Appayya’s Vedānta and Nīlakaṇṭha’s Vedāntakataka

The seventeenth century author Nīlaka??ha Caturdhara wrote several works criticising the Vedāntic theology of the sixteenth century author, Appayya Dīk?ita. In one of these works, the Vedāntakataka, Nīlaka??ha picks out two doctrines for criticism: that the liberated soul becomes the Lord (ī?varabhāvāpatti), and that souls thus liberated remain the Lord until all other souls are liberated (sarvamukti). These doctrines appear both in Appayya’s Advaitin and in his ?ivādvaitin writings. They appear to be ones to which Appayya was committed. They raise theological and conceptual problems, however, both in themselves as doctrines, and as part of nondual Vedāntic teaching. A study of the Vedāntakataka reveals those features of Appayya’s Vedānta that Advaitins in Banaras in the century after his life considered to be anomalous, and illuminates aspects of the context in which his ideas developed and circulated.     

Śālikanātha’s Criticism of Dharmakīrti’s svasaṃvedana Theory

The aim of this paper is to clarify how Śālikanātha’s epistemology can be distinguished from that of Dharmakīrti, especially in terms of their respective views on cognitive form (ākāra). It has been pointed out that Śālikanātha’s tripuṭī theory and svayaṃprakāśa theory are very close to Dharmakīrti’s epistemology. However, it remains questionable if Śālikanātha, who belongs to the Prābhākara branch of the Mīmāṃsā and is therefore a nirākāravādin, can subscribe to notions that Dharmakīrti developed on the basis of sākāravāda. The present paper concludes that Śālikanātha agrees with Dharmakīrti in assuming that a single cognition consists of three parts; unlike Dharmakīrti, however, Śālikanātha puts emphasis on the difference between these parts, especially between the cognition and its form, on the ground that the cognitive form belongs to the external thing, and not to the cognition (nirākāravāda). In Dharmakīrti’s epistemology, the cognitive form belongs to cognition (sākāravāda); in the ultimate level, there remains no difference between the three parts.     

Prāsaṅgika Epistemology: A Reply to Stag tsang’s Charge Against Tsongkhapa’s Uses of Pramāṇa in Candrakīrti’s Philosophy

Stag tsang, amongst others, has argued that any use of mundane pramā?a—authoritative cognition—is incompatible with the Prāsa?gika system. His criticism of Tsongkhapa’s interpretation of Candrakīrti’s Madhyamaka which insists on the uses of pramā?a (tha snyad pa’i tshad ma)—authoritative cognition—within the Prāsa?gika philosophical context is that it is contradictory and untenable. This paper is my defence of Tsongkhapa’s approach to pramā?a in the Prāsa?gika philosophy. By showing that Tsongkhapa consistently adopts a non-foundationalist approach in his interpretation of the Prāsa?gika’s epistemology, and by showing that he emphatically denies any place for the foundationalist epistemology of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti in the Prāsa?gika system, I will argue that Tsongkhapa’s epistemology emerges from Stag tsang’s criticisms unscathed.     

The Commitments of a Madhyamaka Trickster: Innovation in Candrakīrti’s Prasanna-padā

This paper challenges the notion that there is a complete continuity between the thought of Nāgārjuna and the thought of Candrakīrti. It is shown that there is strong reason to doubt Candrakīrti’s gloss of Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā (MMK) 2.1, and that Candrakīrti’s peculiar reading of this verse causes him to alter the context of the discussion in the four cases in which Nāgārjuna quotes MMK 2.1 later in the text—MMK 3.3, 7.14, 10.13 and 16.7. The innovation produced by Candrakīrti is next contrasted to Nāgārjuna’s style of argument, and it is shown that these two author’s notions of emptiness, as well as their particular implementation of Madhyamaka logic, significantly diverge from each other. Finally, Candrakīrti’s reading of these verses is compared with his commentary on MMK 15 so as to suggest a possible subtle metaphysical position that is at the base of his thinking.     

Coase’s world and Coase’s blackboard

In this contribution I focus on a particular characteristic of Ronald Coase’s work, as exhibited in “The Problem of Social Cost”: his ability to force upon his audience a clearer grasp of reality than they previously held. More specifically, I aim to consider to what extent the “blackboard economics” that Coase himself derided have been avoided in a Coasean world, taking that expression to refer in some sense to a world where Coasean insights can flourish, and as such to be a world not simply of Coase’s own making but a world that has been developed by others in applying the Coase Theorem. My strategy is to interrogate the nature of a Coasean world through developing a framework that can look more closely at different approaches to theoretical modelling, the different worlds involved in these models, and the different positive and normative applications that can be derived from them. I shall further consider whether the understanding of the law that inhabits a Coasean world reflects a “real-world” legal environment. Finally, I shall seek to assess the impact of Coase’s work on our understanding of the relationship between law and economics, in our world.     

Editor’s note

ABSTRACT

Over the past decade, a small movement endorsing the use of animal abuse registries (AARs) has emerged in the United States. Today, one state, 16 counties, and the City of New York have adopted AAR legislation, and 28 other states have attempted to pass such legislation. Here, we discuss similarities between AARs and sexual offender registries in theoretical terms, discuss the nature of AAR legislation, and provide data on the use of AARs, and count the number of offenders listed in those registries at two points in time. We also provide a count of animal abuse, and potential ways that animal abuse might be counted that are not addressed in current AAR legislation. We discuss whether AARs are ‘a good idea,’ especially as a policy response that might be associated with green criminology.     

Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha’s Elaboration of Self-Awareness (svasaṃvedana), and How it Differs from Dharmakīrti’s Exposition of the Concept

The article considers what happened to the Buddhist concept of self-awareness (svasa?vedana) when it was appropriated by ?aiva Siddhānta. The first section observes how it was turned against Buddhism by being used to attack the momentariness of consciousenss and to establish its permanence. The second section examines how self-awareness differs from I-cognition (ahampratyaya). The third section examines the difference between the kind of self-awareness elaborated by Rāmaka??ha (‘reflexive awareness’) and a kind elaborated by Dharmakīrti (‘intentional self-awareness’). It is then pointed out that Dharmakīrti avails himself not only of intentional self-awareness but also of reflexive awareness. Some remarks on the relationship between these two strands of Dharmakīrtian Buddhism are offered. The conclusion points out that although self-awareness occurs in Buddhism as inextricably linked with anātmavāda, the doctrine of no-self, and sākāravāda, the view that the forms we perceive belong not to external objects but to consciousness, it is used by Rāmaka??ha to refute both of these views. An appendix addresses the problem of how precisely to interpret Dharmakīrti’s contention that conceptual cognition is non-conceptual in its reflexive awareness of itself.     

On the Buddha’s Cognition of Other Minds in the Bahirarthaparīkṣā of the Tattvasaṅgraha

This paper aims at examining the arguments between ?ubhagupta (c.720–780) and ?āntarak?ita (c.725–788) over the Buddha’s cognition of other minds and shows how the question of the Buddha’s cognition of other mindsis incorporated into the proof of vijñaptimātratā or “consciousness-only” by ?āntarak?ita. According to ?āntarak?ita, ?ubhagupta assumes that the Buddha’s cognition, which is characterized as “the cognition [of the Blessed One] which follows the path of cognition” (aupalambhikadar?ana), grasps other minds when the Buddha’s cognition is similar (sārūpya) to other minds. For ?āntarak?ita, the Buddha’s cognition cannot be aupalambhika. If the Buddha’s cognition were similar to the other minds, it would follow that the Buddha, whose cognition erroneously grasps other minds as something distinct from it, has not yet removed the hindrance constituted by objects of knowledge (jñeyāvara?a). But if it is accepted that the Buddha’s cognition is beyond the grasped-grasper duality, can the Buddha, who does not know other minds, be called sarvajña “omniscient”? According to ?āntarak?ita, even though the Buddha has no seeing (adar?ana), the Buddha causes all sentient beings to gain benefits by virtue of seeing other minds and hence deserves to be called sarvajña. What underlies this argument is that the Buddha knows other minds without making a distinction between his own mind and other minds, which is possible only on the basis of self-cognition (ātmasa?vedana).