The threat of autocracy diffusion in consolidated democracies? The case of China,Singapore and Australia

The majority of today’s authoritarian regimes have little hope of promoting autocracy beyond their own borders, let alone to consolidated democratic countries. However, China and Singapore are two prominent examples of non-democratic countries whose soft power arsenals have given them some global appeal beyond that enjoyed by most authoritarian regimes. But to what extent has China’s and Singapore’s power of example influenced consolidated democracies in terms that the latter wanting to replicate some political practices or even norms in these non-democratic regimes? In this article, we engage recent works to examine this question in relation to how Australians perceive the political example offered by China and Singapore. Focusing our analysis on several prominent polls conducted recently by the Lowy Institute for International Policy, we suggest that at present there is little evidence of a causal impact of the rise of authoritarian powerhouses such as China and Singapore on how Australians view democracy at home. Through these case studies, this article sheds some light on the theoretical as well as practical questions about the inherent impediments of authoritarian diffusion in consolidated democracies.     

Democratic states and authoritarian firewalls: America as a black knight in the uprising in Bahrain

Although history is replete with democracies supporting autocracies, democratic black knights have not been approached in a systematic manner. This article examines American rhetoric and policy towards the 2011 uprising and subsequent crackdown in Bahrain in order to further our understanding of how and why democratic states act to reinforce authoritarian firewalls. It finds that the USA was instrumental in providing diplomatic and political cover to the Bahraini government and ensuring that the regime paid no substantive costs for its counter-democracy actions. This case suggests that democratic states may be more effective at providing normative support for non-democratic regimes than their authoritarian counterparts and that democracies may have more in common with autocracies when choosing to act as a black knight than initially thought. Avenues for future research are identified.     

Democracy’s effect on economic growth: A pooled time-series analysis, 1951–1980

The relationship between democracy and economic growth has concerned social scientists since the 17th century, but recent democracy movements make this question especially important today. Do poor countries face a cruel trade-off between democracy and growth? Do democracy and growth go together as a “win-win” proposition? Or is democracy irrelevant to growth? Using pooled annual time-series data from 1951–1980 for 106 countries, including 88 non-core countries, we explore long-term and short-term direct and indirect effects of democracy on growth. Little or no direct effect emerges, but positive indirect effects appear via two mechanisms: a marginally significant effect via investment and a robust effect via government expenditure. Democracy also has a robust non-linear effect on economic growth via social unrest, inhibiting growth under non-democratic regimes and furthering it in highly democratic ones. Combining these findings, we conclude that democracy does not significantly hamper economic growth, and under many circumstances slightly boosts it.     

Remittances,Regime Type,and Government Spending Priorities

Previous work suggests that remittances enable governments to reduce spending on public services and divert resources to serve their own interests. We argue this need not occur. Building on recent work which shows that the impact of remittances is contingent on the domestic environment in remittance-receiving countries, we hypothesize that (1) remittances are more likely to increase government spending on public services in democracies than in autocracies and (2) remittances are more likely to finance activities that deter political competition in autocracies than in democracies. Using a sample of 105 developing countries from 1985 through 2008, we find strong support for our hypotheses when examining the impact of remittances on public education, health, and military spending. We also provide suggestive evidence for the mechanism underpinning our results: micro-level evidence on remittance recipients’ preferences and political engagement.     

Understanding the foreign policy of autocratic actors: ideology or pragmatism? Russia and the Tymoshenko trial as a case study

While the literature on the autocratic regimes has been rapidly growing in the last years, there still exists a research gap in this field: which impact do autocratic regimes have on the regime transition in the neighbouring countries? The literature on autocracies has demonstrated that autocratic political leaders tend to support each other. This article argues that the external influence of an autocracy may be more complex. The article analyses the case of Russia's international standing in relation to the trial of Yulia Tymoshenko. Using detailed process tracing, it has been shown that in terms of the Russian position, pragmatic goals may undermine ideological goals. Thus, while the main objective of Russia is to ensure the stability of gas contracts, the unintended consequences of its actions undermine the consolidation of autocratic regime in Ukraine. The article builds on the literature on regime transition, autocracy, and international relations.     

Catching the ‘Shanghai Spirit’: How the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Promotes Authoritarian Norms in Central Asia

This article examines how the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) seeks to undermine democratisation in Central Asia. Prior studies of the interplay between international organisations and democracy have tended to examine only one half of this relationship: whether, how, and under what circumstances do international organisations promote democracy? However, the opposite has been largely ignored: how do international organisations sustain autocracy? Authoritarian governments are increasingly adopting policies aimed at preserving their political power and the SCO represents an additional strategy in this regard: utilising multilateral cooperation to defend themselves against regional or global democratic trends. As such, the ‘Shanghai Spirit’ may be a sign of things to come as autocratic leaders become more bold in their rejection of democratic norms.     

The post-cold war predicament: A conclusion

The 1997 Asian economic crisis discredited the international discussion about ‘Asian values’ in Pacific Asia, replacing it with a globalised ‘good governance’ discourse. The financial breakdown undermined claims by Asian autocrats that government should be based on authoritarian ‘Asian values’, not ‘Western democracy’. Yet, seven years later, authoritarian regimes in the region are flourishing while the new democracies flounder. Why have dictatorships, not democracies, prospered politically since the Asian financial crisis? Pacific Asia began as an ‘imagined community’ of developmental dictatorships, making authoritarian development the ‘original position’ against which democratic governance is judged. While the demise of ‘Asian values’ contributed to the fall of the Suharto regime in Indonesia, it did less harm to authoritarian regimes in more economically developed Malaysia and Singapore. The US‐led anti‐terror coalition provided several authoritarian rulers in Pacific Asia with welcome support from the West, while allowing them to weaken internal opposition. The new democracies, by contrast, faced international pressures to combat terrorism, often arousing local protest. Finally, middle class‐based reformist movements have risked destabilising the region's new democracies in the name of good governance.     

Autocratic opening to democracy: why legitimacy matters

As recent experiments in democratisation around the world show signs of achieving success, or failure, or more usually something in between, the attention of democracy promotion actors in the international community is turning to the world's remaining outstanding autocracies. This article identifies the autocracies, discusses the notion of autocratic opening, and explores how opening can come about, with particular reference to international intervention. The article argues that, for identifying the prospects for autocratic opening and determining the forms of constructive engagement available to international actors, it is useful to distinguish between the different grounds on which various autocracies claim legitimacy, and the specific vulnerabilities to which their principal legitimating base gives rise.     

Moderate Islam and secularist opposition in Turkey: implications for the world,Muslims and secular democracy

Developing an argument based in theories of democratic consolidation and religious competition, and discussing the reasons for the secularist opposition to the government, this article analyses how government by a party rooted in moderate Islamism may affect Turkey's peculiar secular democracy, development and external relations and how Muslims in the world relate to modernization and democracy. Arguing that secularism in advanced democracies may be a product of democracy as much as it is the other way around, the article maintains that democratic consolidation may secure further consolidation of Turkish secularism and sustainable moderation of Turkish political Islam. Besides democratic Islamic – conservative actors and other factors, democratic consolidation requires strong democratic – secularist political parties so that secularist and moderate Islamist civilian actors check and balance each other. Otherwise, middle class value divisions and mistrust in areas like education and social regulation may jeopardise democratisation and economic modernisation and continuing reconciliation of Islamism with secular democracy and modernity.     

Disabling dissent: the colour revolutions,autocratic linkages,and civil society regulations in hybrid regimes

State elites in hybrid regimes have increasingly sought to manipulate the legal regulation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as part of the growing backlash against democracy assistance in nondemocratic countries around the world. Sophisticated laws detailing burdensome NGO registration procedures and complex regulations enabling invasive government oversight of NGOs represent upgraded forms of civic curtailment and democracy resistance. This paper analyses these significant developments in a systematic, cross-national fashion over time by constructing a new dataset of NGO legal barriers in hybrid regimes from 1995 to 2013. It demonstrates that the expansion of repressive NGO regulations are shaped by international factors, particularly autocratic linkages, in the form of trade or defence pacts with Russia and China, as well as authoritarian learning from the colour revolutions. It thus contributes to debates on autocracy promotion and authoritarian resurgence by moving beyond the regime level to focus on the sub-regime dimension of freedom of association.     

Democracy,property rights and economic growth

What does the global surge in democracy and capitalism portend for economic growth? The shift toward popular government is predicted by some to accelerate growth, by others to retard it. Often left out of the equation is property rights as a factor distinct from democratic rule. Using recent data on 59 less developed and transitional countries, this article explores the relationship among institutional factors and growth in the 1980s and early 1990s. Democratic freedoms and property rights are associated with the dependent variable, suggesting that national income in poor countries stands to gain from recent efforts to implant these institutions.     

Political Corruption and Institutional Stability

This article is the first to statistically examine the reciprocal relationship between formal political institutions and political corruption. We argue that political corruption is an informal institution that allows nondemocratic leaders to build political support, act as a substitute for liberalizing concessions in the formal institutions of the state, and thereby extends the longevity of non-democratic regimes. Yet, whereas high corruption level will prevail in nondemocratic regimes, we expect the electoral constituency in democratic regimes to have the formal power to curb political corruption. We demonstrate that these expectations hold by estimating a dynamic multinomial regression model on data for 133 countries for the 1985–2008 period. Our model shows that high-corruption autocracies and hybrid regimes are more stable than their low-corruption counterparts, but that low-corruption democracies are more stable than high-corruption ones. For autocratic and hybrid regimes, the stability is due both to corruption making the formal institutions more resistant to democratization and that the formal institutions prevent reductions in corruption. Consistent democracies, on the other hand, are able to reduce corruption and become more stable as a result.     

Development strategy and regime type: Why doesn’t democracy matter?

The development strategy literature argues that autonomous bureaucrats in authoritarian Asian NICs followed successful export-led growth strategies while Latin American policymakers were pressured by mobilized sectors to maintain doomed import substitution industrialization. What is more, this ISI strategy made the consolidation of democracy impossible. However, my research on Venezuela indicates that ISI and democracy can be made compatible—the democratic state was penetrated by business and labor, those avenues for penetration were protected from electoral politics, and the relative participation of business and labor remained fluid. How are recently established democracies being made compatible with a new market-oriented development strategy? Evidence from East Asia and Latin America indicates that the transition to market-oriented economies and the institutionalization of participation by key sectors have not gone together. Policymakers are trying to isolate bureaucrats from public pressure and centralize power away from bodies vulnerable to electoral oversight. The “deinstitutionalization” of democratic politics may make the relationship between regime type and development strategy unstable.     

Women's parliamentary representation: are women more highly represented in (consolidated) democracies than in non-democracies?

Although there have been many studies that address the representation of women in parliament, there are few analyses that compare the current state of gender representation between democracies and non-democracies. Focusing on Africa, Central and South America, as well as Asia and the Pacific region, this paper evaluates whether democracies have more female deputies or whether female representation increases with the maturity of democracy. While controlling for the type of electoral system, quotas, women's participation in the workforce, a state's GDP, as well as its degree of corruption and Communist regime type, this cross-national analysis reveals that the variable democracy does not affect the representation of the genders in parliament. Women's parliamentary representation also does not increase with the maturity of democracy.     

Democracy or autocracy on the march? The colored revolutions as normal dynamics of patronal presidentialism

What impact have Eurasia's 2003–2005 “colored revolutions” had on the state of democracy and autocracy in the region? The logic of patronal presidentialism, a set of institutions common to post-Soviet countries, suggests that the revolutions are at root succession struggles more than democratic breakthroughs generated by civic activists and foreign democratizing activity. This helps explain why Georgia is experiencing a new retreat from ideal-type democracy while only Ukraine, whose revolution weakened the patronal presidency, has sustained high political contestation after its revolution. This means that autocratic leaders clamping down on non-governmental organizations, free media, and their foreign supporters may have learned the wrong lessons, perhaps making their countries more susceptible to violent revolution than they were before.     

Elites and institutions in conservative transitions to democracy: Ex-authoritarians in the Brazilian National Congress

Although many students of democratization accept that new democracies are impacted by various legacies of the previous authoritarian regime, little attention has been paid to the relationship between characteristics of the political class and the imperative of institution building in the new democracies. Conservative transitions to democracy, where continuity in the political class remains high despite the change in regime, are notably dependent on the participation of ex-authoritarians in the process of institution-building. Many such elites were socialized to marginal or fictional representative institutions under authoritarianism, leading them toward political practices which may subsequently be inimical to the development of effective instituions under democracy. A study of ex-authoritarians in the Brazilian Congress reveals their weaker commitment to legislative institutionalization, thus illustrating some of the tradeoffs and drawbacks of conservative transitions to democracy. Timothy J. Power is assistant professor of political science at Louisiana State University. He is currently writing a book on the role of the political right in Brazilian democratization.     

Multiple democracies: political cultures and democratic variety in post-enlargement Europe

Democratization studies endorses a liberal view of democracy and political culture. Insufficient notice is taken of alternative models of democracy. I argue that a ‘multiple democracies’ approach that takes potential variety in democratic political cultures into account has three advantages over the conventional approach: it is sensitive to the historical and contextual nature of democratic regimes, it takes a dual imaginary into account, and it is able to conceptualize the emergence of innovative forms of political culture. Instead of a ‘model approach’, I suggest a multiple democracies approach that identifies political cultures by means of available patterns of cultural repertoires or ethics of democracy.     

从“太阳花学运”看台湾民主

台湾自视为民主化的“灯塔”,但“太阳花学运”暴露出台湾民主存在诸多问题,引发广泛争议。争议中的共识是台湾民主出了问题,但也存在分歧,即究竟该对近三十年来的台湾民主化持什么态度,肯定、否定,抑或其他？分歧的产生与民主质量理论运用到台湾民主研究有关,民主质量的概念特性导致不同学者对其内涵的理解有所不同。有将其理解为狭义的“民主”的质量,包括竞争性选举、政党轮替等;也有将其理解为中义的“民主政治”的质量,包括法治、宪政、分权、人权等其他政治范畴;还有将其理解为广义的“民主政体”的质量,包括政治绩效、经济绩效、社会绩效等政治、经济和社会范畴。通过民主质量理论可知,台湾基本实现了巩固的民主,但尚未实现优质的民主。     

Is China More Democratic Than The US?

Historically, liberal democracy was born as a means to curb the power of kings and tyrants through mechanisms that would ensure accountability and consent of the governed. A system of checks and balances—two legislative chambers, executive and independent courts—were instituted to ensure power did not become too concentrated. Today's highly diverse, mass consumer societies, however, have presented another set of challenges. Power is so diffused governance is becoming ineffective. The short‐term mentality of voters and the lobbying of special interests undermine the ability of democracies to focus on the long‐term and the common interest. Because there are more checks than balances, gridlock has supplanted consensus. In this section, we compare Chinese and Western systems on their ability to deliver good governance. The editors of the Economist magazine put the debate in historical context.     

Unlikely candidates for democracy: The role of structural context in democratic consolidation

Many contributors to the new literature on democratic consolidation overemphasize the role of political leadership, strategic choices about basic institutional arrangements or economic policy, and other contingent process variables. Their focus on political crafting has encounraged an undue optimism about the possibility of consolidating democracies in unfavorable structural contexts. This article critiques the current literature and asserts the primary importance of structural context in democratic consolidation. The powerful influence of structural context is illustrated by using just two structural variables, economic development level and prior authoritarian regime type, to indicate a group of thirty-eight countries in which democracy has failed to consolidate during the third wave of democratization (1974-present) and is very unlikely to do so in the near or medium-term future. Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the past. J. Mark Ruhl is Gleen and Mary Todd Professor of Political Science and Chair of the Department of Political Science at Dickinson College in Carlisle, PA. He has written extensively on Latin American politics and has specialized in the cases of Colombia and Honduras. Recent publications by Professor Ruhl includeParty Politics and Elections in Latin America (Westview, 1989), coauthored with R.H. McDonald of Syracuse University, and “Redefining Civil-Military Relations in Honduras”Journal of Intermerican Studies and World Affairs (Spring 1996).