Democratization and political corruption in the Philippines and South Korea: A comparative analysis

The Philippines and South Korea have long had difficult corruption problems. More recently, both have experienced significant democratization. This article compares the two cases, first developing an analysis of corruption in each country, then laying out their reform strategies and assessing their effectiveness, and finally exploring the contrasting relationships between democratization and corruption that are found in these countries. The Philippines confront reformers with more difficult challenges, beginning with the size and decentralization of the society, but other contrasts are important as well. The political will required to produce successful reform has been lacking in the Philippines, for a variety of reasons, while recent anti-corruption initiatives in Korea have had stronger backing. Recent Korean reforms also emulate the successful approaches of Singapore and Hong Kong in important ways. By itself, democratization will not check corruption in either country, but where reform is accompanied by significant resources and where democratic accountability complements political will--more true of Korea than of the Philippines--significant progress can be made.     

“It’s the politics, stupid!”. The politicization of anti-corruption in Italy

This article aims to analyze the relationship between judicial activism against political corruption and electoral accountability. The judiciary plays a pivotal role in enforcing anti-corruption legislation, and, in many countries, courts have moved closer and closer towards that kind of working. In the article, we analyze the conditions under which a judicial prosecution of corrupt practices can also lead to electoral punishment of political misconducts by voters, or to a failure of accountability mechanisms. The latter outcome is more likely to occur if judicial activism is politicized. The ‘politicization’ of anti-corruption initiatives is here defined as an increase in the polarization of opinions, interests, or values about judicial investigations and the extent to which this polarization is strategically advanced towards the political debate by parties, political leaders, and media. By crystallizing a new dimension of political conflict, political actors can negatively affect electoral accountability, diminishing the risk of electoral punishment. We study this phenomenon by analyzing the case of Italy, a country which has experienced high levels of politicization of anti-corruption. However, whether and to what extent anti-corruption policies can be politicized is a question open for many other countries that can take a similar path.     

China’s anti-graft campaign and international anti-corruption norms: Towards a “new international anti-corruption order”?

This article analyzes the growing impact of an increasingly powerful China on the evolution of norms governing the global fight against corruption. Combining insights into the diffusion of anti-corruption norms and China’s ‘two-way socialization’ into the international order with an analysis of the Chinese leadership’s internationalized anti-corruption campaign, it argues that China’s active involvement in the international fight against corruption is bound to challenge prevailing international ‘definitions’ and ‘solutions’ of corruption. Despite the considerable attention to supposed incompatibilities between ‘culturally insensitive’ Western anti-corruption efforts and conflicting Chinese cultural norms, the actual ‘China challenge’ to the international anti-corruption regime is much less a cultural than a political one. While China’s formal-legal anti-corruption system has been receptive to international socialization, China’s own contributions to international norm making are defined by the Party’s top-level leadership, which promotes a different set of anti-corruption norms. However, a coherent alternative ‘Chinese model’ of anti-corruption, akin to the globally propagated ‘China path’ for economic development and poverty reduction, is not yet in sight.     

Protecting integrity at the local level: the role of anticorruption and public management networks

This article argues that anti-corruption agencies at the local-level have been successful in a way that can be evaluated and emulated. A related contention is that corruption control is most effective when the central public integrity agency is part of both a local anticorruption network and a local public management network. Quite reasonably, the international anti-corruption project has focused most time and energy on advocating and assessing efforts made to ensure public integrity at the national level. Baseline studies by scholars and supra-national integrity nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) identify the form of corruption control (if any) adopted by the central government. Key considerations in assessing the status of national anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) are the ones mentioned in the introduction to this special issue: political independence, scope of authority, investigatory powers, position in the national legal/political network, durability, and use of effectiveness measures. Similar taxonomies are deployed by OLAF, Transparency International, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and by scholars on corruption control.     

《联合国反腐败公约》中的引渡制度探析

<联合国反腐败公约>是目前反腐败方面最重要的国际法律文件,它筑起了一道强大的国际反腐法律强网.实现对腐败犯罪的引渡是国际反腐败的一种自然延伸.而<联合国反腐败公约>关于引渡的规定既是对缔约国的要求,也是各国进行国际合作的有效路径.为了实现对腐败犯罪的引渡,接受"死刑犯不引渡原则"则是我国的上上选择.     

Combatting institutional corruption: The policy-centered approach

How can institutional corruption be combatted? While recent years have seen a growth in anti-corruption literature, examples of countries rooting out systemic corruption remain few. The lack of success stories has sparked an academic debate about the theoretical foundations of anti-corruption frameworks: primarily between proponents of the principal-agent framework and those seeing systemic corruption as the result of collective-action problems. Through an analysis of current principal-agent and collective action anti-corruption literature, this article adds two additional arguments to the debate: (a) the need to specify what one talks about when talking about systemic corruption and (b) the necessity to move beyond the principal-agent versus collective action frameworks dichotomy towards a policy-centered approach for how to combat institutional corruption. Having outlined how institutional corruption can be seen as one type of systemic corruption, this article shows how a policy-centered approach such as strengthening the appearance standard through an independent public commission can address theoretical mechanisms emphasized in each anti-corruption framework–thus arguing that the frameworks complement rather than rival each other. The article ends by arguing for an anti-corruption discourse acknowledging that a multifaceted problem such as corruption requires multiple frameworks rather than attempts for silver-bullet explanations.

     

Does Hypocrisy Matter? National Reputational Damage and British Anti-Corruption Mentoring in the Balkans

In the late 2000s, numerous prominent public commentators raised concerns that corruption scandals were harming Britain’s ability to play a leadership role in anti-corruption initiatives abroad. With a view to contributing to critical criminological scholarship on international policy transfer and double standards in criminal justice policy and practice, this article explores the extent to which reputational damage curtailed Britain’s appeal as an anti-corruption mentor in South-East Europe during the 2000s. Challenging the common presumption that stronger states tarnished by corruption scandals will face ‘hypocricy costs’ abroad, this article finds that a range of factors work to insulate stronger states from the potential ramifications of reputational decline.     

From global problems to international norms: what does the social construction of a global corruption problem tell us about the emergence of an international anti-corruption norm

This article examines the ontological contestation that is inherent to the emergence of an international anti-corruption norm. First, the article briefly analyses the compatibility of an agenda on the social construction of problems from sociology and the well-established study of norms in constructivist IR. It argues that an analytical shift from the study of norms to the social construction of problems can shed light on the power relations that underlie international norms, and corruption in particular. The article traces the emergence of a global corruption problem up to the early 2000s when scholars have traditionally placed the establishment of an international anti-corruption norm. It first shows the contestation of corruption as a global issue on the level of problem definition, and then, it shows the role of venue shopping and venue shifting in the diffusion of anti-corruption talks and the norm cascade of the 1990s. The article concludes with an analysis of how the social construction of problems challenges the conventional approach of the emergence of an international anti-corruption norm.     

Modeling the international technology transfer process in construction projects: evidence from Thailand

Many developing and newly industrialized countries lack the technical and management capabilities to undertake large and/or complex infrastructure projects. In an effort to more rapidly develop their infrastructure, economies and living standards, many have embarked on a series of international Technology Transfer (TT) initiatives within the construction and other industries. However, these initiatives have not immediately translated into enhanced capabilities and competitiveness within host country firms, resulting in a sustained reliance on foreign firms. In an attempt to improve rates of TT in developing countries, this article proposes a conceptual model for international TT that accommodates the numerous factors believed to impact on the processes effectiveness and derived outcomes. Utilizing the results from a questionnaire survey of 162 industry professionals from Thailand, an international TT model including the significant factors which impact on the TT process and the degree of value added from it, was formulated through exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis. Moreover, the significance of direct and indirect interrelationships between model factors was determined through structural equation modeling. This model included four process enablers, namely, government influence, transferee characteristics, transferor characteristics and relationship building, and one outcome factor named TT value added. Building relationships (i.e. trust, understanding and communication) between the transferor and transferee was determined to be the key predictor of TT-induced value creation for the host construction sector.      

反腐败国际合作法律问题探析--兼谈中国对《联合国反腐败公约》的应对

随着世界经济的一体化,腐败对一国经济发展和政治合法性的危害超越了现有的国界,影响着世界的和平与繁荣。许多国家已经认识到,只有充分而全面的国际合作才能有效地控制和惩治腐败,反腐败的国际交流与合作将愈来愈广泛。作为第一项全球性反腐败法律文件——《联合国反腐败公约》的通过,为反腐败国际合作提供了一个新的平台。我们应该转变“各自清扫门前雪”的旧观念,树立反腐败国际合作的新观念,加强在预防和打击腐败方面与各国和国际组织的合作。     

灰色地带:反腐败法律的文化分析

法人类学对腐败和反腐败法律的分析做出了重要贡献。指出了法律界定为"腐败"的行为的社会根基以及腐败行为的两个规范框架:国家的法律和社会惯例;评估腐败问题时存在的双重标准:国际组织和西方国家常常认为"南方"和"东方"国家的腐败问题比"发达"国家更严重;反腐败与政治稳定常常难以求得平衡,媒体对腐败的报道带来了一系列棘手的问题,在处理反腐败问题时常常采用过于简单的两分法。法律人应当对这些卓识给予更多的关注。这对于理解英国的几个重大案件具有重要的意义。     

Dealing with corruption: the next steps

The 1997 White Paper from the British Government's Department for International Development (DFID) was specific in identifying the role of governance now being addressed by international and national donors: “improving governance can ... improve the lives of poor people directly. It is also essential for creating the environment for faster economic growth. Both aspects can be compromised by corruption, which all governments must address. In developing countries it is the poor who bear proportionally the heaviest cost“ (DFID, 1997, p. 30). Dealing with corruption is thus a priority both in terms of who it most affects and in terms of which objectives of governance — including participatory and responsive government and economic growth — it constrains. Although it has long held a specialist academic interest, corruption has become the subject of growing practitioner attention which means that the focus on corruption is beginning to move significantly from theory to practice and the practical. While there is substance to the belief that fire-engines cannot be designed without a thorough understanding of the fire they are intended to put out, there is also a sense in which the pervasiveness and tenacity of the current fires of corruption are such that action rather than refining theories and processes is what is now required. To paraphrase an analogy made by a senior British civil servant about the general issue of identifying policy — that corruption “is rather like the elephant — you recognise it when you see it but cannot easily define it” (quoted in Hill, 1997, p. 6) — is also to suggest that, while theorising may help draw up longer-term approaches to dealing with corruption, there is enough information and experience to develop best practice proposals for more immediate implementation and for developmental strategies that link to the longer-term approaches. This article addresses some of the issues of this agenda which seeks to develop, for those actively involved in anti-corruption initiatives, frameworks within which to consider realisable and cost-effective shorter-term anti-corruption strategies. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Aid, governance and corruption control: a critical assessment

If the OECD??s Development Co-operation Report for 2009 is correct in its claim that ??The international aid effort now adds up to less than the sum of its parts??, then continued rapid growth in aid transfers is likely to contribute to further aid absorption problems, as well as institutional atrophy and deteriorating governance and corruption control among aid recipients. This article considers aid for good governance and anti-corruption, using Tanzania as an example. ??The supply side of aid?? sketches the bigger picture in which such aid is located, stressing collective action problems facing the aid industry in the current period of growth and diversification. ??The consequences of aid proliferation on corruption control in an aid-dependent state?? provides some empirics from Tanzania. ??Conclusions: whither ??corruption control????? draws some conclusions for the future of aid for governance and corruption control. A key message is that donor-driven governance and corruption control initiatives have failed to address the governance weaknesses that excessive and uncoordinated aid has helped to create.     

Sugar coated bullets: Corruption and the new economic order in China

The recent political debate concerning the influence of corruption on the new economic order in the People's Republic of China is unique not only for its detailed and public manifestations, but also because it works around the acceptance of some degree of corporate private ownership of the means of production within China. The concern for corruption in Chinese government and commerce is not, of itself, novel.We prefer in this paper briefly to focus on the economic and political environment from within which this concern has been generated, to comment on the significance for the Government of the PRC in associating the pall of corruption with the undermining of more capitalist economic reform, and then to examine how the legal definitions and controls on corruption have been transformed to complement a new political agenda. Associated with this, it has been necessary to advance some rather tentative predictions concerning the development of new anti-corruption initiatives in the PRC, their justifications, and pressures on the economic transition which is said to be corruption generative.Speculation about the future face of economic corruption in China is of limited value when one is interested in questions of regulation and control. As the definition, indication and interpretation of corruption is a political process which may pay little regard to realistic indicators, so too the creation of control initiatives may not be dependent on predictions of actual developments in graft. We have endeavoured to show that recent regulatory programmes in the PRC themselves indicate much about the commercial contradictions that underly the new economic order, as well as evidencing the socio-legal dilemmas inherent in anti-corruption official discourse.     

The Private Sector and the Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol: Experiences, Challenges and Prospects

This article emphasizes the critical importance of the private sector to the success of the efforts to mitigate climate change. Analysing the progress and experiences gained so far, this article concentrates on the role of the private sector in the operationalization of the Kyoto Protocol's three flexible mechanisms, namely Joint Implementation (JI), the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and international emissions trading. The article illustrates in detail the various tasks performed by private actors during the CDM and JI project cycles, and contemplates their possible participation under Article 17 of the Protocol on international emissions trading. While identifying some challenges, the article argues that the Kyoto Protocol's flexible mechanisms have succeeded in finding innovative ways of involving the private sector in climate change mitigation and that the post-2012 climate regime should build on these experiences.     

Explaining corruption: An institutional choice approach

The end of the Cold War, thestrengthening of world democracy, and the advancement of neoliberaleconomic reforms, have exposed corruption as a major world problem andspawned a plethora of international and national anti-corruption programs. Past theorizing has increased our knowledge about corruption, however, aninterdisciplinary (political, economic, cultural) theory of the causes ofpolitical corruption has never emerged. This article develops amiddle-range interdisciplinary theory of the causes of corruption builtthrough employment of an institutional choice analytic frame. The analyticframe draws on the Institutional Analysis and Development work of ElinorOstrom, Roy Gardner, & James Walker, and the constructivist work ofNicholas Onuf. The resultant theory is advanced through a statisticalanalysis. The article concludes that ongoing international and nationalanti-corruption programs will likely fail unless they include reforms to stateinternal power structures and political cultures.     

The role of the judiciary in combating corruption: aiding and inhibiting factors in Nigeria

Based on empirical facts and research in socio-economic fields, it is consensually agreed among scholars that corruption is one of the greatest hindrances to the development of any country. As part of the efforts to combat the menace of corruption, laws and institutions have been put in place. Consequently, judges, by virtue of their position in society, have an important role to play to ensure the effectiveness of those laws and institutions. However, the Nigerian judiciary has failed to live up to its responsibility in its role of combating corruption in the country and is even itself accused of corruption. This article discusses the factors that are necessary to assist in building an effective, vibrant and corruption-free judiciary. Salient factors that hinder the judiciary in the performance of its role to combat corruption are highlighted. The article finally suggests the need to reform Nigeria’s judicial sector and to set in motion all the machinery necessary for the purpose of creating a formidable judiciary in the country.     

On the dark side of the code: organizational challenges to an effective anti-corruption strategy

Corporations have been fighting for decades to eliminate corruption. However, despite the proliferation of compliance programs and a recurrent surge of interest in business ethics, commercial bribery prevails as a “rational choice strategy” for economic success and thus is widely regarded as the result of immoral choices of greedy individuals. This article reports on a modus operandi study concerning corruption within a large industrial corporation (Siemens AG). Results highlight the fact that neither consistent anti-corruption norms nor severe formal sanctions were able to deter certain employees from deviant behavior in this landmark case of structural corruption. Sociologists and business economists have both pointed to the organizational culture that provides an explanation for this paradox. The author compares three diverging hypotheses: (1) private gain, (2) cognitive normalization, and (3) organizational cultures, and concludes that the structural causes of corrupt practices fit the definition of ‘useful illegality’ (Luhmann). To a large extent, this old sociological concept resembles the criminological idea of corporate crime, but it emphasizes the cultural factors that undermine management’s preventive strategies, and thus holds the promise of theoretical progress. Implications that emerge from the case analysis for the social control of corporate bribe payers are discussed. The discussion reveals why challenges to successful anti-corruption efforts persist at the organizational level.