The Democratic Costs of Constitutionalisation: The European Case

There is little doubt that the European Union suffers from a legitimacy deficit. However, the causes of this deficit and, as a consequence, the remedies are contested. This article wants to show that an important, but often overlooked, cause for the legitimacy deficit lies in the overconstitutionalization of the EU. The European Treaties have been constitutionalized by the ECJ, but are full of provisions that would be ordinary law in states. Constitutionalization means de‐politicization. What has been regulated on the constitutional level is no longer open for political decision‐making. Thus, in the EU political decisions of high salience are not only withdrawn from the democratically legitimized institutions, but also immunized against political correction. Therefore, the consequences from the constitutionalization have to be drawn: The Treaties should be reduced to those norms that reflect the functions of a constitution, whereas all the other parts have to be downgraded to the level of secondary law.     

共和与民主宪政

共和国是千百年来政治法律家们所追求的政权组织形式。共和主义可以使各种社会政治资源得以充分利用。民主是人民当家作主 ,自己决定自己的事业 ,是近现代人们所推崇的政体的主流形式。宪政主义的核心是废除绝对主权 ,强调对宪法限制统治权 ,确认并保护人民的权利。共和与民主并不矛盾 ,民主是共和的重要组成部分 ,没有民主就没有共和 ,但民主必须受到节制 ,共和必须接受民主的洗礼 ,民主共和必须由宪法予以确认。在宪政的体制下发扬民主 ,完善共和 ,是建设现代文明国家的基本要求。     

American Constitutionalism and Democratic Virtue

Neither the historical tradition of American constitutionalism nor those who have theorized about it have promoted political or theoretical designs hospitable to the valorization or promotion of democratic virtue. This article illustrates this point by canvassing practical interpretations of the American constitution, from the document of 1787–1791 to Bush v. Gore , and theoretical interpretations from Madison to Rawls, Dworkin, Ackerman, Elster, Holmes, and other contemporary theorists of liberal constitutionalism and natural law. Exposing these roadblocks to the theory and practice of democratic virtue in America, it argues, provides a critical corrective to current debates about the relationship between constitutionalism and democracy.     

Political Constitutionalism and the European Union

What kind of constitution is emerging in Europe? There are two approaches to answering this question. The first, a ‘foundational’ approach, rejects the premise: there can be no real constitution in the absence of a ‘demos’, a foundation which exists only nationally. The second, ‘freestanding’ approach, depicts it as paradigmatic of a broader phenomenon of cosmopolitan constitutionalism, based on individual rights guaranteed through a transnational rule of law. Rejecting both for their failure to account for European constitutionalism as a historical process of polity‐building, a third approach, ‘political constitutionalism’, is proposed, capturing the dynamic quality of constitutionalisation in the EU. From this perspective, what is emerging in Europe is a constitution that reflects a common good (predominantly conceived in economic terms), albeit one which is legally, political and socially contested. It is by capturing this complex picture of the political formation of Europe that the constitutional question will be most fruitfully pursued.     

European Constitutionalism and the Modern Social Imaginary

This article seeks to shed light on some of the problematic assumptions underpinning the contemporary debate over the constitutional identity of the European Union. The central claim put forward here is that the development of the European Union’s constitution is significantly constrained by what Charles Taylor has described as the modern social imaginary. The constraint operates at two levels. First, modern understandings of constitutionalism typically ignore or underemphasize its dynamic and historical characteristics and its relationship with the self-understanding of political subjects. Thus, modern constitutionalism fails to acknowledge the importance of historically conditioned assumptions involved in the formation of the identities of political subjects. In short, it fails to understand constitutionalism as a ‘regime’. Second, modern constitutionalism’s blind-spots result in a relatively unreflective adherence to a particular type of constitutional regime: the modern economy and its associated ‘consumerist’ form of political citizenship.     

Pathos and Patina: The Failure and Promise of Constitutionalism in the European Imagination

Legal studies react to the Union's social legitimacy deficit either by funnelling the problem to empirical sociology (accompanied by the familiar call for more transparency and democracy), or by ignoring it altogether. This article argues that the crisis in social acceptance can be traced back to the texture of EU law. Law is more than a body of rules: it is a social practice, a structure of meaning, and a system of beliefs. In this light, national law has a richly textured fabric of cultural resources to rely on, which makes it 'ours'. In contrast, EU law embodies the fluid surface of consumer identity and appears less 'ours'. The Union's counter–measures—adding pathos and patina to neutralise our distrust—have proven unsuccessful. Neither will a new written Constitution be particularly helpful. The way out, rather, is coming to terms with the market citizen, rather than believing in, and forcing upon the consumer, stories of shared values and historically situated commonality.     

Beyond Constitutionalism: The Search for a European Political Imagination

Two recent books, Joseph Weiler's The Constitution of Europe and Larry Siedentop's Democracy in Europe, seek to address one of the defining issues in contemporary European legal studies; the search for a European public philosophy. Both site their critiques within a particular jurisprudential tradition, the modernist; one that is bound up with anxieties about legitimacy and constitutionalism. This review article suggests that the ‘new’ Europe has been too easily distracted by the lures of constitutionalism, and more particularly by the temptations of Treaties. Public philosophies are not found in Treaty articles. Rather, a public philosophy is a state of mind, a product of the political imagination. And it is the absence of such an imagination which lies at the root of contemporary concerns regarding constitutionalism and legitimacy; the concerns which underpin Weiler's and Siedentop's books. A discussion of these books, in the first two parts of this article, is followed by a discussion of Godfried Wilhelm Leibniz's ‘universal’ jurisprudence. It is suggested that such a jurisprudence is better able to furnish a public philosophy for the ‘new’ Europe; just as, indeed, it was for the ‘old’ Europe. Moreover, such a jurisprudence is far more than a mere theory of laws and constitutions. Leibniz's jurisprudence requires that we think, not merely ‘beyond’ sovereignty, or even beyond democracy, but beyond constitutionalism.     

宪政视野中的民主政治

宪政就是被宪法和法律规范的公共权力。宪政民主的价值是使社会和经济持续发展;宪政民主要受到环境和文化等多种因素的制约,宪政民主的公共权力构建必须实行分权制衡,宪政民主的实现还必须有赖于社会力量的作用。     

Civil Society and the Re-imagination of European Constitutionalism

Abstract: The twin concepts of constitutionalism and democracy, which offer a complex template for the structural organisation of a polity, can be understood in terms of a dialectic of complementary but competing values, values represented by responsiveness to an existing order and innovation towards a potentially new order. Recognising this necessarily dynamic relationship, an essentialist reading of a constitutionalisation of the demos is abandoned, and an examination of the extent to which the dialectic can credibly or legitimately be played out in a supranational ‘community’ and in the context of an emerging transnational civil society can be undertaken. Rather than seeking credibility or legitimacy through the rationalisation of a community by an ethical consensus as in some forms of republicanism and communitarianism, the dialectic opens up the norms and boundaries of the polity and leads to an understanding of the ‘community’ in less rigid and more diffuse, even plural, terms. Once understood in this way the possibility emerges for legitimacy to be pursued through a public sphere enlarged by a context‐transcending constitutional discourse mediated by transnational civil society. Alternatively the normative ‘openness’ of the polity might be prioritised and with it the uncertainty/fluidity of the constitutional arrangement itself; in this way the legitimate pursuit of constitutionalism is understood in terms of a never‐ending agonistic struggle or experimental practice.     

Constitutions,Constitutionalism, and the European Union

The institutional reforms of the EU, coupled with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, have fuelled the debate about a European Constitution. This paper begins by examining the nature of constitutions and constitutionalism. The focus then turns to the EU itself. It is argued that the Community has indeed been transformed into a constitutional legal order, and that the arguments to the contrary are not convincing. This does not however mean that the EU has, or should have, a European Constitution cognisable as such which draws together the constitutional articles of the Treaties, together with the constitutional principles articulated by the European Court of Justice. The difficulties with this strategy are examined in detail, and the conclusion is that we should not at present pursue this course. It would be better to draw on the valuable work done by the European University Institute in its recent study in order to simplify and consolidate the Treaties.     

The Idea of a European Constitution

Any abstract account of a field of law must make generalizationsthat are both faithful to the legal materials and appropriateto the subject matter's aims. The uniqueness and fluidity ofthe European Union's institutions makes such generalizationsvery difficult. A common theoretical approach to EU law (onethat is often relied upon by the Court of Justice, the Parliamentand the Commission) is to borrow directly from the theory ofdomestic constitutional law. The most recent manifestation ofthis tendency is the draft Treaty on the European Constitution,which includes many of the symbolic features of a domestic constitutionalorder. But the European Union is not a state and the constitutionalanalogy is in many ways problematic. In this article I defendthe view that a more complex theory is more appropriate to theunique combination of ordinary politics with diplomatic conferencesthat constitutes the European Union. The key to these institutionsis, in my view, a Kantian international ideal of liberal peace.The foundational constitutional principles of the EU, principlesthat both fit the current legal framework and offer its mostattractive interpretation, require the qualified autonomy ofmember states in a union of republics that create collectiveinstitutions for the purposes of liberal peace.     

Women's Rights, the European Court, and Supranational Constitutionalism

This analysis examines supranational constitutionalism in the European Union (EU). In particular, the study focuses on the role of the European Court of Justice in the creation of women's rights. I examine the interaction between the Court and member state governments in legal integration, and also the integral role that women's advocates—both individual activists and groups—have played in the development of EU social provisions. The findings suggest that this litigation dynamic can have the effect of fueling the integration process by creating new rights that may empower social actors and EU organizations, with the ultimate effect of diminishing member state government control over the scope and direction of EU law. This study focuses specifically on gender equality law yet provides a general framework for examining the case law in subsequent legal domains, with the purpose of providing a more nuanced understanding of supranational governance and constitutionalism.     

Conflicting Conceptions of Constitutionalism: Investment Protection from the European Union and International Perspectives

Netherlands International Law Review - International investment law as it is currently being transformed in the European Union (EU) proves to be an ideal test case for assessing global...     

Democratic Deficits of a Dualist Deliberative Constitutionalism: Bruce Ackerman and Jürgen Habermas

Abstract.  This paper analyzes the deliberative constitutional models of Bruce Ackerman and Jürgen Habermas. It argues that Ackerman's version of democratic dualism sets strict normative distinctions between constitutional and ordinary political deliberations. As a result, it ignores everyday political processes and citizens' ordinary public deliberations and is unresponsive to ongoing social changes in a liberal pluralist society. On the other hand, Habermas's discursive constitution defends a dynamic relationship between constitutional and ordinary politics. It provides a better model of a continuous constitutional development that is more open to new social and historical circumstances.     

The European Community and Biodiversity Loss: Missing the Target?

The European Community has set itself the stringent policy target of halting all biodiversity loss by 2010. It intends to achieve this target by following a dual strategy. On the one hand, the 1979 Wild Birds Directive and 1992 Habitats Directive are designed to protect important sites housing vulnerable wildlife. On the other hand, biodiversity protection is to be integrated into all other Community policies. The Community views the Common Agricultural Policy as having a vital role in both areas. It provides a mechanism through which much needed Community funding can be channelled into the management of protected wildlife sites. Equally, it also has an important influence upon biodiversity in the wider countryside. This article examines the regulatory measures that have been taken to integrate biodiversity protection into the Community's agricultural policies and assesses whether they are likely to be sufficient to enable the Community to meet its 2010 target.     

The Perils of ‘As If’ European Constitutionalism

This review article offers thoughts on Kaarlo Tuori's recent book, European Constitutionalism, and more particularly on what he calls the ‘disciplinary contest over the legal characterisation of the EU and its law’. As the book's title suggests, Tuori privileges the constitutional perspective in that contest, so much so—he freely admits—that his analysis ‘predetermine[s] how the EU and its law will be portrayed’. And therein also lies the book's main weakness. Tuori's predetermined ‘constitutional’ interpretation, like so much of the dominant legal discourse in the EU today, ultimately obscures the core contradiction in EU public law. National institutions are increasingly constrained in the exercise of their own constitutional authority but supranational institutions are unable to fill the void because Europeans refuse to endow them with the sine qua non of genuine constitutionalism: the autonomous capacity to mobilise fiscal and human resources in a compulsory fashion. The EU's lack of constitutional power in this robust sense derives from the absence of the necessary socio‐political underpinnings for genuine constitutional legitimacy—what we can call the power‐legitimacy nexus in EU public law. To borrow Tuori's own evocative phrase, the EU possesses at best a ‘parasitic legitimacy’ derived from the more robust constitutionalism of the Member States as well as from the positive connotations that using ‘constitutional’ terminology evokes regardless of its ultimate aptness. The result is an ‘as if’ constitutionalism, the core feature of which is an increasingly untenable principal‐agent inversion between the EU and the Member States, one with profound consequences for the democratic life of Europeans. The sustainability of integration over the long term depends on confronting these adverse features of ‘European constitutionalism’ directly, something that legal elites—whether EU judges, lawyers, or legal scholars—ignore at their peril.