Reconciling dualism and non-dualism: three arguments in Vijñānabhikṣu’s Bhedābheda Vedānta

The late 16th century Indian philosopher Vijñānabhik?u is most well known today for his commentaries on Sā?khya and Yoga texts. However, the majority of his extant corpus belongs to the tradition of Bhedābheda (Difference and Non-Difference) Vedānta. This article elucidates three Vedāntic arguments from Vijñānabhik?u’s voluminous commentary on the Brahma Sūtra, entitled Vijñānām?tabhā?ya (Commentary on the Nectar of Knowledge). The first section of the article explores the meaning of bhedābheda, showing that in Vijñānabhik?u’s understanding, “difference and non-difference” does not entail a denial of the principle of contradiction. The second shows how the relation between the individual soul (jīva) and Brahman can be understood as a relation of part and whole. The third section discusses Brahman as cause of the world, and Vijñānabhik?u’s particular formulation of Brahman as “locus cause” (adhi??hānakāra?a). Understanding these arguments enables us to appreciate how Vijñānabhik?u’s Difference and Non-Difference Vedānta is a credible alternative to the Advaita Vedānta schools prevalent in northern India in the late medieval period, and how in his later works Vijñānabhik?u built upon this Difference and Non-Difference metaphysical framework to argue for the unity of Vedānta, Yoga, and Sā?-khya philosophies.     

Appayyadīkṣita’s Invention of Śrīkaṇṭha’s Vedānta

Apart from his voluminous, immensely learned, and spectacularly successful contributions to the fields of Hermeneutics (Mīmā?sā), non-dualist Metaphysics (Advaita Vedānta), and poetics, the sixteenth century South Indian polymath Appayyadīk?ita is famed for reviving from obscurity the moribund ?aivite Vedānta tradition represented by the (thirteenth century?) Brahmasūtrabhā?ya of ?rīka??ha. Appayya’s voluminous commentary on this work, his ?ivārkama?idīpikā, not only reconstitutes ?rīka??ha’s system, but radically transforms it, making it into a springboard for Appayya’s own highly original critiques of standard views of Mīmā?sā and Vedānta. Appayya addresses long sections of his commentary to matters dealt with glancingly or not at all in the root text, drawing conclusions which ?rīka??ha nowhere endorses. Furthermore, the distinctive positions Appayya develops in the ?ivārkama?idīpikā feed into Appayya’s other works in ways that have so far been largely ignored by modern scholars. For example, most or all the discussions Appayya’s Pūrvottaramīmā?sāvādanak?atramālā, twenty-seven essays on scattered topics in Mīmā?sā and Vedānta, build on arguments first advanced in the ?ivārkama?idīpikā—most notably Appayya’s totally original theory of the signification of adjectives, first developed in the ?ivārkama?idīpikā, the full elaboration and defense of which takes up fully sixteen of the twenty-seven essays that make up the Pūrvottaramīmā?sāvādanak?atramālā.     

Śālikanātha’s Criticism of Dharmakīrti’s svasaṃvedana Theory

The aim of this paper is to clarify how Śālikanātha’s epistemology can be distinguished from that of Dharmakīrti, especially in terms of their respective views on cognitive form (ākāra). It has been pointed out that Śālikanātha’s tripuṭī theory and svayaṃprakāśa theory are very close to Dharmakīrti’s epistemology. However, it remains questionable if Śālikanātha, who belongs to the Prābhākara branch of the Mīmāṃsā and is therefore a nirākāravādin, can subscribe to notions that Dharmakīrti developed on the basis of sākāravāda. The present paper concludes that Śālikanātha agrees with Dharmakīrti in assuming that a single cognition consists of three parts; unlike Dharmakīrti, however, Śālikanātha puts emphasis on the difference between these parts, especially between the cognition and its form, on the ground that the cognitive form belongs to the external thing, and not to the cognition (nirākāravāda). In Dharmakīrti’s epistemology, the cognitive form belongs to cognition (sākāravāda); in the ultimate level, there remains no difference between the three parts.     

On the Alleged Indebtedness of the Vedānta Paribhāṣā Towards the Vedānta Kaumudī: Some Considerations on an Almost Forgotten Vivaraṇa Text (Studies in Vedānta Kaumudī I)

Dharmarāja Adhvarin’s (middle XVII cent.) Vedānta Paribhā?ā (VP) is a well-known introduction to Advaita Vedānta, targeted to beginners who are already trained in Navya Nyāya. According to Dasgupta (1942), the VP is so heavily indebted to Rāmādvaya’s Vedānta Kaumudī (VK), which was composed in the middle of the 14th century and is today almost forgotten, that the VP’s “claim to originality vanishes”. The VK was, however, only edited in 1955 and then again in 1973. In the light of this improved textual basis, what is our judgement about Dasgupta’s hypercritical statement? Did actually the VP ever claim to be original? Was this originality somehow superimposed on the VP later? Is the VP really so much indebted to the VK? This paper aims at comparatively analysing the textual background of these questions. I will start from the analysis of one Advaita’s epistemological tenet, namely the valid knowledge (pramā), in the VK and then compare it to the corresponding parts in the VP.     

A Monstrous Inference called Mahāvidyānumāna and Cantor’s Diagonal Argument

A mahāvidyā inference is used for establishing another inference. Its Reason (hetu) is normally an omnipresent (kevalānvayin) property. Its Target (sādhya) is defined in terms of a general feature that is satisfied by different properties in different cases. It assumes that there is no (relevant) case that has the absence of its Target. The main defect of a mahāvidyā inference μ is a counterbalancing inference (satpratipak?a) that can be formed by a little modification of μ. The discovery of its counterbalancing inference can invalidate such an inference. This paper will argue that Cantor’s diagonal argument too shares some features of the mahāvidyā inference. A diagonal argument has a counterbalanced statement. Its main defect is its counterbalancing inference. Apart from presenting an epistemological perspective that explains the disquiet over Cantor’s proof, this paper would show that both the mahāvidyā and diagonal argument formally contain their own invalidators.     

Mipam’s Middle Way Through Yogācāra and Prāsaṅgika

In Tibet, the negative dialectics of Madhyamaka are typically identified with Candrakīrti’s interpretation of Nāgārjuna, and systematic epistemology is associated with Dharmakīrti. These two figures are also held to be authoritative commentators on a univocal doctrine of Buddhism. Despite Candrakīrti’s explicit criticism of Buddhist epistemologists in his Prasannapadā, Buddhists in Tibet have integrated the theories of Candrakīrti and Dharmakīrti in unique ways. Within this integration, there is a tension between the epistemological system-building on the one hand, and “deconstructive” negative dialectics on the other. The integration of an epistemological system within Madhyamaka is an important part of Mipam’s (’ju mi pham rgya mtsho, 1846–1912) philosophical edifice, and is an important part of understanding the place of Yogācāra in his tradition. This paper explores the way that Mipam preserves a meaningful Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction while claiming both Yogācāra and Prāsaṅgika as legitimate expressions of Madhyamaka. Mipam represents Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka as a discourse that emphasizes what transcends conceptuality. As such, he portrays Prāsaṅgika as a radical discourse of denial. Since the mind cannot conceive the “content” of nonconceptual meditative equipoise, Prāsaṅgika, as the representative discourse of meditative equipoise, negates any formulation of that state. In contrast, he positions Yogācāra as a discourse that situates the nonconceptual within a systematic (conceptual) structure. Rather than a discourse that re-presents the nonconceptual by enacting it (like Prāsaṅgika), the discourse of Yogācāra represents the nonconceptual within an overarching system, a system (unlike Prāsaṅgika) that distinguishes between the conceptual and the nonconceptual.     

The Evidence for Somānanda’s Pantheism

It is well known that Utpaladeva’s (c. 925–975) articulation of the Pratyabhijñā deviates in style and substance from that of his teacher, Somānanda (fl. c. 900–950), and that the former’s ī?varapratyabhijñākārikās (along with two auto-commentaries) come to be regarded as the definitive formulation of the school’s philosophy almost from the moment they were first composed. In this essay, I argue that while the spirit and general philosophical contours of Somānanda’s ?ivad???i serve as the basis for all subsequent writings in the history of the Pratyabhijñā, Somānanda nevertheless articulates a philosophical monism that is both pantheistic and absent in its essentials from Utpaladeva’s oeuvre. This pantheism, I further suggest, stands in contrast to Utpaladeva’s panentheistic monism, which while compatible with Somānanda’s philosophical vision is nevertheless articulated in different terms: Somānanda emphasizes the functioning of ?iva’s power(s), while Utpaladeva articulates a monism based on the identification of paired opposites. In doing so, this essay identifies Somānanda’s unique contributions to the history of the Pratyabhijñā.     

An Early Tibetan Commentary on Atiśa’s Satyadvayāvatāra

Dīpa?kara?rījñāna (982–1054 c.e.), more commonly known under his honorific title of Ati?a, is a renowned figure in Tibetan Buddhist cultural memory. He is famous for coming to Tibet and revitalizing Buddhism there during the early eleventh century. Of the many works that Ati?a composed, translated, and brought to Tibet one of the most well-known was his “Entry to the Two Realities” (Satyadvayāvatāra). Recent scholarship has provided translations and Tibetan editions of this work, including Lindtner’s English translation (1981) and Ejima’s Japanese translation (1983). However, previously there was no known Indian or Tibetan commentary to this work. This article identifies for the first time a brief commentary to the Satyadvayāvatāra and discusses its content and purport in relation to early Madhyamaka philosophy in Tibet, and provides an annotated translation of the work. This early Tibetan commentary on the two realities (satyadvaya) provides important insight into how late eleventh century or early twelfth centuries Tibetan followers of Ati?a understood the tenets of Buddhist philosophy, the nature of valid cognition (tshad ma), and the importance of spiritual authority. The early Tibetan commentary to Ati?a’s Satyadvayāvatāra provides direct textual evidence of the beginnings of scholasticism in Tibet and offers an early perspective on the formative developments in the intellectual history of Tibetan Madhyamaka.     

The Tantric Context of Ratnākaraśānti’s Philosophy of Mind

The conflicting positions of the two early eleventh century Yogācāra scholars, Ratnākara?ānti and his critic Jñāna?rīmitra, concerning whether or not consciousness can exist without content (ākāra) are inseparable from their respective understandings of enlightenment. Ratnākara?ānti argues that consciousness can be contentless (nirākāra)—and that, for a buddha, it must be. Mental content can be defeated by reasoning and made to disappear by meditative cultivation, and so it is fundamentally distinct (bheda) from the nature of consciousness, which is never defeated and never ceases. That mental content is thus separable from the nature of consciousness is unimaginable to Jñāna?rīmitra, who argues that all mental content cannot be so defeated, nor can it disappear completely, and who concludes that Ratnākara?ānti’s commitment to this idea can be based on nothing but faith (?raddhā). Contra Jñāna?rīmitra, I will suggest that Ratnākara?ānti’s view is based not only on faith, but is also driven by a certain (often implicit) theory of buddhahood, the implications of which he is committed to working out. Because Ratnākara?ānti’s theory of buddhahood is developed in part in his tantric work, our understanding of his position benefits from our reading it in this context, wherein buddhahood and the most effective techniques for attaining it are explored.     

Is Word-Meaning Denoted or Remembered? Śālikanātha’s Cornerstone in Defence of Anvitābhidhāna

Journal of Indian Philosophy - The role of memory in one’s cognition of sentential meaning is a pivotal topic in Indian philosophical debates on the nature of language. The...     

Outlines of a Pedagogical Interpretation of Nāgārjuna’s Two Truths Doctrine

This paper proposes an interpretation of Nāgārjuna’s doctrine of the two truths that considers sa?v?ti and paramārtha-satya two visions of reality on which the Buddhas, for soteriological and pedagogical reasons, build teachings of two types: respectively in agreement with (for example, the teaching of the Four Noble Truths) or in contrast to (for example, the teaching of emptiness) the category of svabhāva. The early sections of the article show to what extent the various current interpretations of the Nāgārjunian doctrine of the dve satye—despite their sometimes even macroscopic differences—have a common tendency to consider the notion of ?ūnyatā as a teaching not based on, but equivalent to supreme truth. This equivalence—philologically questionable—leads to interpretative paths that prove inevitably aporetic: indeed, according to whether the interpretation of ?ūnyatā is ‘metaphysical’ or ‘anti-metaphysical’, it gives rise to readings of Nāgārjuna’s thought incompatible, respectively, with anti-metaphysical and realistic types of verses traceable in the works of the author of the Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā (MMK). On the contrary, by giving more emphasis to the expression samupā?ritya (“based on”), which recurs in MMK.24.8, and therefore, by epistemologically separating the notion of ?ūnyatā from the notion of paramārtha-satya (and of some of its conceptual equivalents such as nirvā?a, tattva and dharmatā), we may obtain an interpretation—at once realistic and anti-metaphysical—of the theory of the two truths compatible with the vast majority (or even totality) of Nāgārjuna’s verses.     

Prāsaṅgika Epistemology: A Reply to Stag tsang’s Charge Against Tsongkhapa’s Uses of Pramāṇa in Candrakīrti’s Philosophy

Stag tsang, amongst others, has argued that any use of mundane pramā?a—authoritative cognition—is incompatible with the Prāsa?gika system. His criticism of Tsongkhapa’s interpretation of Candrakīrti’s Madhyamaka which insists on the uses of pramā?a (tha snyad pa’i tshad ma)—authoritative cognition—within the Prāsa?gika philosophical context is that it is contradictory and untenable. This paper is my defence of Tsongkhapa’s approach to pramā?a in the Prāsa?gika philosophy. By showing that Tsongkhapa consistently adopts a non-foundationalist approach in his interpretation of the Prāsa?gika’s epistemology, and by showing that he emphatically denies any place for the foundationalist epistemology of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti in the Prāsa?gika system, I will argue that Tsongkhapa’s epistemology emerges from Stag tsang’s criticisms unscathed.     

A Criticism of M. Siderits and J. L. Garfield’s ‘Semantic Interpretation’ of Nāgārjuna’s Theory of Two Truths

This paper proposes a critical analysis of that interpretation of the Nāgārjunian doctrine of the two truths as summarized—by both Mark Siderits and Jay L. Garfield—in the formula: “the ultimate truth is that there is no ultimate truth”. This ‘semantic reading’ of Nāgārjuna’s theory, despite its importance as a criticism of the ‘metaphysical interpretations’, would in itself be defective and improbable. Indeed, firstly, semantic interpretation presents a formal defect: it fails to clearly and explicitly express that which it contains logically; the previously mentioned formula must necessarily be completed by: “the conventional truth is that nothing is conventional truth”. Secondly, after having recognized what Siderits’ and Garfield’s analyses contain implicitly, other logical and philological defects in their position emerge: the existence of the ‘conventional’ would appear—despite the efforts of semantic interpreters to demonstrate quite the contrary—definitively inconceivable without the presupposition of something ‘real’; moreover, the number of verses in Nāgārjuna that are in opposition to the semantic interpretation (even if we grant semantic interpreters that these verses do not justify a metaphysical reconstruction of Nagarjuna’s doctrine) would seem too great and significant to be ignored.     

Navya-nyāya in the Late Vijayanagara Period: Appaya Dīkṣita’s Revision of Gaṅgeśa’s īśvarānumāna

Journal of Indian Philosophy - In his celebrated treatise of Navya-nyāya, the Tattvacintāma?i, Ga?ge?a offers a detailed formulation of the inference of God’s...     

Ratnākaraśānti’s Theory of Cognition with False Mental Images (*alīkākāravāda) and the Neither-One-Nor-Many Argument

The paper aims to clarify Ratnākara?ānti?s epistemological theory that mental images in a cognition are false (*alīkākāravāda) in comparison with ?āntarak?ita?s criticism of the Yogācāra position. Although Ratnākara?ānti frequently uses the neither-one-nor-many argument for explaining his Yogācāra position, the argument, unlike ?āntarak?ita?s original one, does not function for refuting the existence of awareness itself as the basis of mental images. This point is examined in the first two sections of this paper by analyzing Ratnākara?ānti?s proof of the selflessness of entities (dharmanairātmya) and his application of the neither-one-nor-many argument for demonstrating the falsehood of mental images. On the other hand, the last section investigates into his defense of the alīkākāravāda against ?āntarak?ita?s severe criticism of it. Here, too, we can find his tactical usage of the neither-one-nor-many argument, or more precisely, one of its variants: the neither-identical-nor-different argument. Through the above procedure, we can see how Yogācāra philosophy survived in the late period of Indian Buddhism by blending the Madhyamaka opponent?s argument with its own thought.     

A South Indian ?ākta Anthropogon?: An Annotated Translation of Selections from Mahe?varānanda’s Mahārthama?jarīparimala, gāthās 19 and 20

This article represents the first of a projected series of annotated translations of the Mahārthama?jarīparimala of Maheśvarānanda, a Śaiva Śākta author active in Cidambaram around the turn of the fourteenth century of the Common Era. The present translation includes excerpts from the text’s presentation of two of the levels of reality (tattvas), puruṣa and prakṛti. These two tattvas, the apex of the older Sāṃkhya scheme incorporated centuries earlier by the Śaivas, provide for Maheśvarānanda the centerpiece and climax of his understanding of the structure of the Śaiva cosmos. Fundamental to the rhetoric of Maheśvarānanda’s idiosyncratic presentation is his reliance upon a simultaneous strategy of integration and distinction of his argument within the wider world of Śaiva doctrinal common sense. He seeks to integrate the characteristic meditative structure of his Krama or Mahārtha system within a theological framework shared by all Śaiva theists. It can be seen that Maheśvarānanda’s interpretation of the junction between these two reality levels delineates a picture of what it is to be a human being, equipped with an inner life and a personality. The article also reviews the quality of the published editions of the Mahārthama?jarī, discusses its textual history, and offers a number of suggested emendations to the passages translated.