The self-selection of democracies into treaty design: insights from international environmental agreements

Generally, democratic regime type is positively associated with participating in international environmental agreements. In this context, this study focuses on the legal nature of an agreement, which is linked to audience costs primarily at the domestic level that occur in case of non-compliance and are felt especially by democracies. Eventually, more legalized (“hard-law”) treaties make compliance potentially more challenging and as democratic leaders may anticipate the corresponding audience costs, the likelihood that democracies select themselves into such treaties decreases. The empirical implication of our theory is that environmental agreements with a larger share of democratic members are less likely to be characterized by hard law. Results from quantitative analyses strongly support our argument, shed new light on the relationship between participation in international agreements and the form of government, and also have implications for the “words-deeds” debate in international environmental policy-making.     

Interest groups and state Medicaid drug programs

A simultaneous equations model is estimated to analyze the interaction between state Medicaid pharmaceutical drug reimbursement rates, drug recipients per capita, and expenditures per drug recipient. Interest groups are shown to have a strong positive impact on pharmacy reimbursement rates, which, in turn, have an impact on pharmacy participation rates and drug utilization and expenditure patterns. Finally, a strong inverse relationship exists between expenditures per recipient and program size. The results verify the existence of substantial variation in state Medicaid programs and point to potentially growing disparities as a result of current policies.     

International environmental agreements with agenda and interaction between pollutants

This paper analyzes how the sequence of negotiating agreements on each pollutant affects coalition behavior in international environmental agreements (IEAs) when multiple and correlated pollutants exist. I consider a model in which countries suffer from two pollutants with different externality characteristics and attempt to cooperate by sequentially negotiating on IEAs. The membership outcome depends on the environmental concern, abatement technology, spillover effect and most importantly the correlation between pollutants as either substitutes or complements. I find that cooperation in the first stage can facilitate later negotiations and that countries are prone to cooperate on a pollutant of common concern. Moreover, except for symmetric countries, different negotiation agendas may result in distinctive participation outcomes when pollutants are complements. Therefore, with systematic policy design, the negotiation sequence can serve as another method to encourage participation and cooperation in IEAs.     

Environmental regime effectiveness and the North American Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement

Scholars and practitioners around the globe are grappling with how to improve the effectiveness of complex, transboundary, and multilevel environmental regimes. International environmental agreements (IEAs) have been around for decades yet achievements and outcomes have not met expectations. While international relations scholars have primarily focused on the effectiveness of agreements between states, public policy scholars have been interested in outcomes at a variety of scales including international, national, sub-national, and local across various environmental policy domains and at the instrument and program levels. This article presents findings from a case study of environmental regime effectiveness that uses a modified version of the Oslo-Postdam solution to assess the effectiveness of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, a long-standing, bilateral international environmental agreement between Canada and the USA. The findings indicate that there is a need to more broadly define international environmental agreements in complex transboundary systems to include both formal and informal regime features and multilevel governance efforts and to focus on specific policy goals and ecological outcomes associated with IEAs. This case also illustrates the potential to modify the Oslo-Postdam approach by combining expert assessment and data collection methods with traditional policy analysis and program evaluation methods in assessments of environmental regime effectiveness.     

The European Union in international environmental negotiations: a legal perspective on the internal decision-making process

From an EU point of view, most international environmental agreements are mixed. This means that both the European Community (EC) and its member states are party to the agreement. As the participation of the EC in international negotiations and agreements is properly arranged by the Treaty establishing the European Community, but the EU member states’ participation is not legally organized on the EU level, the internal decision-making process regarding mixed agreements is rather complicated. Insights into this process are needed to understand the representation and the role of the European Union in international environmental negotiations. This article clarifies the legal framework of the EU decision-making process regarding such negotiations.

Will International Investment Rules Obstruct Climate Protection Policies? An Examination of the Clean Development Mechanism

Rules governing the global environment and the international economy are currently decided in separate arenas. Yet, environmental agreements can have strong economic implications, particularly with the growing use of market mechanisms. Economic liberalization rules, meanwhile, may limit the effectiveness of environmental agreements. This paper assesses the potential interaction between one important market-based environmental mechanism – the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol on climate change – and the framework of international investment law.     

Prolonged international environmental negotiations: the roles and strategies of non-state actors in the EU

For scholars of international environmental agreements, the role of non-state actors has been a central focus. There is a considerable literature on the influence of environmental NGOs and business groups on state behaviour and in turn international environmental outcomes. However, much less empirical work has been done to examine the influence of these actors and the strategies they can use in prolonged international environmental negotiations that last for years or decades. This article takes up this task. Drawing on a rich empirical data set on the role of European-based actors in the international climate change negotiations, it considers the influence of non-state actors in prolonged negotiations and identifies four strategies that these actors can use to influence state actors and non-state actors alike.     

Free trade agreements for the environment? Regional economic integration and environmental cooperation in East Asia

Traditionally, it has been argued that increased economic competition through free trade agreements would bring about environmental degradation. This study, however, argues that recent international free trade agreements have tended to enhance environmental cooperation among participating countries. This study has examined the process by which East Asian countries have developed mechanisms for the extant level of regional environmental cooperation, particularly highlighting the reasons for commonalities and differences in regional environmental cooperation between ASEAN and the dominant economies in the region. It finds that three factors particularly matter for developing regional environmental cooperative mechanisms: networks of intergovernmental organizations, the strong willingness of political leaders which is often embodied in national strategies for regionalism and the establishment, and the institutionalized linkage—particularly through FTAs—between trade and the environment. Tracing the process of policy evolution within three groups of countries sheds light on the political conditions under which the four entities involved (the ASEAN, Japan, China, and the Republic of Korea) have produced and strengthened cooperative environmental mechanisms among them along with free trade agreements. Focusing especially on the environmental policy changes in Japan, China, and the ROK associated with the creation of its FTAs with ASEAN, the study concludes that each of free trade agreements has incrementally developed environmental cooperation, especially when integrated into a vision for regional integration.     

Implementation of the Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management in Cambodia: effects of regime design

Over the past 20 years, a cluster of international environmental agreements has developed aiming at reducing the risks associated with production and use of chemicals. The Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management (SAICM) is the newest addition to this cluster and serves to guide efforts to meet the 2020 goal to use and produce chemicals in a way that minimizes significant adverse effects on human health and the environment. SAICM differs from other chemical and waste agreements on several key points: It is a policy framework that is legally non-binding; it comprises a broad scope of activities; and it allows for active participation of non-governmental stakeholders. A central aim of SAICM is to decrease the gap between developed and developing countries in terms of capacities to manage chemicals safely. This article examines the early implementation of SAICM, based on a national-level case study in Cambodia and interviews with SAICM stakeholders. The results show that SAICM has generated a clear momentum in Cambodia and has led to several implementation projects. Based on the interviews, the overall conclusion is that design features of the SAICM—its broad scope, multi-stakeholder participation and voluntary status—are appropriate for the purpose of improving chemicals management in a developing country like Cambodia. However, these features also bring about difficulties in measuring progress on implementation. The future development of SAICM therefore needs to balance the benefits of its key design features with the need to more effectively and precisely monitor progress toward the 2020 goal.     

气候变化背景下外国投资者与政府争端的解决——以我国双边投资协定为例

我国签订的双边投资协定中一般都规定了投资者与东道国政府间投资争端的解决方式,尤其是晚近我国所签订的双边投资协定多数允许投资者将争端提交国际仲裁。但是,在目前全球应对气候变化背景下,作为温室气体排放大国,我国有义务控制和减少温室气体的排放,采取相应的环境规制措施,这些环境规制措施可能会损害或影响到外国投资者在我国的利益。根据双边投资协定,外国投资者可能会将这些争端提交国际仲裁,我国有可能被国际仲裁庭裁定为此对外国投资者承担相应的赔偿责任。面对新形势,我国必须重新审视双边投资协定中投资者与东道国投资争端解决方式的相关规定。     

Science,Politics, and Persistent Organic Pollutants: The Role of Scientific Assessments in International Environmental Co-operation

International measures to address environmental problems increasingly rely on scientific information, and a growing number of international agreements require periodic scientific re-assessments. However, the arena of scientific assessment, governed by a combination of scientific criteria and political interests, is not well-understood, and few case studies have mapped the influence of scientific assessment on the birth and development of environmental policy issues. This article examines the role of scientific assessments and the science-politics interplay in international attempts to regulate persistent organic pollutants (POPs), focusing on the processes within the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). The study shows that scientific and political activities are intrinsically linked in international POPs work. Scientific and political agendas are co-constructed with no clear boundary between the science and politics spheres. Scientific assessments played a prominent role in constructing POPs as an issue of international concern, setting agendas and shaping policies.     

Corporate Social Responsibility: A Step Towards Stronger Involvement of Business in MEA Implementation?

This article explores the relationship between multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) and corporate social responsibility (CSR). It offers an overview of the linkages, a survey of relevant provisions of key MEAs, and a review of the relationship between global trade rules and MEAs. Finally, the article highlights three ongoing discussions with relevance to linkages between CSR and MEAs: (1) whether, and if so how, to identify minimum global business standards in the environmental sphere; (2) the rapidly evolving 'sub-theme' within the CSR agenda which addresses the business/development interface, and the contribution of business to poverty reduction, sustainable livelihoods and achieving the Millennium Development Goals; and (3) the development by the International Organization for Standardization of an international guidance standard on 'organizational social responsibility', which, if adopted, will become ISO 26000. The risk of seeing CSR as a new pathway to MEA implementation is that the role of MEAs in informing the development of minimum acceptable environmental norms of business behaviour will be 'watered down'. If MEAs are to learn from CSR, their competitors and often stronger counterparts in the international architecture – intergovernmental trade and investment arrangements – also need to be equipped not only to be sensitive to CSR, but actively to support it. ¹     

The influence of the Regional Coordinating Unit of the Abidjan Convention: implementing multilateral environmental agreements to prevent shipping pollution in West and Central Africa

The Regional Coordinating Unit of the Convention for Co-operation in the Protection and Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment for West and Central Africa (the Abidjan Convention) has under its wings several multilateral environmental agreements including those addressing shipping pollution. Shipping, potentially, has negative impacts on marine fauna and flora and air quality, with implications for public health. The Regional Coordinating Unit seeks to strengthen implementation of the Abidjan Convention by party-states through co-operation with state actors using various pathways based on its internal resources and competencies but the Unit is also starting to explore engagement with potential non-state actors. The ability of the Unit to exert influence on implementation is constrained by domestic politico-administrative institutions. This paper seeks to understand the influence of the Regional Coordinating Unit on the implementation of the Abidjan Convention in the field of shipping pollution. It uses three theoretical perspectives for the analysis: the influence of international environmental bureaucracies, domestic regulatory-politics and transnational governance. The paper shows how these theories are complementary because the influence of international bureaucracies such as the Regional Coordinating Unit cannot be adequately understood through factors internal to their organisation alone but needs to be analysed in relation also to external factors, both domestic politico-institutional ones in states that international bureaucracies work with, and the role of relevant non-state actors in the implementation of multilateral environmental agreements. It is concluded that, although influence cannot be measured directly, it is likely that Regional Coordinating Unit’s influence through its autonomy-centred efforts are quiet strong but negatively constrained by the traditional state-centric responsibility for implementation of international legal instruments where domestic regulatory-politics lack sufficient political will and support from and engagement with non-state actors.     

Enforcing compliance with international environmental agreements using a deposit-refund system

Whether nations are able to cooperatively manage shared resources through international environmental agreements (IEAs) depends on whether compliance with voluntary commitments can be enforced. Given that nations are sovereign enforcing compliance with IEAs cannot rely on the presence of a strong sanctioning body. Nonetheless, enforcement provisions must be effective in the sense that they will deter non-compliance and credible in the sense that they will actually be imposed. In this paper, we address the problem of enforcing compliance with IEAs by examining one promising mechanism—a deposit-refund system—that exhibits the necessary features for effective enforcement. We analyze a simple model to demonstrate the desirable properties of the mechanism and then consider the effects of imperfect monitoring, uncertainty, partial participation and reputation on the effectiveness of a deposit-refund system.     

Are international environmental agreements enforceable? implications for institutional design

Over the past several decades, European international environmental institutions have evolved, heeding institutionalist calls for stronger institutions backed by sanctioning and dispute settlement mechanisms. This apparent increase in institutional strength has led to a corresponding increase of the behavioral effectiveness, or active compliance management of institutions as observed in the incidence of arbitral tribunal decisions. However, upon closer examination, it is apparent that this behavioral effectiveness has not been exclusively due to provisions for arbitral tribunal decisions within international environmental agreements. Rather, the incidence and enforcement of these arbitral tribunal decisions is linked to the institutional design of the enforcement mechanisms. Most international environmental agreements rely on parties to raise disputes and enforce commitments, causing individual countries to bear the cost of enforcement. In addition, bringing a dispute to an arbitral tribunal requires the accordance of the parties to the dispute. In contrast, the European Court of Justice allows for enforcement to originate from a strong central authority and for the cases of arbitration to be filed unilaterally. International environmental agreements that have been joined by the European Community and have a provision for an arbitral tribunal have stronger enforcement mechanisms, are more likely to result in enforcement action, and are more effective in generating behavioral change.     

Environmental policy integration among multilateral environmental agreements: the case of biodiversity

The system of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) comprises hundreds of conventions and protocols designed to protect the environment. Institutional interaction within the MEA system raises issues of environmental policy integration (EPI), i.e. balancing different environmental objectives and considerations. Mainstream proposals for enhancing EPI in environmental governance build upon the assumption that environmental institutions are fragmented. However, recent research reveals that the MEA system has been defragmenting over the years such that EPI is less a problem of institutional fragmentation than of effective management of institutional interplay. This paper examines the factors affecting EPI among MEAs by looking at experiences in the cluster of biodiversity-related multilateral agreements. The analysis is based on a series of interviews with MEA secretariat officials and international experts conducted between September 2011 and January 2012. The paper identifies institutional, political and cognitive barriers constraining interplay management efforts. While some have proposed regulatory changes in the cluster, national-level co-ordination appears to be the best way to advance EPI.     

Implementing Global Nature Protection Agreements in Russia

The article discusses Russian implementation of the Ramsar Convention, the World Heritage Convention, CITES and the Convention on Biological Diversity. The country's international obligations are part of Russian law, but little has been done by Russian authorities to implement the agreements on the ground. Compliance with the international agreements is the result of Russian protection measures that exist independently of the conventions. Environmental concerns have been given reduced priority since the early 1990s. An independent environmental protection agency no longer exists, and the number of inspectors has been drastically reduced. Implementation activities are undertaken primarily by international NGOs, and partly by regional authorities.     

关于公众参与环境影响评价的若干思考

本文结合我国现行的有关公众参与环境影响评价(EIA)的法律法规,参照国外有关公众参与的法律文件和国际条约,运用法律关系、法律行为、权利、义务等基本法理,论述了公众参与环境影响评价的特殊内涵,对参与环境影响评价的公众的权利义务进行了初步探讨,在此基础上,提出了关于如何进一步完善公众参与制度的建议。     

Transboundary river basin agreements in the Mekong and Zambezi basins: Enhancing environmental security or securitizing the environment?

Multilateral agreements are emerging as important mechanisms for structuring cooperation in politically and ecologically complex transboundary river basins around the world. While such agreements are offered and legitimized as a means to advance ecological and human security, they instead often promote state-centric environmental securitization. As a result, seemingly progressive agreements grounded in international law are likely to precipitate and mask environmental degradation until it becomes serious or even irreversible, creating both ecological and human security crises at a variety of scales. Case studies of wetland ecosystems in both the Zambezi and Mekong basins reveal the material and discursive linkages between international agreements and security. By drawing on critical approaches that acknowledge both the socially constructed and the multi-dimensional nature of sovereignty, this paper exposes significant institutional barriers to ecologically sustainable transboundary cooperation in the two basins.