The Push and Pull of Ministerial Resignations in Germany, 1969–2005

When and why are cabinet ministers forced out of office? We argue that ministerial resignations cannot be understood as mechanistic consequences of serious personal or departmental errors as the classical responsibility hypothesis implies. Rather, they follow a systematic political logic. Cabinet ministers have to resign whenever the prime minister perceives the political costs of a minister staying in office to be higher than the benefits of keeping the status quo. We test this argument with resignation events in Germany in the period 1969 to 2005. Based on detailed data collection, we find 111 resignation events, i.e. serious public discussions about a cabinet minister's future, 14 of which ended in resignation. These data are analysed employing statistical as well as Qualitative Comparative Analysis based on Boolean algebra to detect patterns of ministerial resignations.     

Making words count: Coalition agreements and cabinet management

The cabinet is a central actor in policy making in parliamentary systems. Yet, relatively little is known about how coalition cabinets operate. The delegation of decision‐making authority to ministers invites policy drift, which threatens the cohesiveness of the cabinet's policy programme. Cabinets employ a variety of methods to contain policy drift. The writing of coalition agreements is among the major tools, but there are others, including limiting ministerial autonomy and the use of junior ministers to shadow ministers. The present study demonstrates that coalition agreements are written to contain policy drift and that it is directly related to the degree of hierarchy in the cabinet. It studies the factors that affect the likelihood of a coalition agreement being written and how extensive they are, if written. Among these are the ideological diversity found in the cabinet, the use of alternative methods for controlling ministers and the complexity of the bargaining situation.     

Cutback Management in the Netherlands

In this article cutback management is defined as the effort of cabinet ministers to facilitate budgetary cutback decisions through institutional change. Institutions are conceived as formal and informal rules for budgetary decision making. The article presents a sketch of the ways in which successive Dutch cabinets over the 1975–98 period attempted to cut back the expenditures of central government by institutional change and outlines the results that were achieved. The article focuses on three institutions: (1) macrobudgetary norms, (2) rules of budgetary discipline, and (3) procedures for the preparation of cutback decisions. The article identifies two kinds of effective resistance against cutbacks: (1) political resistance emanating from cabinet ministers and (2) bureaucratic resistance emanating from the administrators of executive agencies. It analyzes how the various forms of institutional change affect these forms of resistance and evaluates the results of the cutback effort.     

Duty calls but not for all: The policy involvement of cabinet ministers during crisis

During a crisis, the public expects the government to handle the situation. In parliamentary democracies, these expectations are directed to the cabinet and its ministers. Cabinet ministers are expected to be highly involved in policy making under their jurisdiction and in general. During periods of politics as usual, ministers differ in their policy involvement. This paper asks whether that changes during a crisis. Based on an analysis of cabinet ministers in Israel during the first wave of the COVID19 crisis, this paper finds that ministers’ policy involvement during a crisis is relatively low. Most ministers are little involved in issues outside their jurisdiction. Ministers less central to the crisis management are also little involved in issues under their jurisdiction. Ministers central to the crisis management are highly involved in introducing decisions on issues under their jurisdiction, but not necessarily in other aspects of policy making. These findings have implications for issues of accountability and trust.     

Cabinet structure and fiscal policy outcomes

A central explanation of fiscal performance focuses on the structure of the cabinet. However, the partisan context of cabinet decisions remains under‐explored, the findings are based on small samples and the variables of interest are often poorly operationalised. Using a new dataset of spending ministers and partisan fragmentation in the cabinets of 58 countries between 1975 and 1998, this study finds a strong positive association between the number of spending ministers and budget deficits and expenditures, as well as weaker evidence that these effects increase with partisan fragmentation.     

Women's Work? The Distribution and Prestige of Portfolios in the Canadian Provinces

Historically not only have women cabinet ministers in Western democracies been few in number, but they have generally been limited to "women's ministries" such as education, health, social services, and culture. This article systematically investigates the responsibilities and prestige of portfolios that women cabinet ministers in the ten Canadian provinces have held over a 21-year period, 1976–1997, an era in which their share of cabinet positions rose from less than 4% to almost 25%. Although still concentrated in traditional women's ministries, they have diversified the portfolios they hold. Using a tri-fold classification of portfolios into (1) important, (2) middle range, and (3) junior positions, we find that women increasingly have achieved more prestigious portfolios, perhaps a reflection of the reduced number of cabinet positions in the 1990s and more concerted attempts to promote women. But the law of increasing disproportion still exists, at least in overall terms of the relative prestige of cabinet positions.     

Bureaucratic dilemmas: Civil servants between political responsiveness and normative constraints

The interaction between political executives and civil servants rests on a delicate balance between political responsiveness and the duty of civil servants and ministers to respect legal and other normative constraints on executive authority. In Danish central government, this balance is stressed by norms that define the correct behavior when the civil service provides ministers with political advice and assistance. Organizational factors strongly influence civil servants' behavior when they have to balance responsiveness against constraints on their role as political advisers. Moreover, civil servants working closely with ministers pay more attention to legal constraints than their peers among agency officials and specialists. Agency officials and specialists are much more prone to prioritize professional standards. We argue that this pattern can be generalized West European systems.     

Policy positions and jobs in the government

Abstract.  This article conducts a theoretical and empirical analysis of the allocation of the full set of jobs – both cabinet and junior ministers – in the Prodi Government that formed after the Italian election of 1996. We first discuss theoretical arguments linking forecasts of government policy to the policy positions of both cabinet and junior ministers. We then estimate the policy positions of cabinet and junior ministers appointed to the Prodi cabinet, applying a new technique for computerized content analysis to the collected legislative speeches of each minister during the 1996–1997 parliamentary session. Having considered the face validity of these results, we then use them to explore to observable implications of the various theoretical approaches. We conclude that, in this case, there does appear to be systematic evidence linking both the allocation of government jobs and the evolution of spending patterns between departments to the policy positions of senior politicians.     

Ministerial careers and the nature of parliamentary government: the cases of Austria and Belgium

Abstract. The characteristics of parliamentary government vary markedly from one Western European country to another. Although we still do not know in detail the nature and amplitude of these variations, they are sufficiently manifest to warrant close examination. One way in which these variations can be assessed is through the analysis of the career patterns of ministers. These are interesting both in themselves and because they provide information about the nature of the decision-making process: for instance, ministers who stay in office for very short periods are less likely to be involved in collective decisions than ministers who stay in office for a decade or more. Differences are particularly marked among ministerial career patterns in the Austrian and Belgian cabinets. Not only do Austrian ministers stay in office longer: they tend to come to office only once and then remain in the same post; they often do not come to the government by the parliamentary route, many coming from the civil service, industry, or interest groups. In all these respects, Belgian ministers have opposite characteristics. Thus it does seem that while both governments are ostensibly parliamentary, the Austrian government tends to be managerial, while the Belgian government is parliamentary and more truly 'political'.     

Do Belgian parties undermine the democratic chain of delegation?

The Belgian party-archy violates the ideal-type chain of parliamentary delegation in many ways, insofar as political parties play a predominant role at each stage. They channel the delegation of power from voters to MPs, from Parliament to the cabinet, from the collective cabinet to individual ministers, and from ministers to their civil servants. Hence, they can be considered the effective principals in the polity, and many actors of the parliamentary chain of delegation, such as MPs, ministers, and civil servants have been reduced to mere party agents. The extreme fragmentation of the Belgian party system in combination with its increasing need for multilevel coordination have further enhanced the position of political parties in the Belgian polity. Yet, at the same time (since the early 1990s), Belgium has also witnessed a gradual decline in the informal system of partitocratic delegation and clientelistic excesses, thereby giving back part of their autonomy to some formal agents, such as the cabinet, top civil servants and some MPs. Still, one can wonder whether these corrections are sufficient to counter the strong outburst of public dissatisfaction with the way parties have run the country in past decades.     

Ministers as double agents? The delegation process between cabinet and ministers

Abstract. Delegation from cabinet to ministers is complicated because the cabinet consists of the same ministers that are supposed to act as its agents. In the extreme case ministers are completely autonomous within their portfolio. This paper argues that the resulting potential for agency loss is limited, but not negated, by both hierarchy and collective decision–making in cabinet, or by establishing direct delegation relationships between legislative committees or political parties and ministers, bypassing the government. Appointments to ministerial office are the prevailing exception to ministerial autonomy. To the extent that ministerial preferences are not stable and exogenous, screening before appointments is an ineffective control, and ministerial identification with departmental interests is the most probable source of agency loss.     

Crisis Accountability: Ministerial Resignations in Sweden

Accountability processes after crisis events sometimes entail harsh criticism from public and political players alike, forcing cabinet ministers to be on top of the political game and sometimes even resign. However, harsh accountability processes are just as likely to leave ministers undamaged. This article combines two existing theories that propose different factors to account for variation in outcomes: ministerial resignations as a consequence of cabinet formation and individual positions; or resignations as a result of blame management strategies involving individual actors within the cabinet and beyond. Ten crisis episodes in Sweden are analysed and compared. The findings suggest that individual political power bases and experience matter to how well blame management strategies can be employed, while the composition of the government gives structural constraints. The dynamic interplay and framing battle between incumbent decision makers, and external arenas and the skill with which individual ministers engage and frame responsibility, play a key role in determining their post‐crisis careers.     

Executive capacity to control legislatures and presidential choice of cabinet ministers in East Asian democracies

How do presidents in new democracies choose cabinet ministers to accomplish their policy goals? Contrary to existing studies explaining the partisan composition of the cabinet with institutional characteristics, such as formal authority, we argue that the broader political context surrounding the president's ability to control the legislature can affect cabinet partisanship. By analyzing original data on cabinet formation in all presidential systems in East Asia since democratization, we find that when presidents are more likely to be dominant in executive–legislative relations, they have less concern about legislative support and more leeway to focus on policy performance by appointing nonpartisan cabinet members. This analysis suggests that understanding cabinet partisanship requires a view of cabinet appointments as a trade‐off between securing legislative support and managing policy performance, and the scope of this compromise depends on the strength of the president vis‐à‐vis the legislature.     

Presidentialisation in the Executive Sphere? Evidence from Norwegian Cabinets

Empowerment of state leaders has been apparent over the last decades in various parliamentary democracies. Signs of this development, often labelled ‘presidentialisation’, have been reported in the executive sphere also in Sweden and Denmark in recent years. Few accounts have been made of developments in Norway. This article studies Norwegian cabinets for the last 25 years in light of the so‐called ‘presidentalisation thesis’. The article finds no clear tendency of prime ministers appointing more weak and controllable ministers, or more frequently making reshuffles in cabinet, as one would expect from the presidentialisation thesis. However, the Prime Minister's Office has been clearly strengthened, suggesting that the prime ministers' ability to coordinate cabinet policy has increased.     

Ethnic Politics and Women's Empowerment in Africa: Ministerial Appointments to Executive Cabinets

Under what conditions do women participate in executive power in multiethnic societies? Previous research has examined how political institutions, socioeconomic factors, and cultural norms affect the appointment of women as cabinet ministers. However, no study has assessed the extent to which the politicization of ethnicity—a cleavage that shapes political life in many countries—affects women's cabinet appointments. Focusing on sub‐Saharan Africa, we argue that women are less likely to become cabinet ministers where incumbents use such appointments to build patronage‐based alliances with politicians who act as advocates for ethnic constituencies. Using an original dataset on the composition of cabinets in 34 African countries from 1980 to 2005, we show that women's share of cabinet appointments is significantly lower in countries where leaders must accommodate a larger number of politicized ethnic groups, but it rises with higher levels of democracy and greater representation of women in parliament.     

Remaking Australia's Economic Policy: Economic Policy Decision-Makers During the Hawke and Keating Labor Governments

This paper reports on interviews with 93 members of strategically located institutional elites and nominated influentials. It examines the sources of economic ideas in economic policy and studies a select number of key economic policy decisions made during the Labor governments of Hawke and Keating. It will argue that the economic liberalisation carried out during the Labor government reflected the influence of a range of individuals and institutions, depending on the economic decision in question, while a variety of domestic and internationally based institutions and individuals contributed ideas to economic policy-making. It will reject Pusey's (1991) belief that the central agencies (ie Treasury, the Department of Finance and the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet) were necessarily the major influence in economic policy and show that other individuals and institutions, including cabinet and particular ministers, ministerial offices, the ACTU and other government departments, were also important. It will discuss further how economic policy is made in Australia.     

Corruption and women in cabinets: Informal barriers to recruitment in the executive

Research on corruption and women in politics has mainly focused on legislatures, generally finding that corruption decreases the election of women. This article turns the spotlight to the executive branch—an arena where selection is less transparent than recruitment to legislative seats—and examines if corruption decrease the share of ministers who are women. Drawing on feminist institutionalist theories, we posit that in an environment of high political corruption, (male) elites involved in cabinet formation will tend to appoint ministers whom they can trust with secretive tasks. In systems with corrupt networks, relative newcomers, such as women, should face obstacles to career advancement. The article tests this reasoning empirically on a global sample of countries across time. Using a new indicator measuring corruption in executive bodies, we find support for our argument; corruption tends to hinder women's presence in cabinets, albeit only in democracies and not autocracies.     

TRANSITION: TAKING OVER POWER IN 1983

Abstract: From 1979 the Labor Party had devoted considerable attention to planning for a future administration. It came to power with a detailed scheme covering the organization of cabinet, relations with caucus, the internal organization of the public service and public authorities. With the cooperation of a well-prepared public service the transition appeared smooth and well coordinated. The decision taken by senior ministers, with the subsequent approval of caucus, to create an "inner" cabinet may cause future tensions with the outer ministry and in their relations with caucus. It also had an impact on the structure of cabinet committees. The committee system, designed to reduce the workload at cabinet meetings, appeared to function well in the first three months. Compared with 1972, relatively few changes were made to administrative arrangements and the appointment of ministerial staff proceeded smoothly.     

LET THE MANAGERS GOVERN: MINISTER-BUREAUCRAT RELATIONSHIPS IN NEW SOUTH WALES

Abstract: This article considers the relationships between ministers and chief executives in the New South Wales Liberal-National government. It looks at how ministers have set about taking charge of the public service against the background of the new political and economic realities confronting the state government. Senior ministers have consciously sought to limit their dependence on public servants and they have used a range of strategies to do so. They have remoulded the public service in a new "managerialised" form. Policy-making has been further internalised into ministerial offices and party circles and away from departments. The role of cabinet has been strengthened to impose a new corporate purpose as a counterbalance to traditional departmental interests. New incentive systems, based on contract employment and performance agreements, have been introduced to focus public service loyalties on the goals of the government. Advocates of managerialism, usually career public servants, have been appointed to key positions. Ministerial advisers have been used as countervailing sources of advice and as extensions of ministerial authority. Many ministers themselves have assumed an involved style of ministerial management of departments.     

Entering the men's domain? Gender and portfolio allocation in European governments

While all government portfolios used to be the purview of men exclusively, more and more women are selected to sit around the cabinet table. But under which circumstances do women get appointed to different ministerial portfolios? This article, proposes a theoretical framework to consider how party leaders’ attitudes and motivations influence the allocation of portfolios to male and female ministers. These propositions are tested empirically by bringing together data on 7,005 cabinet appointments across 29 European countries from the late 1980s until 2014. Considering the key partisan dynamics of the ministerial selection process, it is found that women are significantly less likely to be appointed to the ‘core’ offices of state, and ‘masculine’ and ‘neutral’ policy areas. However, these gender differences are moderated by the ideology of the party that allocates them. Women are more likely to be appointed to ‘masculine’ portfolios when a party's voters have more progressive gender attitudes. This theoretical framework and analysis enhances our understanding of women's access to the government, which has important implications for how ministers are selected, as well as how women are represented in the most powerful policy-making positions in Europe.