CENTRAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET PRACTICES AND TRANSPARENCY: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON

From an international perspective, a relationship between public sector transparency and better economic and social outcomes is something that is increasingly acknowledged. In terms of lack of transparency in budget reports both bureaucratic model and fiscal illusion theory have been argued as explanations. To assess transparency in budget practices we analyse to what extent a sample of 41 countries are meeting OECD requirements according to its Best Practices for Budget Transparency document (OBP). We find an average OBP fulfilment of 56.4 per cent. Transparency is negatively correlated with corruption and positively correlated with economic development. Countries receiving external financial and technical support meet fewer OBP recommendations than countries not receiving it. Considering the political framework, both progressive and conservative governments reach similar transparency levels. OECD members do not significantly fulfil more OBP suggestions than non‐members. In respect of 4 variables: transparency, corruption, democracy and development, four clusters of countries arise: top‐performing, low transparency‐developed, low transparency‐developing and worst‐performing.     

South Africa's governance challenges: assessing the South Africa–China mineral case

The past 50 years of Africa's history have been blighted by a lack of good governance, which has hindered economic growth and political stability. The continent continues to maintain weak states which are clearly evident in the persistent corruption, unconstitutional behaviour, inefficiency, waste and unnecessary bureaucracy that remain widely practised. However, owing to emerging markets such as China and India that have promoted foreign direct investment in developing countries, a lot of speculation has arisen regarding the impact of the Forum for Cooperation between Africa and China on continental governance. The speculation tends to focus on whether the multilateral trade agreement between Africa and China will be mutually beneficial, or promote bad governance practices such as corruption. This paper argues that in order for any multilateral agreement to become economically beneficial in Africa, the continental elites must first implement good governance best practices. Furthermore, the onus is on the African states, not their regional or trading partners, to implement economic institutional change.     

Political Corruption and Institutional Stability

This article is the first to statistically examine the reciprocal relationship between formal political institutions and political corruption. We argue that political corruption is an informal institution that allows nondemocratic leaders to build political support, act as a substitute for liberalizing concessions in the formal institutions of the state, and thereby extends the longevity of non-democratic regimes. Yet, whereas high corruption level will prevail in nondemocratic regimes, we expect the electoral constituency in democratic regimes to have the formal power to curb political corruption. We demonstrate that these expectations hold by estimating a dynamic multinomial regression model on data for 133 countries for the 1985–2008 period. Our model shows that high-corruption autocracies and hybrid regimes are more stable than their low-corruption counterparts, but that low-corruption democracies are more stable than high-corruption ones. For autocratic and hybrid regimes, the stability is due both to corruption making the formal institutions more resistant to democratization and that the formal institutions prevent reductions in corruption. Consistent democracies, on the other hand, are able to reduce corruption and become more stable as a result.     

Corruption and the Mexican political system: Continuity and change

Thanks to the nature of its political system, Mexico has had a long history of political corruption. Yet recent changes in the patterns of corruption and broader political changes have seemingly altered the equation. Anger over rampant corruption under President Carlos Salinas contributed to the stunning electoral defeat of the PRI in July 1997, while the outcome, the PRI's loss of majority control of the Chamber of Deputies, will add to the structural pressures that have mounted in recent years against institutionalised corruption. This article explores these trends. It sets out the historical and theoretical foundations of corruption in Mexico, examines changes in the incidence and patterns of corruption, and discusses the impact of recent political changes on this aspect of the system. Though cautiously optimistic regarding the impact of Mexico's political breakthrough on efforts to deal with the problem of corruption, the essay concludes on a cautious note, highlighting the difficulties other Latin American countries have encountered in strengthening the rule of law and reining in corruption.     

Rich Country Corruption

Corruption in rich countries is different to corruption in poor countries. There are many analyses and models of corruption in poor countries, and interventions are structured with these in mind. When analyzing corruption in rich countries, borrowing from the experiences in poorer countries does not fit well with public administration practices. Ironically, citizens in rich countries have high levels of perceived corruption, yet they reported very little personal experience with corruption in any form. This article uses data to outline some corruption risks and proposes that any analysis focuses on classifying specific types of corruption in rich countries.     

The Impact of Socio-Political Integration and Press Freedom on Corruption

The analyses in this study demonstrate a more nuanced understanding of a previously understood phenomenon – that openness has a negative relationship with corruption. It is argued that this relationship is substantially influenced by the domestic context, a relationship that has been underdeveloped by previous empirical studies. Focusing on social and political integration, I find that the effect of openness on corruption is conditioned by domestic institutions. The empirical evidence suggests that while political and social openness have a significant impact in combating corruption given a free press, the impact of such international forces are negligible in cases where press freedoms are low.     

Political corruption,economic performance,and electoral outcomes: a cross-national analysis

The current study examines how the incumbent government's economic performance plays a role in mediating the impact of political corruption on electoral outcomes in 115 developing countries with relatively higher levels of corruption than Western consolidated democracies. Borrowing theoretical insights from the information-processing theory of voting, this study finds that political corruption becomes a formative electoral factor when the regime fails to sustain a sufficient level of economic growth. Otherwise, political corruption is not a significant factor that shapes electoral outcomes, irrespective of the level of perceived corruption, because the economy occupies voters' minds as the most important issue, making it a more accessible issue than political corruption.     

The spread of famine in Africa: Avoiding the worst

The aim of this article is to provide an evaluation of Uganda's current strategy to fight corruption. Like many countries on the African continent, Uganda has deemed it necessary to make attempts to reduce and control corruption within the public sector. As awareness of the deleterious and debilitating effects of corruption has grown, so too have both internal political factors and external pressures from aid donors increased in order to push for fundamental change in this respect. In terms of the donors, many have stipulated specific conditions relating to a good governance agenda based upon adherence to public integrity and minimum standards of public conduct. Sensitivity to pressure also stems in part, from a wish by government to be seen to be actively responding to donor concerns. Internal pressures stem from a growing desire by the public to demand accountability from those in government.     

Civil war and the coalition government of democratic Kampuchea

This article explores the relationship between the politics of international development and the reproduction of global inequality. I argue that contemporary discourses about— and the practices of—‘development for developing countries’ represent an attempt to reconstitute the political utility of the ‘Third World’. In an era of globalisation the deployment of the notion of a Third World of ‘developing countries’ which require immediate, systemic attention through the discourse and practice of international development continues to provide a way of both disciplining and displacing the global dimension of social and political struggle. I refer to this dynamic in terms of the political utility of the Third World, which, I argue, has been conducive to the organisation of global capitalism and the management of social and political contradictions of inequality and poverty. I develop this argument by drawing on the historical implications and legacy of ‘international development’ as practised in and on the Third World and through a critical analysis of the methodological premises that constitute international development. I illustrate this by drawing on a key strategy aimed ostensibly at development: the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (prsp) approach, promulgated by the World Bank and the imf, which I discuss in relation to the ‘development agenda’ inaugurated during the 1999 wto meeting in Doha (Qatar). I argue that the ideology and practice of the global politics of international development reinforce the conditions of global inequality, and must be transcended as both an analytical framework and an organising principle of world politics. While the prsp and related approaches are currently presented as key elements in the building of the ‘architecture for (international) development’, what is emerging is a form of governance that attempts to foreclose social and political alternatives.     

Bureaucratic corruption in africa: causes,consequences and remedies

One of the critical policy issues in African management today is bureaucratic corruption. This problem has in some countries reached such proportions as to frustrate good policy intentions and to parayze management operations. The study examines the extent of bureaucratic corruption in selected African countries, analyzes their potential causes. Critically asesses their consequences on the pattern of political. socio-economic and administrative development, and reviews the effectivenes of remedies proposed or actually tried.     

Governance and Hyper-corruption in Resource-rich African Countries

Official corruption is frequently associated with the abundance of valuable extractive resources. This article reviews the worst cases of ‘resource curse’ in Africa—Angola, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Nigeria—in light of the most recent developments. Despite its systematic association with public corruption, however, mineral wealth is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition. Corruption is widespread in resource-poor countries as well—in Africa and elsewhere—and some resource-rich African countries such as Botswana have a record of good economic performance and high public integrity, suggesting specific ways in which transparency and accountability for the use of mineral resources can be encouraged and corruption correspondingly reduced. Because corruption in resource-rich African countries is heavily influenced by external interests, particularly the multinational extractive industries, recent initiatives by the United States and the international community to foster transparency carry a significant potential for reducing corruption and improving governance.     

General Trends and Causes of High Compensation of Government Managers in the OECD Countries

Government managers play a central role in the public administration of countries to support their overall efficiency. The compensation of central government senior managers has received considerable attention in recent years since it has risen in many countries. The public, the media and academia see government senior managers as being overpaid, with salaries increasing in a disproportionate and inequitable way. The literature has analyzed some possible determinants of this socio-administrative issue. However, the political and institutional factors affecting public managers’ compensation are still largely unknown. This study shows that the average compensation of central government senior managers in some OECD countries seems to be positively associated with the average salary of members of parliament (MPs). Furthermore, high compensation of public managers seems to be more frequent in countries with low freedom of expression, of association and of the media, as well as low quality of contract enforcement, property rights and control of corruption. These results may provide fruitful insights into the possible causes of this relation, to support reforms and best practices which can improve the efficiency of the public administration in modern economies.     

FUBAI: differing Chinese views of corruption since Tiananmen: does a road paved with corruption lead to socialism?

Corruption, particularly in the public official based definition which is dominant in reform China, involves the violation of administrative ethics and responsibilities for private gain. Corruption has long been a key factor in analyzing and understanding modernization in Communist and Third World countries. Corruption has the potential to undermine a regime's legitimacy and power as well as a nation's economy. Moreover, by contributing to both economic and political polarization, it also has the potential to significantly influence the social stratification and overall social structure of societies in the midst of significant political, economic and social transformation; in other words, how they ‘modernize’. While the majority of Chinese analyses of corruption recognize the threat posed by corruption, they disagree on the sources and consequences of such corruption, and thus on the means for controlling and/or eliminating it.

The success of any anti-corruption process is determined by a) the causes and consequences of corruption and the ways in which they are perceived or blocked out by the regime's analytical framework; b) regime goals, including the degree to which, by promoting the transformation of the forms of legitimate economic intercourse, it encourages changing what is defined as corruption and c) the degree to which it is capable of accomplishing its goals once set. However, inasmuch as the dominant Chinese analysis tend2 to exclude certain key factors, frequently including the regime's goals in ‘modernizing’ Chinese society, the present anti-corruption policies are not likely to be successful.     

Global Pressures,National Policies,and Labor Rights in Latin America

This paper examines the impact of countervailing external pressures on labor rights in 17 Latin American countries. On the one hand, these countries have been urged to reform their labor laws and practices to comply with international labor standards, including protections for the collective rights of workers. On the other hand, they have been pressured to adopt more flexible labor markets, which often undermine collective labor organization. After dividing the countries by the type of political regime that prevailed when the pattern of relations between labor and the state was being established, the paper presents and explains the results of indices created to measure two outcomes: labor standards and labor market flexibility. It then analyzes the impact of four types of external actors (the ILO, national governments pursuing trade agreements, multinational corporations, and international financial institutions) on these outcomes, both de jure and de facto. The paper's main finding is that these actors have had an impact on labor outcomes in the region, but that their influence is heavily mediated by domestic factors, particularly historical legacies of state-labor relations.     

Comparative grand corruption and protection pacts among elites: the cases of Ao Man Long in Macao and Hui Si-Yan in Hong Kong

Although Transparency International has consistently ranked the governments of both the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) and Macao Special Administrative Region (MSAR), both under the sovereignty of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), much higher on the clean governance scale than the PRC itself, the reality is that the two special administrative regions witnessed two prominent cases of political corruption comparable to the mainland corruption. These were the Ao Man Long case in Macao and the Rafael Hui Si-yan scandal in Hong Kong. This paper examines the two cases of political corruption in both Macao and Hong Kong and makes comparisons and contrasts between them. It argues that individual greed contributed to the two cases of high-level bureaucratic (grand) corruption in Macao and Hong Kong, implying that institutional safeguards against corruption, such as the establishment of anti-corruption commissions, and the scrutiny of the mass media, are by no means adequate. In other words, institutional mechanisms against corruption in the HKSAR and MSAR do have loopholes that need to be plugged. Moreover, protection pacts between a minority of government officials and the business elites can be formed because of their close personal connections, strengthening the possibility of grand corruption.     

The Fight Against Government Corruption in Romania: Irreversible Results or Sisyphean Challenge?

The fight against political, especially government, corruption has dominated Romanian political discourse for many years. However, the vast majority of the political elite have continuously opposed the prosecution and conviction of defendants of corruption crimes. After a long constitutional conflict that seriously inhibited the fight against government corruption between 2006 and 2009, law enforcement agencies finally began to experience some success. Nevertheless, the extent of government corruption has remained consistently high. This article analyses the struggles that have occurred between 2004 and 2013 in the fight against government corruption in Romania and particularly examines the interplay between formal and informal factors in this field.     

Political corruption,economy, and citizens' evaluation of democracy in South Korea

South Korean politics has been haunted by numerous corruption scandals as well as the prosecution of politicians and their cronies for their corruption. Yet despite the prevalence and salience of political corruption, many citizens of South Korea tend to overlook the problem by continuing to support corrupt politicians and administrations. This study defines under what circumstances political corruption shapes citizens' judgment of government and the political system as a whole in South Korea. The results indicate that national economic conditions as a perceptual screen mediate the effect of political corruption on the evaluation of democratic governance.     

Domestic actors and liberalization: a case study of internal and external pressures in Moi's Kenya

The diffusion of political and economic liberalization to countries all across the world over the last 30 years has raised questions about the influence of domestic and international actors. Most scholars have given credit to international actors such as the USA, Western European countries, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank for the spread of liberalization or any political openness and/or market-oriented reform. Their external-actors-focused explanations have been almost exclusively at the expense of domestic actors. They have essentially viewed domestic actors as simply receivers of liberalizing change or incapable of initiating reform. As a result, international development policies and programs have tended to focus on what these external actors can do to force other countries to liberalize. While recognizing the influence of these external actors, this article reverses this emphasis and notes that the focus should be on internal actors and factors, primarily social movements/groups and opposition political polities that are agitating for reform. This article is a case study on Kenya that shows how domestic factors and actors pressured the Moi government to embrace reform starting in the 1980s.     

Why Civil Society Cannot Battle it All Alone: The Roles of Civil Society Environment,Transparent Laws and Quality of Public Administration in Political Corruption Mitigation

ABSTRACT

Utilizing a large-N data that covers about 20000 observations from about 200 countries from 1789 to 2018 from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project, and anchored on institutionalism as an overarching theory, and the nascent literature on civil-society corruption nexus, the paper looks at the predictive capacity of civil society environment, transparency of laws and predictability of enforcement, and rigorousness and impartiality of public administration in political corruption. Using a four-step hierarchical multiple regression, results show that while civil society and its structure is a significant determinant of the level of political corruption, the introduction of transparency of laws and predictability of enforcement, rigorousness, and impartiality of public administration, and civil society environment in the regression model accounted for additional variance in political corruption. Practical and theoretical implications, particularly on civil society-corruption nexus and the broader corruption-democracy linkage, are discussed.     

Migrants’ Remittances and Home Country Elections: Cross-National and Subnational Evidence

Elections in developing countries have increasingly become international events. Previous scholarship identifies many examples in which migrants from developing countries have played a role in financing elections in their home countries and provides cross-national evidence that migrants increase remittances in election years. However, previous cross-national analyses have been limited by their reliance on annual national-level data. This article provides statistical analyses of quarterly subnational data of remittance inflows to Mexican states and new monthly national-level data on remittance inflows for nine countries. These analyses demonstrate that political remittance cycles appear in the quarter prior to an election, can exist both for national and subnational elections, and are influenced by both economic conditions in migrants’ host countries and political conditions in their home countries.