Markem v Zipher--the Court of Appeal provides guidance on entitlement proceedings

Legal and practical context. The Markem v Zipher Court of Appealjudgment provides useful guidance on patent entitlement proceedingsand, more generally, on the conduct of litigation. Key points. (i) Patent entitlement. To bring an entitlementaction under sections 8, 12, and 37 a party must invoke a breachof some rule of law. Validity is only relevant in entitlementproceedings where a patent or part of it is clearly and unarguablyinvalid. A claim-by-claim approach is not appropriate in proceedingsunder sections 8, 12, and 37 and ‘invention’ inthese sections refers to information in the specification. Theproper approach to entitlement should be to identify who contributedto the invention and determine whether he has any rights tothe invention. (ii) Litigation generally. A witness should be cross-examinedas to the truthfulness of his evidence whenever a party wishesto challenge that evidence. Where a party has more than onecause of action relating to the same factual background, considerationshould be given to bringing all causes of action in the sameproceedings to avoid a future claim being struck out for abuseof process. Practical significance. This case highlights the importanceof a properly pleaded case and of the ongoing need to reviewthe case strategy throughout proceedings.     

Willis v. Wu. In the Supreme Court of South Carolina

South Carolina does not recognize a common law cause of action for life brought by or on behalf of a child born with congenital defect because it is impossible to prove that being terminated by elective abortion, and thus never being born, is better than being born and living a life with disabilities.     

Litigant Status and Trial Court Appeal Mobilization

The advantages held by haves over have nots in litigation have long fascinated scholars, with a long line of research revealing that litigant status often affects litigant resources, experience, and chances of overall success from trial courts to appellate courts. What has received considerably less attention, however, is how this status affects the decision to appeal. Bringing a new perspective to this important area holding implications for the shape and content of the judicial hierarchy, this study analyzes the decision of the losing federal district court litigant to appeal to the US courts of appeals. Utilizing an original database containing a sample of federal district court civil cases decided between 2000 and 2004, the results indicate, as predicted, that litigant status differentials affect whether there will be an appeal. This influence is further magnified when conditioned upon the relative costs of the appeal. These findings provide one of the first detailed examinations of litigant status and appeals coming from US trial courts and, simultaneously, offer the first empirical evidence to date that business litigants, like previously known government parties, are advantaged over individuals when deciding whether to appeal.     

Betrayal of confidence in the Court of Appeal

In overturning Latham J's judgment in R v Department of Health, Ex Parte Source Informatics Ltd. that anonymisation does not obviate breaching a personal confidence, the Court of Appeal holds that where the duty of confidence arises in equity it does not prohibit the confidant using the confided information without the consent of the confider if this does not treat the confider unfairly (relative to the Court's view of the confider's legitimate interests). We argue that this principle--by bringing fairness to bear on the scope of the duty of confidence rather than on whether a breach of it may be lawful--has no authority in usable precedents; that the Court's interpretation of fairness in applying this principle is, in any event, incompatible with the Data Protection Act 1998 (in part because the Court has too narrow a conception of privacy); that the Court errs in holding that neither anonymisation of personal data nor use of anonymous data falls under the Data Protection Act; and that the Court's insensitivity to the vulnerability that leads patients to disclose information about themselves to health professionals for their treatment, leads it to misidentify the basis of the duty of confidence in such disclosures. The Court of Appeal's reasoning does not clarify the duty of confidence, but virtually abolishes it in the face of competing commercial and research interests.