Inconsistency between educational attainment and literacy: The case of Russia

From the moment when wide spread of large scale assessments in sociology and economics began, the most commonly used indicators of peoples’ qualifications are the number of years spent in education and the possession of a high school/college/university diploma. But what if these formal indicators are unreliable under certain conditions and do not reflect actual literacy and competency of people? This article, drawing on data from the Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC), questions accuracy of the basic educational indicators in Russia. There is a linear relationship between the possession of a formal graduation diploma and the measurement of PIAAC literacy of the able-bodied population in OECD countries, including the Eastern European ones. However, the analysis shows that in Russia there is an inconsistency between literacy and formal educational status. This fact in itself casts doubt on the effectiveness of formal education indicators in Russia. The social implications resulting from this inconsistency become apparent through an international comparison of research results. These ill effects have been documented in the areas of employment, education and social reproduction and in the social self-awareness of the Russian people.     

Russia’s Power Politics in Ukraine and Syria: Status-seeking between Identity,Opportunity and Costs

Abstract

This article looks at Russia’s exercise of power politics in Ukraine and Syria as a way of improving its international status. Russia’s recent willingness to use power and coercion is theoretically counterintuitive as it appears to be in dissonance with the prevalent characterisation of the country as a status-overachieving inconsistent power. We argue that this behaviour is not the result of a consistent weighing of status against capabilities, but rather reflective of both internal and external dynamics. We analyse issues of identity, opportunity and costs as factors that influence Russian foreign action, showing that power politics will not solve Russia’s status-inconsistency problem in the long run.     

‘Greatpowerness’ as the key element of Russian self-consciousness under erosion

The article analyzes changes in attitudes to and interpretations of Russian ‘greatpowerness’ (velikoderzhavnost') between the years of 2000 and 2014, that is to say during President Putin's period of rule. The concept of Russia as the great power was changing during this time in two respects: first, there was an increasing reticence of self-assessments; second, we observe prioritization of protecting the country's own, mostly regional, interests as opposed to expansion which would be characteristic of a great power. Moreover, this period clearly demonstrates contradictions and dangers, engendered in the process of losing self-perception as that of the great power. The readiness of Russian political elite to part bit by bit with the status of the great power and to go to the status of a regional power is combined (as the events around Ukraine have shown) with unwillingness to sustain the new status of the country with the help of the capabilities of a soft power. Lack of these, as well as of the skills in their use, and finally, a desire to raise the rating of trust in the government with the help of “a small victorious war” have formed the basis for the aggressive upsurge towards Ukraine. In the absence of serious hard and soft capabilities, the splashes of aggressiveness in Russian foreign policy and of anti-Western sentiments in domestic political life are unlikely to have any lasting effect. They are able, however, to generate extremely negative long-term consequences for the country.     

‘Rising Power’ Status and the Evolution of International Order: Conceptualising Russia’s Syria Policies

Abstract

Taking Syria’s armed conflict as a case study to illustrate the processes of normative contestation in international relations, this article is interested in re-examining the typology of Russia as a ‘rising power’ to account for ‘rise’ in a non-material dimension. The article integrates the concept of ‘rising power’ with the literature on international norm dynamics to reflect on the rationale for Russia’s engagement in Syria despite adverse material preconditions. It will argue that Russian norm divergence from alleged ‘Western’ norms illustrates Moscow’s ambition to co-define the conditions for legitimate transgressions of state sovereignty.     

Russian Challenge to the EU’s Normative Power: Change and Continuity

The article examines how Russian criticism of the normative power Europe (NPE) has evolved. Initially Russia insisted that NPE arguments covered realpolitik. However, two new approaches have recently emerged in Russian reporting on human rights in the EU. One is the demonstration that the EU does not qualify as a normative power. Another is the development of an alternative interpretation of human rights. Russia has, therefore, mastered all NPE critiques. This has occurred as the result of a change in how Russia views international relations. Moscow’s ultimate goal has, however, remained unchanged; it is to reaffirm its equality with key global players.     

Prospects for Russia-NATO relations: The SWOT analysis

Despite recent changes in international relations and lapse of time since the fall of the USSR, the issue of Russian membership in NATO has been an ongoing fact. Hence, the principle scope of the paper is SWOT analysis of potential Russian membership in NATO from the perspective of the Russian Federation. Through the introduction and evaluation of advantages and disadvantages of such membership in the light of latest geopolitical events in Eurasia suggested by academic and professional circles in NATO countries and Russia, we proceed with identification of fundamental strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats that Russia might face. Taking into account such determining factors as the size of its territory, shifting geopolitical conditions in the world, modern understanding of security and a potentially frozen dispute in Ukraine, we come to the conclusion that benefits potentially brought by Russian membership in NATO could be sustained while drawbacks could be eliminated by incorporation of NATO to OSCE and a change in voting procedures of the Alliance.     

Between Amity,Enmity and Europeanisation: EU Energy Security Policy and the Example of Bulgaria's Russian Energy Dependence

Considering the development of the Bulgarian energy security strategy this article analyses how the country has adapted to EU membership and to energy security challenges, such as disruptions to Russian gas supplies in 2006 and 2009 and rising gas prices. Utilising a conceptual lens which synthesises Regional Security Complex Theory and Europeanisation, the article offers an explanation of energy policy changes. It concludes that conceptions of Russia as an energy security guarantor have changed since Bulgaria's EU accession and that Bulgarian energy policy has undergone a qualified reorientation away from a positive dependence on Russian energy sources, towards a convergence with EU priorities of diversification and a single energy market.     

Continuity and change in Russia's policy toward Central and Eastern Europe

The accession of the CEE states to NATO and the European Union has put an end to the geopolitical ambiguity and implicit insecurity in the region between Russia and the so-called ‘Old Europe’. Instead of being an area of great powers' rivalry, elements of ‘buffer belts’ lacking meaningful strategic options, objects of raw Nazi-Soviet deals, or zones under Russian occupation and domination, the three Baltic States and the Visegrad group countries became full-fledged members of the European Union and were given NATO's security guarantees. By the middle of the 2000s, one would conclude that traditional geopolitics had ended in this region.However, the changes in the strategic situation in CEE have not changed the deep rooted moving forces and long-term strategic goals of the Russian policy toward the region. Moscow seeks to have the position, as its official rhetoric says, of an ‘influential centre of a multipolar world’ that would be nearly equal to the USA, China, or the EU. With this in view Moscow seeks for the establishment of its domination over the new independent states of the former USSR and for the formation of a sphere of influence for itself in Central Eastern Europe. If it achieves these goals, then Europe may return once again to traditional geopolitics fraught with great power rivalries and permanent instabilities radiating far beyond CEE borders.Yet a few questions remain. Has Russia come to the conclusion that attempting to restore its privileged position of influence in Central-Eastern Europe is wrong? Has Russia enough power to threaten the CEE countries? How credible are NATO's security guarantees? How may Russian behavior in CEE affect a wider European geopolitical context? These questions are appropriate in the light of Russia's ‘resurgence’ as a revanchist power and because Russia is, and most probably will remain in the next five to ten years, a weighty economic and strategic factor in areas along the Western borders of the former USSR.     

The last surge to the south: The new enemies of Russia in the rhetoric of Zhirinovsky

In Mein Kampf, what would become the foreign policy of Nazi Germany was set forth in great detail. No one paid attention until it was too late. In a series of books and articles, Vladimir Zhirinovsky demonizes the Moslem states along Russia's southern borders. He claims that Russia's most ancient enemy has become its new worst enemy. Large numbers of Russians are beginning to listen. My article notes Zhirinovsky's achievements in Russia to date. It presents his analysis of the Middle East in his own words, most of which are translated into English for the first time. It investigates the extent to which his rhetoric is supported by actual events in Russian history. It sets forth his plans for conquest if he becomes president. It identifies the major weaknesses in his arguments and suggests how his views may still secure him a large popular following in Russia.     

The Politics of Dominant Party Formation: United Russia and Russia's Governors

This article analyses the emergence of United Russia (Edinaya Rossiya) as a dominant party by examining the behaviour of Russia's governors. Using original data on when governors joined United Russia, the article demonstrates that those governors with access to autonomous political resources were more reluctant to join the dominant party. By showing that Russian elite members made their affiliation decisions on the basis of calculations about their own political resources rather than simply being coerced by the Kremlin, this article provides evidence for a theory of dominant party formation that casts the problem as a two-sided commitment problem between leaders and elites.     

Russia's quest for respect in the international conflict management in Kosovo

This article examines the emotion-based status-seeking logic in Russia's foreign policy vis-à-vis the West, presenting the example of Russia's reactions to NATO's military campaign against Serbia in 1999. It is argued that Russian assertiveness in combination with expressive rhetoric must be understood as a result of the ruling elite's need to have Russia's identity and self-defined social status as an equal great power in world politics respected by its Western interaction partners. Russia's reactions to NATO's intervention, which was not authorized by the UN Security Council, must be read as a strategy coping with the emotion anger about the perceived humiliation and provocation of status denial and ignorance by the West. We find various elements of such a coping strategy, among them the verbalization of the feeling of anger among Russian political circles and the media; uttering retaliation threats, but no ‘real’ aggressive, retaliatory action; minor and temporary activities aimed at restoring Russia's image and status as an influential an equal power. On the surface, the Kosovo episode did not result in any visible break or rift in the Russian–Western relationship. However, emotionally it has lead to a significant loss of trust in the respective partner on both sides.     

Historical aspirations and the domestic politics of Russia's pursuit of international status

What determined Russia's national interests and grand strategy in the first decade after the Cold War? This article uses aspirational constructivism, which combines social psychology with constructivism, to answer this question. Central to aspirational constructivism are the roles that the past self and in-groups, and their perceived effectiveness play in the selection of a national identity and the definition of national interests. This article explains why Russian political elites settled on a statist national identity that focused on retaining Russia's historical status as a Western great power and hegemon in the former Soviet Union and in engaging the country in bounded status competition with the United States.     

Two Ways of Influence-building: The Eurasian Economic Union and the One Belt,One Road Initiative

Russia and China have been pursuing the Eurasian Economic Union and the One Belt, One Road initiative since the early 2010s, employing two distinct sets of practices in their respective influence-building endeavours. Russia is interested in creating an exclusive sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space, in order to bolster its great power status and secure regional primacy. China, in turn, is expanding its economic influence over a vast geographical area disguising economic expansion behind multilateralism. These differences make Sino–Russian competition in Central Asia less plausible.     

Middle Range Powers in Global Governance

Abstract

This article compares and evaluates the contributions of middle range powers to global governance initiatives. Examining participation in terms of personnel, financial and ideational contributions, we test several hypotheses derived from neorealism, critical theory, liberalism, constructivism, and post-internationalism against six cases: Canada, Japan, China, Russia, India and Brazil. We find that material power has a negative impact on contributions, while a country’s leadership’s attitude towards the international order, the length of its membership in major international organisations and the strength of its civil society all seem to have positive effects on its participation in global governance. Trade dependence, however, does not seem to exhibit the expected impact. The article indicates that multiple theoretical approaches may prove useful for evaluating the behaviour of middle range powers, and that further research should be conducted on the relative importance of each of the factors mentioned above in explaining middle range power contributions to global governance.     

共同社会化与中国的国际秩序战略

国际秩序是由国家、国际组织等多种行为体构成的共同体,既包括确认秩序成员资格和调整成员互动的规范与规则,也包含反映秩序成员利益分配的地位或位置排序。共同社会化是崛起国与国际秩序成员共同调适,就秩序的规则与规范构成、利益分配份额以及崛起国在秩序中的地位与行为取得共识的过程。它具有调适过程的协商性、调适目标的共识性、调适结果的不确定性等特点。崛起国可从“改革+示善”两方面出发,实施共同社会化国际秩序战略。一方面,崛起国可主动改革国际秩序,加强治理能力,提升自身在国际秩序中的地位。另一方面,崛起国也需要以实际行动表明对改革秩序的善意,以获得外界的认可和支持。当今中国的国际秩序实践体现了共同社会化特点,既推动秩序改革,提升治理能力,提升中国在国际秩序中的影响力,又通过履行承诺展现改革的善意与效益。今后,中国可继续采用共同社会化的国际秩序战略,从有所作为地推进国际秩序改革、积极战略示善、理性处理对美关系、合理匹配成本与收益等方面出发,不断优化自身复兴的外部秩序环境。     

Rethinking the Economic Relationship between Kazakhstan and Russia

According to their governments, economic relations between Kazakhstan and Russia—the two largest post-Soviet countries—have been exceptionally solid and robust. However, statistical data demonstrate that Russian investments in Kazakhstan's economy have been weak, and that Kazakhstan has only recently increased investment in the Russian economy. This raises the question of whether relations between the two countries have been more uneven than has been claimed officially. The article also explores the influence of off-shore investments via third countries and other aspects of the bilateral relationship between Kazakhstan and Russia and the involvement of each country in the other's economy.     

A Sociology of Dependence in International Relations Theory: A Case of Russian Liberal IR

This article addresses the question of interaction between Western and "non-Western" international relations (IR) by analyzing liberal theory of IR that is emerging in contemporary Russia. We argue that, despite a growing diversity within Russian scholarship of liberal orientation, it remains largely a product of Western, particularly American, intellectual hegemony, and more so than any other theoretical perspective. As compared to two other existing traditions in Russian IR—realism and critical studies—liberalism remains the most dependent and therefore must be explored before any other traditions as a crucial case for understanding the dialectic of cultural dependence and hegemony in production of global knowledge. We argue that the greater dependence of Russian liberal IR results from its relatively weak indigenous tradition, perception of Russia's material weakness as opportunity, and greater availability of Western research funds. We also discuss an alternative, less dependent version of Russian liberal IR, and opportunities that its existence implies for development of a global, de-centered international relations theory.     

Explaining the 2014 Sino–Russian Gas Breakthrough: The Primacy of Domestic Politics

On 21 May 2014, during a state visit by President Vladimir Putin to Beijing, China and Russia signed a $400 billion, 30-year gas deal. Under this agreement, China will import 38 billion cubic metres of natural gas from Russia’s Gazprom, beginning in 2018. Why, after 15 years of stalemated negotiations, did this breakthrough occur in 2014? Why did a natural, symbiotic gas relationship not develop earlier and more gradually? Most studies explain this by looking at Russia’s international isolation post Ukraine. Based on interviews with both Chinese and Russian officials this article argues the following: domestic incentives, rather than foreign-policy pressures, are the real force behind the timing of Sino–Russian energy breakthroughs in 2014.     

The “Rape of Europe”: 2016 New Year's Eve sexual assaults in Cologne in hegemonic discourse of Russian media

The article deals with the Russian media coverage of sexual assaults against women during the 2016 New Year's Eve celebrations in Cologne. The authors examine it in the frame of discourse of “Gayropa” that represents the EU via changes in gender order of the West European societies. The pro-Kremlin media coverage of the “Rape of Europe” contributes to positioning Russia in the world, maintaining power legitimacy in the country, and supporting gender order in Russian society. The media discourse treats it as an evidence of decline of the European civilization.     

Russian stereotypes and myths of Ukraine and Ukrainians and why Novorossiya failed

This article discusses two inter-related issues. Firstly, the factors lying behind Russia's fervent belief that its Novorossiya (New Russia) project, aimed to bring back to Russia eight oblasts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Zaporizhhya, Odesa, Mykolayiv, and Kherson in eastern and southern Ukraine and launched during the 2014 “Russian Spring,” would be successful. Russian identity misunderstood, and continues to misunderstand, Ukraine and Ukrainians through stereotypes and myths of Ukraine as an “artificial state” and Ukraine's Russian speakers as “fraternal brothers” and Russians and Ukrainians as “one people” (odin narod). Secondly, why Ukrainian national identity was different than these Russian stereotypes and myths and how this led to the failure of the Novorossiya project. Russian stereotypes and myths of Ukraine and Ukrainians came face to face with the reality of Russian-speaking Ukrainian patriotism and their low support for the Russkij Mir (Russian World). The article compares Russian stereotypes and myths of Ukraine and Ukrainians with how Ukrainians see themselves to explain the roots of the 2014 crisis, “Russian Spring,” and failure of Russian President Vladimir Putin's Novorossiya project.