Ukraine's “Eurorevolution”

The author reconstructs a selective chronology of the protest events that took place in Ukraine in November 2013–January 2014 and comments on various aspects of the political and economic crisis—unprecedented in the post-Soviet history of Ukraine—that brought to the fore the question of the further existence and development of Ukrainian society and the Ukrainian state. He argues that the protests showed that a substantial segment of Ukrainian society was seeking a fundamentally new European structure of political and economic life, a development that took the Yanukovych government by surprise and led to its downfall.     

The “age of empire”: again?

Law and ways of thinking about law have historically been integral to processes of colonialisation and extension of empire. Contemporary forms of colonialism in a globalising legal environment may be less obvious, more nuances or even subconscious. However, the emergence of higher education as a trade commodity, the shift to fee-paying students as consumers and the market competition for international students among universities raise questions about the export and import of various forms of legal education, especially in the context of plural and mixed legal systems, debates about legal transplants, and concerns about legal imperialism. This article examines these issues and considers the place of comparative legal education in the contemporary environment facing university law schools.     

The Trial of Joseph Dotterweich: The Origins of the “Responsible Corporate Officer” Doctrine

This article analyzes the origins of the “responsible corporate officer” doctrine: the trial of Joseph Dotterweich. That doctrine holds that an officer may be personally liable for the criminal act of a subordinate if the officer was, in some indefinite way, able to prevent the violation. Applying this doctrine, the prosecution of Dotterweich entailed strict liability for a strict liability offense. The underlying offenses—the interstate sale of one misbranded and adulterated drug and one misbranded drug—were said to be strict liability offenses. And then, with respect to Dotterweich as the corporation’s general manager, the government argued that he was strictly liable because he stood in “responsible relation” to the company’s acts. The government never tried to prove that the company, Buffalo Pharmacal, was negligent, nor did it try to prove that Dotterweich was negligent in his supervision of the employees of Buffalo Pharmacal. The prosecutor and judge were candid about this theory throughout the trial, although the judge conceded that it seemed bizarre and unfair. The defense lawyer repeatedly sought to inject what became known throughout the trial as the “question of good faith,” but was circumvented at almost every turn. What would thus seem to be the crux of any criminal trial—the personal fault of the defendant—was carefully shorn from the jury’s consideration. The government’s theory was so at odds with intuitive notions of liability and blame that, as one probes into the case, and looks at the language used in the government’s appellate briefs, imputations of moral fault inevitably crept in. Yet the government was not entitled to make such accusations, as it had pruned moral considerations from the trial. The article argues that the responsible corporate officer doctrine can never enjoy a secure place in our legal system. First, the doctrine is at a minimum in tension with, and often in direct opposition to, basic principles of the criminal law; and second, the doctrine fails, when followed to its logical conclusions, to accord with basic notions of fair play. The article concludes that the responsible corporate officer doctrine is either unnecessary, in cases in which the evidence establishes personal fault, or unjust, in cases in which it creates liability in the absence of personal fault through the unspecified notion of “responsibility.” The Dotterweich case illustrates what is contemplated by the latter possibility, and why it is problematic in any judicial system that purports, in the words of the Model Penal Code, “to safeguard conduct that is without fault from condemnation as criminal.”     

The Case of the “Offering of Life” in the Causes for Canonization of Catholic Saints: The Threshold of Self-Sacrifice

International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue internationale de Sémiotique juridique - Catholic legal and doctrinal tradition defined two main cases for the canonization of saints:...     

The perspective of “justice” of international law in the global context

After the Cold War and the quick development of globalization, non-state acts by international organizations, transnational corporations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), etc., are becoming more active. Global issues with regard to, inter alia, environment, human rights, terrorism are constantly emerging, which bring great challenge to the Westphalia System that is based on state sovereignty and centered on the national state. At the same time, the values, which include “individualism” and “global justice,” are constantly casting impact on international legal system. Doubtlessly, in the current context of international relations, “justice among states” is still the reasonable positioning of the value of modern international law. However, making “individualism” and “global justice” compatible and modifying “justice among states” is an inevitable trend. At the same time, the rule brought about by the modification on the value of justice must be handled properly.     

Organised Criminals as “Agents of Obligation”: The Case of Ireland

Relying on Brown's (2005a, b) thesis that contemporary shifts in penal policy are best understood as a reprisal of colonial rationality, so that offenders become “non-citizens” or “agents of obligation”, this article argues, firstly, that this framework (with certain important refinements and extensions) finds support in developments in Irish criminal justice policy aimed at offenders suspected of involvement in “organised crime”. These offenders have found themselves reconstituted as “agents of obligation” with duties to furnish information about their property and movements, report to the police concerning their location and, importantly, refrain from criminal activity or face extraordinary sanctions. Secondly, it is submitted that this draconian approach to the control of organised crime is built on false premises; specifically the idea that “organised crime” as such exists and is best controlled through restrictions on the freedom of key groups or “core nominals”.     

The economic and legal significance of “full” deposit availability

European Journal of Law and Economics - Bank deposits have two characteristics: they are available on demand and at par value. Deposit redemptions face, at least given current technology, a lag...     

The Concept of “Political Prisoner”: A Critique

The term “political prisoner” plays an important role in contemporary affairs. But how coherent is the concept behind the term, and is use of this term essentially unobjectionable? As it turns out, the most influential contemporary definitions of the concept of “political prisoner” are fundamentally flawed, and the use of the term itself may do more harm than good. One basic problem with the concept of “political prisoner” concerns the most current definitional criteria, which all prove either arbitrarily narrow or excessively broad. Even more worrisome than these definitional issues, the use of the concept contributes nothing to the moral assessment of detentions and punishment, and deflects attention from other considerations that are more relevant in evaluating their legitimacy. There is, finally, a third fundamental problem with the concept: it serves to arbitrarily privilege one class of prisoners vis-à-vis all the others.     

A “meeting of the minds” — The greater illusion

Conclusion Despite a superficial similarity in circumstance, the dynamics of the judicial process of contract interpretation are not equivalent to the circumstances giving rise to the Primacy Dilemma. The Primacy Dilemma involves two parties; the judicial process involves a third: the court. This distinction is critical for while Wittgenstein's exposé of the Primacy Dilemma as illusion does not require that centuries of refinements to theories of contract interpretation be scrapped, it does require an abandonment of the ideal that courts do not and cannot make contracts; courts merely enforce agreements that the parties themselves have reached.Copyright ©1995 by Samuel C. Damren. All rights reserved.     

The “Trump Factor” and the Changing Face of Globalization

The victory of Donald Trump’s administration not only meant a change in domestic socioeconomic policy, but also in the sphere of U.S. foreign ties; it has had a strong influence on the development trend of the world economy and trade. Taking the path of protectionism and confrontation with key trade and economic partners in Latin America, Asia, and Europe, Washington has attempted to break the status quo and transform the existing character of the globalization process. The “Trump factor” has become a key element in the formation of a new global order.     

“Schrems II”: The return of the Privacy Shield

On 16 July 2020, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Justice rendered its landmark judgment in Case C-311/18 Data Protection Commissioner v. Facebook Ireland Ltd and Maximillian Schrems (“Schrems II”). The Grand Chamber invalidated the Commission decision on the adequacy of the data protection provided by the EU-US Privacy Shield. It however considered that the decision of the Commission on standard contractual clauses (“SCCs”) issued by the Commission for the transfer of personal data to processors established in third states was legally valid.The legal effects of the judgment should first be clarified. In addition, it has far-reaching implications for companies which transfer personal data from the EU to the US. The judgment of the Grand Chamber has also far-reaching implications for transfers of personal data from the EU to other third states. Last, it has far-reaching implications for the UK in the context of Brexit.© 2020 Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.     

The “strange power of speech”: The unprecedented but limited success of telephone company First Amendment arguments

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 rendered moot recent successful telephone company constitutional challenges to the Cable Act ban on telephone company provision of video. The cases, however, suggest the “strange power”; of the First Amendment to shatter well‐established structural regulations and present evidence that well‐heeled actors can gain through the courts regulatory concessions not readily attainable from Congress or the FCC.

Neither precedent nor logic supports these court rulings, which eliminated economic regulation based upon speculative First Amendment gains rather than upon demonstrated abridgments of speech or changes in the video market