官僚机构与公共政策

官僚制是一种被设计来有效执行公共政策的理性的组织结构,然而在一个高度复杂和技术导向的社会中,官僚机构不但是公共政策的执行者而且是主要决策者。     

A Race for the Regs: Unified Government,Statutory Deadlines,and Federal Agency Rulemaking

Theory suggests that Congress should delegate more policymaking authority to the bureaucracy under unified government, where lawmakers are less worried about the president orchestrating “bureaucratic drift.” Yet, all unified governments come to an end, making broad delegations potentially advantageous to future lawmaking coalitions (“coalitional drift”). We seek to assess how lawmakers simultaneously limit the risk of each of these pitfalls of delegation. Our answer is rooted in Congress’s ability to spur agency rulemaking activity under unified government. Specifically, we expect statutes passed under unified government to require agencies to issue regulations quickly and for enacting coalitions to use oversight tools to influence agency policy choices. Such “proximate oversight” allows coalitions to cement policy decisions before a new election changes the configuration of preferences within Congress and the executive branch. We assess our argument using unique data on both congressional rulemaking deadlines (1995–2014) and the speed with which agencies issue regulations (1997–2014).     

It Takes a Coalition: The Community Impacts of Collaboration

Members of Congress frequently collaborate on policy initiatives, reaching out to colleagues in both parties to find common ground on solutions for the problems faced by their constituents. Using a novel dataset of over 30,000 “Dear Colleague” letters sent by members of the 111th Congress, I use the collaborative relationships that exist in the earliest stages of the policy process to measure the social influence of legislators. I demonstrate that districts represented by members of Congress who are better connected to their colleagues receive a greater share of federal grant money. I argue that this is because collaborative legislators are well‐positioned to be influential allies to strategic bureaucrats who want to maintain a broad base of support for their programs in Congress. Thus, devoting resources to building relationships with their colleagues is one way members of Congress can more effectively support the communities they represent.     

走向后官僚制时代：公务员价值取向的转变

官僚制度下形成了官僚制组织及其成员以理性为基础的价值取向,但是新公共管理运动的兴起,使官僚制组织及其理论受到了冲击,新的社会需求要求政府公务员树立新的价值取向。我国作为后发展中国家,在对官僚制组织体制进行反思和改革的过程中,应形成具有我国特色的公务员价值取向。     

外贸豁免制度的贸易保护功能研究

随着各国贸易保护战略的推进,反垄断法作为政府进行经济调控的工具,与贸易保护政策间的互动关系日益紧密。对外贸易反垄断豁免正是各国为满足贸易需求而普遍适用的竞争政策,它对于促进一国对外贸易发展、提高国际竞争力、保护国内产业利益具有特别的功能和效果,但其适用也受到限制。根据发达国家的有关立法和实践,我国《反垄断法》下的外贸豁免制度尚需完善,惟有如此方能确保其必要的贸易保护功能得以有效发挥。     

Constituent Communication Through Telephone Town Halls: A Field Experiment Involving Members of Congress

Telephone town halls are an increasingly prevalent method for members of Congress (MCs) to communicate with constituents, even while garnering popular criticism for failing to facilitate engagement and accountability. Yet scholars have paid little attention to the events and their effects, and even less to how they might be improved. To remedy this problem, we report on a field experiment in which four MCs joined their constituents in telephone town halls. Overall, participation in an event improved constituents’ evaluations of the format in general, and of the MC in particular. Furthermore, we studied how these events might be improved by evaluating a reform—a single‐topic focus with predistributed briefing materials—designed to enhance deliberative interaction. This reform enhanced effects on opinions of the format without significantly altering effects on attitudes toward the MC. Our results suggest that telephone town halls hold promise for constituents, officeholders, and democratic practice.     

试论竞争政策与贸易政策的关系

竞争政策与贸易政策都是基本的经济政策,并且在主要方面都体现为相应的经济法律制度.在现代社会,竞争政策与自由贸易政策在追求的目标和面临的现实条件方面具有一致性,在功能上具有相互促进和补充的作用,但是两者在作用的领域、价值观念和取向以及具体处理和作用的方式等方面存在内在的差异性和潜在的冲突.     

消极权利与立法者的积极义务——以德国联邦宪法法院第二次堕胎判决为例

公民基本权利的义务主体是国家,其实现需要国家履行相应的义务。传统宪法理论把消极权利和消极义务、积极权利和积极义务看作是一一对应的关系,而当代宪政实践表明,每一种基本权利都对应着国家的消极义务和积极义务。在消极权利所对应的国家积极义务中,最重要的是立法者的积极义务。立法者只有通过立法提供组织、程序及财政上的法律保障,公民消极权利的实现才具有可能性。     

我国国际私法关于“公共秩序”立法的审视

"公共秩序"是国际私法上一项必不可少的制度,但它的内涵和外延却具有相当大的弹性和模糊性,这一特性既可以说是它天生的缺陷,更可以说是它的生命力之所在.就当前采用这一制度的各国立法司法实践与国际立法的重要走势及对这种走势的科学分析来看,中国目前的立法将"公共秩序"表述为"社会公共利益"是不准确的,有关立法与司法实践中存在种种不当,须加以改进.     

公共政策的工程品格

公共政策具有工程活动的所有特征,政策活动是改造社会的工程活动。社会科学是公共政策的理论指导,公共政策是社会科学理论在实践中的综合应用。公共政策学应借鉴工程学的研究方法,实现公共政策理论与实践上的创新。     

The Private Interests of Public Officials: Financial Regulation in the US Congress

Legislators' private financial holdings affect policy decisions. Due to financial self‐interest, we theorize that legislators whose personal investment portfolios include equities from firms affected by proposed policies vote for legislation that benefits those firms. We also theorize that legislators with greater personal exposure to equity investments support policies that benefit equities markets generally. We create a novel data set of legislators' personal stock investments and examine major congressional actions since the 1990s on financial deregulation and market intervention. US House members who own stocks in firms who benefit from financial deregulation vote for deregulation. House members with greater exposure to financial and automotive stocks support the financial and auto bailouts, respectively. General exposure to equities markets is also associated with support for key legislation boosting markets. The normative implications are significant, as legislators' private interests influence decisions in the public sphere.     

公共政策：谁之政策？何种政策？

公共政策是公众的政策,它既是多数人的政策,也是少数人的政策,但并非少数个人或特殊阶层谋取私利的工具。公共政策应该是公正的政策,公平的政策,公开的政策。公正性、公平性、公开性是公共政策的基准性价值,是体现政策公共特性的基本维度。公共政策通过提取、分配、管制、象征等基本功能,实现自由、安全、秩序和繁荣,最终维系公共利益。本文从三个方面的设问揭示:公共政策的本质就是个人偏好与集体选择的制度安排。     

再论社会公共利益的法律保护——案例法的视角

虽然我国法律规定有对社会公共利益的保护制度,但这一制度没有得到足够重视,执法部门在实践中也没有用好这个制度。本文以新近发生的三个事例作为引子,提出社会公共利益是指以社会公众为利益主体的,涉及整个社会最根本的法律原则、道德的一般原则及隐藏于它们之后的与时代相适应的公平正义观念;其具有公众性、普遍性、客观性特点,内容上至少应包含平等、正义和秩序。     

通往司法的法理学——中国法理学的现实主义路向

法理学研究与司法实践是建构法治国家的两个紧密关联的重要方面。当前中国法理学研究中存在宏大叙事和文本主义的倾向,在司法实践中则有死守"法律形式主义"的可能,两者因与现实脱节而构成目前中国法理学研究的困境,而引致这种困境的则是占据主导的传统"立法者的法理学"。通过超越传统司法推理模式,转换"立法者"的姿态,而以法律现实主义的立场与方法,确立一种通往司法的法理学,或可摆脱前述困境。     

Interaction of criminological research and public policy

We examine here some of the interactions of research and policy over the past several decades. The “rehabilitation period” was effectively terminated by nulleffect evaluations of various rehabilitation techniques. The “just deserts-utilitarian period” was fed by research estimates of the deterrent and incapacitative effects of criminal justice activities. The more recent “overt politicization period” saw the earlier attempt to bring rational and theory-based perspectives to policy development replaced by much stronger emphasis on political concerns. We explore possible ways to reestablish the research-policy connections. This paper was prepared for the Plenary Session,Journal of Quantitative Criminology 10-Year Anniversary, 1995 Annual Meeting of the American Society of Criminology, Boston, MA.     

强化我国知识产权导向政策问题研究

知识产权制度是政府公共政策体系重要组成部分之一,其功能在于维护知识权利秩序并保证实现知识进步效益目标.从政府政策视角,探讨我国实施知识产权战略过程中的“知识产权导向”问题,并将我国部分省市对《国家知识产权战略》中“强化知识产权导向”的政策理解和细化措施进行比较分析,提出:在建设创新型国家总政策的指导下,应全面调整和完善地方各级知识产权政策,构建科学合理、强调知识产权导向作用的知识产权公共政策体系.     

Yea or Nay: Do Legislators Benefit by Voting Against Their Party?

This article asks whether legislators are able to reap electoral benefits from opposing their party on one or more high‐profile issues. Using data from a national survey in which citizens are asked their own positions on seven high‐profile issues voted on by the U.S. Senate, as well as how they believe their state's two senators have voted on these issues, I find that senators generally do not benefit from voting against their party. Specifically, when a senator deviates from her party, the vast majority of out‐partisans nonetheless persist in believing that the senator voted with her party anyhow; and while the small minority of out‐partisans who are aware of her deviation are indeed more likely to approve of and vote for such a senator, there are simply too few of these correctly informed citizens for it to make a meaningful difference for the senator's overall support.