制度经济学视角下的腐败预防与治理研究

腐败在本质上是作为公共代理人的公权力承担者与经济行为主体之间的利益交换行为,是经济和市场原则在政治领域的错用,是公权力异化和被滥用的结果。从制度经济学视角分析,市场失灵会导致权力获得对稀缺资源的分配权,民众与政府官员之间的多重委托代理关系会导致公权力委托代理关系的复杂化,从而造成权利与权力的关系失衡,进而引发权力委托代理关系失灵。当制度缺失、监管缺位时,腐败收益往往会高于腐败成本,政府官员在对成本收益进行考量后,就会实施腐败行为。而预防和治理腐败,不仅需要不断推进市场化改革,改善公共权力委托代理关系,还需要提高腐败行为的机会成本。     

论经济新常态下高管降薪与深化国企体制改革——基于“习李经济学”的思考

从学术角度系统论述了"习李经济学"理论内涵,并指出"习李经济学"是基于实现国家战略目标的泛经济学。在经济新常态背景下,从关联性、发展性及协同性三个层面,论述了高管降薪与深化国企体制改革的内在契合性,并以此为基础从纳入顶层设计、推进国有企业薪酬激励制度改革、构建差异化薪酬体系以及强化监管四个层面,提出如何更好地合理推进国企高管降薪工作,以实现国有企业体制改革目标,促进国有企业良性发展。     

论经济新常态下高管降薪与深化国企体制改革——基于“习李经济学”的思考北大核心CSSCI

从学术角度系统论述了"习李经济学"理论内涵,并指出"习李经济学"是基于实现国家战略目标的泛经济学。在经济新常态背景下,从关联性、发展性及协同性三个层面,论述了高管降薪与深化国企体制改革的内在契合性,并以此为基础从纳入顶层设计、推进国有企业薪酬激励制度改革、构建差异化薪酬体系以及强化监管四个层面,提出如何更好地合理推进国企高管降薪工作,以实现国有企业体制改革目标,促进国有企业良性发展。     

遏制公权力异化与腐败的制度伦理向度

公权力异化与腐败是权力滥用的两面,而遏制公权力异化和腐败也是人类历史的难题。虽然人们普遍强调从教育、制度和监督的综合治理模式入手来解决公权力异化与腐败问题,但是从制度伦理视角来分析和遏制公权力异化和腐败则是更为清晰和有效的路径选择。     

论理想村级组织的制度基础

村级组织是联结国家与农村社会的中介。建立理想村级组织制度模式，有利于改革和完善村级组织制度，增强村级组织的功能。村级组织实际制度与成文制度较高的一致性，成文制度安排的行为模式与制裁手段的统一，成文行为模式的相容性以及充分照顾非正式制度安排的村级组织成文制度安排，是构成理想村级组织的主要制度基础     

基于定律视野的反腐败进路

把握腐败行为特性及其形成、演变规律,是反腐败政策设计的前提。通过定律作为分析工具,有助于分析纷繁复杂的腐败生态,揭示反腐败政策的内在机理的视窗。运用两元性定律剖析公权力为什么呈现纷繁复杂的形态,以及权力腐败源自公权力内在属性的倒错;运用路径依赖定律研判在路径控制要素的掣肘下中国特色反腐倡廉发展愿景实现程度;运用"奥卡姆剃刀"力图破解当前反腐败制度爆炸所带来的新问题;运用戈森定律分析腐败的动机。     

德国国有企业改革及启示

德国政府从上个世纪五十年代开始至今对国有企业实施了一系列的改革,改革因其力度大、成效显著而令世人瞩目。改革的主要目的是政府希望通过对国企的改革摆脱因维持大量低效或无效的国企而使财政陷入困境的状况。德国国有企业改革分三个阶段进行,改革后的德国企业的特点是企业的所有制形式以私人垄断所有制为主;组织形式以股份制为主;生产资金以银行借贷为主;经营决策由企业自己作主且职工参与企业重大决策。德国国有企业改革的经验:政府分级所有;政府分类管理;政府参与控股;大胆运用托管经营方式;职工参与管理;建立监督体系。深入探讨和研究德国国有企业改革的相关内容对正处在加入WTO后新形势下的中国的经济体制改革和国有企业改革有重要的借鉴意义和启示。     

浅议建立与现代企业制度相适应的企业会计模式

如何建立起与现代企业制度相适应的企业会计模式？总的说来，应以社会主义市场经济理论为指导，根据现代企业制度对会计的要求，通过进一步深化会计改革，建立起以多元化企业会计目标为起点，以经营管理型会计工作为核心，以间接管理型会计管理体制为手段，以注册会计师为主体的社会会计监督体系为保证的企业会计模式。1．建立起多元化的企业会计目标模式。现代企业制度的建立将投资者的终极所有权与企业法人财产权相分离，把现有的国有企业改造成既是法人实体又是市场主体的有限责任公司或股份有限公司。这时，国家及国家授权的投资机构、…     

社会公权力诉讼的制度建构

转型期社会公权力日益成熟，并可能危及公民权利。社会公权力既不同于国家公权力，也不同于公民权利。社会公权力诉讼存在制度障碍，需要新的制度建构方能对社会公权力加以有效的司法规制。     

基于公平的国有企业利润分配问题研究

国企分红问题是近几年国内外关心的一个重要问题，国企要向政府缴红利已经步入实施阶段。本文系统地分析了国企红利上缴对国企本身的影响，得出了基于公平的国有企业分红的支出方向：充实社保基金、弥补国家公共事业支出、补充企业国家资本金和弥补国有企业改革成本。对我国现阶段国有企业利润分配问题的研究有一定的借鉴作用。     

政府与市场关系的调适:破解反腐困局的根本路径

中国的腐败问题具有深刻的制度根源,即计划机制与市场机制双轨并行下的"增量改革"及其与之相配套的各项体制机制设计。一方面,公有企业固有的垄断冲动与政府规制触角无孔不入的延伸,大大拓展了政府的寻租空间,为官员腐败培育了肥沃的土壤;另一方面,监督机制的软弱与虚化,更是在一定程度上刺激了腐败现象的发生。通过对政府与市场关系以及这组关系的变动对腐败问题所产生的影响进行深入的考察,结合我国独具特色的渐进主义转型模式在当前阶段所面临的困境与挑战,厘清政府与市场的合理边界,继续科学地调适政府与市场的关系,进一步深化市场化改革,才是破解反腐困局的根本出路。     

Does corruption suppress voter turnout?*

This paper investigates to what extent voters’ perceptions of political corruption affect turnout. In previous research, two opposing views are put forward with regards to the relationship between corruption and turnout. On the one hand, corruption increases turnout because voters either are bought off to participate or because they are mobilized on clean government issues. On the other hand, corruption decreases turnout because presence of corruption corrodes the political system which leads to general cynicism, distrust and voter apathy. In this paper, we contribute to the existing research by adopting a multi-level approach to the relationship between corruption and turnout. We test the hypothesis that voters’ perceptions of corruption dampens turnout but that the effect is conditional upon the corruption context. We test our hypothesis by combining individual-level data and country-level data from 26 countries from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems and country-level data from the Quality of Government Data Set. The findings show that perceiving corruption negatively affects turnout, but only in countries with low to medium levels of system corruption.     

Linking Managers With Ministers: Dilemmas of the state owned enterprise

In relations with their state-owned enterprises, governments try to capture the advantages that are thought to exist in operating through autonomous institutions. At the same time, they attempt to prod the enterprises toward a set of governmental goals. The resulting relationships between ministers and managers have produced a pattern of behavior by state-owned enterprises that differs considerably at times from those of private enterprises. But articulating the goals of the government in ways that are internally consistent has proved difficult, as has securing the benefits of autonomy. Some governments are attempting to improve the relationship with their state-owned enterprises by developing explicit agreements, even contracts, between ministers and managers. Although this approach does not face up to some basic problems in the manager-minister relationship, it cannot be ruled out as a significant step in improving the link.     

Political change and turnovers: How do political principals consider organizational,individual, and performance information?

Public Choice - This study explores whether changes in political leadership affect the survival of chief executive officers (CEOs) of Korean state-owned enterprises (SOEs). On the basis of...     

北京市老字号的发展现状及对策研究

老字号是北京历史文化名城的重要标志.在市场经济条件下,一方面要重视对老字号的法律保护和政策扶持,另一方面要加快以产权制度为核心的国有老字号企业改革,发挥老字号的品牌优势和市场机制的作用,推动北京老字号进入规范、有序、健康的发展轨道.     

中国公共政策制定中的政府俘获及其解决对策

中国公共政策制定中的政府俘获主要有国有垄断企业有力影响政府的决策、地方支柱企业绑架地方政府的决策、向政府官员提供非法的个人所得三种表现形式。政府俘获产生的原因包括企业与政府形成利益共同体、以GDP增长为核心的政绩考核体系、政府反腐败不力及廉政建设滞后、各社会群体参与不均衡、政府权力缺乏制约,法治不健全等方面。解决这一问题应从以下几方面采取措施:减少政府对市场经济的干预、保障民众的结社权利,培育公民社会、实现政策制定的公开透明和广泛参与,严惩政府官员腐败行为、加强廉政制度建设,建立以科学发展观为指导的政绩考核体系。     

论我国反腐败机构设置的改革与完善

我国现行反腐败机构由于设置上还不够完善,工作中出现了职责分工不明确、协作配合不强、工作独立性缺乏保障、调查手段不得力等一些问题。鉴于我国反腐败斗争的长期性、复杂性、艰巨性,以及国外反腐败机构设置运行的成功经验,我国反腐败机构设置需要进一步的改革和完善。一方面,通过修改相关法律法规,将检察机关的反贪部门与行政监察机关合并,继续与党的纪律检查机关合署办公,并授予行政监察机关在调查腐败案件时采取特殊侦查手段的权力;另一方面,建立严格的内控和权力制约机制,加强对合并后的纪检监察机关的监督,防止纪检监察机关滥用权力,保证执法工作的客观、公正。     

Chinese State-owned Enterprise Investments in Uganda: Findings from a Recent Survey of Chinese Firms in Kampala

Within the large body of China-Africa literature, there is a growing body of literature that differentiates between China’s various economic actors, more specifically between its state-owned and private enterprises. This paper intends to contribute to this literature by comparing Chinese state-owned enterprises and hybrid (mixed owned) enterprises with private enterprises in Kampala, the capital of Uganda. An air of mystery often surrounds Chinese companies in Africa, this paper will provide some clarity concerning companies in Kampala. To do this we first look at the governmental assistance given to these companies, then the kind of assistance they potentially receive. Next we investigate what motivated these companies to come to Uganda, and how they established themselves, whether it is after a Chinese aid project or construction job, or some other route. We further investigate the size, employment policy and markets of these Chinese state-owned enterprises in Kampala. Finally we look at the employment of Ugandan labour and management, the problems faced by the enterprises and the environmental challenges, as well as how these are dealt with. We conclude that Chinese SOEs and mixed ownership companies in Uganda are involved in a small range of sectors, often capital-intensive sectors such as oil and construction, and are therefore also larger than the majority of the Chinese private enterprises. SOEs and mixed ownership enterprises tend to have arrived in Uganda earlier than most private enterprises, face slightly different problems, and are more interested in the Ugandan market as whole than their privately owned counterparts. More importantly, they have greater proportions of local employees and are more interested in indigenizing their workforces.     

Corruption: Governance challenge towards reducing unemployment in Nigeria

The study examines the possibility of having a very low rate of unemployment in Nigeria, if there is a reduced rate of corruption in the long-term. While using cointegration regressions and Vector Error Correction Mechanism (VECM) over the period 1996–2020, it is affirmed that corruption could increase unemployment rate in the long run. The two corruption indicators employed (control of corruption and corruption index) are found to have a substantial effect on unemployment rate. Further evidence confirms that corruption and unemployment are cyclically interdependent. Findings indeed stress that a high level of corruption is harmful to employment growth. On the other hand, in the absence of sufficient job opportunities, rent-seeking government officials would be more interested in collecting bribes from job seekers, which results in sustained unlawful practices among the public officials. Thus, adopting effective corruption-control measures is critical. It is therefore suggested that to effectively tackle corruption incidents, there should be incentives for citizens or public officials to report bribery and the process of reporting corruption incidents should be further simplified. Strengthening anti-corruption agencies and developing a sound legal framework that promotes a culture of lawfulness and impeccable practices in the public sector are central.     

儒家政治文化与反腐倡廉

儒家政治化对我国现实政治发挥着双重作用。其官本位权本位、人治政治、臣民化、人情政治等是腐败滋生和蔓延的重要原因；而民本主义、社会责任、道德修养、从政规范等有利于廉政建设。应创造性地利用和改造儒家政治化，以德治国，推进反腐倡廉。