Role call: sex,gender roles,and intimate partner violence

ABSTRACT

Intimate partner violence (IPV) continues to be viewed in gendered and heteronormative ways. Stanziani, Cox, and Coffey (2018, Adding insult to injury: Sex, sexual orientation, and juror decision-making in a case of intimate partner violence. Journal of Homosexuality, 65(10), 1325–1350) presented participants with a case of alleged IPV while manipulating the sex and sexual orientation of the aggressor/victim dyad. Results suggested participants view violence perpetrated by a man against a woman most abhorrently. The current study replicated and expanded that study, exploring how gender role beliefs influence participant decision-making. Female participants held more adverse attitudes towards IPV when a male assaulted a female. Further, participant gender role beliefs influenced decision-making. Specifically, males who endorsed higher levels of hegemonic masculinity perceived the crime to be less serious, while females who endorsed the same beliefs perceived the defendant as less likely to benefit from treatment. Overall, results suggest individual beliefs regarding gender roles and masculinity may influence their perceptions of IPV, regardless of the gender and sexual orientation of the aggressor and victim.     

Hijacking Law

This essay considers the legal strategies of comparative communities in South Asian, Middle Eastern, and US history. What does it mean for a particular group to “hijack” a body of law, taking everyone on board to an unwanted destination? The piece compares the legal strategies of the Parsi community in colonial and postcolonial India to those of the German Jewish yekke population in mandate Palestine and early independent Israel, the women's movement in India in recent decades, and Protestants in contemporary America before the 2015 Obergefell decision legalizing same‐sex marriage. There are multiple ways of trying to take control of a body of law, and for multiple reasons. A group may capture a body of personal law to perpetuate its own values within the group. It may try to control a territorial legal system to impose its values on the entire population. It may work across bodies of personal law to obtain as uniform a result as possible—as if the system were a unified field, not a segmented one. Or its group members may make available their legal expertise to shore up a newly independent state's legal system. The essay suggests that taking control of a body of law does not necessarily mean hijacking it.     

Laws of Inclusion and Exclusion: Nomos,Nationalism and the Other

This article explores how and why contemporary nationalist ‘defence leagues’ in Australia and the UK invoke fantasies of law. I argue these fantasies articulate with Carl Schmitt’s theory of ‘nomos’, which holds that law functions as a spatial order of reason that both produces and is produced by land qua the territory of the nation. To elucidate the ideological function of law for defence leagues, I outline a theory of law as it relates to (political) subjectivity. Drawing on the work of Foucault, Agamben and Brown, I demonstrate how subjects form and are formed by historically contingent relationships to law in the contemporary neo-liberal moment. Turning to Lacan, I show how nationalistic invocations of law provide nationalists with a fantasy that the nation’s law represents them and holds them together (as the nation itself). Similarly, I argue that nationalists imagine that the other has their own law as well, which not only corresponds to the other, but functions as a legible index of the other’s otherness—a metonym for the threatening uncertainty and radical difference that the other represents. Drawing on Lacan’s concept of the big Other, I ultimately argue that nationalists aggressively (re)assert law not only to defend the nation, but to ensure their own symbolic and ontological security therein.

     

Who has the right to govern online activity? A criminal and civil point of view

This paper compares how the Australian defamation case of Dow Jones & Co. Inc. v. Gutnick [2002] HCA 56 and the English obscenity case of R. v. Perrin [2002] EWCA 747 dealt with the legal concept of publication in the transnational online context or, more specifically, with the issue as to how to treat a foreign online publication. Despite the different nature of the causes of action, with the former being a civil case and the latter being a criminal case, the article shows that, not only were the underlying jurisdictional issues the same, but that there were also significant similarities in the approaches taken to them. Both courts firmly rejected arguments in favour of an exclusive country‐of‐origin approach and stuck with the traditional country‐of‐destination orthodoxy. Nevertheless, it is argued that, given the different nature of and rationales behind civil and criminal law, as well as the less cooperative transnational criminal law regime, the same jurisdictional approach taken to both civil and criminal transnational activity may in fact yield substantially very different outcomes. Thus, the approach appropriate in the criminal law context may lead to undesirable over‐regulation in the civil law context.     

Bermuda Triangle: the supply of services (implied terms) act 2003 and the competing theories of exemption clauses

Patton and Cook v Bank of Bermuda is a judgment that undermines the legal certainty which should have been brought about by the implementation of the Supply of Services (Implied Terms) Act 2003, and raises questions of broad importance for all contracts governed by Bermuda law – particularly as the decision has not been overturned in the years since, and remains the only authority to engage directly with the effect of section 6 of the 2003 Act; arguably its most important provision. The key issue that will be explored in this paper is whether the distinction drawn in Patton between contracting out of a duty of reasonable skill and care, and contracting out of liability for breach of that duty is, as a matter of contract law theory and jurisprudence, valid and meaningful, or whether it is a distinction without a difference.     

Contract Negotiations and the Common Law: A Move to Good Faith in Commercial Contracting?

Classically a duty to negotiate commercial contracts in good faith has been seen as part of the civil, not the common, law world. Common law commercial lawyers have long resisted the lure of “good faith” as a contractual concept, despite engagement with civil law principles in harmonisation projects, by virtue of membership of the European Union and their use in international conventions such as the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG). This paper will examine whether this situation is changing, focusing on two common law jurisdictions—England and Wales and Canada. In England and Wales and the common law of Canada, case-law in the last 10 years has indicated a movement towards acceptance of express and implied duties of good faith in relation to contractual performance, see e.g. Yam Seng Pte Limited v International Trade Corporation Limited [2013] EWHC 111 (QB) and, most recently, Essex CC v UBB Waste (Essex) Ltd (No. 2) [2020] EWHC 1581 (TCC) in England and Wales; Bhasin v Hrynew 2014 SCC 71 and Callow v Zollinger 2020 SCC 45 in Canada. This paper will examine the extent to which these cases may open the way more generally for a duty to negotiate commercial contracts in good faith. It will examine the reception of these cases and whether they indicate (i) greater acceptance of “good faith” as part of contract law thinking and (ii) a possible extension of good faith into the pre-contractual period.

     

Law,Genre and the Voice of the Friend

The article attempts to think friendship in its relation to law and justice and provides some arguments for the importance of this concept in Derrida’s ethical, legal and political philosophy. It draws on early texts such as Of grammatology and reads them in conjunction with later texts such as The animal that therefore I am. The relation of friendship to law and justice is explored by means of Derrida’s notion of “degenerescence” understood as the necessity or law of indeterminateness that cuts across, both limiting and de-limiting, all laws, types and generic partitions, for instance, juridical (natural and positive right), humanistic (human and animal), anthropological (sexual difference), philosophical (physis and nomos). Drawing on Derrida’s readings of “sexual difference” in Heidegger and the latter’s evocation of “the voice of the friend” in Being and time, the article addresses the theme of Geschlecht and articulates the exigency to think sexual difference beyond duality together with the exigency to rethink law and right otherwise than on the ground of nativity and “natural fact” and in terms of what Derrida calls “a friendship prior to friendships” at the origin of all law and socius.     

All Bark and No Bite: Notes on the Federal Constitutional Court's 'Banana Decision'

The Federal Constitutional Court's banana decision of 7 June 2000 continues the complex theme of national fundamental‐rights control over Community law. Whereas in the ‘Solange II’ decision (BVerfGE 73, 339) the Federal Constitutional Court had lowered its standard of review to the general guarantee of the constitutionally mandatorily required minimum, the Maastricht judgment (BVerfGE 89, 155) had raised doubts as to the continued validity of this case law. In the banana decision, which was based on the submission of the EC banana market regulation by the Frankfurt‐am‐Main administrative court for constitutional review, the Federal Constitutional Court has now confirmed the ‘Solange II’decision and restrictively specified the admissibility conditions for constitutional review of Community law as follows. Constitutional complaints and judicial applications for review of European legislation alleging fundamental‐rights infringements are inadmissible unless they show that the development of European law including Court of Justice case law has since the ‘Solange II’ decision generally fallen below the mandatorily required fundamental‐rights standard of the Basic Law in a given field. This would require a comprehensive comparison of European and national fundamental‐rights protection. This paper criticises this formula as being logically problematic and scarcely compatible with the Basic Law. Starting from the position that national constitutional courts active even in European matters should be among the essential vertical ‘checks and balances’ in the European multi‐level system, a practical alternative to the Federal Constitutional Court's retreat is developed. This involves at the first stage a submission by the Federal Constitutional Court to the Court of Justice, something that in the banana case might have taken up questions on the method of fundamental‐rights review and the internal Community effect of WTO dispute settlement decisions. Should national constitutional identity not be upheld even by this, then at a second stage, as ultima ratio taking recourse to general international law, the call is made for the decision of constitutional conflicts by an independent mediating body.     

Authority and Authorisation

The core of Kelsen's strong views onauthority emerging from his concept of law is this:Authority of law, authority in law andauthority about law are one and the same thing.The conceptual problems suggested by these threedifferent prepositions must and can be solved in onefell swoop. Kelsen's core view will first be probed bygiving an account of what is a promising approachoffered in a fairly early text, Das Problem derSouveränität, namely, what it means to`set' or `posit' the law. Inevitably, this leadsto an interpretation of the Grundnorm, one thatintends to accommodate as many Kelsenian emphases aspossible. The Grundnorm will be presented as ashield against hypostatising authority. From there,some characteristics will be inferred of the type ofauthority that arises from Kelsen's account of legalknowledge, which will be called, somewhat polemically,authority without an author.     

Investors’ Rights in (Crypto) Custodial Holdings: Ruscoe v Cryptopia Ltd (in Liquidation)

Ruscoe v Cryptopia Ltd (in Liquidation) is a landmark decision of the New Zealand High Court that considers for the first time in a comprehensive way whether cryptocurrencies are property at common law and to what extent account holders’ (interests in) cryptocurrencies are protected from the claims of the insolvent crypto‐exchange's creditors. The ruling relies on a body of case law from various common law jurisdictions and, to a significant extent, on the findings of the UK Jurisdiction Taskforce Legal Statement on Cryptoassets and Smart Contracts. In tackling complex areas of legal uncertainty, it provides an authoritative conceptual benchmark for future court decisions and normative initiatives.     

论中国和平发展与国际法的交互影响和作用

A peaceful and harmonious world is an important social basis for China’s peaceful development, and international law lays a legal foundation and guarantee for building such a world. In the “village of globe” with co-existence and economic globalization, international law provides China a peaceful development with legal certainty in external environment of peace and security, fair and equal international competitive order, and international cooperation; and on the other hand, it puts on an increasing legal restraint on the internal and external strategies of China’s peaceful development. At the same time, the peaceful development of China deems to make a great contribution to the world, which are the main subject of international law in peace and development, as well as to human rights, rule of law and democracy, which are the universal values pursued by international law. Zeng Lingliang, Ph.D of law, is presently a dean and professor in the Faculty of Law in University of Macau. He is an awardee of the Cheung Kong Scholars Award Program and Jean Monnet Chair of European Union Law in Wuhan University, and one of the first three individuals nominated by the China government on the list of panelists in the WTO. He has published many articles on WTO issues, EU law and international law, and his influenced monographs are European Communities and Modern International Law (1992) and its revised edition—European Union and Modern International Law (1994), Law of World Trade Organization (1996), International Law and China in the Early 21 ^st Century (2005) and the Essentials of EU Law—in the New Perspective of the Treaty on the Constitution for Europe (2007).     

Locating Humour in Indian Buddhist Monastic Law Codes: A Comparative Approach

It has been claimed that Indian Buddhism, as opposed to East Asian Chan/Zen traditions, was somehow against humour. In this paper I contend that humour is discernible in canonical Indian Buddhist texts, particularly in Indian Buddhist monastic law codes (Vinaya). I will attempt to establish that what we find in these texts sometimes is not only humourous but that it is intentionally so. I approach this topic by comparing different versions of the same narratives preserved in Indian Buddhist monastic law codes. This is a revised version of a paper presented at the XVth Congress of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, Atlanta, Georgia, USA, June 23-29, 2008. I wish to acknowledge financial assistance from the Arts Research Board, McMaster University.     

What a difference difference makes: gendered harms and judicial diversity

Taking the UK Ministry of Justice's ongoing quest to ensure a more diverse judiciary as its starting point and backdrop, this paper establishes the House of Lords' decision in Secretary of State for the Home Department v. K (FC); Fornah (FC) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] as a lens through which to explore the ‘difference’ of the woman judge and, in particular, the developing jurisprudence of Baroness Hale—the first (and only) female law lord in the UK. It argues that Baroness Hale's candid recognition and articulation of the gendered nature of the experiences and violence in Fornah's story reveals not only the difference difference (in whatever form) might make to understandings of the judge, judging and justice but also the importance of recognising the transformative potential of judicial diversity to create a space in which difference is celebrated and valued on its own terms, a place where difference can truly make a difference.     

Politics of Law and the Lacanian Real

The paper explores the role of Jacques Lacan’s Ethics of Psychoanalysis in debates in law and legal philosophy. It proceeds by considering a debate between Slavoj Žižek and Judith Butler over Lacan’s concept of the real, which forms part of a larger discussion over the future of democracy and the rule of law (Butler et al. 2000). Through reference to discussions of the relationship between law and ethics based on the Antigone tragedy, I argue that the difference between Žižek and Butler’s positions should not be understood in terms of the correctness of their reading of Lacan, but in terms of the political commitments that inform their respective interpretations. I explain the implications of this debate over one of Lacan’s most enigmatic concepts, thereby showing how Lacan’s theory can be used to rethink the politics of law in light of the increased emphasis on ethics in contemporary legal debates.     

Between Justice and Law in Aotearoa New Zealand: Two Case Studies

Through two case studies, this essay examines the relationship between the operation and practice of law in Aotearoa New Zealand and the naming of the ‘unlawful’, ‘uncivil’ or ‘disorderly’ within a colonial context. Against the background of the apparent complicity between law and colonial interest and desire in Aotearoa, I argue that, in both the ‘Haka Party’ case (1979) and Mair v Wanganui City Council (1996), the acts of the defendants draw attention to the relationship between the authority of the law and the repression or exclusion of difference. According to the judges in both cases, the dictates of Maori law and custom were in conflict with the principles of ‘law and order’. Read in terms of colonial relations, the perceived relationship between Maori law and custom and the threat to ‘civilization’, law and order reveals the way in which ‘the law’ has operated in a culturally biased manner and has reflected the interests of Pakeha (New Zealanders of European descent). Thus, the perceived threat of the challenge made to the law in either case can be seen as the threat to reveal it for what it is, to expose the violence that maintains it, and thus to open a space for critique. Perhaps more powerfully than any physical attack on the system itself, these acts which expose the law challenge it in the name of justice, making it possible for the law to be seen both as a reflection of a particular cultural interest and hence as co-opt-able, takeable and able to be made to serve another end, that of the other in the name of justice. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

The War of the Booksellers: Natural Law,Equity, and Literary Property in Eighteenth-Century Scotland

This article analyses the case of Hinton v Donaldson (1773) in which the judges of the Scottish Court of Session refused to follow their English brethren in recognizing an author's right of property outside the Statute of Anne (1710). The decision must be understood against the background of distinct notions of common law and equity in Scots law, drawn from the Natural law tradition of the European jus commune. At the same time the decision reveals developing strands of Enlightenment thought and concepts of the judicial role in relation to legislation.     

Meaning, Time and the Law: Ex Post and Ex Ante Perspectives

This paper considers the tension between timelessness and timeboundedness in legal interpretation, examining parallels between sacred texts and secular law. It is argued that familiar dualities such as those between statute and judge-made law, law and equity, written and spoken discourse, dictionary meaning versus intended or contextual meaning, can be examined using this timeless/timebounded framework. Two landmark English cases, DPP v Shaw (1961) and R v R (1991) are analyzed as illustrating contrasting aspects of the socio-legal politics of “reasoning backwards”. The related temporal distinction between ex ante and ex post points of view is examined both within legal theory and as a key issue for linguistic and semiotic systems. The argument is made that this distinction is the key to a wide range of methodological and theoretical problems in relating linguistics and semiotics to law.

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论具有人格利益的财产

The traditional theory of property and tort law generally denies personality interests in property. In recent years, legislative and judicial practices at home and abroad have turned to care for personality interests in property and to protect it. The property with personality interests can be classified into four categories, namely, (a) property with personality symbolism, (b) property with specific human emotion, (c) property originated from specific human body, and (d) intellectual property from specific human wisdom, the first two of which internalize external matters and the last two externalize the inherent self. Comparing with fungible property, the property with personality interests on the basic of facts and law shall be more protected in legislative and judicial practices. Zhou Qiong, Ph.D. of law, studies at Huazhong University of Science and Technology. She also serves as editor of the Private Law Review. Ms Zhou’s research interests focus on civil law in general and tort law in particular. She has released several articles on civil law and science & technology law, and she is also one of the co-authors of Science and Technology Law (Hep, 2006). Moreover, she got the title of Top Ten Academic Achievements from Huazhong University of Science and Technology (2007).     

Habermas,Feminism, and Law: Beyond Equality and Difference?*

In this paper, I argue that Habermas' proceduralist model of law can be put to feminist ends in at least two significant ways. First, in presenting an alternative to the liberal and welfare models of laws, the proceduralist model offers feminism a way out of the equality/difference dilemma. Both these attempts to secure women's equality by emphasising women's sameness to men or their difference from men have placed the onus on women to either find a way of integrating themselves into existing institutions or to confront the so‐called question of women's difference. The proceduralist model renders this dilemma irrelevant. Instead, it proceeds from the fact of sexual difference; a fact that produces competing and conflicting needs and interests that require interpretation by both men and women. This, I argue, marks a change in the very way we conceptualise the so‐called problem of women's difference, insofar as the question is no longer framed in these terms. Second, I argue that this deliberative process over the interpretation of conflicting interests affects a fundamental shift in the nature of legal institutions themselves, insofar as law is no longer a vehicle for promoting male interests.