Book reviews

Historically speaking, the self-identification process of Russia has revolved around the West–East axis. However, there has been a considerable asymmetry in the impact of these two poles. In this article I will argue that “the West” was a dominating concept in the self-narration of Russians and “the East” was mostly a function of the interaction between Russia and the West. The difference in the level of attention and emotions which Russia manifests towards the West and the East has been caused by the religious factor, which was crucial for shaping Russia's identity and her sense of uniqueness. While the West and Western Christianity presented a challenge to the Orthodox fundamentals of Russia's self-image, China was neutral in terms of religious identity. The negligible importance of the religious factor added to rationality in Russian policy towards China. In the article I analyze the Chinese factor in Russia's self-identification process in the context of Moscow's attitude towards the West and the East by using two main elements: identity and fear. Comparing the historical pattern with the present one, I attempt to determine the consequences of these two factors for the Russian Federation.     

Russia says no: Power,status, and emotions in foreign policy

Since 2003, Russian foreign behavior has become much more assertive and volatile toward the West, often rejecting U.S. diplomatic initiatives and overreacting to perceived slights. This essay explains Russia's new assertiveness using social psychological hypotheses on the relationship between power, status, and emotions. Denial of respect to a state is humiliating. When a state loses status, the emotions experienced depend on the perceived cause of this loss. When a state perceives that others are responsible for its loss, it shows anger. The belief that others have unjustly used their power to deny the state its appropriate position arouses vengefulness. If a state believes that its loss of status is due to its own failure to live up to expectations, the elites will express shame. Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has displayed anger at the U.S. unwillingness to grant it the status to which it believes it is entitled, especially during the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, and most recently Russia's takeover of Crimea and the 2014 Ukrainian Crisis. We can also see elements of vengefulness in Russia's reaction to recognition of Kosovo, U.S. missile defense plans, the Magnitsky act, and the Snowden affair.     

Russia's quest for respect in the international conflict management in Kosovo

This article examines the emotion-based status-seeking logic in Russia's foreign policy vis-à-vis the West, presenting the example of Russia's reactions to NATO's military campaign against Serbia in 1999. It is argued that Russian assertiveness in combination with expressive rhetoric must be understood as a result of the ruling elite's need to have Russia's identity and self-defined social status as an equal great power in world politics respected by its Western interaction partners. Russia's reactions to NATO's intervention, which was not authorized by the UN Security Council, must be read as a strategy coping with the emotion anger about the perceived humiliation and provocation of status denial and ignorance by the West. We find various elements of such a coping strategy, among them the verbalization of the feeling of anger among Russian political circles and the media; uttering retaliation threats, but no ‘real’ aggressive, retaliatory action; minor and temporary activities aimed at restoring Russia's image and status as an influential an equal power. On the surface, the Kosovo episode did not result in any visible break or rift in the Russian–Western relationship. However, emotionally it has lead to a significant loss of trust in the respective partner on both sides.     

Status and emotions in Russian foreign policy

The importance of status concerns on Russia's foreign policy agenda has been increasingly observed. This preoccupation with status is particularly visible in Russia's relations with the West. Although strong claims about status in Russian foreign policy are frequently made in public and private by researchers, journalists, politicians, diplomats and other commentators, such claims often lack any closer theoretical or empirical justification. The aim of this introductory article is, therefore, to outline the basic components that form the research agenda on status. Status, if properly examined, helps us understand not only Russian foreign policy, put also present-day international politics and its transformation in a broader sense.In a first part, we identify the theoretical voids concerning the study of international status. In a second part we outline the drivers and logic of status concerns, considering in particular identity theories, psychological approaches and existing research regarding emotions. The presented research agenda on status, derived from International Relations and related theories, provides a well-structured tool-box for investigating the link between status, identity and emotions in Russian foreign policy vis-à-vis the West. In a third part we present the key questions rose by the contributors to this Special Issue and summarize their main findings.     

The final triumph of the Pax Americana? Western intervention in Yugoslavia and Russia's debate on the post-Cold War order

This paper addresses the question of world order by considering how Western military actions in Yugoslavia were perceived from a different cultural perspective. It traces how the NATO-led bombing campaign during March–June of 1999 affected various visions of world order that had existed in Russia before the campaign and describes the discursive change this campaign produced. The argument is made that Russia's foreign policy elites, from Westernizers to Neo-Communists and Expansionists, perceived Western goals in Yugoslavia differently from their counterparts in the West. However, they differed in their recommendations regarding Russia's response and lessons to be drawn from the Kosovo crisis. The paper also identifies several points where the different perspectives can converge. More specifically, all Russian schools of thought viewed the NATO campaign as a dangerous precedent potentially destabilizing the existing world order. They also shared the conviction that Russia should play a larger role in world affairs and that without Russia's involvement there could be no peace and stability in the Balkans and in Europe. They point to the United Nations as the only forum for debating the legitimacy of military interventions and for preventing interventions carried out without the approval of the UN.     

The Religious Dimension of Post-Communist “Ethnic” Conflict

1 This paper is a result of the ongoing research project, “Transnational Politics in the Black Sea Rim: Religions, States, and Minorities” (April 2009–March 2012) financed by the Japan Ministry of Education. The draft of this paper was presented at the international conference, “The Modernization of Russia and Eurasia: Challenges and Opportunities,” held at National Chengchi University (Taipei) 13–14 November 2010. View all notesThe collapse of socialist regimes resulted in tremendous regional realignments in the regions surrounding the heartland of Eurasia. Remarkably, not only states, but also transnational actors have played significant roles in this process. This study highlights transnational ethnicities (Mingrelians, Armenians, and Muslims) in Abkhazia, and tries to describe how the involvement of transnational religious organizations (such as the Armenian Apostolic Church and Turkey's Diyanet) affected the politics around these minorities. In the Black Sea rim, interstate and transnational politics are rather autonomous from each other. For example, when scores of powerful countries, such as the United States and European Union member states, desperately tried to ignore Russia's recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, regarding it as a lawless act, Turkey's Diyanet admitted that Russia's recognition of Abkhazia created a new legal situation and began to fulfill its long-dreamed-of desire to help the Abkhazian Muslims. According to political conjuncture in Abkhazia, the same Gali population changes from Georgians to Mingrelians and back. This demonstrates how ethnic categories are used in a constructivist way in the Black Sea rim.     

Estonia caught between East and West: EU conditionality,Russia's activism and minority integration

This article takes a subjective approach to studying norm compliance in order to determine how EU conditionality and Russia's activism have affected elite attitudes toward minority policies, majority–minority relations, and language use in Estonian society in the post-accession period. The results of a Q method study and semi-structured interviews with integration elites in spring 2008 reveal four distinct viewpoints. The study casts doubt upon the success of EU conditionality in Estonia by demonstrating that European minority rights norms remain contested and have not been internalized by a substantial portion of elites. In addition, the study points to an important role for Russia's activism in the development of a more inclusive society. Russia's activism actually works against minority integration by reinforcing pre-existing domestic norms that are not compatible with European minority rights standards and by aggravating tensions over history and language, which frustrate integration efforts. This article ultimately contributes to studies on the effects of international pressure on minority integration by pointing to the need for greater attention to the ways in which multiple actors at both the international and domestic levels structure the influence of EU conditionality.     

Russia's Response to Crisis: The Paradox of Success

Russia's recovery from the deep economic crisis it experienced in 2008–2009 did not deliver clear political dividends for the Russian leadership. This is because of the context in which the crisis occurred and the way that the leadership, particularly President Medvedev, and many of its critics described the crisis. The oil-fuelled boom that preceded the crisis had the effect of deepening it. Economic recovery based on rising energy prices looks like a failure, rather than a success, and highlights the underlying structural problems of the Russian economy. Arguments about the need for modernisation from within government exacerbated this perception. This seems to have weakened the connection between approval for the leadership and economic growth, a staple of pre-crisis politics.     

Battle for Perceptions: Projecting Russia in the West

The article provides an analysis of Russia's image that the Kremlin has been projecting in Western countries in the years of Vladimir Putin's presidency. The negative character of Russia's image in the West was recognised as one of the major security threats for the country, and an energetic public relations campaign was launched to improve it. The article explores the core elements of this ‘constructed’ image, and examines how they are related to the self-images of Russia held by Russian political elites. Finally, it considers the implications of the ambition to create this ‘desired’ image for Russian foreign policy.     

Obsession with status and ressentiment: Historical backgrounds of the Russian discursive identity construction

This article analyzes the role of ressentiment in the long-term historical process of Russia's collective self-identification vis-à-vis “the West”. It argues that ressentiment was persistently generated by the structure of this relationship as long as Russia's aspiration for an equal status continually proved to be unrealistic. This induced different discursive strategies that are described by social identity theory (SIT) as social mobility, social creativity and social competition. As a motivating factor for the development of these strategies, on the one hand, and a recurrent consequence of their invalidity on the other, ressentiment became a considerable driving force of discourse about Russian identity.     

‘Mimicking’ the West? Russia's legitimization discourse from Georgia war to the annexation of Crimea

The 2008 Georgia war represented a turning point in Russian foreign policy. It was for the first time since the dissolution of the Soviet Union when Moscow invaded an independent country and for the first time when two members of the Council of Europe fought against each other. A premiere for Russian post-Soviet foreign policy was registered in 2014 too. The annexation of Crimea represented the first incorporation of foreign territories by Moscow since World War II. These two events generated the West's protest and blatantly contradict Russia's proclaimed foreign policy discourse centered around the respect for states' sovereignty and equality of actors in the international system. Starting from the assertion that the formulation of Russia's foreign policy is determined by the West's international behavior – Moscow looking whether to emulate or to find alternatives to it; the present paper will compare Russia's legitimization arguments for the 2008 war and the 2014 annexation of Crimea trying to assess how Moscow answers Western criticism and whether there is a continuity in Russian official legitimization narratives.     

Russian Regions in Expanding Europe: The Pskov Connection

BARGAINING OVER POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC POWER between the federal government in Moscow and the 89 subjects of the Russian Federation is now widely considered as critical to the success of Russia's democratic and free market reforms, if not to Russia's enduring viability as a state.1 The key challenge to Moscow, and to Russia as a whole, is how to harmonise different levels of political control so that economic growth could be accelerated and social tensions eased in the regions. This challenge is aggravated by the absence of reliable institutions (understood as enforceable rules of the game) regulating centre-periphery relations and the ideological and organisational disarray at the centre itself. In the regions along Russia's post-Soviet borders in particular, this problem is further complicated by a tension between geopolitical insecurity and powerful incentives for trade and economic development coming from outside Russia's borders. Relations between Moscow and the outlying regions thus become a truly 'intermestic' issue, affecting both Russia's internal post-Soviet institution building and the mode of Russia's integration into the global economy. The politics that shape relations between the Russian regions and Moscow are therefore part and parcel of Russia's evolving relations with the outside world, and the policies of regional elites are part and parcel of an increasingly complex fabric of Russia's foreign relations.     

Russkii Obraz and the politics of “managed nationalism”

This article examines the rise of Russkii Obraz, a Russian ultranationalist organization whose leaders cultivated a neo-fascist ideology and collaborated with skinhead gangs. Despite its extremism, Russkii Obraz played an important role in the Kremlin's “managed nationalism,” a set of measures to manipulate the nationalist sector of the political arena. During 2008–2009, Russkii Obraz collaborated closely with pro-Kremlin youth organizations and enjoyed privileged access to Russia's tightly controlled public sphere. This article argues that the key to Russkii Obraz’s brief ascendancy was its duality, its capacity to project moderation in public and extremism in private. For several years, this duality enabled Russkii Obraz to participate in public life while building a support base in the skinhead subculture. But the two projects collided when the security organs exposed Russkii Obraz’s links to an ultranationalist death-squad. Nevertheless, official indulgence of Russkii Obraz cannot be attributed merely to ignorance of its violent potential. This indulgence also reflected the fact that it was precisely those at the neo-fascist limits of the political spectrum who were most willing to collaborate in the regime's efforts to suppress demands for democratization.     

The Russian Constitutional Court and the Communist Party case: Watershed or whitewash?

Constitutional Courts stand at the interface between law and politics, as the newly formed Russian Constitutional Court exemplified during Russia's time of troubles between 1991 and 1993. One Constitutional Court case from that period had particular significance. The Russian court considered the constitutionality of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Russian Communist Party (CP RSFSR). The seven month long hearing tested the court's stamina and resolve. Described before it began as ‘Russia's Nuremberg’, was the Communist Party case a turning point in Russia's relationship with her past, or was it a staged showpiece with no real impact? This paper explores the Russian Constitutional Court's longest case and its effects.     

Islamic Terrorism and the Question of National Liberation,or Problems of Contemporary Chechen Terrorism

Scholars have analyzed various causes of contemporary Chechen terrorism in Russia and have offered multiple explanations as to why this terrorism persists. Most commonly, these scholars accuse Russia of suppressing a Muslim struggle for national liberation in Chechnya because of Russia's own interests in Chechen territory or its lucrative oil resources. This work analyzes various instances of Chechen terrorism, 1991–2002, to conclude that the dynamics of terrorism do not support the claims of various scholars, journalists, and Chechen terrorists that Chechen rebels are fighting a war of independence and that the Russian government's failure “to let Chechnya go” instigates future acts of terrorism.     

Rational or reckless? Georgia's zugzwang in the Caucasus

Although the 2008 Russian-Georgian war was a military defeat for Georgia, it has only reinforced Georgia's westward trajectory. One noteworthy difference from Georgia's pre-war policy is a new regional strategy – the North Caucasus Initiative – that seeks to create a soft power alternative to Russia's military dominance in the region. We suggest that this approach is rational rather than reckless, as some critics have claimed. It represents a carefully calculated strategy that is already benefiting Georgia and from which all concerned parties, including Russia, stand to gain. If the South and North Caucasus were more open and less divided – a direction in which this new initiative appears to point – the Caucasus could become more prosperous and more stable. That would serve Russia's long-term interest by significantly reducing the cost of subsidies to sustain and stabilize the volatile region.     

The Russia-NATO mistrust: Ethnophobia and the double expansion to contain “the Russian Bear”

This paper argues that Russian-Western mistrust persists due to historical and cultural developments with roots in the Cold War. The post-Cold War imbalance of power served to exacerbate the problem. The United States emerged as the world's superpower acting on perceived fears of Russia, whereas Russia's undermined capabilities dictated a defensive, rather than a hegemonic response. The paper analyzes the decision to expand NATO by excluding Russia from the process. It also asks why the process suddenly stopped in 2008. What changed the West's mind about the expansion was not a revised perception of Russia, but rather concern with its growing power and assertiveness as revealed by the Kremlin's use of force during the Caucasus' war.     

Russia's perceptions and misperceptions of the EU Eastern Partnership

This article is devoted to the problem of the reaction to the Eastern Partnership by Russia's both the political establishment and the expert community. The question of reactions to the Eastern Partnership in the target countries has been extensively posed in academic literature. However, the question of Russia's reaction to the Eastern Partnership, one of the most important actors of the region, has been rarely raised by the academic community. A wide array of factors impacted Russian elites' perception of the Eastern Partnership – from problematic issues in the EU-Russia relations to the post-Soviet states' political and economic transformation. Studying the dynamics and peculiarities of Russia's perspective on the Eastern Partnership makes it possible to draw meaningful conclusions on the nature of Russia's phobias that fuel its domestic and foreign policy.     

EU–Russian Relations and Turkey's Role as an Energy Corridor

This article analyses the impact of EU–Russian relations on Turkey's role as a corridor for the transit of energy supplies to Europe. While the European Union (EU) has inherent leverage in its collective purchase of most Russian gas exports, market power has shifted in Russia's favour. Russian efforts to build new pipelines and widen downstream access have stimulated EU interest in diversifying energy imports and transit routes. In this sense, the EU has recognised Turkey's potential value as a secure and independent route for importing non-Russian energy supplies, which may in turn have an impact on Turkey's EU accession process.     

Towards an Anti-Japanese Territorial Front? Russia and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Dispute

This article examines Russia's position on the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute. It focuses particularly on the claim that Russia and China are forming an anti-Japanese territorial front. Looking closely at official statements and actions, as well as Russian-language media and scholarship, it finds that Russia, while retaining a position of formal neutrality, clearly considers China's claims more favourably. While this could be seen to have alarming implications by arraying China and Russia on one side against Japan and the USA on the other, the article also finds that Russia's support is not without qualifications and that its place in the conflict is not yet entrenched.