The Voters' Curses: Why We Need Goldilocks Voters

Scholars have long deplored voters' lack of interest in politics and argued in favor of greater political engagement. We present a formal theory of elections where successful communication of campaign messages requires both effort by candidates and attention from voters. Voters' interest in politics affects their attention and impacts the effectiveness of the electoral process as a screening and disciplining device. In line with existing theories, there exists a curse of the uninterested voter: When voters have little interest in politics, the electoral process performs poorly, and voters' attention to politics is low. Surprisingly, we uncover a curse of the interested voter, by which the same happens when voters have a strong interest in politics. Our results highlight the importance of distinguishing between voters' interest and attention, two notions often conflated in empirical studies. Moreover, policy interventions aimed at subsidizing the cost of acquiring political information can have unintended consequences.     

Good Administration: Why We Need It More Than Ever

This article relates the concept of 'good administration' to a range of key constitutional issues, including The Governance of Britain , the debate about a British Bill of Rights, the creation of the Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council, and the Law Commission's consultation on public law remedy. It argues that 'good administration', far from being remote from these issues, is a critical component of much that we value most in public life. By drawing upon, for example, the Parliamentary Ombudsman's publication of Principles of Good Administration and the Court of Appeal judgment in a case concerning the Ombudsman's report on occupational pensions, the article suggests that the principles of deliberative democracy, human rights and restorative justice combine to make the Parliamentary Ombudsman an effective instrument for 'humanising the bureaucracy', as first envisaged when the Office was created by the Wilson government in 1967.     

Why Public Employees Rebel: Guerrilla Government in the Public Sector

Employee recalcitrance and employer reprisal are ever-present conditions in public service. Yet we have limited knowledge of the forces that move administrators away from acquiescence and toward antagonism. The authors follow the theoretical thrust of behavioral public administration to better understand administrative behavior by targeting the determinants of guerrilla government actions. They do so by presenting the results of a conjoint experiment embedded in a survey of federal bureaucrats. Findings show that decisions to pursue guerrilla activities are conditional on a multitude of factors—namely, the bureaucrat's personal views of the directive as a policy solution, the compatibility of the directive with the bureaucrat's ethical framework, the status of the person issuing the directive, and the probability that the directive might cause harm to others. Notably, these decisions generally are not affected by the probability of retribution or the expected type thereof. However, they are affected by the magnitude of harm that may ensue if orders are obeyed and not resisted.     

Measuring Preferences for Divided Government: Some Americans Want Divided Government and Vote to Create It

Political Behavior - Tests of theories of the electoral origins of divided government hinge on the proper measurement of voter preferences for divided government. Deriving preferences for divided...