Effects of funding mechanisms on participation in multilateral environmental agreements

International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics - The “rational design approach” to studying international agreements holds that policy-makers evaluate costs and...     

Environmental policy integration and the architecture of global environmental governance

This article discusses environmental policy integration—a concept so far mainly applied to domestic and European politics—at the global level. The article distinguishes between integration of institutions, of organizations, and of their bureaucracies, and it addresses both internal integration (within the environmental policy domain) and external integration (between environmental policies and non-environmental policies). The overall focus is on one set of policy reform proposals that have been salient in the global environmental governance debate for the last decades: the question of whether the creation of a world environment organization would improve the effectiveness, legitimacy, and efficiency of global environmental governance. We revisit this debate and explore the options for organizational change, including clustering, upgrading, streamlining, and hierarchical steering, with a focus on whether the reform proposals can bring about environmental policy integration. We conclude that in the longer term, upgrading of the UN Environment Programme to a UN specialized agency, with additional and increasing streamlining of other institutions and bureaucracies, offers the most potential for environmental policy integration and does not appear to be unrealistic.     

Correction to: Effects of funding mechanisms on participation in multilateral environmental agreements

International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics - In the original publication of the article, there were few mistakes in the text, tables and figure. The corrected text has been...     

Interplay management: enhancing environmental policy integration among international institutions

This article investigates how and to what extent the current management of inter-institutional relationships within International Environmental Governance (‘interplay management’) contributes to Environmental Policy Integration (EPI), and identifies options for enhancing EPI among international institutions. To this end, it first develops a framework for the systematic analysis and assessment of interplay management as a means for achieving ‘strong’ EPI, distinguishing four levels and two principal modes of management. On this basis, the article assesses the current contribution of International Environmental Governance to advancing EPI as regards three categories of institutional interaction. The analysis demonstrates the need to fit interplay management to the particular governance conditions of varying interaction situations and highlights the lack of systematic and consistent support for EPI among international institutions. Options to improve this situation include in particular promoting inter-institutional learning and assistance for the benefit of environmental institutions as well as ensuring consideration of and respect for environmental requirements. Adapting the statutes and mandates of individual institutions and developing suitable guidance under general international (environmental) law have the highest potential for implementing these options. In contrast, joint management initiatives and a strengthened international environmental organisation have a much more limited, supplementary potential.     

Managing global change for sustainable development: technology,community and multilateral environmental agreements

The purpose of this paper is to consider how international law has sought to mediate between the promotion of environmentally sound technologies and local community participation. It will be suggested that the paradigm of sustainable development presents the most sensible framework through which to consider these issues. The paper will then present three short case studies centred around various aspects of the ongoing implementation of the Rio Conventions, namely the endorsement of sequestration activities within the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, the development of an access and benefit sharing framework under the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity and further encouragement of community participation in the 1994 UN Convention to Combat Desertification. In conclusion, the paper will suggest that community participation must be given comparable status with the promotion of technological advances if long-term success is ever likely to be attained.

The politics of multilateral environmental agreements lessons from 20 years of INEA

International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics - This review article addresses the question: What lessons can we learn from work published in International Environmental...     

Regional integration and free-trade agreements in the Balkans: opportunities, obstacles and policy issues

The Balkan states are engaged in a complex and contradictory process of simultaneous regional integration and disintegration. The main instrument of regional integration has been a network of bilateral Free Trade Agreements which the Balkan countries have adopted under the guidance of the Stability Pact for South East Europe, and more recently the extension of the CEFTA free trade area to the region. The bilateral FTAs have been criticised for creating a ‘spaghetti bowl’ of differentiated trade relations, and creating risks of trade deflection and trade diversion. At the same time other arrangements, including the contractual relations of individual countries with the EU, cut across the region and fragment their mutual trade relations. Moreover, Croatia is likely to become an EU member within the next few years, at which point it will suspend its trade agreements with the non-member Balkan states. Therefore, soon after having established a new mechanism of integration, the region will once again be split apart, leaving a rump association of five or six poverty-stricken and politically unstable countries to pursue the vision of regional cooperation. This paper focuses on the prospects for regional integration among these remaining countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia. It explores the patterns of their mutual trade, and the opportunities and obstacles to increasing trade between them.     

Signaling in international environmental agreements: the case of early and delayed action

This paper presents a stylized international environmental agreements game with two regions differing in their preference for environmental quality. If side payments are allowed, cooperation can increase the payoffs accruing to both regions. However, cooperation can be impeded by asymmetric information about the regions’ types and only become feasible once a region has credibly revealed its type. We show how in a two-stage game early (delayed) action can act as a credible signal to reveal private information on high (low) benefits. Yet, the cooperative solution with asymmetric information is Pareto-dominated by the outcome with perfect information.     

International regimes and environmental policy integration: introducing the special issue

Pressure is mounting for states to become better at integrating its environmental policies into sector policy, a challenge often referred to as environmental policy integration (EPI). Policy research on EPI has grown to become a distinct and substantial field of study at the national and EU levels, where political commitment and interest in the topic have been large. In the study of international regimes, EPI analytical concepts have so far not been applied although the EPI quest is at least as important and critical at this level. This special issue addresses this gap, by combining these two sets of literature and examining various aspects of EPI in international regimes, its manifestations and its challenges. This introductory paper introduces key conceptual discussions underlying the development of this special issue, distils and discusses some of the key findings and messages from the four ensuing research articles and presents directions for future research. It finds that many EPI challenges and institutional barriers are strongly accentuated at international levels of governance, but also that similarities with the national level suggest that closer interactions between the two fields of study are warranted. At both levels, the EPI “game” is full of inherent tensions and goal conflicts, institutional constraints abound, and cognitive interactions and learning processes appear as key mechanisms to advance EPI. Suggestions for how to enhance EPI in international regimes are still tentative, and analysis beyond international relations and regime theory is needed to capture potential institutional innovations for advancing EPI.     

The influence of the Regional Coordinating Unit of the Abidjan Convention: implementing multilateral environmental agreements to prevent shipping pollution in West and Central Africa

The Regional Coordinating Unit of the Convention for Co-operation in the Protection and Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment for West and Central Africa (the Abidjan Convention) has under its wings several multilateral environmental agreements including those addressing shipping pollution. Shipping, potentially, has negative impacts on marine fauna and flora and air quality, with implications for public health. The Regional Coordinating Unit seeks to strengthen implementation of the Abidjan Convention by party-states through co-operation with state actors using various pathways based on its internal resources and competencies but the Unit is also starting to explore engagement with potential non-state actors. The ability of the Unit to exert influence on implementation is constrained by domestic politico-administrative institutions. This paper seeks to understand the influence of the Regional Coordinating Unit on the implementation of the Abidjan Convention in the field of shipping pollution. It uses three theoretical perspectives for the analysis: the influence of international environmental bureaucracies, domestic regulatory-politics and transnational governance. The paper shows how these theories are complementary because the influence of international bureaucracies such as the Regional Coordinating Unit cannot be adequately understood through factors internal to their organisation alone but needs to be analysed in relation also to external factors, both domestic politico-institutional ones in states that international bureaucracies work with, and the role of relevant non-state actors in the implementation of multilateral environmental agreements. It is concluded that, although influence cannot be measured directly, it is likely that Regional Coordinating Unit’s influence through its autonomy-centred efforts are quiet strong but negatively constrained by the traditional state-centric responsibility for implementation of international legal instruments where domestic regulatory-politics lack sufficient political will and support from and engagement with non-state actors.     

The effectiveness of international environmental agreements

Many argue that international environmental agreements (IEAs) can alter states’ cost-benefit analyses by providing crucial information about the costs of environmental degradation. Thereby, IEAs may help to effectively curb environmental pollution. However, previous attempts to empirically measure institutional effectiveness found it difficult to provide credible estimates because they have missed to produce convincing counterfactuals. This study empirically estimates the effectiveness of one prominent example of an international environmental institution, the Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution agreement (LRTAP). It sets forth a transparent identification strategy in light of latest advancements in the causal inference literature and presents evidence for the non-effectiveness of the LRTAP in changing member states’ behavior in terms of anthropogenic emissions of two substances (NO _x and SO₂). By deriving and illustrating the use of difference-in- differences (DID) design in the context of IEAs, this study provides a general methodological tool kit to drawing causal inferences about the effectiveness of international environmental institutions.     

The political economy of international environmental agreements: a survey

This paper surveys the recent literature on the political economy of the formation of international environmental agreements. The survey covers theoretical modelling approaches and empirical studies including experimental work. Central to our survey is the question how the political process impacts different stages of agreement formation and stability. We distinguish the rules defined during pre-negotiations that govern negotiations, ratification and implementation. Strategic delegation and lobbying are directly relevant during the negotiation and ratification phases. Implementation, the choice of policy instruments at the national level, will also be impacted by lobbying and indirectly influence negotiations. We find that the basic theoretical framework for the analysis of international environmental agreements is largely unrelated to empirical approaches. Furthermore, we observe that models of the political process of agreement formation, like for example sequential game models, are yet to be developed.     

Risk-sharing agreements to cover environmental damage: theory and practice

Mordernization has witnessed increasingly new industrial sectors which have the potential to create environmental disasters. The insolvency of risk creators in case of such disasters may lead to insufficient compensation as well as to a dilution of preventive incentives. Insurance is a traditional instrument to address these problems, but is subject to limitations such as the lack of information by the insurers on the risk and limited insurance capacity. The risk-sharing agreement is an alternative which is widely used in high-risk sectors but it received relative little attention in academic literature. This paper analyses the potential of risk-sharing agreements in minimizing total social costs of environmental harmful activities, in comparison with insurance. The comparison shows the advantage of risk-sharing agreements in terms of less demanding information requirements, allowing for mutual monitoring and the potential to reduce administrative costs. However, the analysis also shows that a few conditions need to be met for such advantages to be materialized. This paper then discusses a typology of various risk-sharing agreements and illustrates the different categories with examples from the maritime and nuclear sectors. Based on these experiences, this paper explores the possibilities to expand risk-sharing agreements to other policy areas where environmental risks may emerge.     

Lessons learnt from two decades of international environmental agreements: law

International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics - As Patricia Birnie cautiously and prophetically put it in the inaugural issue of this journal (INEA 1, January 2001, p. 74),...     

International environmental agreements between developing countries only: learning from the Brazil–Uruguay case over the suspicion of acid rain

This article is about the process of negotiation and implementation of a bilateral environmental agreement between two developing countries. It analyzes the case of the Act of Jaguarão between Brazil and Uruguay on assessing the risk of transboundary air pollution by the President Medici (UTPM) coal-powered thermo-electrical facility in the Candiota region of southern Brazil. The article adds to the scarce literature on international environmental conflict resolution and negotiations between developing countries, especially in Latin America. First, it explains that even with the asymmetry of power between Brazil and Uruguay, negotiation was possible due to a series of factors, such as the interest of Brazilian environmental agencies in improving the monitoring of emissions from UTPM and the international scrutiny of Brazil prior to the upcoming Rio-92 Earth Summit. Both states obtained mutual gains from the agreement by developing ‘joint fact finding’ research and monitoring. Second, different from most of the mainstream literature, the research reveals that weaknesses in institutional agreements, such as a lack of sanctions or deadlines, were not an implementation impediment. In fact, the very weaknesses of the agreement actually enabled authorities in both countries to cooperate in the development of an acid rain monitoring program in the Candiota region, and as a result, to improve air monitoring capacities in both countries. Third, this research shows that the implementation process (1991–2003) produced different results and impacts: it helped to develop technical capacities of environmental agencies in both countries, increased the political power of Brazilian environmental agencies to control UTPM, and pushed for behavioral changes to enable UTPM to respond to the demands of both governments.     

Environmental policy integration and bilateral development assistance: challenges and opportunities with an evolving governance framework

The aim of this article is to examine progress so far, as well as current challenges and opportunities for EPI in bilateral official development assistance (ODA). A short review of progress shows that effectiveness has so far been limited. Although there has been intense donor activity in relation to stating commitment to the EPI principle and developing a wide range of processes, institutions, and tools, a large part of ODA still is likely to have directly harmful impacts on the environment. The implications for EPI of the emerging governance framework for ODA, namely, the principles stipulated in the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, are then discussed. Both challenges and opportunities are presented, and these are empirically illustrated with a case study of the integration of climate change adaptation in ODA. Finally, this article proposes that at least four special conditions apply to EPI in the bilateral ODA context as compared with domestic EPI: two or more jurisdictions, electorates, and governments are involved; a negotiation context characterized by sovereign states but with a potential power asymmetry; potential conflicts of interest and equity concerns in cases where environmental objectives refer to global environmental problems primarily caused by developed countries; and a policy-making process characterized by a comparatively wide span of both strategic and operational decisions, where EPI can take on very different meanings. The initial exploration presented in this article suggests that these conditions hold, and that, as a consequence, EPI arguably involves more ‘high-politics’ decisions and questions than in a domestic policy context.     

The self-selection of democracies into treaty design: insights from international environmental agreements

Generally, democratic regime type is positively associated with participating in international environmental agreements. In this context, this study focuses on the legal nature of an agreement, which is linked to audience costs primarily at the domestic level that occur in case of non-compliance and are felt especially by democracies. Eventually, more legalized (“hard-law”) treaties make compliance potentially more challenging and as democratic leaders may anticipate the corresponding audience costs, the likelihood that democracies select themselves into such treaties decreases. The empirical implication of our theory is that environmental agreements with a larger share of democratic members are less likely to be characterized by hard law. Results from quantitative analyses strongly support our argument, shed new light on the relationship between participation in international agreements and the form of government, and also have implications for the “words-deeds” debate in international environmental policy-making.     

International Environmental Agreements for biodiversity conservation: a game-theoretic analysis

This paper contributes to the emerging literature on International Environmental Agreements with an analysis of key characteristics for biodiversity conservation. We study three features that are specific to an international conservation agreement: the existence of a natural upper bound of conservation in each country, the importance of local benefits, and the subadditivity of the global conservation function. We consider asymmetries in benefits and costs of conservation and, separately, in the upper bound of conservation in each country, and we examine the impacts of these features on coalition stability and on the effectiveness of biodiversity agreements. Results show that subadditivity of the global conservation function can lead to larger stable coalitions. The inclusion of a transfer scheme that might be implemented through, e.g., international trade of biodiversity credits, can have an impact on coalition composition and can improve conservation outcomes and the size of stable coalitions in certain ranges of the parameter space.