国有资产寻租行为及其治理对策

国有资产委托—代理中的寻租行为,是一种涉及经营性国有资产钱权交易的活动。它通常采用非信用经济担保、贪污挪用、低估或无偿占用、违纪截留、破产逃债、行贿受贿、参与集资、无效投资等形式,已经和正在带来严重危害,对其应着力从制度建设、监督制约、依约守信和经济执法等方面综合治理。     

寻租腐败:一种经济学分析视角

腐败现象,从经济学的角度讲,其性质是一种寻租活动。“寻租”是指人类社会中追求非生产性经济利益的活动。寻租活动的危害主要有:权力的滥用和腐化;社会资源的巨大浪费;社会成员是非价值传统观和对政府合法性认同感的丧失。寻租从本质上说是权力寻租行为。在我国正处于向市场经济过渡的转轨时期,制度“真空”的存在是权力寻租的主要根源。因此,遏制寻租腐败源头的根本措施在于制度创新。     

税收征管人员寻租的制度原因分析

税法的不完备导致税权滞留于公共领域成为租金.在约束与激励机制不健全的条件下,税收征管人员具有寻租的动机.遏制税收征管人员的寻租行为,必须在完备税法体系的同时建立起科学且合理的约束和激励机制.     

寻租理论与腐败问题分析

寻租理论作为一个规范化的概念是于20世纪70年代初，80年代后期传入我国。其主要目的就是为建立市场经济体制寻找理论基础以及反腐败。寻租理论提出的背景及寻租性腐败造成的损失分析，总结出寻租性腐败产生的主要原因。提出了我国今后在解决寻租性腐败问题时的几点建议。     

遏制财政管理寻租的伦理制度探究

财政管理寻租是阻碍我国经济发展的绊脚石,各级政府都采取各种措施来防治公共财政管理的寻租现象。从行政伦理规范建设方面来防范公共财政管理寻租,分析其原因、措施和路径,可以从源头上预防和杜绝财政管理中的寻租现象。     

权力寻租性腐败的表现及成因

腐败现象的存在,其根由主要是权力寻租导致的。而权力寻租与租金的存在,则是由于政府强制性权力微观干预体制造成的。我国处于社会主义市场经济体制建设与发展的初期,政府强制性权力微观干预过多,是导致大量权力性寻租腐败现象产生的主要原因。     

公共政策公共性偏离问题分析——基于寻租理论的视角

公共性是公共政策的价值基础和核心目标.但在现实中,公共政策在制定和执行中或多或少地偏离了此目标,因为在公共政策的制定和实施过程中存在一种衍生物,那就是"租".寻租行为对特殊利益的争夺损害了公共利益,导致了公共政策的"非公共化".寻租理论的意义在于倡导避免浪费性寻租的政策,因而我们不仅要知道寻租行为的后果,还要知道寻租行为是怎样影响公共政策偏离的,进而实现遏制寻租的目的.     

国有资产流失中的寻租活动分析

寻租活动分析是本世纪70年代以来西方经济学的一个重要研究领域。寻租理论指出了腐败在经济制度方面的原因,并提供了减少腐败基础的途径。当前国有资产严重流失问题,在大部分情况下,都能从“寻租”的角度探寻到深层原因。 “寻租”行为劣化资源配置,造成社会浪费,导致腐败猖镢。     

政府采购的寻租风险及其防控

政府采购过程中存在寻租风险,主要在需求确定环节、评标定标环节、采购方式选择环节、信息发布环节、履约验收环节、采购人委托代理机构环节易发多发.政府采购的寻租行为造成社会资源的浪费、供应商的市场竞争力下降,严重损害政府形象和信誉.权力的腐蚀性是寻租风险产生的根本原因,政府采购制度的缺陷是产生寻租风险的客观条件,政府采购人员作为"理性经济人"的利益驱动是寻租风险的内在动机,政府采购中形成的"委托--代理"关系是产生寻租风险的诱导因素.防控政府采购寻租风险,需要加快政府采购的法制建设,建立全方位的政府采购监督机制,切断寻租风险产生的源头,构建腐败风险防控机制.     

寻租与反寻租:一个理论模型

本文试图对国内学术界偏好使用却又屡被误用的寻租理论作出学术澄清.本文认为,完整、准确的寻租理论应由如下四个命题组成:1.市场主体价值指向的租金非仅一种而是有三种,即分别由创新原因、自然原因和管制原因引致的垄断租金;2.市场主体追求创新租金的寻利行为是自由竞争条件下的正和博弈,而其追逐管制租金的寻租行为则是在不完全竞争条件下的负和博弈;3政府进行制度创新,引导市场主体从寻租走向寻利,可以实现反寻租的目的;4.由于政府同样具有理性经济人特征,通过制度创新进行反寻租有可能引起新的寻租,陷入反寻租的悖论.     

Consumer Decision Making in the Information Age

Providing people with more information and more options may seem as a good policy. However, because of limited attention and cognitive resources, people are not able to use all available information and freedom of choice effectively to achieve their own best interests. When cognitive resources and attention are depleted, decision making becomes shallow and intuitive, often unable to take important aspects of given situations into account – even though this information is readily available. An intuitive decision making may lead to suboptimal outcomes by overestimating the importance of the most salient cues and disregarding the less obvious future consequences. Although this creates a demand for decision making aides that could be satisfied by markets, policy regulation may be necessary in some areas. We provide specific examples of problems arising from limited attention together with solutions based on behavioral economics approach to policy making known as nudging.     

Rent-seeking and the behavior of regulators: An empirical analysis

The main contribution of this paper is to describe empirically how the rent-seeking process takes place in a regulated industry through the consistency in Board decisions. Evidence provided by discrete-choice decision models of regulators confirms that the conventional rent-seeking view of regulation is correct, namely to distribute wealth between various groups differently from what market forces would do. First of all, the structure of the rent-seeking activities in the Quebec regulated trucking industry is well explained. There exist behavioral uniformities (Russell and Shelton, 1974) in decisions taken by the Quebec Transport Commission, given its wide range of choice provided by the absence of detailed regulatory standards by the Quebec legislature. Secondly, trucking firms and large shippers are the interest groups seeking to extract artificially contrived rents. The capture theory of regulation is not a dominant political strategy and therefore does not analytically explain various trades taking place among interest groups when a permit authority is requested. So logrolling by regulators is clearly essential to maintain their non-transferable investment of time and talent and protect their political afterlife. Thirdly, large firms are more successful, at the margin, than small firms in their expansion because of their political effectiveness. The regulatory agency gives more rents to those who offer relatively strong electoral support to its party. Finally, appointed regulators do not achieve other positive payoffs from the regulatory process than those which may result from the agency problem. So the regulatory agency does not promote its own policy agenda, but rather that of the elected politicians, given the organizational and control problem between these two.I am indebted to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for its financial support, to Gérard Bélanger, Jean-Luc Migué for helpful comments and to Sylvain Veillette, Pascal Migué, Marc Leduc for valuable research assistance. I benefitted from useful comments by the editor of this journal. All the remaining errors are mine.     

论风险社会中的决策

在工业社会中,政治的文明化和科学技术的进步意味着人的一切理性化的行动都是在决策的前提下进行的。民主决策和科学决策是两种基本的决策模式,特别是在20世纪得到了自觉的建构,成为成熟的决策模式。这两种决策与工业社会中普遍存在的社会化大分工是一致的,都是专门性的活动。民主决策表现为政治精英和社会治理专家的职业活动,而科学决策则属于政策科学家的专业活动。因而,都存在决策者与执行者相分离的问题。与一切社会活动一样,专业化使决策显示出优势,但在风险社会中,也就是在社会的高度复杂性和高度不确定性条件下,这种分离则会使决策脱离实际和出现时间滞后等问题。因此,我们主张一种新型的行动中的决策。行动中的决策是一种即时决策,行动者既是决策者也是执行者,是决策与执行的统一化。     

Public Management Decision Making: Effects of Decision Content

One obvious aspect of public management decisions and decision making has largely escaped attention—decision content. We examine the effects of decision content by asking the following questions for budget cutback and information technology decisions: How does content affect the time required for decision making? How does content affect who participates? How does content affect the decision criteria employed? How does content affect the information quality used in the decision-making process and red tape? The results suggest that information technology and budget cutback decisions differ in important ways. For information technology decisions, cost-effectiveness is not a significant criterion, average decision time is much longer, and decisions are generally viewed as permanent and stable. For cutback decisions, cost-effectiveness is a significant criterion, decisions are made much more quickly, and they are viewed as unstable and changeable. Surprisingly, decision content does not appear to affect the number of participants.     

科学决策的思维模式——略论决策内容与不同特点思维的对应关系

科学决策过程是科学思维过程。笔者经过多年研究发现 ,决策程序的每一个环节、每一种决策技术、决策的每一种类型 ,都有特定的思维方式与之对应。本文即是对这种一一对应关系的专门研究     

政府决策与执行分离的价值分析与构想

政府决策与执行分离是政府职能转变的重要内容,保持政府决策与执行的适度分开,对于促进我国公共行政体制改革与政府体制创新具有十分重要的意义。本文主要针对政府决策与执行分离的特定内涵及其理论意义与实践价值作简要的分析,并结合我国的具体国情和公共管理实践,总结出在我国实现政府决策与执行职能适度分离的思路与构想。     

犯罪决策的经济分析

本文以理性人假设为前提,对犯罪决策进行经济分析。笔者认为,犯罪成本由物质性成本、非物质性成本及惩罚性成本构成。当预期刑罚成本高于预期犯罪效益,犯罪物质性成本、心理感受之和高于预期犯罪效益时,潜在犯罪人不选择犯罪;反之,则可能选择犯罪。     

Rent-seeking with non-identical sharing rules: An equilibrium rescued

Nitzan's (1991) analysis of differential sharing rules in a collective rent-seeking setting is reconsidered. Two groups, each with more than one member, are presumed to use different linear combinations of two sharing rules, one based on an equal-division of the prize, and the other on each member's relative effort. We show that an equilibrium always exists for this type of game, and then characterize the equilibrium. Our result is contrary to Nitzan's claims that (a) in the general case an equilibrium often does not exist, and (b) an equilibrium never exists when the groups use the polar extreme rules.