European Commission merger control: Combining competition and the creation of larger European firms

The article examines the European Commission's use of its legal powers over mergers. It discusses and tests two views. One is that the ‘neoliberal’ Commission has ended previous industrial policies of aiding ‘national champion’ firms to grow through mergers and instead pursues a ‘merger‐constraining’ policy of vigorously using its legal powers to block mergers. The other is that the Commission follows an ‘integrationist policy’ of seeking the development of larger European firms to deepen economic integration. It examines Commission decisions under the 1989 EC Merger Regulation between 1990 and 2009. It selects three major sectors that are ‘likely’ for the ‘merger‐constraining’ view – banking, energy and telecommunications – and analyses a dataset of almost 600 Commission decisions and then individual merger cases. It finds that the Commission has approved almost all mergers, including by former ‘national champion’ firms. There have been only two prohibitions over 20 years in the three sectors and the outcome has been the creation of larger European firms through mergers. It explains how the Commission can pursue an integrationist policy through the application of competition processes and criteria. The wider implication is that the Commission can combine competition policy with achieving the ‘industrial policy’ aim of aiding the development of larger European firms.     

The acceptance,relevance and dominance of lobbying the EU Commission — a first‐time survey of the EU Commission's civil servants

Among public affairs techniques lobbying is by far the most mystifying one — at least in Europe. Lobbying comes from the Latin word ‘labium’ and means ‘entrance hall’ or ‘lounge’. Therein the essential meaning can be seen: today political decisions are not made in plenary assemblies but primarily in the pre‐political phase of balancing the various interests. Lobbying is to be understood as the ‘diverse intensive activities of social groups, chambers and companies in the political and bureaucratic vestibule’ (Beyme 1980). Modern lobbying on the EU level is an intermediary policy for the support of political decision making — even if some critics refuse to believe it. Lobbying at EU level has become a politically realistic dimension. Even if the mass media still take a very sceptical and negative view of lobbying in Brussels, based on the existing European taboo on influencing politics, an in‐depth analysis reveals various lobbies at work in EU institutions. Lobbying today is an essential part of all EU decision areas. This paper describes the functional theory approach of lobbying known as ‘cooperation as confrontation through communication’. For the first time, recipients of lobbying in the EU Commission are demonstrating their acceptance of lobbying efforts. The paper is based on the doctoral thesis ‘The acceptance, relevance and dominance of lobbying the EU Commission’ by Peter Koeppl, University of Vienna (unpublished). Copyright © 2001 Henry Stewart Publications     

Re‐imagining Geographic Labour Mobility through ‘Distance Labour’

Geographic labour mobility is necessary for increasing productivity in Australia. Long‐distance commuting has been found to be especially significant. However, important considerations are being excluded from policy discussions within the Productivity Commission on this topic. This commentary covers these important omissions. They are, namely, the problematic conflation of the terminologies of ‘fly‐in, fly‐out’ and ‘long‐distance commuting’ with mining, and a lack of qualitative research investigating the material impacts of these labour practices on people's lives. This commentary puts forward a new terminology, ‘distance labour’, to better include those industries on the margins of distance commuting. By accounting for the social worlds of workers engaged in distance labour, the Productivity Commission could increase the validity of its datasets, and provide more egalitarian policy recommendations.     

Breaking down the barriers? New public management in the European commission

On 15 March 1999, the mass resignation of the College of Commissioners amidst accusations of fraud, mismanagement and nepotism was the catalyst for potential transformation of the European bureaucracy in a radical way. The Commission is at the centre of networks of European governance but it only demonstrates a ‘shadow of a cohesive administrative culture’ (Cini 1996: 223). The managerial reforms which have finally been engaged by the Commission twenty years later than its member countries focus primarily on efficiency and accountability in order to bridge the ‘EU's management deficit’ (Metcalfe 2000: 824). This paper seeks to argue that reforms in the European Commission can only be successful if a cultural analysis is carried out, developing a distinctive approach to European public management in order to lay the basis for new forms of European governance. Copyright © 2002 Henry Stewart Publications.     

What does Brexit Mean for the UK's Climate Change Act?

This article examines the potential implications of the United Kingdom's exit from the European Union (so‐called ‘Brexit’) for the success and survival of the country's flagship climate policy, the Climate Change Act 2008. The impact of a ‘soft’ and a ‘hard’ Brexit for the main features of the Climate Change Act are assessed, building on documentary evidence and elite interviews with key policy‐makers and policy‐shapers. The article argues that the long‐term viability of the Climate Change Act was being threatened even before the EU referendum, and that Brexit will do little to improve this situation. Even though the existence of the Climate Change Act is not under immediate threat, a range of issues presented by Brexit risk undermining its successful implementation.     

The Political Foundations of the Eurocracy

This article explores the politics behind the design of EU regulatory institutions. The EU has established an extensive ‘Eurocracy’ outside of the Commission hierarchy, including over 30 European agencies and a number of networks of national regulatory authorities (NRAs). The article examines the politics of institutional choice in the EU, explaining why EU policy-makers create agencies in some policy areas, while opting for looser regulatory networks in others. It shows that the design of EU regulatory institutions – ‘the Eurocracy’ – is driven not by functional imperatives but by political considerations related to distributional conflict and the influence of supranational actors.     

Political discourse networks and the conflict over software patents in Europe

In 2005, the European Parliament rejected the directive ‘on the patentability of computer‐implemented inventions’, which had been drafted and supported by the European Commission, the Council and well‐organised industrial interests, with an overwhelming majority. In this unusual case, a coalition of opponents of software patents prevailed over a strong industry‐led coalition. In this article, an explanation is developed based on political discourse showing that two stable and distinct discourse coalitions can be identified and measured over time. The apparently weak coalition of software patent opponents shows typical properties of a hegemonic discourse coalition. It presents itself as being more coherent, employs a better‐integrated set of frames and dominates key economic arguments, while the proponents of software patents are not as well‐organised. This configuration of the discourse gave leeway for an alternative course of political action by the European Parliament. The notion of discourse coalitions and related structural features of the discourse are operationalised by drawing on social network analysis. More specifically, discourse network analysis is introduced as a new methodology for the study of policy debates. The approach is capable of measuring empirical discourses both statically and in a longitudinal way, and is compatible with the policy network approach.     

Recruitment and Expertise in the European Commission

The article examines the changes in the European Commission’s recruitment practices from its creation in the 1950s until today. Based on the insight that recruitment shapes the role of professional experts in public bureaucracies, the article traces the emphasis on specialist skills and qualifications in the Commission’s recruitment competitions (the concours) over time. It finds that the selection of policy staff to the Commission has become more generalist since the 1960s, a surprising finding given that the organisation is often regarded as a ‘technocracy’ dominated by experts. The article attributes this development to the multinational character of the administration, as the need to integrate citizens from new member states has prompted the Commission to rely on one-size-fits-all recruitment tests. It also discusses whether the declining emphasis on specialist knowledge in staff selection can be seen as part of a broader trend towards a more generalist Commission, where officials are required to change jobs frequently and where expert functions are outsourced to other bodies.     

Decoupling practical and legal compliance: Analysis of member states’ implementation of EU policy

Despite the vast literature on policy implementation, systematic cross‐national research focusing on implementers’ performance regarding different policy issues is still in its infancy. The European Union policies are conducive to examining this relationship in a comparative setting, as the EU member states need to implement various EU directives both legally and in practice. In this study, a first attempt is made to analyse the relationship between legal conformity and practical implementation and the conditions for practical deviations in 27 member states across issues from four policy areas (Internal Market, Environment, Justice and Home Affairs and Social Policy). In line with existing approaches to EU compliance, it is expected that the policy preferences of domestic political elites (‘enforcement’) affect their incentives to ‘decouple’ practical from legal compliance. Instead, administrative and institutional capacities (‘management’) and societal constraints (‘legitimacy’) are likely to limit the ability of policy makers to exert control over the implementation process. The findings suggest that practical deviations arise from policy makers’ inability to steer the implementation process, regardless of their predispositions towards internationally agreed policies. The results have strong implications for the effective application of international rules in domestic settings, as they illustrate that political support for the implementation of ‘external’ policy does not ensure effective implementation in practice.     

The Power of the Purse: Supranational Entrepreneurship,Financial Incentives,and European Higher Education Policy

This article shows how the European Commission cultivates policy shifts toward a particular idea of a common European Higher Education Area by using its considerable financial leverage. By making European Union (EU) funding dependent on grant recipients meeting certain strategically selected conditions, the Commission creates new incentive structures for domestic actors, in this case higher education institutions (HEIs), with two important consequences. First, the Commission turns universities into agents for its policies: Universities lobby governments to pass legislation, which would allow them to conform to Commission requirements. Second, HEIs try to comply with the Commission's requirements even in the absence of compatible national frameworks, thereby leapfrogging policy decisions on the national level. Describing this as a “soft” mechanism for achieving convergence, as Open Method of Coordination accounts posit, overlooks the fundamentally non‐negotiable nature of the process from the participants' perspective and considerably underestimates the Commission's real influence. We examine this argument through a case study of an EU‐funded higher education program, Erasmus Mundus.     

Are Europeans ready for a more democratic European Union? New evidence on preference heterogeneity,polarisation and crosscuttingness

Some scholars and policy makers argue in favour of increasing democratic contestation for leadership and policy at the European level, for instance by having European‐wide parties campaign for competing candidates for President of the European Commission ahead of European Parliament elections. But do such changes put the survival of the European Union at risk? According to the consociational interpretation of the EU, the near absence of competitive and majoritarian elements has been a necessary condition for the stability of the EU political system given its highly diverse population. This article contributes to the debate in two ways. First, it develops a more precise understanding of ‘problematic’ diversity by examining how three variables – the heterogeneity, polarisation and crosscuttingness of citizen preferences over public polices – affect the risk of democratic contestation generating persistent and systematically dissatisfied minorities. Second, it uses opinion surveys to determine whether the degree of diversity of the European population is problematically high compared to that of established democratic states. It is found that the population of the EU is slightly more heterogeneous and polarised than the population of the average Member State, although policy preferences in several Member States are more heterogeneous and polarised than the EU as a whole. Strikingly, however, policy preference cleavages are more crosscutting in the EU than in nearly all Member States, reducing the risk of persistent minorities. Moreover, policy preferences tend to be less heterogeneous and polarised, and nearly as crosscutting, in the EU as a whole as in the United States. For observers worried about how high polarisation and low crosscuttingness in policy preferences may combine to threaten democratic stability, these findings should be reassuring.     

The Stein Rokkan Lecture 2016 Mission impossible? Reconciling economic and social Europe after the euro crisis and Brexit

During the crisis, the European Union's ‘social deficit’ has triggered an increasing politicisation of redistributive issues within supranational, transnational and national arenas. Various lines of conflict have taken shape, revolving around who questions (who are ‘we’? – i.e., issues of identity and inclusion/exclusion); what questions (how much redistribution within and across the ‘we’ collectivities) and who decides questions (the locus of authority that can produce and guarantee organised solidarity). The key challenge facing today's political leaders is how to ‘glue’ the Union together as a recogniseable and functioning polity. This requires a double rebalancing: between the logic of ‘opening’ and the logic of ‘closure’, on the one hand, and between the logic of ‘economic stability’ and ‘social solidarity’, on the other. Building on the work of Stein Rokkan and Max Weber, this article argues that reconciliation is possible, but only if carefully crafted through an extraordinary mobilisation of political and intellectual resources. A key ingredient should be the establishment of a European Social Union, capable of combining domestic and pan‐European solidarities. In this way, the EU could visibly and tangibly extend its policy menu from regulation to (limited, but effective) distribution, reaping the latter's benefits in terms of legitimacy. The journey on this road is difficult but, pace Rokkan, not entirely impervious.     

A European response to non-compliance: the Commission’s enforcement efforts and the Common European Asylum System

This article aims at systematically analysing the European Commission’s effort to enforce compliance with the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). In recent years, human rights organisations have increasingly denounced EU member states’ violations of the right to asylum and accused the EU of turning a blind eye to non-compliance with the CEAS. Although the primary responsibility to implement EU law lies with member states, the Commission ought to assist them and enforce violated legislation. How exactly does the Commission react to member states’ non-compliance with the CEAS? What can be inferred from these insights? By using infringement data, policy documents, and complementary interviews, the article scrutinises which of the available instruments are applied de facto. Subsequently, the findings are critically discussed, suggesting that the Commission prefers capacity-enhancing instruments and is rather tentative in using instruments to increase member states’ willingness to comply.     

EU public affairs and the White Paper on Governance

The White Paper on Governance process[This analysis covers the period up to and including the publication of COM (2001) 428 of 25.7.2001, ‘European Governance: A White Paper’.] began life as a search for an issue by a new Commission President. The issue is packaged as enhancing/modernising democracy in the EU and legitimising EU institutions, and searches for further avenues of civil participation. The process ‘sells’ the concept of ‘democratic deficit’, though reveals a highly open and accessible system which is already severely overloaded by interest representation. Rather than escalating a ‘lobby free for all’, the opportunity could be taken to strengthen governance by organising EU interest representation. This could be done by accrediting associations that are able to meet strict criteria of representativity as ‘governance partners’, making them sufficiently attractive to their members to work through them rather than bypassing them, and which would strengthen their ability to contribute to EU governance as policy capable organisations. These associations could find a place in a revamped and reorganised Economic and Social Committee, which would be engaged at a much earlier stage in the EU policy process. Copyright © 2001 Henry Stewart Publications     

Agenda-setting under pressure: Does domestic politics influence the European Commission?

The European Union (EU) has become increasingly visible and contested over the past decades. Several studies have shown that domestic pressure has made the EU's ‘electorally connected’ institutions more responsive. Yet, we still know little about how politicisation has affected the Union's non-majoritarian institutions. We address this question by focusing on agenda-setting and ask whether and how domestic politics influences the prioritisation of legislative proposals by the European Commission. We argue that the Commission, as both a policy-seeker and a survival-driven bureaucracy, will respond to domestic issue salience and Euroscepticism, at party, mass and electoral level, through targeted performance and through aggregate restraint. Building on new data on the prioritisation of legislative proposals under the ordinary legislative procedure (1999–2019), our analysis shows that the Commission's choice to prioritise is responsive to the salience of policy issues for Europe's citizens. By contrast, our evidence suggests that governing parties’ issue salience does not drive, and Euroscepticism does not constrain, the Commission's priority-setting. Our findings contribute to the literature on multilevel politics, shedding new light on the strategic responses of non-majoritarian institutions to the domestic politicisation of ‘Europe’.     

The European Commission and fiscal governance reform: a strategic actor?

The intensification of the financial and economic crisis in Europe has added a new impetus to the debate over the possibilities for securing supranational fiscal integration within the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Since the literature on the European Union’s response to the crisis is dominated by the study of intergovernmental politics, this article considers the previously neglected role of the Commission. A framing analysis of the Commission’s crisis discourse is operationalised here, which is supplemented by interviews with senior officials located in the Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) during key phases of the crisis. It is found that a supranational reform agenda was never internalised by the Commission. Instead, the Commission acted strategically by framing the crisis around intergovernmental fiscal discipline. These findings suggest that, in line with the ‘new intergovernmentalist’ thesis, supranational institutions themselves may not be as ‘hard-wired’ towards supranationalism as is often assumed.     

Consultations with Interest Groups and the Empowerment of Executives: Evidence from the European Union

We examine how an executive's consultations with interest groups during the formative stage of the policy process affect its bargaining success during the decision‐making stage after it has proposed new policies to legislative actors. Our theory sets out how consultations with interest groups strengthen the executive by bolstering its formal and informal agenda‐setting power. The empirical testing ground for our theory is the European Union (EU), and in particular the consultations held by the European Commission. The analysis assesses the effects of these consultations on the congruence between the Commission's legislative proposals on controversial issues and EU laws. Our analysis incorporates detailed information on the type and scope of each consultation. In line with our theory, we find that the Commission had more success during the decision‐making stage after conducting open consultations with large numbers of interest groups during the policy formation stage.     

Channelling Protest in Illiberal Regimes: The Cuban Case since the Fall of the Berlin Wall

Abstract

As part of the strategy for better governance, the European Commission has taken steps towards improved consultation and dialogue on European Union (EU) policy with interested parties. Opening up the policy process and getting interest groups involved are considered important for the democratic legitimacy of EU policy making. This article examines the public Internet consultation on the Commission proposal for a new European chemicals policy, the so-called REACH system. Being one of the most consulted issues in EU history, the chemicals policy review is considered as a critical test for the participatory mechanisms provided by the European Communities. By analysing more than 6000 contributions to the consultation, it is demonstrated that it invited broad participation, although industry was considerably better represented than NGOs and other civil society associations. Moreover, an overwhelming majority of participants were national actors from the largest member states rather than transnational actors. It is concluded that online consultations can invite broad participation in EU policy shaping but it is unlikely to bring about equal participation from different group of actors. Therefore it raises concern when measured against standards of democratic governance.     

Islam and Religion in the EU Political System

This article examines the increasing relevance of Islam and religion in the institutional arrangement of the EU post-Maastricht and the future policy implications for the complex political system of the EU. By adopting a combination of qualitative methodologies that are theoretically rooted in historical institutionalism and in a systemic view of the EU, the paper studies the emergence of Islam and religion as policy issues in two institutional settings, the European Commission and the European Parliament, during the 1990s and up to the first decade of the twenty-first century. The analysis shows a growing attention to faith communities on the part of the Commission, in the post-Maastricht context, culminating in the elaboration of semi-official avenues for encounter and dialogue with religious groups. It also indicates how, in turn, these semi-official practices and the ideas behind them have gradually imposed themselves upon multiple levels of the EU political system, thus opening up an institutional space in the EU for consultations with and ‘informal policies’ towards faith communities, both within and outside the EU borders.