Education Reform and Accountability Issues in an Intergovernmental Context

Since the early 1980s, widespread expressions of concern aboutpublic education in the United States have been accompaniedby various proposals for improving public school performance.This article develops a conceptual framework for analyzing educationreform and accountability issues in an intergovernmental context.The writers then identify and discuss common themes in fiveprominent education reform efforts in the United States: (1)the promulgation of specific goals and requirements for publicschools; (2) the introduction of open-enrollment plans; (3)the establishment of charter schools; (4) the encouragementof private contracting for the delivery of school services;and (5) the development of public and private voucher programs.While diverse, each of these efforts involves a deliberate attemptto change the accountability mechanisms in the delivery of education,and all have been affected by intergovernmental politics.     

Rural Development Councils: An Intergovernmental Coordination Experiment

Eight pilot state Rural Development Councils were establishedby the federal government in 1990 to coordinate rural developmentefforts among federal departments and agencies and to establishcollaborative relationships with states, local governments,and the private sector. After one year of operation, these councilsprovided a mechanism for the participating states to definethe rural issues relevant to their unique settings and to worktoward the accomplishment of their goals. In addition, the processallowed federal officials in Washington and in the states toutilize the discretion available in the system to maximize collaborationand cooperation. Additional states will be involved in the effortin 1992. Three types of agendas or expectations surrounded theinitiative: substantive, political, and process approaches.Although it is too early to determine the extent to which thecouncils have "delivered" on these expectations, the experimentprovides preliminary evidence of the scope of federal abilityto stimulate change within a state as well as the economic andpolitical forces that constrain it.     

Reputation and Accountability Relationships: Managing Accountability Expectations through Reputation

Accountability is said to be about the management of expectations. Empirical studies reveal considerable variation in organizational interest, intensity, and investment in accountability relationships. Less is known, however, about what explains these observed variations. Drawing on accountability and reputation‐concerned literatures, this article argues that a reputation‐based perspective on accountability offers an underlying logic that explains how account‐giving actors and account‐holding forums actually manage these expectations and how organizations make sense of and prioritize among accountability responsibilities. Reputational considerations act as a filtering mechanism of external demands and help account for variations in degrees of interest in, and intensity of, accountability. The resulting accountability outcomes are coproduced by the reputational investment of both account‐giver and account‐holder, resulting in distinct accountability constellations and outcomes.     

Intergovernmental Growth Management: A Partnership Framework for State-Local Relations

Growth management receives strong support as a policy concept.However, there are serious political reservations concerningits implementation. The Florida Growth Management Act is anexample of a well constructed policy that relies on a partnershipapproach to state-local relations. Its implementation during1989 has brought to light the difficulties in maintaining thatpartnership, mainly due to disagreements over responsibilityfor funding the infrastructure needed to manage growth. Statewillingness to negotiate revenue sources and responsibilityis essential to strong state-local relations. The complexitiesof financing growth management threaten the viability of strongplanning policy, regardless of its rationality.     

Greater Expectations: A Field Experiment to Improve Accountability in Mali

I argue that if citizens systematically underestimate what their government can and should do for them, then they will hold politicians to a lower standard and sanction poor performers less often. A field experiment across 95 localities in Mali in which randomly assigned localities receive a civics course identifies the effect of raising voter expectations of government on their willingness to hold leaders accountable. The course provides information about local government capacity and responsibility as well as how local politicians perform relative to others, effectively raising voter expectations of what local governments can and should do. Survey experiments among individuals in treated and control communities (N = 5,560) suggest that people in treated villages are indeed more likely to sanction poor performers and vote based on performance more often. A behavioral outcome—the likelihood that villagers challenge local leaders at a town hall meeting—adds external validity to survey findings.     

National Support For Regional Review: Federal Compliance and The Future of Intergovernmental Coordination

In 1969, OMB issued Circular A-95 to broaden the "confidentialexchange" between applicants and federal agencies, to providestate and local clearinghouses an opportunity to review federalassistance applications. Because President Reagan recently signedExecutive Order 12372 revoking A-95 and making states responsiblefor procedures governing regional coordination of federal programs,this is a useful time to analyze and evaluate the A-95 experience.Any review process somehow must solve the three critical, overlappingproblems which plagued A-95 from the outset: unpredictable andinsufficient funding, vague review criteria, and poor federalcompliance. This article focuses on federal noncompliance: theextent of agency violations, structural and political reasonsfor noncompliance, and the success of efforts to modify andimprove the system. The study draws on a 1981 survey of RegionV areawide clearinghouses and the author's experience as a 1980–1981NASPAA Faculty Fellow with the Chicago Federal Regional Council.     

The Contested Council: Conflict Dimensions of an Intergovernmental EU Institution

Recent research has tried to uncover the political space in which the Council of Ministers of the European Union decides. Rather than the left-right conflict or a cleavage between governments with national and supranational attitudes, this article shows that a redistributive dimension, decisively shapes the interactions in this most important legislative body of the European Union. In contrast to extant studies, we employ ex ante rather than ex post preference data and rely on correspondence analysis as a means to identify the underlying dimensions of contestation. The article concludes with an empirical investigation of how enlargement will affect the emerging political space within the European Union. Our quantitative analysis suggests that the gulf between net-contributors and net-receivers will further deepen.     

Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations in 1996: The End of an Era

On 30 September 1996 the U.S. Advisory Commission on IntergovernmentalRelations (ACIR) closed its doors, ending thirty-seven yearsof advocacy for federalism and intergovernmental relations.A majority of members in the Congress felt that A CIR had becomeirrelevant to the issues facing them and agreed that littlewould be lost by terminating the commission. The Clinton administration,although supportive until near the end, withdrew its'supportout of displeasure with the commission's handling of the unfundedfederal mandates issue. The national associations representingstate and local governments were ambivalent. ACIR was no longerlooked to for solutions to the nation's intergovernmental relationsproblems. With the exit of ACIR, the federal government's lastresource for addressing broad intergovernmental issues—beyondthe confines of individual programs—is gone.     

Intergovernmental Relations: Ensuring Informed Cooperation in Strategic Policy Development

COAG was formed out of a concern by commonwealth, state and territory governments to improve intergovernmental cooperation. In particular, COAG allowed leaders and central agencies to discuss and coordinate policy frameworks from a whole-of-government perspective. It also has increased the prospects of further reform to Australia's political system in the areas of financial arrangements, international treaties and constitutional reform.     

Intergovernmental Grants: A Formal Model of Interrelated National and Subnational Political Decisions

Intergovernmental grants are based on the interrelated choicesof: (i) the national government deciding whether to offer thegrant; (ii) the national government determining grant conditions;(iii) the subnational government deciding whether to acceptthe grant; and (iv) the subnational government determining policy,including spending levels, upon grant receipt. Empirically andtheoretically, scholars often study these decisions separately,leading to an incomplete understanding of grant-related behavior.This article develops a noncooperative game theoretic modelthat simultaneously captures all four of these decisions. Thisapproach helps to better explain puzzles surrounding intergovernmentalgrants, including the ‘flypaper effect,’ asymmetricresponses of recipient governments to grant increases and decreases,the grant-acceptance decisions of subnational governments, andtradeoffs between the size of grants and the strings that areattached.     

National Competition Policy — Its Evolution and Implementation: A Study in Intergovernmental Relations

The second reading speech on the Competition Policy Reform Bill 1995 described the policy as 'the most important single development in micro-economic reform in recent years'. The speech went on to describe the vision of the Hilmer Report 'for a national competition policy in which the commonwealth, states and territories cooperated to ensure that universal and uniformly applied rules of market conduct apply to all market participants regardless of their form of ownership'. This article considers how this vision was translated into reality.     

Understanding Ripple Effects: The Cross–National Adoption of Policy Instruments for Bureaucratic Accountability

This article examines different explanations for the cross–national diffusion of three recent innovations in bureaucratic accountability—the institution of the ombudsman, freedom of information legislation and data protection (information privacy) law. The first two explanations are based on the assumption that these innovations are by–products of modernization, either the growth of the state or democratization. The third assumes that policy is shaped through processes of international communication. A combination of methodologies is employed to conclude that while the growth of government and liberal democratic values are necessary conditions for the adoption of all three policy instruments, they are not sufficient conditions. The pattern of adoption observed is best explained by examining how evidence about these respective policies flows from adopting states to non–adopters. In the case of the ombudsman, this process can be characterized as one of lesson–drawing; for freedom of information, evidence is used for legitimation purposes; for data protection, the diffusion is attributable to harmonization through international organizations. Policy transfer is hence a multi–faceted concept that embraces a number of distinct processes of transnational learning and communication.     

State Spaceport Initiatives: Economic and Political Innovation in an Intergovernmental Context

State spaceports are an interesting example of intergovernmentalrelations because activities conducted at such facilities spanthe state, federal, and international realms. Five states—Alaska,California, Florida, New Mexico, and Virginia—are themost visible participants in the process. In this study, thesupporting rationales for such endeavors are discussed withinthe context of the broader contours of intergovernmental relations.The field is a product of the post-Cold War period during whichopportunities for state space activities arose due to changesin the national security environment. Three distinct but interrelatedexplanations are suggested for why the field has developed slowly,although during the past two years, progress in achieving goalshas begun to occur.     

Intergovernmental Relations in Canada: The Emergence of Collaborative Federalism

"Executive federalism" or "federal-provincial diplomacy" haslong been considered the defining characteristic of Canadianfederalism, which combines federalism and Westminster-stylecabinet government. However, these processes have come underincreasing stress in recent years from a number of forces thathave affected the nature and conduct of federalism and intergovernmentalrelations in Canada. Executive federalism has not been displaced,but has been increasingly informed by a set of practices thatwe call "collaborative federalism," characterized more by theprinciple of co-determination of broad national policies ratherthan by the more traditional pattern of federal-leadership.     

Electoral Accountability in a Federal System: National and Provincial Economic Voting in Canada

Are federal incumbents punished for national and/or provincialeconomic performance, and are provincial incumbents held accountablefor the state of the provincial and/or national economy? Usinga pooled cross-sectional time-series analysis of electoral resultsand macroeconomic data for 1953–2001, this article exploresthe extent to which provincial and federal incumbents in Canadianelections are affected more by national or provincial economicconditions. The results of the analysis suggest that federalincumbents would not gain many votes by claiming credit forthe economic prosperity of any particular province when, onaverage, national economic conditions are deteriorating. Theresults further suggest that provincial incumbents are not heldaccountable for economic conditions in their provinces, butare rather punished for national economic deterioration whenthe incumbent federal party is of the same partisan family.     

Gender Equality Architecture: The Intergovernmental Level in Federal Systems

This article provides a first overall account of the intergovernmental components of Australia's gender equality architecture in the period 1978–2014. From the 1990s this is largely a story of institutional fragility. In explaining this, factors identified by scholars of state feminism, such as lack of political will, partisan ideologies and discursive shifts, particularly the increased influence of neoliberal approaches to governance, are taken into account. The new factor introduced is that of executive federalism, characterised by decision‐making behind closed doors. When women's intergovernmental bodies attempted to open doors to community input this proved fruitless, particularly in the area of economic decision‐making. Repeated attempts to introduce gender‐disaggregated reporting on the outcomes of Commonwealth‐State agreements were also largely unsuccessful. The article concludes that the democratic deficits associated with executive federalism – lack of parliamentary oversight or accountability and lack of community consultation – are closely related to the deficits in gender mainstreaming.     

Accountability in Public Service Quasi‐markets: The Case of the Australian National Disability Insurance Scheme

Australia's National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) represents the latest in a worldwide shift towards individualised funding models for the delivery of care services. However, market‐based models for care deliveries bring new considerations and dilemmas for accountability. Drawing on previous work by Dickinson et al. (2014), we examine a range of accountability dilemmas developing within the early implementation of the NDIS. These relate to accountability for the following: care outcomes, the spending of public money, care workers, and advocacy and market function. Examining these accountability dilemmas reveals differences in underpinning assumptions within the design and on‐going implementation of the NDIS, suggesting a plurality of logics within the scheme, which are in tension with one another. The contribution of this paper is to set out the accountability dilemmas, analyse them according to their underpinning logics, and present the NDIS as having potential to be a hybrid institution (Skelcher and Smith 2015). How these dilemmas will be settled is crucial to the implementation and ultimate operation of the scheme.