compassion and equality will be directed towards legalising active non-voluntary euthanasia in order to make accelerated termination of death available also to the incompetent. The removal of discrimination against the incompetent has the potential to become as potent a catch-cry as the right to die. However, the legalisation of non-voluntary euthanasia is undesirable. A review of the relevant authorities reveals that there is no coherent and workable "best interests" test which can be invoked to decide whether an incompetent patient is better off dead. This provides a strong reason for not stepping onto the slippery path of permitting active voluntary euthanasia.     

Video surveillance in public space in China

Video surveillance device has been widely installed in public places at present. How should the right of privacy under video surveillance in public space be considered and protected effectively? There is no enough attention in the existing legislation of China, which results in a relatively conservative attitude in the judicial system of China. In fact, it is supposed to have privacy interests in public space. Privacy is not simply an absence of information about people in the minds of others. Moreover, it is the control over information about ourselves. Unlike casual glimpse by passers-by, the continuous, intentional and intensive focus of video cameras make individuals lose control of their information, which consequently leads to lose their privacy interests in public space. Thus, in order to protect personal privacy interests and defend personal justice in public space, it is necessary to regulate video surveillance in public space in legislation and judicature.     

Employee rights to privacy and access to personnel records: a new look.

Do employees really enjoy a so-called right to privacy in their employment relationship? To what extent are their rights violated by the pre-employment screening process? These are the questions discussed in this article by David F. Linowes, Boeschenstein Professor of Political Economy and Public Policy and Science at the University of Illinois and recently chairman of the Privacy Protection Study Commission. Citing the availability of data to a prospective employer through credit card companies, banks, insurance companies, mailing lists, health records, and investigative reporting agencies, Professor Linowes makes the point that little is left unknoun when the investigative process is completed. There is no clear line separating what is relevant and what is privileged. The Study Commission's report to Congress suggests guidelines that would insure fairness to all parties.     

安乐死的民法学思考——亦谈安乐死的合法化问题

关于安乐死问题学者多是从哲学、宗教、伦理、医学等诸方面进行研究,而较少从民法基本理论角度进行分析。本文拟尝试以法益分析的方法从民法学之生命权和人格尊严权角度对安乐死做一初步考量。并在此基础上提出选择安乐死是自然人的一项天然权利,应给安乐死合法地位。     

Conundrums with penumbras: the right to privacy encompasses non-gamete providers who create preembryos with the intent to become parents

To date, five state high courts have resolved disputes over frozen preembryos. These disputes arose during divorce proceedings between couples who had previously used assisted reproduction and cryopreserved excess preembryos. In each case, one spouse wished to have the preembryos destroyed, while the other wanted to be able to use or donate them in the future. The parties in these cases invoked the constitutional right to privacy to argue for dispositional control over the preembryos; two of the five cases were resolved by relying on this right. The constitutional right to privacy protects intimate decisions involving procreation, marriage, and family life. However, when couples use donated sperm or ova to create preembryos, a unique circumstance arises: one spouse--the gamete provider--is genetically related to the preembryos and the other is not. If courts resolve frozen preembryo disputes that involve non-gamete providers based on the constitutional right to privacy, they should find that the constitutional right to privacy encompasses the interests of both gamete and non-gamete providers. Individuals who create preembryos with the intent to become a parent have made an intimate decision involving procreation, marriage, and family life that falls squarely within the the right to privacy. In such cases, the couple together made the decision to create a family through the use of assisted reproduction, and the preembryos would not exist but for that joint decision. Therefore, gamete and non-gamete providers should be afforded equal constitutional protection in disputes over frozen preembryos.     

Information Privacy Protection in the New Chinese Civil Code: Priority or Replacement?

The right to privacy has been developed through judicial practice and has evolved from “the protection of the right to reputation” to “privacy interest” then to “privacy right.” The Civil Code of the People’s Republic of China (2020) clarifies the right to information privacy and the right to personal information as two independent personality rights and establishes a privacy priority protection mechanism for private information in civil law. The comparative efficiency of the right to personal information may mean that the protection of the right to information privacy is weakened or even replaced by the right to personal information. The uncertainty and fragmentation of private information also creates a wide gray space for judicial decisions. The development from traditional privacy right to information privacy right and personal information right is generally positive and shows the active legal response to the protection of private information in multiple ways. However, clarifications and systematization are required to increase the effectiveness of such protections.     

A historian's view on the right to be forgotten

This essay explores the consequences for historians of the ‘right to be forgotten', a new concept proposed by the European Commission in 2012. I first explain that the right to be forgotten is a radical variant of the right to privacy and clarify the consequences of the concept for the historical study of public and private figures. I then treat the hard cases of spent and amnestied convictions and of internet archives. I further discuss the applicability of the right to be forgotten to dead persons as part of the problem of posthumous privacy, and finally point to the ambiguity of the impact of the passage of time. While I propose some compromise solutions, I also conclude that a generalized right to be forgotten would lead to the rewriting of history in ways that impoverish our insights not only into anecdotal lives but also into the larger trends of history.     

论公共摄像监视——以隐私权为中心

目前，在公共空间实施摄像监视已日益普遍。如何看待公共空间中摄像头“注视”之下的个人隐私权并予以相应保护，我国现有的立法尚未予以足够关注，司法上亦采取较为保守的态度。事实上，个人身处公共空间，亦有其隐私利益存在。因为隐私并不仅仅是他人头脑中关于人们自身信息的某种缺失，而更多的是，人们对于自身信息的控制。摄像头长时间地有计划地有目的地注视，不同于路人偶然无意识的一瞥，它将使人们因此而丧失对自身信息的选择暴露权和控制权，从而导致个人在公共空间的某些隐私利益的丧失。鉴于此，我们认为有必要从立法上和司法上规范公共摄像监视行为，捍卫人们在公共空间中的必要的隐私利益，维护人们在公共空间中的个性正义。     

A Behavioural Understanding of Privacy and its Implications for Privacy Law

This article draws upon social interaction theory (the work of Irwin Altman) to develop a theory of the right to privacy, which reflects the way that privacy is experienced. This theory states that the right to privacy is a right to respect for barriers, and that an invasion of privacy occurs when a privacy barrier is penetrated. The first part of the paper establishes the position of the author's theory in the existing scholarship. The second part of the paper expands upon the theory to explain the nature of privacy barriers and the way that the author's theory manages a number of specific privacy issues, including threats to privacy, attempted invasions of privacy, unforeseeable interferences with privacy and waiving the right to privacy. The final part of the paper demonstrates the impact that this approach to privacy could have upon judicial reasoning, in particular Article 8 European Convention on Human Rights.     

论私录视听资料的证据能力

未经当事人同意而录制的视听材料有可能涉及被录制者的隐私.之所以规定不得采用法律所禁止的方法收集视听资料,是为了保护当事人的隐私权.传统理论认为侵犯被录制者隐私权的私录资料不具有合法性.但隐私与隐私权并不相同,对私录资料证据能力的认识须从解释论与立法论的角度分别考虑.从解释论角度,如果私录资料侵犯了他人的隐私权,那么该证据资料便会因不具备合法性而被排除在诉讼之外;如果只涉及隐私而未侵犯隐私权,便可具有证据能力.而在立法论,那些即使侵犯了隐私权的私录资料也同样具有证据能力,可以作为认定案件事实的根据,但这并不妨碍隐私权人在本案诉讼结束之后对侵权人另行提起诉讼保护自己的隐私权.     

安乐死的宪法学思考

安乐死是困扰人类的一个道德和法律难题,是一个多学科研究的问题。从宪法学的角度来看,安乐死主要涉及到:病人的生命权与人性尊严的竞合、病人是否具有死亡权或者能否放弃自己所享有的基本权利、病人的个人自决权与国家对基本权利的保护义务及其冲突三个问题。如果解决宪法学上的这三个问题,将为其他学科具体构建安乐死制度提供理论上的论证资源。