Does everyday corruption affect how Russians view their political leadership?

Do Russians’ personal experiences with corruption influence how they evaluate their political leaders and, if so, in what direction? In addressing this question, we focus specifically on small-scale corruption that arises when Russians encounter employees of service provision organizations. We analyze survey data gathered in the summer of 2015 from Russia to trace the links between personal corrupt behavior and political attitudes. We show that participation in everyday corruption lowers a person’s support for the political regime, both as a bivariate relationship and in a multivariate model with controls. Being involved in corrupt transactions reduces support for the regime through two indirect mechanisms: by making the political leadership’s performance seem worse and by heightening perceptions that corruption is widespread among the country’s leaders. We find no support for arguments in the literature that bribery and other forms of bureaucratic corruption help citizens pursue their needs in the face of inefficient state institutions and less developed economies. In Russia, those who frequently encounter corruption are less, not more, happy with the regime.     

Ending Up in Pizza: Accountability as a Problem of Institutional Arrangement in Brazil

Brazilians often complain that investigations of corruption by public servants drag on for years or bring few legal sanctions on the perpetrators. This lack of accountability is so pervasive that a slang phrase, acabou em pizza , is often invoked when investigations are inconclusive. This article investigates the role of four Brazilian public institutions charged with keeping public servants accountable. For analysis, it breaks the accountability process into its three component stages: oversight, investigation, and sanction. Through a study of six prominent cases of corruption, it shows that the weakness of the accountability process in Brazil is due not entirely to the toothlessness of individual institutions of accountability, but also to the independence of such institutions at each of the three stages. These findings suggest that institutional arrangements influence the degree of accountability, and thereby also public trust and confidence, in Latin America's largest democracy.     

Political mistrust in southern Europe since the Great Recession

The political effects of the Great Recession on southern Europe were substantial. The rapid economic deterioration of Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain from 2008 onwards was accompanied by an increase in citizens’ dissatisfaction towards national political institutions. The sources of political mistrust in the southern periphery were of a political and economic nature. Using quantitative data from EU member states from 2000 to 2015, this paper evaluates the suitability of competing theories in explaining this shift in political attitudes in southern European countries. It first hypothesizes that political mistrust is explained by citizens’ rationalist evaluations of changing macroeconomic performance. It also hypothesizes that political mistrust changes according to institutional performance. The paper argues that economic crises act as an external shock that places politics, politicians and institutions in the spotlight as a result of citizens’ deteriorating performance of the economy. The findings suggest that unemployment, public debt and political corruption are key variables in understanding short-term changes in political mistrust.     

Corruption or Insecurity? Understanding Dissatisfaction with Mexico's Police

Since at least 2005, Mexico has confronted a severe security crisis that threatens to undermine its rule of law and democracy. An effective police response has been hindered by frustrated citizens who do not report crime, come forward with information, serve as witnesses, or support their police. This foments a vicious cycle whereby insecurity and corruption foster dissatisfaction, which yields further insecurity and corruption. Breaking this cycle requires a better understanding of why citizens are dissatisfied with their police. One view holds that discontent is due to police corruption, but a somewhat rival perspective contends that citizens are primarily concerned with security outcomes. This study uses comparative survey data from 14 major Mexican cities to test these potentially rival approaches. It finds that both corruption and security outcomes matter, but direct experience with bribery has the single largest impact on dissatisfaction with the police.     

Kenya's corruption problem: causes and consequences

The culture of corruption has grown roots in Kenyan society at large and become endemic. Institutions, which were designed for the regulation of the relationships between citizens and the State, are being used instead for the personal enrichment of public officials (politicians and bureaucrats) and other corrupt private agents (individuals, groups, and businesses). Corruption persists in Kenya primarily because there are people in power who benefit from it and the existing governance institutions lack both the will and capacity to stop them from doing so. This work takes a governance and development perspective to analytically examine the causes and consequences of corruption in Kenya. It identifies the key factors (such as absence of strong and effective democratic institutions, centralised power, lack of public accountability, and impunity) and synthesises and analyses available data, indicators, and other information in that regard.     

The Contributions of the Ombudsman to Human Rights in Latin America, 1982–2011

Democratic institutions, ranging from constitutional provisions and electoral rules to judiciaries, have been important in improving the rights of citizens across the world. If institutions matter for human rights, then it stands to reason that institutions built specifically to protect human rights, like the human rights ombudsman, should matter too. Using a comparative case study approach, this article examines the effect of the human rights ombudsman at the regional level on several human rights measures in Latin America between 1982 and 2011. The results suggest that the presence of an ombudsman, and some of its design features, have had effects on some social and economic rights, in keeping with the broad mandate given to this office.     

Parliamentary oversight and corruption in the Caribbean: comparing Trinidad & Tobago and Grenada

Parliamentary oversight is a key determinant of corruption levels. This article presents research findings on parliamentary oversight in two Caribbean countries: Trinidad & Tobago and Grenada. Our results cast doubt on the results of previous research and also indicate that certain facets of ‘the Westminster’ system need to be relaxed, to reflect contextual reality in smaller island economies. Political will to adopt our recommended reforms is critical, but, as in other countries, inertia often dominates the political environment. Until citizens demand that their elected representatives establish various oversight and anti-corruption mechanisms and ensure these mechanisms are free of political influence, the institutions will be ‘window dressing’ and corrupt actions will go undeterred and unpunished.     

Can the poor fight back? A multilevel analysis of corruption,poverty and collective demand for accountability in Africa

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the effects of the perceptions of corruption and personal experience of bribery on the propensity for ordinary Africans to support collective action-based anti-corruption tactics. It also evaluates how poverty shapes the association between corruption and support for collective civic action against corruption. The paper bases its findings on the multilevel level regression analysis of public opinion data from 35 African countries. The results show that an increase in experience of paying bribes increases poor people’s preference for anti-corruption tactics based on collective action. Furthermore, individuals who perceive corruption to be widespread are significantly more likely to support collective action as their country’s poverty level rises. These findings strongly challenge the view recently expressed in some of the literature that high levels of corruption erode the willingness of especially poor Africans to bring corruption under control.     

Tracing Foreign Policy Decisions: A Study of Citizens' Use of Heuristics

Public opinion researchers agree that citizens use simplifying heuristics to reach real, stable preferences. In domestic policy, the focus has been on citizens delegating judgement to opinion leaders, notably political parties. By contrast, citizens have been held to deduce foreign policy opinions from their own values or principles. Yet there is ample scope for delegation in the foreign policy sphere. In this exploratory study I use a 'process-tracing' method to test directly for delegation heuristic processing in university students' judgements on the Iranian nuclear issue. A substantial minority sought guidance on foreign policy decisions, either from parties, international actors or newspapers. This was not always simple delegation; some used such heuristics within more complex decision-making processes. However, others relied on simple delegation, raising questions about the 'effectiveness' of their processing.     

Conditional Cash Transfer Programs and Electoral Accountability: Evidence from Latin America

Do conditional cash transfer programs reduce voters' incentives to hold their government accountable for its performance? Studies show that these programs generate considerable electoral returns for the governments responsible for them. One important and unexplored question is whether these popular programs have also changed the landscape of accountability in Latin America. Survey data from 16 Latin American countries that have adopted CCT programs do not offer support for the claim that such programs have a detrimental effect on electoral accountability for corruption and for the economy. Only in countries where CCT programs do not follow strict rules do beneficiaries attribute relatively less weight to the government's economic performance, but this effect is marginal. These findings fill an important gap in the literature and offer reassuring evidence that cash transfers can alleviate poverty while preserving voters' incentives to exercise electoral accountability in crucial areas of government performance.     

Nobody Is a Prophet in their Own Land? Evaluations of Pope Francis in Latin America

Using data drawn from surveys of Latin American elites and citizens, this article aims to analyse the determinants of evaluations of Pope Francis, with a special focus on ideology and religious denomination, religiosity, and trustworthiness of the Catholic Church. Results show that the Pope remains linked to opinions on the Church, but not to religiosity, and that differences in personal religious affiliations (or lack thereof) among respondents are sharper among citizens than among elites. Furthermore, Pope Francis is found to be not closely associated to the left–right axis in Latin America, except in the case of Argentine MPs, where the right-leaning members express lower opinions of the Pope.     

Corruption protection: fractionalization and the corruption of anti-corruption efforts in Iraq after 2003

This paper argues that corruption protection arises because a central feature of Iraq’s institutional environment is its factionalised political system between groups (i.e. sectarian affiliation), and these groups both protect their members from corruption charges launched by other groups, and collude to protect each other from prosecution of corruption. The paper defines corruption protection as ‘action carried out to prevent perpetrators of corruption from being brought to justice’, which is a systematic attempt among corrupt agents seeking to evade accountability for primary corruption activity. The paper has identified two contrasting paths taken by these groups in power in the dynamics of corruption protection: (a) The competitive mode is illustrated by spurious allegations of corruption made by some groups against other groups. Tension between factions results in fake charges being brought against rivals which sometimes lead to wrongful imprisonment of the innocent; (b) collusive between intra-factional groups, corruptly conspiring to hide each other’s corrupt acts thereby constructing a shield which protects the entire elite in Iraq, an issue which I label ‘solidarity in corruption’. The paper will conclude that despite the apparent strength of anti-corruption framework, the reality tells us a very different story; the multiple institutions established to fight corruption and the system of accountability can also constitute a means for corruption protection.     

Challenges to decentralisation in Ghana: where do citizens seek assistance?

Decentralisation in Ghana, and across sub-Saharan Africa, faces a number of challenges to successful local governance provision because there are a number of formal and informal actors to choose from. Citizens may take problems they want a governance provider to solve to a member of parliament or a district assembly person, a traditional chief or a police officer, a neighbour or an NGO. In this article we report on a four-constituency survey administered to explore and understand how citizens choose between the options of local institutions available to them in order to solve a problem important to their community or themselves. We find that formal national (Parliamentarians) and informal traditional (Chiefs) institutions are where respondents turn for assistance most often instead of constitutionally described local modes of governance (District Assemblies). We consider the implications of this finding in terms of decentralisation in Ghana and the need to build institutions that are context-sensitive and reflect how citizens understand political options.     

Do Citizens Judge Health Experts Through a Partisan Lens? Evidence from a Factorial Survey Experiment

Scholars have claimed that right-wing citizens are more skeptical about experts than left-wing citizens. This article, however, argues that depending on their party affiliation, citizens prefer certain kinds of expertise over others. I confronted Swiss adults (N = 2,465) with individual risk advice on either flu vaccination or colorectal cancer screening. The quote varied regarding the expert providing the advice (e.g., academic, administration, or corporation) and the degree of policy advocacy. The citizens then assessed the experts' credibility and their own behavioral intention (e.g., get a flu shot). Citizens across the political spectrum are more likely to positively evaluate experts who represent institutions aligned with their beliefs. Moreover, right-wing citizens are more skeptical about experts who advocate for specific policies than their left-wing counterparts. This study underscores the need for a better understanding of how partisanship affects expert perceptions to manage health policy problems and other science-based issues.     

Political Corruption in Central America: Assessment and Explanation

Analysts agree that political corruption is an obstacle to democratic consolidation but disagree about how to measure the extent of corruption in individual nations. This analysis of the Central American countries demonstrates that the most important competing quantitative measures of political corruption produce strikingly different rankings. These contradictory results are caused less by poor measurement techniques than by the existence of two different dimensions of corruption that do not always coincide. Statistical indicators based on expert perceptions of corruption and alternative indicators based on ordinary citizens' firsthand experiences with bribery measure, respectively, grand corruption by senior officials and petty corruption by lower‐level functionaries. This study attempts to explain why several Central American nations suffer primarily from one or the other rather than both. It advances recommendations for future research and future anticorruption policies that may be applied to Latin America as a whole.     

Le public suisse face à la science et aux institutions: des relations à explorer

The purpose of this research note is to examine if the attitude toward science of the Swiss citizens is related to their confidence in Swiss institutions, precisely in political institutions. Based on the results of one survey (Eurobarometer 2001), we show that the attitude toward science is moderately related to the confidence, that the number of significant relationship of each institution depend on the level of confidence of the institution, and that we distinguish two types of relation: linear and inverted U‐shaped.     

The Political Economy of Policy Volatility in Latin America

Why are some Latin American states plagued by persistent policy volatility while the policies of others remain relatively stable? This article explores the political economy of natural resource rents and policy volatility across Latin America. It argues that, all else equal, resource rents will create incentives for political leaders, which will result in repeated episodes of policy volatility. This effect, however, will depend on the structure of political institutions. Where political institutions fail to provide a forum for intertemporal exchange among political actors, natural resource rents will result in increased levels of policy volatility. Alternatively, where political institutions facilitate agreement among actors, resource rents will be conducive to policy stability. This argument is tested on a measure of policy volatility for 18 Latin American economies between 1993 and 2008. The statistical tests provide support for the argument.     

Resistance to Privatization: Why Protest Movements Succeed and Fail in Latin America

Why do some protest movements in Latin America succeed in rolling back privatizations while others fail? This article argues that protests against privatizations have tended to succeed under two conditions. First, privatization's opponents form linkages (or “brokerage”) across multiple sectors of society. Broad coalitions are more likely to achieve their goals, while groups acting alone, such as labor unions, are more easily defeated or ignored by governments. Second, civil rights are protected but political representation is weak. In that case, opponents have the legal right to protest, but are unlikely to have opportunities for communicating their concerns through formal institutions, which prompts them to channel their demands outside of existing political institutions. Using case examples and logistic regression, this study confirms these arguments and discusses the implications for democracy in the region.     

Political support through representation by the government. Evidence from Dutch panel data

Research on political support demonstrates that satisfaction with democracy is higher among electoral winners than losers, and that it is higher for citizens who are ideologically more congruent with the government. In this paper, I analyze how support for the political system is affected by representation by the government. Expanding on previous studies, I leverage long-run panel data from the Dutch LISS panel spanning over several electoral cycles. Drawing on various measures that go beyond the distinction between election winners and losers and also measure how close citizens are to the government coalition as a whole, I show that being well represented by the government has a wide-ranging positive relationship with satisfaction with democracy, external efficacy and trust in political institutions. While this relationship is mostly short-run, political support can decline substantially if non-representation persists in the long-run. This highlights the relevance of long-run panel data for studying the consequences of representation.     

Disaggregating Corruption: A Comparison of Participation and Perceptions in Latin America with a Focus on Mexico1

An abundant empirical literature on corruption relying on survey research has emerged since the mid‐1990s. The predominant line of inquiry concerns perceptions of corruption with respect to institutions and processes. Another, separate line of inquiry that has enjoyed less attention concerns reports about individuals’ participation in corruption. These two dimensions of corruption, however, are typically conflated, leading to error and confusion. This article explores the relationship between the two and seeks to differentiate the two. Using data at the country and individual levels, analysis shows how the two may be only weakly related to one another – though causality remains unclear – and respond to distinct sets of determinants and generate distinct outcomes. The analysis underlines the need to specify the findings in the literature: that the causes and consequences of corruption relate more to ‘perceived’ corruption rather than actual corruption.