Authoritarian Attitudes, Democracy, and Policy Preferences among Latin American Elites

This article examines the prevalence and consequences of authoritarian attitudes among elites in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela. We focus on the connection between antidemocratic elite attitudes and support for democracy; the causes and effects of authoritarian attitudes among elites and their implications for authoritarianism; and the impact of authoritarian attitudes beyond social policy preferences to other policy areas that have indirect implications for order. Contrary to some of the literature, we find that antidemocratic attitudes affect elites' support for democracy. Our analysis also speaks to the debate on the origins of authoritarianism. Much of the evidence supports Altemeyer's notion that perceived threat raises levels of authoritarianism, rather than Feldman's contention that threat strengthens the influence of authoritarian attitudes. Finally, we demonstrate that there is a broader influence of authoritarian attitudes on economic policy preferences, but only where those policies appear to have implications for social order.     

Legal development and human rights in Uruguay: 1985–2002

This article attempts to explain why Uruguayan judges have lagged behind judges in Chile and Argentina in the prosecution of the military for human rights violations committed during the dictatorship period in the 1970s and 1980s. By tracing judicial human rights activity in Uruguay from the transition to democratic rule in 1985 until the end of 2002, I argue that Uruguayan judges have been actively restricted by an aggressive anti-human rights policy expressed through a national amnesty law and explicit executive interference in judicial matters. Structural changes to the judiciary might have aided Uruguayan judges to overcome these barriers. Instead, failure to reform the judiciary has prolonged its conservative nature and made judges slow in responding to international legal development in the human rights field.     

Civil Society and Political Transition in Mexico

This article analyzes the current political transition in México from the vantage point of civil society. It departs from a definition of the Mexican authoritarian regime, now the oldest in the world, as a model of fusion between the state, the market and society. The crisis of the developmental model and the regime's increasing inability to incorporate the new social actors created by industrialization and urbanization opened up a long period of political crisis whose main content was a process of societal differentiation. The failure of President Salinas' project of neo-liberal reconstruction of the authoritarian regime deepened the crisis and led to the formation and consolidation of strong national political parties, the beginning of a still unequal, but effective electoral competition and especially to the emergence of several civic groups that are struggling for a democratization that goes beyond electoral politics. The collective identity as civil society of these civic groups has been instrumental for the critique of the regime's gradualist strategy of "permenent electoral reform".     

Security sector reform in transitions from military rule: Legacies of authoritarianism in Brazil

According to the international legal system, countries in transition from authoritarian rule have the duty to provide truth, justice and reparations, and to prevent the recurrence of systematic human rights violations. Security sector reforms are a key preventive mechanism, and this article analyzes the impact of these reforms on the recurrence of torture, killings, and disappearances. As there are many types of reforms in the security sector, the main research question is: which reforms, or combination of reforms, are effective in preventing the recurrence of human rights violations? Brazil experienced a brutal military regime between 1964 and 1985, when security forces were involved in systematic human rights violations. A case study of the Brazilian transition from military authoritarian rule was conducted and the findings suggest that the involvement of armed forces in domestic issues, weak civilian authority, overlapping jurisdiction, and blurred lines of command within the security forces have a negative impact on the outcome of interest. Finally, contributions were made to scholarly debates concerning transitional justice, human rights, and institutional change     

Consolidating authoritarian rule: calibrated coercion in Singapore

Abstract

Despite the persistence of authoritarian forms of rule, studies of state domination have seen little need to analyse the use of force against citizens. This essay argues that, while state violence is elemental, it is not straightforward. States have a range of repressive tools at their disposal, which they need to deploy rationally and with finesse if they are to consolidate their authoritarian systems. As a step towards problematizing state violence, this essay suggests the concept of calibrated coercion, which represses challengers with minimum political cost. Calibrated coercion is illustrated through an in-depth case study of press controls in Singapore, where one of the world's most successful hegemonic parties has governed continuously for four decades. Behind the stability of the press system, the Singapore government has made fundamental changes to its modes of control, with less frequent recourse to blunter instruments such as newspaper closures or arbitrary arrest. Instead, less visible instruments are increasingly used, with the media's commercial foundations turned against themselves.     

The Geography of Repression and Opposition to Autocracy

State repression is a prominent feature of nondemocracies, but its effectiveness in quieting dissent and fostering regime survival remains unclear. We exploit the location of military bases before the coup that brought Augusto Pinochet to power in Chile in 1973, which is uncorrelated to precoup electoral outcomes, and show that counties near these bases experienced more killings and forced disappearances at the hands of the government during the dictatorship. Our main result is that residents of counties close to military bases both registered to vote and voted “No” to Pinochet's continuation in power at higher rates in the crucial 1988 plebiscite that bolstered the democratic transition. Potential mechanisms include informational frictions on the intensity of repression in counties far from bases and shifts in preferences caused by increased proximity to the events. Election outcomes after democratization show no lasting change in political preferences.     

Elections,repression and authoritarian survival in post-transition Indonesia and the Philippines

Abstract

This paper compares post-transition Philippines and Indonesia, examining the ways in which authoritarian practices survive and are shaped by regime transition. It examines the transition process in each case, to identify the problems of management and control that regime elites set for themselves in the post-dictatorship period. It is argued that Philippine elites set out to disaggregate and domesticate an already mobilized opposition movement, while the Indonesian authorities strove to keep similar popular politics from mobilizing. The paper then considers how these political objectives find expression in the structuring of two important institutional fields – the electoral and policy making processes – concluding with an examination of how these considerations influence patterns of repression. In particular, the paper also investigates whether repression targets primarily proscribed modes of activity, or sets out to threaten and intimidate proscribed organizations and people. Differences in electoral and policy processes, as well as in patterns of repression, demonstrate the ways in which authoritarianism can survive regime transitions and can undermine the promise of democracy in the post-dictatorship period.     

Federalism and Democratic Transitions: The "New" Politics of the Governors in Brazil

Although federalism is a potentially important variable in democratization,few studies explore its impact in democratic transitions andconsolidation. Scholars generally agree that federalism is quitestrong in contemporary Brazil. This study examines how and whystrong federalism reemerged in Brazil following twenty yearsof centralizing military rule. In brief, the 1964–1985military regime tried but failed to transform the state-basedorganizational structure and power base of Brazil's traditionalpolitical elite; Brazil's "transitional" electoral cycle alsoreinforced the strength of state governors. Examples are providedof how subnational actors influenced the transition processin the national government and how state based actors and interestschallenge Brazil's efforts to consolidate its democracy.     

Inflation and political instability in eight Latin American countries 1946-83

The path of consumer price rises is compared with data for the incidence of political change and the frequency of military regimes from 1946 to 1984 for the following countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. A highly significant connection between the frequency of military government and the level of inflation is found. This appears to be due to two other significant results: (i) The military regimes are relatively unstable ones. (ii) Inflation normally turns upwards under civilian and downwards under military regimes, i.e., the military regimes are relatively strong in fighting inflation. Finally, it is demonstrated that few regimes survive a spell of hyperinflation.     

The Institutional Basis of Intercommunal Order: Evidence from Indonesia's Democratic Transition

When authoritarian regimes break down, why does communal violence spike and why are some locations more prone to violence than others? To understand violence during transitions, it is necessary to understand what sustains order when regimes are stable. While existing theories attribute order to formal or informal security institutions on their own, I argue that intercommunal order obtains when formal and informal security institutions are aligned. During authoritarian breakdowns, the state's coercive grip loosens, exposing mismatches between formal and informal institutions and raising the risk of communal violence. Formal‐informal mismatches emerge in communities accustomed to heavy state intervention since they will have developed more state‐dependent informal security institutions. I apply an instrumental variables approach on a nationwide dataset of village‐level data to show that prior exposure to military intervention, proxied by the distance to security outposts, led to Indonesia's spike in violence during its recent democratic transition.     

From Chicago to Santiago: Neoliberalism and Social Security Privatization in Chile

This article examines the ideology and principles that inspired the privatization of social security in Chile during the Pinochet regime. The article highlights the role of the state in the establishment of a fully funded, defined contribution system, as well as the importance of the transmission of ideas from the halls of the University of Chicago to Chile's centers of power. In the case of Chile, the ideas of freedom espoused by Milton Friedman and Frederick von Hayek were applied by a repressive authoritarian regime that violated human and political rights. Furthermore, these ideas served to legitimize a political and economic system based on the deprivation of freedom. Although social security reform was a critical component of a revolution going on in Chile in the 1970s, the ultimate purpose of this article is to show that the effects of this reform are by no means limited to Chile. The Chilean reform has been adopted by countries in Latin America and other parts of the world, and it has critically affected those societies as well. The article shows that the establishment of the fully funded, defined contribution system has been very costly, both for the state and the insured, while coverage has dramatically declined. The article concludes that the market economic reforms have enhanced only the freedom of those who could take advantage of the new economy, and that few of the promises made during the Pinochet regime by the neoliberal economists came true.     

Institutions of the Offensive: Domestic Sources of Dispute Initiation in Authoritarian Regimes, 1950–1992

What are the most important sources of institutional variation among authoritarian regimes, and how do such institutions influence these dictatorships' propensity to initiate military disputes? This article argues that most existing studies in both comparative politics and international relations employ a flawed conceptualization of authoritarian institutions. Excessive focus on the personalization or institutionalization of authoritarian regimes' decision‐making procedures has distracted attention from the more critical issue of what institutions these regimes deploy to enhance social control and secure political incumbency. Since military regimes are systematically less effective than single‐party regimes at developing these types of authoritarian institutions, they more frequently resort to desperate measures to fend off domestic challenges to their power. In particular, we find compelling empirical support for our hypothesis that military regimes are more likely than single‐party regimes to initiate military disputes, irrespective of whether those regimes are highly personalized or not.     

Human Rights Contention in Latin America: A Comparative Study

This paper reports original data on contentious challenges, especially protests, focused on human rights in seven Latin American countries from 1981 to 1995. An analysis reveals that human rights contentious challenges are most prevalent where human rights abuses are worse and authoritarianism is present and in countries that are more urbanized. However, the incidence of such human rights contentious challenges is not related to the number of human rights organizations (HROs) in the country. Results also suggest two different types of human rights contention. National human rights movements, present in Argentina and Guatemala, involved HROs and demanded improvements in the national human rights situation. The other form is ancillary human rights protest, in which human rights challenges are led by a variety of groups, focus on repression particular to the groups involved and are either short-lived or part of a more general wave of opposition. This form of contention was more prevalent in Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Venezuela.     

The contribution of lobby regulation initiatives in addressing political corruption in Latin America

For most of its history, Latin America has lived under authoritarian and elite rule where public decisions were often crafted in the shadows by cabinets and parliaments to the benefit of a small minority. Recently, the development of participatory political systems has brought some transparency to the policy-making process. Such scrutiny reveals evidence of the capture of aspects of policy-making by private interests that use obscure strategies to achieve their political goals. As a consequence, a widespread movement for regulating the role and tactics of interest groups emerged, which is seen as a necessary step to address the root causes of political corruption. This article provides an overview of efforts to regulate lobbying in Latin America. It explains attempts at regulation in four countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru), evaluates the level of success of these efforts, and assesses prospects for the future regarding reducing corruption through the instrument of lobby regulations. The authors argue that such regulations alone cannot eliminate political corruption. However, lobby regulations can contribute to increased transparency and aid in developing an anti-corruption culture. It will be shown that lobby laws in Latin America exhibit many of the problems long identified with similar regulations across western democracies. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Electoral engineering in Chile: the electoral system and limited democracy

On the eve of Chile's transition from military to elected government, the outgoing regime enacted an electoral engineering project intended to conserve the constitutional order it encoded in 1980. An analysis of 1989 and 1993 general elections shows that the way votes are translated into seats favors, as intended, the second largest electoral block, the Chilean Right. This bias, along with the number of appointed senators and the special majorities required for constitutional amendments, gives the Right a minority veto power on any reform initiative. Moreover, the electoral system produces incentives for parties, candidates and voters that enhances this balance of power. The role that the electoral system plays in Chile therefore consolidates a limited form of democracy, rather than a liberal one.     

Prosecutorial regulation in the Global South: Environmental civil litigation by prosecutors in China compared to Brazil

Brazil's successful prosecutorial civil action against polluters could be a regulatory example for the Global South. This paper analyses whether such regulation could also develop without the major political, institutional, and legal reforms that spurred it in Brazil. To do so, it analyzes China, where similar reforms have so far not occurred, but where prosecutors have recently started to initiate civil litigation against polluters. It finds that prosecutorial civil litigation in China has only a limited regulatory effect or potential. Prosecutors in China are influenced by conflicting incentive structures that reward one‐off lower level test cases with an innovation bonus, while structurally stimulating a focus on general crime fighting. Ironically, as a result of such incentives, the recent legal reform, toward providing standing for prosecutors in public interest litigation, will, in contrast to Brazil, decrease rather than increase the regulatory effect of these cases. These findings have implications for understanding how the interaction between regulatory independence, legal reform, and regime type shapes possibilities for regulatory innovation in the Global South.     

Timing and targeting of state repression in authoritarian elections

Autocrats face a fundamental tension: how to make elections appear credible (maintaining legitimacy) without losing control over outcomes (losing power). In this context, we claim that incumbents choose the timing and targets of state repression strategically. We expect that before elections, regimes will moderate their use of violence against ordinary citizens, while simultaneously directing state-sponsored repression towards opposition elites. Ordinary citizens are likely to experience greater repression after the election. We test these expectations using unique events-based repression data, conducting cross-national analysis of all presidential elections in authoritarian regimes from 1990 to 2008 to understand the timing and targeting of repression around elections under authoritarian regimes. In keeping with our expectations, we find that in the months prior and during the election, opposition leaders experience greater rates of repression than voters. We suspect that incumbents find it more effective to repress electoral challengers, since these pose a direct threat to their victory. Conversely, incumbents resist repressing voters whose support they need at the polls to win and to legitimize the election itself.     

Diffusion,transmutation, and regulatory regime in socialist market economies: telecoms reform in China and Vietnam

Abstract

Marketization and state restructuring are proceeding apace in China and Vietnam. China and Vietnam are not, however, converging upon the global regulatory model, even allowing for customary national variations. Rather, they are building up distinctive forms of regulatory regimes aiming to maintain the party-state's control over key state sectors, while at the same time integrating with the global economy and conforming to international norms and standards. This study argues that the regulatory model being adopted in Vietnam and China is the product of a specific kind of transition from a command to a market economy within an authoritarian political regime. While diffusion theories are of use in identifying external driving forces for the reform effort, these theories are of limited value for unveiling the dynamics of local contexts. Indigenous incentives, opportunity structures, and the experimental nature of public policy explain why, despite their exposure to global reform movements and commitment to multilateral institutions, China and Vietnam are likely to end up not with just a variety of the same regulatory regime, but a different one. The case of telecommunications regulation is used to illustrate this.     

Coups d’état and defense spending: a counterfactual analysis

We explore how institutional set-ups, in particular changes in political institutions through coups d’état, can affect the way military expenditures are determined. We use a counterfactual approach, the synthetic control method, and compare the evolution of the military burden for 40 countries affected by coups with the evolution of a synthetic counterfactual that replicates the initial conditions and the potential outcomes of the countries of interest before exposure to coups. Our case studies suggest that successful coups result in a large increase in the military burden. However, when no effects or a decrease in the defense burden are found, it is often the consequence of a democratization process triggered by the coup. These results are in keeping with recent theoretical developments on the bargaining power of the military in authoritarian regimes. Failed coups, by contrast, produce a smaller, and mostly positive, effect on the military burden, possibly as a result of the incumbent’s strategy to avert further challenges to the stability of the regime by buying off the military.