The European Union’s ambiguous concept of ‘state fragility’

Although scholars and practitioners alike perceive ‘state fragility’ to be a key challenge for security and development, there are significant variations in the definition of this phenomenon. This article analyses the European Union’s notion of ‘state fragility’. Based on a document analysis covering the years 2001–12 and expert interviews conducted in November 2012, the article reveals that the EU has not (yet) decided on a clear-cut definition of ‘state fragility’. Three factors explain this lack of decisiveness: the EU’s complex institutional framework, which impedes policy coherence; developments at the international level that require the EU’s compliance; and the organisation’s diplomatic efforts to maintain cooperative relationships with aid-recipient countries that have been labelled ‘fragile’. The result is conceptual ambiguity that potentially reduces the EU’s capacity to respond to fragile situations.     

‘Fragile States’: introducing a political concept

The special issue ‘Fragile States: A Political Concept’ investigates the emergence, dissemination and reception of the notion of ‘state fragility’. It analyses the process of conceptualisation, examining how the ‘fragile states’ concept was framed by policy makers to describe reality in accordance with their priorities in the fields of development and security. The contributors to the issue investigate the instrumental use of the ‘state fragility’ label in the legitimisation of Western policy interventions in countries facing violence and profound poverty. They also emphasise the agency of actors ‘on the receiving end’, describing how the elites and governments in so-called ‘fragile states’ have incorporated and reinterpreted the concept to fit their own political agendas. A first set of articles examines the role played by the World Bank, the oecd, the European Union and the g7+ coalition of ‘fragile states’ in the transnational diffusion of the concept, which is understood as a critical element in the new discourse on international aid and security. A second set of papers employs three case studies (Sudan, Indonesia and Uganda) to explore the processes of appropriation, reinterpretation and the strategic use of the ‘fragile state’ concept.     

State Transitions from Rigidity to Fragility and Failure: The Case of Middle East and North Africa

ABSTRACT

The taxonomy of the state’s effective governance capacity present in the literature is evolving around state fragility. However, this article argues that a state moves along the state transition curve, resulting in governance capacity variations over time. It begins as a fragile state, consolidating to becoming a vibrant state, only to embark, eventually, on a downward trajectory through phases of rigidity, decaying, and fragility, before becoming a failed state. About one-third of MENA (Middle East and North Africa) countries are either fragile or failed states. Only technological change and knowledge accumulation and diffusion can shift this curve upward, thereby increasing a state’s effective governance capacity.     

Discursive democracy and the challenge of state building in divided societies: reckoning with symbolic capital in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Current approaches to democratic state building place serious conceptual limits on policy options. A democratic future for Bosnia's people will require far more searching engagement with identity formation and its politicization than reform efforts have so far contemplated. Theories of discursive democracy illuminate how this might be possible. We deploy the discursive idea of symbolic capital to show how one might identify the lines along which people in Bosnia could constitute meaningful, internally legitimated political communities – or that would indicate the experiment was not worth attempting. Unless advocates of democratic state building can articulate, rather than assume, a sufficiency of common ground among the populations' multiple, overlapping and conflicting identities, they may have to revert to the default of separate political communities.     

The resilient state: new regulatory modes in international approaches to state building?

‘Resilience’ has quickly risen to prominence in international security and development circles. In recent years it has found its way into political discourse on state building and state fragility, triggering a vast but often conceptually indistinct examination of the subject. Given its meaning in policy publications and guidelines, ‘resilience’ tends to eschew a static conceptualisation of statehood, turning instead to a more dynamic, complex and process-oriented rendering of state–society relations. This illustrates a conceptual shift from ‘failed states’ to ‘fragile states and situations’. It also transforms the concept of ‘failed state’ as a mere threat perception – with ‘stability’ as its logical other – into ‘fragility’ as a particular form of social and political risk. This paper analyses the concepts in 43 policy papers, focusing on the nexus of ‘resilience’ and ‘fragility’ in international state building, and assesses potential consequences. What does ‘resilience’ – as the opposite vision to ‘fragility’ – in fact mean? What is the practice derived from this chimerical state of states?     

Precipitating state failure: do civil wars and violent non-state actors create failed states?

This article examines whether the incidence of civil wars and the presence of violent non-state actors have an effect on state failure. Research on failed states has thus far prioritised armed conflicts as one of the key causes of state failure. This study challenges that claim and posits that civil war incidence has limited impact on the transition from fragility to failure. Global quantitative analysis of state failure processes from 1995 to 2014 shows that although armed conflicts are widespread in failed states, civil violence does not lead to state failure and large numbers of failed states become engulfed by civil war only after the failure occurs. By contrast, this study demonstrates a direct link between the presence of violent non-state actors and state failure.     

State disintegration and power politics in post-Suharto Indonesia

This article illustrates how discourses on ‘state fragility’ have been instrumentalised by the Indonesian military in order to consolidate its political and economic power after the fall of Suharto. In the wake of Indonesia’s transition to democracy violent conflicts escalated in East Timor, Aceh, Papua, the Moluccas and Sulawesi. Most notably East Timor’s successful secession spawned fears over the potential ‘balkanisation’ of Indonesia. In this context the Indonesian military, which had been shunned for its involvement in Suharto’s New Order, managed to re-establish itself as the ‘guardian of the nation’. Based on fieldwork in Indonesia, the article describes how post-9/11 discourses over a potential break-up of Indonesia were used by the Indonesian military to reconsolidate its power in the post-Suharto era. The research findings illustrate that, against the looming threat of state disintegration, attempts to revoke the military’s prerogatives have either failed or have been aborted during the planning stages.     

State building and the non-state: debating key dilemmas

This article unpacks the relationship between state building and the non-state. While accepting both the positive and corrosive characteristics of non-state actors and informal practices of governance, it attempts to (1) advance an argument in favour of mainstreaming ‘non-state’ forms that are positive and useful for state building; and (2) highlight the tensions between the practice of state building and the reality of the non-state. In thinking beyond the state and non-state dichotomy, the article seeks to identify factors that are necessary if state-building programmes are to work in complex environments. Drawing on received wisdom from recent experiences, this conceptual study focuses on important contextual, local, political and legitimacy issues to highlight prominent dilemmas. The conclusion suggests four policy-relevant lessons that reinforce the argument in favour of mainstreaming the non-state agenda into the critical thinking about security and development.     

Corporatism packaged in pluralist ideology: the case of Slovenia

Corporatism has been an influential doctrine in the Slovenian polity since its beginning. After the onset of democratization in the early 1990s, its influence remains strong. Forms of corporatism are embodied in the National Council as the second chamber of parliament, in the chamber system, the system of social partnership and the RTVS (Public Television of Slovenia) Council. It is also present in certain socio-political priorities such as a higher value being placed on partnership over competition, on fairness over human rights, on community over individualism. Social pluralism has always been a part of Slovenian public life. Political pluralism emerged at the end of the 19th century and was never fully developed. There has always been a strong inclination in the political life of Slovenia to organize around interest groups and editorial boards of various publications, a tendency that reveals a plurality of voices but a general unwillingness to fight for political power. It could also be concluded that the development of pluralism in Slovenia relies heavily on corporatism because of the general lack of liberal foundations.     

THE SPATIAL LEGACY OF INFORMAL EMPIRE: OIL,THE SOVIET UNION,AND THE CONTOURS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA'S FAR WEST

Abstract

Beginning in the 1930s, Soviet geologists, engineers, and economic planners began laying the infrastructure of informal empire in China's westernmost province of Xinjiang. Seeking to gain access to its rich petroleum wealth in particular, these Soviet state agents helped create a blueprint for state investment and development in Xinjiang that continues to resonate today. Confronting the substantial Soviet investment in the province and driven by a border policy intent on minimizing capital expenditures for distant peripheries, economic planners in the Republic of China and the People's Republic alike relied heavily on Soviet reports, technology, and infrastructure in their own economic development plans. In the end, the efforts of Chinese and Soviet planners, often working in collaboration, helped create an enduring pattern of state investment in Xinjiang. Focusing on oil extraction, processing, and transport operations in Xinjiang, this work reveals the long-term resonances of informal empire in Chinese border regions.     

Measuring state fragility: a review of the theoretical groundings of existing approaches

State fragility has become a resonant term in the development discourse over the past decade. In its early days it served as a catch-all phrase used by donor organisations to draw attention to the need to assist ‘fragile states’. In response to the call for a better understanding of how to deal with these countries, there was a surge in measures of fragility. However, it was not long before academics pointed to the murkiness and fuzziness of the term, and identified several caveats to most of the proposals for quantification. This paper reviews existing approaches to operationalise this concept, distinguishing between those that offer no ranking or only partial rankings of fragile states, and those providing ordinal lists of countries. The examination of their theoretical underpinnings lends support to the critical view that most existing approaches are undermined by a lack of solid theoretical foundations, which leads to confusion between causes, symptoms and outcomes of state fragility.     

The revenge of the Caucasus: Chechenization and the dual state in Russia

Post-communist development in Russia has been characterized by the development of a dual state in which the constitutional order is balanced by the consolidation of an arbitrary prerogative state. This horizontal dualism has taken root in Russia's regions; and this is accompanied by the establishment of a form of vertical dualism in relations between the regions and the center. Attempts to overcome this form of segmented regionalism under president Vladimir Putin have been undermined by the development of Chechenization, which represents not only the repudiation of dualism in this republic, but threatens to undermine the precarious balance between the constitutional and prerogative states at the federal level as well. Chechenization has its opponents in Moscow as well and its fate is defined by the struggle between the factions at the center. The process of “separatism without secession” is a highly ambiguous one and reflects broader developments in the Russian state as president Dmitry Medvedev seeks to strengthen the constitutional pillar of the dual state.     

Fragility within stability: the state,the clan and political resilience in Somaliland

Abstract

Even in the context of a relatively flourishing state, fragility can be an enduring feature of a political system, particularly in the case of recently established or unrecognised states. This article examines the nature of state-building in a specific context to question the assumption that forms of hybrid governance or pre-existing forms of governance are a necessary evil to be tolerated but which needs ultimately to be overcome during state-building. It does this by adopting the language of resilience and focusing on the case of Somaliland to highlight the role of clan governance as a mechanism of political resilience and as a means of promoting the flexibility required for state-building. Yet, at the same time, the process of state-building often involves formalising governance and limiting the role of traditional social-political forms of governance such as clans, ignoring their role in legitimating and stabilising the political system. However, as this article argues, stability and fragility are inextricably linked; while the clan system has been an important force in stabilising the state, it has also become a pressure point for the state’s latent fragility. By contextualising fragility and stability within the language of resilience, though, this symbiotic relationship can be better analysed.     

State effects and the effects of state building: institution building and the formation of state-centred societies

This article discusses the assumptions underlying state-building efforts and the effects of these efforts. It addresses two main questions: why has state building not led to the establishment of effective states? And what are the effects of statebuilding? It is argued that these efforts have been based on an institutionalist model of the state derived from a Weberian framework, and that the basic reason why state building has failed is that the creation of effective states requires the creation of state-centred societies, where both material and symbolic resources are concentrated in the state. This is very difficult to achieve for external actors. But, although state building has not achieved the kinds of effects associated with effective states, it has nevertheless had significant effects. These include, first, accentuating the patrimonialism which has led to state weakness in the first place; second, reductions in national sovereignty as external actors’ substantial influence on policy agendas renders the state itself subject to control and regulation by actors external to it; and, third, perpetuating the idea of the state, while undermining the possibility of creating actual states which conform to this idea.     

Whither the state? Mining codes and mineral resource governance in Africa

In contrast to the early post-independence era in which African states predominantly controlled the mining sector, the 1980s saw African countries update their mining codes to attract foreign capital. These reform measures largely diminished the power of the state, either resulting in its “selective silence” or its retraction. However, after three waves of these reforms, the disparity between natural resources and sustainable development has continued to widen. Two theories offer a nuanced approach to understanding the state of flux of mining codes and mineral governance in Africa: governance theory and the developmental state theory. This article argues that the activist, interventionist state is making a comeback in mineral resource governance throughout Africa. Moreover, regional initiatives such as the African Mining Vision represent a fundamental departure in mineral governance. However, such initiatives will only bring development to the extent that they are owned by African governments and backed by local communities.     

Playing in the sandbox: state building in the space of non-recognition

For unrecognised states in the international system recognition of sovereign statehood is the ultimate goal. Not being ‘a state’ means being excluded from global networks. However, even in the most basic definitions and criteria for unrecognised states there is a period of relative autonomy accorded due to non-recognition. This is a period when political actors can use isolation to establish the state’s narrative, identity and structure. It is this period that provides the foundations for external interaction. It is in this period that the state is born. This article examines another side to the politics of recognition: the politics of non-recognition. Drawing on the contemporary examples of Somaliland and Kurdistan, the article assesses the benefits as well as the costs of non-recognition.     

Vivir bien governance in Bolivia: chimera or attainable utopia?

The notion of vivir bien – a complex set of ideas, worldviews, and knowledge deriving from indigenous movements, activist groups, and scholars of indigeneity – has become an overarching principle for policy-making and state transformation processes in Andean countries. This article analyses the contradiction between the principle of vivir bien as an egalitarian utopian category and its bureaucratic application in Bolivia to state formation processes and power dynamics involving social movements. It argues that while discursively grounded on such egalitarian principles as reciprocity and rotating authority, its implementation entails bureaucratic propensities to centralise power and authority. Instead of decolonising the state, it is used to discipline the masses.     

The oecd’s discourse on fragile states: expertise and the normalisation of knowledge production

The concept of legitimacy has been highly influential in policy recommendations concerning state building in ‘fragile states’. Indeed, depending on how ‘legitimacy’ is conceived, the actions and practices of state builders can differ substantially. This article discusses what is at stake in the conceptualisation of ‘legitimacy’ by comparing the academic literature with the normative production of the oecd. Looking at two approaches to legitimacy – the institutionalist or neo-Weberian approach focusing on institutional reconstruction, and the social legitimacy approach emphasising the importance of social cohesion for successful state building – the article shows that both these conceptions are present in most reports, but also that the neo-Weberian approach tends to prevail over the social legitimacy perspective. Through a series of interviews with oecd officials and scholar-practitioners who have participated in the writing process of oecd reports, we hint, finally, at future research avenues on the social conditions of knowledge production and its normalisation.     

Social Policy in Hard Times: Crisis-Coping Strategies in Europe from 1976 to 2013

ABSTRACT

Scholarly contributions linking welfare state and crisis management literature still lack a consistent conceptualization of the central matter of interest. To remedy this shortcoming, this article provides a classification of four potential crisis-coping strategies and analyzes the policy outputs of 11 European countries from 1976 to 2013 on the basis of an innovative dataset. The analysis shows that strong deviations from the status quo ante are the rule rather than the exception in times of economic hardship. Furthermore, it reveals a clear shift from the crisis-coping strategy of “Social Protectionism” over “Muddling Through” and “Welfare State Restructuring” to “Austerity” over time.     

Peace education in Israel: an educational goal in the test of reality

Peace education is considered a necessary element in establishing the social conditions required for promoting peace-making between rival parties. As such, it constitutes one of Israel’s state education goals, and would therefore be expected to have a significant place in Israel’s educational policy in general and in response to peace moves that have occurred during the Arab–Israeli conflict since the 1970s in particular. This article reviews the educational policy actually applied by Israel’s state education over the years as reflected in formal educational programs and school textbooks, and suggests that although some significant changes have taken place over time, there has been and still is a significant gap between the stated goal and the practice of peace education in Israel. Reasons for this disparity and its implications are discussed and possible directions are proposed for coping with this educational challenge.