Russia’s Power Politics in Ukraine and Syria: Status-seeking between Identity,Opportunity and Costs

Abstract

This article looks at Russia’s exercise of power politics in Ukraine and Syria as a way of improving its international status. Russia’s recent willingness to use power and coercion is theoretically counterintuitive as it appears to be in dissonance with the prevalent characterisation of the country as a status-overachieving inconsistent power. We argue that this behaviour is not the result of a consistent weighing of status against capabilities, but rather reflective of both internal and external dynamics. We analyse issues of identity, opportunity and costs as factors that influence Russian foreign action, showing that power politics will not solve Russia’s status-inconsistency problem in the long run.     

Russia as a great power: Status inconsistency and the two Chechen wars

The article examines Russia as a great power from the point of view of status inconsistency theory. Applications of the theory to Russia have focused on the status accorded to Russia in diplomatic representation and membership of key international organizations, which suggests that Russia is a ‘status overachiever’ in that it has an international status that is greater than its actual capabilities would warrant. However, this article focuses on Russian perceptions of the country's status internationally, especially as reflected in the actual experience of membership in international organizations (OSCE, Council of Europe) and relations with the EU in the context of the two Chechen wars. The article demonstrates that, at least according to Russian assessments, Russia is accorded lower status in these organizations than the great power status which most Russians believe should be theirs. While concluding that status inconsistency is a useful tool for explaining Russian foreign policy behavior, the article notes that differing assessments of what Russia's level of status recognition is pose challenges for status inconsistency theory.     

All Quiet on the Eastern Front? Media Images of the West and Russian Foreign Political Identity1

National and foreign political identities are discursively constructed, not least through the media. Starting from the contention that Europe serves as the main Other used to define the idea of Russia, this article uses media texts (online and press) to analyse how Russia is constructed as a foreign policy actor in relation to Europe and the ‘West’ more generally. In so doing, the article draws on three discourses around Russia’s foreign policy: ‘Russia as Europe’; ‘Russia as part of Greater Europe’; and ‘Russia as Alternative Europe’. The article suggests that discursive developments in the 2000s have paved the way for a return of Cold War discourses in characterising relations between Russia and the West.     

The frustrating partnership: Honor,status, and emotions in Russia's discourses of the West

This paper analyzes Russia's presidential discourses and emotions of the West from March 2008 to December 2012. By studying the languages of inclusiveness and exclusiveness in annual addresses to the Federation Council and public statements, I have identified several distinct stages in the Kremlin's emotional evolution from fear to hope to frustration: the initial fear (March 2008–June 2009), hope (September 2009–the late 2010), and frustration (since the early 2011). The Russia's emotional shifts are shaped by the country's historically established social relations with the West and are not to be reduced to the dynamics of power and prestige/status. Russia's deep emotional connection to the West as well as Russia's own concept of national honor are the two factors that drive the nation's leaders' complex actions, feelings, and rhetoric. Russia displays emotions of hope each time it feels that its honor is being respected and those of frustration, fear and anger when in the eyes of Kremlin its identity/honor as not recognized.     

Overcoming the Impact of Corruption through Diligence: The Experience of Russian Female Managers

This article proposes that managerial time spent dealing with regulations, in addition to being a reflection of regulatory burden, can also be partially accounted by managerial strategy and propensity to “play by the rules” rather than rely on informal corrupt means to solve business problems in Russia. Using top-manager gender as a proxy for such behaviors, the study finds that firms headed by female managers are more likely to devote more time to dealing with regulations, and to protect their interests in courts. Such firms are less likely to be in a situation where corrupt requests are made, and also minimize corruption impact such as relative size of payments, when actually exposed to corruption pressures. It appears that there are non-spurious gender effect persisting after controlling for multiple firm- and region- level variables. With regards to managerial time spent on dealing with regulations in particular, it appears that the gender effects are reflected in differential responses to corrupt pressures (e.g. spending more time dealing with regulations), but increase in time tax by itself does not appear to limit impact of corruption, except waiting times for operating license, which are shortened. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.     

Putin's Power Revisited: How Identity Positions and Great Power Interaction Condition Strategic Cooperation on Syria

Abstract

This article investigates how Russian foreign policies are shaped in a two-level interactive social game. Russian foreign policies take their cue from ingrained identity positions articulated by the state leadership and negotiated in domestic debates, but they are also informed by interaction with other states. The article explains the shift in Russian policies away from pragmatic cooperation with the West in Syria from autumn 2015 onwards. While the Russian leadership initially sought such cooperation, the prominence of anti-Western discourse in Russia following the crisis in Ukraine as well as the West's rejection of Russia in this period spurred Russia to act independently in Syria.     

Clash of Realities: Gazprom’s Reasoning on the EU Gas Trade

Abstract

Gazprom, the state-controlled Russian energy company, has major export markets in the European Union, but these are changing, challenging the established trading principles of Russian gas. The EU promotes switching to hub-based pricing, whereas Gazprom, despite adapting to some degree, has continued to highlight the advantages of long-term contracts. This article analyses the reasoning of selected Gazprom actors from an institutional-cultural perspective. Apart from conflicts of interest between Russia and the EU, it finds deep-seated differences in worldviews and perceptions of appropriate behaviour in trade relations. Such factors may play a larger role in decision-making than is generally acknowledged.     

Grading greatness: evaluating the status performance of the BRICS

An impressive portfolio of case-study research has now demonstrated how and through what means the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) countries have sought higher social status. However, this field of research lacks systematic means of evaluating this status-seeking. This article fills this lacuna by developing a mixed-methods framework enabling scholars to zoom in and compare individual states’ relative status performance. Using diplomatic representation as a proxy for status recognition and comparing it to a country’s status resources (wealth), the framework indicates how successfully countries have generated recognition from the international society. The findings show that China’s economic ascent has been matched by increased recognition, and that South Africa enjoyed an almost immediate ‘status bounce’ following apartheid, turning it from a pariah to a significant overperformer. Russia should be understood as an ‘overperforming status-dissatisfied power’ while India’s status performance has been around ‘par’ for a country of its economic resources. Lastly, Brazil underperforms more than any of the other BRICS, especially since its democratic transition. The findings highlight considerable variance in the type and duration of gaps between status resource and recognition and suggests that rather than treating these as ‘inconsistencies’ awaiting correction, they can and should be accounted for by case study analyses.     

Explanations of,and responses to,youth homelessness in local authority housing departments

This article examines the relationship between beliefs about youth homelessness and the steps being taken by local authorities to tackle the problem, based on interviews with officers responsible for dealing with youth homelessness in north‐eastern local authorities. Officers blamed young people's homelessness on a wide range of factors, but the action they thought appropriate to tackle the problem tended to focus on making more accommodation available or supporting young people to live in it. Officers expressed frustration at their inability to provide adequate support. It appeared that action to meet young people's needs was most likely to be taken when it also incorporated a ‘housing management’ objective such as filling empty properties.     

Poland's conception of European security and Russia

This article examines the problem of contemporary bilateral relations between Poland and Russia. Its thesis largely attributes the rivalry of these two states in Eastern Europe to conceptions relating to the balancing and bandwagoning of power. This rivalry can be put down to the fact that Polish-Russian relations are being developed within broader global processes such as Russia's relations with NATO, the USA and European Union. The greatest obstacle to the maintenance of mutually beneficial relations is the sensitive issue of security. In recent years Poland has consistently underlined its willingness to reinforce NATO's mutual defense mechanisms by supporting the organization's continued presence in Central-Eastern Europe. This issue has been compounded by Poland's striving to bring the countries of Eastern Europe (especially Ukraine) into closer affiliation with Western institutions favoring European integration, which is evidently perceived as interference in what is regarded by Moscow to be a sphere of Russian influence. This has provoked a number of serious crises in bilateral relations between Poland and Russia since the Euro-Maidan Revolution in Ukraine. Russian plans to install new (Iskander) missile systems close to the Polish border and Poland's effective attempts post-2014 to extend NATO presence within its own country testify to the scale of conflicts of interest between the two states and the lack of trust afforded by both sides. The issues highlighted in this paper are of great importance, since they not only enable the complexity of Central European issues to be more fully comprehended but also help to elucidate other global actors' conceptions relating to cooperation with Europe.     

Russian and Ukrainian elites: A comparative study of different identities and alternative transitions

The deterioration in Russian-Ukrainian relations heightened in 2014 but did not begin then and has deeper roots. Both Russian presidents have had troubled relations with all five Ukrainian presidents irrespective if they were described as ‘nationalist’ or ‘pro-Russian.’ This article is the first to explain why the roots of the crisis go deeper and it does this by investigating three areas. The first is the different sources of elites in 1991 when independent Russia captured Soviet institutions and undertook top-down state building while Ukraine inherited far less and set course with bottom up state-building. The second is divergent Russian and Ukrainian national identities. The third is the resultant different transitions with Russia reverting to great power imperial nationalism and Ukraine quadruple and post-colonial transitions.     

The offensive posture of NATO's missile defence system

A compelling case can be made to develop a NATO's missile defence system in response to the advancement of missile technology and the danger of nuclear weapons. However, this development also undermines Russia's retaliatory capacity, and consequently heightens the offensive potential of nuclear weapons. This article explores the offence/defence posture of NATO's missile defence plans in terms of both capabilities and strategy. It is argued that NATO is incrementally increasing the strength and reach of its missile defence components, while rejecting any international treaty to regulate and limit their future expansion. This corresponds with a strategy of achieving invulnerability through counterforce and utilising NATO as an ‘insurance policy’ against Russia, to be activated when conflicts arise. We conclude that NATO has the capacity to distinguish between an offensive and defensive posture by discriminating between potential targets, but it has displayed no intention to do so.     

Why China Won't Follow Arab Revolt

Do China's mandarins have anything to fear from the winds of freedom that have blown away Arab autocrats? The short answer is no—for now. The Chinese government has performed for its people, lifting hundreds of millions out of poverty during the same length of time Hosni Mubarak reigned in Egypt. Though many in the West would like to think so, it is not likely that the rising middle class in China will one day also fill Tiananmen Square in protest. In the immediate future, the chaos and economic drift that will now engulf the liberated Middle East will remind them again that China was right not to go down the path of Gorbachev's glasnost and perestroika in Russia. And it is not as if they will have a chance. The authorities are determined never to allow any two people who vent virtually on the Net to meet in the street. In this section, we discuss the impact of the Arab revolt—and lack of it—on China's system of governance.     

China's “Color Revolution” Is Red

Do China's mandarins have anything to fear from the winds of freedom that have blown away Arab autocrats? The short answer is no—for now. The Chinese government has performed for its people, lifting hundreds of millions out of poverty during the same length of time Hosni Mubarak reigned in Egypt. Though many in the West would like to think so, it is not likely that the rising middle class in China will one day also fill Tiananmen Square in protest. In the immediate future, the chaos and economic drift that will now engulf the liberated Middle East will remind them again that China was right not to go down the path of Gorbachev's glasnost and perestroika in Russia. And it is not as if they will have a chance. The authorities are determined never to allow any two people who vent virtually on the Net to meet in the street. In this section, we discuss the impact of the Arab revolt—and lack of it—on China's system of governance.     

Towards an Anti-Japanese Territorial Front? Russia and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Dispute

This article examines Russia's position on the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute. It focuses particularly on the claim that Russia and China are forming an anti-Japanese territorial front. Looking closely at official statements and actions, as well as Russian-language media and scholarship, it finds that Russia, while retaining a position of formal neutrality, clearly considers China's claims more favourably. While this could be seen to have alarming implications by arraying China and Russia on one side against Japan and the USA on the other, the article also finds that Russia's support is not without qualifications and that its place in the conflict is not yet entrenched.     

Russia's quest for respect in the international conflict management in Kosovo

This article examines the emotion-based status-seeking logic in Russia's foreign policy vis-à-vis the West, presenting the example of Russia's reactions to NATO's military campaign against Serbia in 1999. It is argued that Russian assertiveness in combination with expressive rhetoric must be understood as a result of the ruling elite's need to have Russia's identity and self-defined social status as an equal great power in world politics respected by its Western interaction partners. Russia's reactions to NATO's intervention, which was not authorized by the UN Security Council, must be read as a strategy coping with the emotion anger about the perceived humiliation and provocation of status denial and ignorance by the West. We find various elements of such a coping strategy, among them the verbalization of the feeling of anger among Russian political circles and the media; uttering retaliation threats, but no ‘real’ aggressive, retaliatory action; minor and temporary activities aimed at restoring Russia's image and status as an influential an equal power. On the surface, the Kosovo episode did not result in any visible break or rift in the Russian–Western relationship. However, emotionally it has lead to a significant loss of trust in the respective partner on both sides.     

How post-imperial democracies die: A comparison of Weimar Germany and post-Soviet Russia

While socioeconomic crisis – like in Germany after World War I and in Russia after the Cold War – is a necessary precondition for democratic erosion resulting in a breakdown of democracy, it is not a sufficient condition. We identify, in the cases of Weimar Germany and post-Soviet Russia, a post-imperial syndrome that includes nationalist irredentism and an ambition to return to the status quo ante of a “great power” as a main reason why democratization faces specific and enormous challenges for former “great powers.” A slide back to authoritarianism in post-imperial democracies takes a high toll. It is facilitated by international political conflicts, including annexation and wars, with new neighbouring states that harbor territories perceived as external national homelands like the Sudetenland or Crimea.     

Islam and the West in world history

Rejecting the thesis that Islam and the West are on a collision course, this article examines the nature of their relations over the centuries and concludes that, although convergence between them is not likely, grounds for mutual tolerance and co-existence have always existed and can, in future, exist. Understanding that proprietary liberalism is not the only model for democracy is a necessary first step in the assessment of the long-term prospects for stable relations between Islam and the West. In this article intellectual, social, economic and political trends are examined, the causes of tensions and conflicts between the two sides are analysed, the nature of the contemporary Islamist project is identified, and the possibilities for effective dialogue between mainstream tendencies in both the West and the Muslim world are assessed.     

The Impact of Jihadist Foreign Fighters on Indigenous Secular-Nationalist Causes: Contrasting Chechnya and Syria

Jihadist foreign fighters have become common in civil conflicts in Muslim countries. While research exists on the impact they have upon returning home, less attention has been given to their influence on the opposition cause that they mobilize in support of. This article looks at the impact that jihadist foreign fighters on the Chechen and Syrian resistance causes, evaluating their influence on oppositional cohesion and ideology, domestic and international perceptions of the movements, and on governmental narratives regarding the conflicts the foreign fighters engage in. It is concluded that foreign fighters have overwhelmingly damaged the Chechen and Syrian opposition movements, making the likelihood of opposition success more remote.     

New directions in Russian international studies: pluralization,Westernization, and isolationism

The essay argues that Western scholars can improve their understanding of the post-Soviet Russia by studying the discipline of new Russian international relations (IR). The other objective of the essay is to move away from the excessively West-centered IR scholarship by exploring indigenous Russian perceptions and inviting a dialogue across the globe. The essay identifies key trends in Russian IR reflective of the transitional nature of Russia’s post-Soviet change. It argues that Russian IR continues to be in a stage of ideological and theoretical uncertainty, which is a result of unresolved questions of national identity. For describing Russia’s identity crisis, the authors employ Erving Goffman’s concept of stigma defined as a crisis of a larger social acceptance by Russia’s “significant other” (West). The essay suggests that, until this crisis is resolved, much of Russian IR debates can be understood in terms of a search for a national idea. It also introduces the authors of the issue and summarizes their contribution to our understanding of Russian and Western IR.