Appayya’s Vedānta and Nīlakaṇṭha’s Vedāntakataka

The seventeenth century author Nīlaka??ha Caturdhara wrote several works criticising the Vedāntic theology of the sixteenth century author, Appayya Dīk?ita. In one of these works, the Vedāntakataka, Nīlaka??ha picks out two doctrines for criticism: that the liberated soul becomes the Lord (ī?varabhāvāpatti), and that souls thus liberated remain the Lord until all other souls are liberated (sarvamukti). These doctrines appear both in Appayya’s Advaitin and in his ?ivādvaitin writings. They appear to be ones to which Appayya was committed. They raise theological and conceptual problems, however, both in themselves as doctrines, and as part of nondual Vedāntic teaching. A study of the Vedāntakataka reveals those features of Appayya’s Vedānta that Advaitins in Banaras in the century after his life considered to be anomalous, and illuminates aspects of the context in which his ideas developed and circulated.     

Appayya Dīkṣita and the Lineage of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita

In the last few years, several scholars have attempted to analyze the historical circumstances of Bha??oji Dīk?ita and the development of his specific stances in the area of Pā?inian grammar. This paper seeks to broaden that investigation by exploring Bha??oji Dīk?ita’s relationship to Appayya Dīk?ita. Appayya Dīk?ita’s works, such as the Madhvatantramukhamardana, were the direct source of inspiration not only for the critique of the Mādhva Vedānta that appears in Bha??oji Dīk?ita’s Tantrādhikārinir?aya and Tattvakaustubha. They may also be seen as the ideological source for Bha??oji Dīk?ita’s grammatical fundamentalism, in rejecting any views that are not strictly in agreement with the views of the three founding sages of Sanskrit grammar, namely Pā?ini, Kātyāyana and Patañjali.     

On the Alleged Indebtedness of the Vedānta Paribhāṣā Towards the Vedānta Kaumudī: Some Considerations on an Almost Forgotten Vivaraṇa Text (Studies in Vedānta Kaumudī I)

Dharmarāja Adhvarin’s (middle XVII cent.) Vedānta Paribhā?ā (VP) is a well-known introduction to Advaita Vedānta, targeted to beginners who are already trained in Navya Nyāya. According to Dasgupta (1942), the VP is so heavily indebted to Rāmādvaya’s Vedānta Kaumudī (VK), which was composed in the middle of the 14th century and is today almost forgotten, that the VP’s “claim to originality vanishes”. The VK was, however, only edited in 1955 and then again in 1973. In the light of this improved textual basis, what is our judgement about Dasgupta’s hypercritical statement? Did actually the VP ever claim to be original? Was this originality somehow superimposed on the VP later? Is the VP really so much indebted to the VK? This paper aims at comparatively analysing the textual background of these questions. I will start from the analysis of one Advaita’s epistemological tenet, namely the valid knowledge (pramā), in the VK and then compare it to the corresponding parts in the VP.     

Reconciling dualism and non-dualism: three arguments in Vijñānabhikṣu’s Bhedābheda Vedānta

The late 16th century Indian philosopher Vijñānabhik?u is most well known today for his commentaries on Sā?khya and Yoga texts. However, the majority of his extant corpus belongs to the tradition of Bhedābheda (Difference and Non-Difference) Vedānta. This article elucidates three Vedāntic arguments from Vijñānabhik?u’s voluminous commentary on the Brahma Sūtra, entitled Vijñānām?tabhā?ya (Commentary on the Nectar of Knowledge). The first section of the article explores the meaning of bhedābheda, showing that in Vijñānabhik?u’s understanding, “difference and non-difference” does not entail a denial of the principle of contradiction. The second shows how the relation between the individual soul (jīva) and Brahman can be understood as a relation of part and whole. The third section discusses Brahman as cause of the world, and Vijñānabhik?u’s particular formulation of Brahman as “locus cause” (adhi??hānakāra?a). Understanding these arguments enables us to appreciate how Vijñānabhik?u’s Difference and Non-Difference Vedānta is a credible alternative to the Advaita Vedānta schools prevalent in northern India in the late medieval period, and how in his later works Vijñānabhik?u built upon this Difference and Non-Difference metaphysical framework to argue for the unity of Vedānta, Yoga, and Sā?-khya philosophies.     

Navya-nyāya in the Late Vijayanagara Period: Appaya Dīkṣita’s Revision of Gaṅgeśa’s īśvarānumāna

Journal of Indian Philosophy - In his celebrated treatise of Navya-nyāya, the Tattvacintāma?i, Ga?ge?a offers a detailed formulation of the inference of God’s...     

Śālikanātha’s Criticism of Dharmakīrti’s svasaṃvedana Theory

The aim of this paper is to clarify how Śālikanātha’s epistemology can be distinguished from that of Dharmakīrti, especially in terms of their respective views on cognitive form (ākāra). It has been pointed out that Śālikanātha’s tripuṭī theory and svayaṃprakāśa theory are very close to Dharmakīrti’s epistemology. However, it remains questionable if Śālikanātha, who belongs to the Prābhākara branch of the Mīmāṃsā and is therefore a nirākāravādin, can subscribe to notions that Dharmakīrti developed on the basis of sākāravāda. The present paper concludes that Śālikanātha agrees with Dharmakīrti in assuming that a single cognition consists of three parts; unlike Dharmakīrti, however, Śālikanātha puts emphasis on the difference between these parts, especially between the cognition and its form, on the ground that the cognitive form belongs to the external thing, and not to the cognition (nirākāravāda). In Dharmakīrti’s epistemology, the cognitive form belongs to cognition (sākāravāda); in the ultimate level, there remains no difference between the three parts.     

Śrīharṣa on Knowledge and Justification

In this paper I explore the extent to which the dialectical approach of ?rīhar?a can be identified as skeptical, and whether or how his approach resembles that of the first century Mādhyamika philosopher Nāgārjuna. In so doing, I will be primarily reading the first argument found in ?rīhar?a’s masterpiece, the Kha??anakha??a-khādya (KhKh). This argument grounds the position that the system of justification (pramā?a) that validates our cognition to be true is not outside of inquiry. Closely adopting ?rīhar?a’s polemical style, I am neither proposing a thesis in this paper that ?rīhar?a is a skeptic, nor am I denying such a possibility. I believe we can pursue our arguments on a neutral ground and let the facts speak for themselves. I will outline salient features that define skepticism in the mainstream philosophical discourse so that analyzing ?rīhar?a’s first argument becomes easier. In so doing, I will introduce some of the arguments of Nāgārjuna in light of ?rīhar?a’s position. This comparison, however, is restricted only to the salient features relevant to further the central argument of this paper and is therefore not aimed to encompass the overall positions of these two giants.     

The Impact of Navya-Nyāya on Mādhva Vedānta: Vyāsatīrtha and the Problem of Empty Terms

Journal of Indian Philosophy - In this article, I explore the encounter of the Mādhva philosopher Vyāsatīrtha with the works of the Navya-Naiyāyika Ga?ge?a...     

A Renaissance Man in Memory: Appayya Dīkṣita Through the Ages

This essay is a first attempt to trace the evolution of biographical accounts of Appayya Dīk?ita from the sixteenth century onward, with special attention to their continuities and changes. It explores what these rich materials teach us about Appayya Dīk?ita and his times, and what lessons they offer about the changing historical sensibilities in South India during the transition to the colonial and postcolonial eras. I tentatively identify two important junctures in the development of these materials: one that took place in the first generation to be born after his death, when the idea of him as an avatar of ?iva was introduced, and another at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, when many new stories about his encounters with his colleagues and students surfaced. The essay follows a set of themes and tensions that pertain to Appayya Dīk?ita’s social and political affiliations, his sectarian agendas, and the geographic sphere of his activities. These themes and tensions are closely related and prove to be surprisingly resilient, despite the many changes that occurred during the five centuries of recollection that this essay sketches. This overall coherence, I argue, is integral to Appayya Dīk?ita’s sociopolitical context and self-chosen identity.     

Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha’s Elaboration of Self-Awareness (svasaṃvedana), and How it Differs from Dharmakīrti’s Exposition of the Concept

The article considers what happened to the Buddhist concept of self-awareness (svasa?vedana) when it was appropriated by ?aiva Siddhānta. The first section observes how it was turned against Buddhism by being used to attack the momentariness of consciousenss and to establish its permanence. The second section examines how self-awareness differs from I-cognition (ahampratyaya). The third section examines the difference between the kind of self-awareness elaborated by Rāmaka??ha (‘reflexive awareness’) and a kind elaborated by Dharmakīrti (‘intentional self-awareness’). It is then pointed out that Dharmakīrti avails himself not only of intentional self-awareness but also of reflexive awareness. Some remarks on the relationship between these two strands of Dharmakīrtian Buddhism are offered. The conclusion points out that although self-awareness occurs in Buddhism as inextricably linked with anātmavāda, the doctrine of no-self, and sākāravāda, the view that the forms we perceive belong not to external objects but to consciousness, it is used by Rāmaka??ha to refute both of these views. An appendix addresses the problem of how precisely to interpret Dharmakīrti’s contention that conceptual cognition is non-conceptual in its reflexive awareness of itself.     

Padmaśrī’s Nāgarasarvasva and the World of Medieval Kāmaśāstra

This essay introduces a special issue on the history of kāmaśāstra in medieval India. It briefly reviews the secondary scholarship on the subject from the publication of the first translations of the genre at the end of the nineteenth century. It highlights the relatively unexplored history of later kāmaśāstra, and stresses the need for contexualized and detailed studies of the many kāmaśāstra treatises produced in the second millennium CE. The introduction, and the essays that follow, also argue for an expanded interpretive framework for the genre, moving beyond ‘sex’ and ‘sexuality,’ to a more widely defined notion of a ‘kāma world’, in which sensual pleasure is understood as being deeply enmeshed with aesthetic, ethical and cosmopolitan cultures.     

The Tiruttoṇṭar Tiruvantāti of Nampi Āṇṭār Nampi

This paper presents an English translation from the original Tamil of the canonical Saivite hagiographical work, the Tiruttoṇṭar Tiruvantāti of Nampi Āṇṭār Nampi. The date of this work is disputed, but it was probably composed at some point between 870 and 1118 CE. This classical Tamil poem gives in summary form the lives of the sixty three Saivite saints of the sixth to ninth centuries known as the Nāyaṉmār, or Tiruttoṇṭar (“holy servants”, sc. of the Lord Siva). The paper also includes an Introduction, setting out the context of the poem and its place in the Saivite literary tradition from which the Saiva Siddhanta philosophy subsequently developed, and Notes which explain the mythological and other references which the poem contains.     

Ratnākaraśānti’s Theory of Cognition with False Mental Images (*alīkākāravāda) and the Neither-One-Nor-Many Argument

The paper aims to clarify Ratnākara?ānti?s epistemological theory that mental images in a cognition are false (*alīkākāravāda) in comparison with ?āntarak?ita?s criticism of the Yogācāra position. Although Ratnākara?ānti frequently uses the neither-one-nor-many argument for explaining his Yogācāra position, the argument, unlike ?āntarak?ita?s original one, does not function for refuting the existence of awareness itself as the basis of mental images. This point is examined in the first two sections of this paper by analyzing Ratnākara?ānti?s proof of the selflessness of entities (dharmanairātmya) and his application of the neither-one-nor-many argument for demonstrating the falsehood of mental images. On the other hand, the last section investigates into his defense of the alīkākāravāda against ?āntarak?ita?s severe criticism of it. Here, too, we can find his tactical usage of the neither-one-nor-many argument, or more precisely, one of its variants: the neither-identical-nor-different argument. Through the above procedure, we can see how Yogācāra philosophy survived in the late period of Indian Buddhism by blending the Madhyamaka opponent?s argument with its own thought.     

Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita’s “Small Step” for a Grammarian and “Giant Leap” for Sanskrit Grammar

This paper is devoted to theoretical and methodical considerations on our study and understanding of macroscopic transitions in the world of Sanskrit intellectuals from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century (cf. Pollock, Indian Economic and Social History Review 38(1):3–31, 2001). It is argued that compared to his immediate predecessors Bha??oji Dīk?ita’s contribution to Prakriyā grammars was modest. It was to a large extent on account of changed circumstances—over the centuries mainly a slow but steady decline—in the position of Sanskrit and the general public’s need for a simple definition of authoritatively correct Sanskrit that Bha??oji’s grammar met with success so quickly, so widely, and so solidly. I once knew a little boy in England who asked his father, “Do fathers always know more than sons?” and the father said “Yes.” The next question was, “Daddy, who invented the steam engine?” and the father said “James Watt.” And then the son came back with “But why didn’t James Watt’s father invent it?” Gregory Bateson (1972, p. 21)      

On the Buddha’s Cognition of Other Minds in the Bahirarthaparīkṣā of the Tattvasaṅgraha

This paper aims at examining the arguments between ?ubhagupta (c.720–780) and ?āntarak?ita (c.725–788) over the Buddha’s cognition of other minds and shows how the question of the Buddha’s cognition of other mindsis incorporated into the proof of vijñaptimātratā or “consciousness-only” by ?āntarak?ita. According to ?āntarak?ita, ?ubhagupta assumes that the Buddha’s cognition, which is characterized as “the cognition [of the Blessed One] which follows the path of cognition” (aupalambhikadar?ana), grasps other minds when the Buddha’s cognition is similar (sārūpya) to other minds. For ?āntarak?ita, the Buddha’s cognition cannot be aupalambhika. If the Buddha’s cognition were similar to the other minds, it would follow that the Buddha, whose cognition erroneously grasps other minds as something distinct from it, has not yet removed the hindrance constituted by objects of knowledge (jñeyāvara?a). But if it is accepted that the Buddha’s cognition is beyond the grasped-grasper duality, can the Buddha, who does not know other minds, be called sarvajña “omniscient”? According to ?āntarak?ita, even though the Buddha has no seeing (adar?ana), the Buddha causes all sentient beings to gain benefits by virtue of seeing other minds and hence deserves to be called sarvajña. What underlies this argument is that the Buddha knows other minds without making a distinction between his own mind and other minds, which is possible only on the basis of self-cognition (ātmasa?vedana).     

The Self as a Dynamic Constant. Rāmakaṇṭha’s Middle Ground Between a Naiyāyika Eternal Self-Substance and a Buddhist Stream of Consciousness-Moments

The paper gives an account of Rāmaka??ha’s (950–1000) contribution to the Buddhist–Brāhma?ical debate about the existence or non-existence of a self, by demonstrating how he carves out middle ground between the two protagonists in that debate. First three points of divergence between the Brāhma?ical (specifically Naiyāyika) and the Buddhist conceptions of subjectivity are identified. These take the form of Buddhist denials of, or re-explanations of (1) the self as the unitary essence of the individual, (2) the self as the substance to which mental properties belong, (3) the self as the agent of both physical actions and cognitions. The difference of Rāmaka??ha’s position from both Nyāya and Buddhism is then elaborated. He posits a self, but not one that is an eternally unchanging substance, nor one that is anything other than consciousness. Hence his difference from Nyāya. He falls with Buddhism in holding that consciousness does not require anything other than itself to inhere in, but departs from Buddhism in holding that consciousness is not momentary but enduring. The guiding metaphor here is light, but light considered as a dynamic, qualitatively unchanging repetition of the action of illumination.