Burden sharing in the NATO alliance: An empirical test of alternative views

This paper undertakes an empirical test of two opposing views of interdependencies among members of military alliances. The first view, associated with Olson and Zeckhauser, argues that the public good aspect of defense induces free riding behavior by smaller alliance members, which imposes a disproportionate burden of supporting the alliance on the larger members. A second view argues that NATO defense activities produce a mix of outputs, some of which are not purely public, and some of which may be complementary across nations. Furthermore, the nature of the weapons systems and their relative use by alliance members may induce substantial cooperation by allies. The test proposed here analyzes the relationship between defense spending shares of NATO members and their population and relative wealth shares. A simple model is specified and tested using pooled time series cross sectional data. The empirical results indicate more support for the cooperative view of ally relationships than the Olson-Zeckhauser non-cooperative model.     

Governing Interlocal Cooperation: City Council Interests and the Implications for Public Management

Local government managers are described as key participants in the development of interlocal cooperation, but the interests of city councils in this process have gone largely unstudied. Here, the author addresses the theoretical importance of council-manager relations in interlocal public service cooperation. Three propositions identify areas of shared council-manager responsibility. Evidence from in-depth interviews with city council members is used to assess each proposition. While interlocal partnership has been described as a managerial activity, council members take an interest in network development and agreement assessment. Managers, on the other hand, give greater attention to public participation and education. The evidence refines assumptions about council-manager roles in the formation of cooperative agreements, with important implications for local government management.     

Elite Interactions and Voters’ Perceptions of Parties’ Policy Positions

Recent research documents that voters infer that governing coalition partners share similar ideologies, independently of these parties’ actual policy statements. We argue that citizens estimate party positions from more general forms of interparty cooperation and conflict, particularly near the times of national elections. We analyze tens of thousands of media reports on elite interactions from 13 Western democracies between 2001 and 2014, and show that—controlling for coalition arrangements and for the policy tones of parties’ election manifestos—voters infer greater left–right agreement between pairs of parties that have more cooperative public relationships, but that this “cooperation effect” is only evident near the times of national elections. Our findings have implications for parties’ policy images and for mass–elite linkages.     

Institutional Collective Action and Economic Development Joint Ventures

There is high interest in economic development efforts involving cooperation or collaboration among metropolitan jurisdictions. To determine why some local governments engage in cooperative agreements while others do not, this paper investigates transaction obstacles, including bargaining, information, agency, enforcement, and division problems. The authors then advance an institutional collective action explanation for intergovernmental cooperation, focusing on the conditions under which these transactions costs are low. This work anticipates that the costs associated with interlocal cooperation are influenced by the demographic characteristics of communities, local political institutions, and the nature of regional government networks. Empirical analysis based on a national survey of local development officials provides support for several predictions from this model and identifies policy variables that, in turn, increase the prospects for cooperation, specifically through the development of informal policy networks.     

Regional fiscal cooperation in metropolitan areas: An exploration

This article explores the potential benefits and costs of regional cooperation on metropolitan area fiscal policies. After discussing the relationships between cities and suburbs, as well as the role of local fiscal policies in regional well‐being, the article presents and tests a model for measuring benefit spillovers resulting from fiscal policies. The results show that state and local infrastructures have important effects on metropolitan property markets, and that current spending is less influential than the level of public capital in place in determining property values. State highway investments are found to reduce the attractiveness of metropolitan area locations. Enhancements to central city infrastructure are estimated to significantly increase suburban property values, and the results of some simple policy experiments are examined.© 1999 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Two ways of realizing justice and democracy: linking Amartya Sen and Elinor Ostrom

In The Idea of Justice (2009), Amartya Sen advocates democracy defined as ‘public reasoning’ and ‘government by discussion’. Sen’s discursive approach facilitates the exercise of political freedom and development of one’s public capacities, and enables victims of injustice to give public voice and discussion to specific injustice. It also responds to the contested nature of ‘universal human rights’ and the need to clarify and defend them via public reasoning. However, Sen’s approach leaves intact the hegemony of a liberal form of democracy that prioritizes political and civil rights over social and economic rights and thus precludes alternative democratic forms, most notably a form of cooperative democracy that politicizes social and economic activities in the pursuit of local and global justice. Sen’s ‘government by discussion’ must combine with cooperative democracy and a global ethos emphasizing cooperation (and action) over privatization in order to address our most serious global injustices, including exploitation, inequality and poverty in the Global South, accelerating destruction of the environment and biodiversity, and global warming and climate change.     

Overcoming the Barriers to Cooperation: Intergovernmental Service Agreements

Interlocal cooperation through service‐sharing agreements has a long history, but its use has increased in popularity during the last 20 years. The decisions of local government units to collaborate through intergovernmental service agreements are best understood as a two‐stage process. The first stage, in which communities decide whether to consider interlocal cooperation, involves the nature of the immediate problem faced plus specific demands for performance and efficiency gains that can result from service cooperation. In the second stage, communities confront a question of institutional supply, and hence must overcome inherent bargaining and collective action issues in order to forge interlocal agreements. Heckman probit estimates of such complex relationships using data drawn from a 2003 ICMA survey suggest strong support for this model. The authors conclude by discussing the role of network relationships among local actors for reducing transaction costs and facilitating intergovernmental collaboration.     

Transaction costs and inter‐jurisdictional cooperation: an application to land use collaboration

• The costs and benefits of inter‐jurisdictional cooperation and how these impede strategic alliances among jurisdictions is an issue of growing importance worldwide. The reason is the potential cost savings, efficiency increase and economic development benefits that can be realized through cooperation. The literature has increasingly mentioned transaction costs as obstacles that mitigate cooperation and as a key component of cooperation costs, which must be outweighed by cooperation benefits in order for communities to perceive advantageous strategic alliances. However, a framework is lacking in the literature for evaluating the implications of transaction costs for inter‐jurisdictional cooperation. This paper develops a framework for evaluating the nature and dynamics of transaction costs and their implications for inter‐jurisdictional cooperation, with an application to land use. A simple cost function model is used to explain the costs and challenges associated with managing coordinated, cooperative or consolidated relationships, and the dynamics of such costs. The analysis highlights the importance of such things as degree of complexity, inter‐party diversity and the relative sizes of collaborating partners. An application to land use cooperation in Michigan suggests that policies to eliminate transaction costs could help reduce the barriers to cooperation of various types.

Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Ethics as an Enabler of Public Policy

Ethics constrains us. But ethics can also act as an ‘enabler’, helping to secure compliance with public policies. Basing policies on ethical principles helps the public know what is required of them by public policies. Framing policies in those ways also primes people to think in terms of their own ethically based reasons for action. Basing policies on ethical principles can assist in securing the cooperation of potential veto players by creating cooperative norms and a culture of trust.     

The Impact of Elections on Cooperation: Evidence from a Lab‐in‐the‐Field Experiment in Uganda

Communities often rely on sanctioning to induce public goods contributions. Past studies focus on how external agencies or peer sanctioning induce cooperation. In this article, we focus instead on the role played by centralized authorities, internal to the community. Combining “lab‐in‐the‐field” experiments with observational data on 1,541 Ugandan farmers from 50 communities, we demonstrate the positive effect of internal centralized sanctioning authorities on cooperative behavior. We also show that the size of this effect depends on the political process by which authority is granted: subjects electing leaders contribute more to public goods than subjects who were assigned leaders through a lottery. To test the ecological validity of our findings, we relate farmers’ behavior in the experiment to their level of cooperation in their community organization. We show that deference to authority in the controlled setting predicts cooperative behavior in the farmers’ natural environment, in which they face a similar social dilemma.     

War,pillage, and markets

Neoclassical economic theory has produced an extensive body of knowledge about market exchange based on cooperative relations: private property. This leads to an artificial dichotomy between cooperation and conflict though. It is best to view market exchange as lying along a continuum of conflict and cooperation. Conflict and cooperation are intertwined. From a game theoretic model of Hobbes' world, I show that a number of property rights structures are possible. Each is characterized as possessing varying degrees of conflict and cooperation. Finally, from a repeated game, I show how conflictual relations (mutual predation) may support more cooperative relations (private property). This new equilibrium is sub-game perfect.     

Can Cooperation Be Mandated? Implementing Intergovernmental Environmental Management in New South Wales and New Zealand

Various forces have led to new thinking about approaches tointergovernmental regulation, emphasizing a shift from the heavyhand of coercive mandates to more cooperative approaches. Thisresearch examines the implementation of cooperative policiesaddressing aspects of environmental management in New SouthWales, Australia, and in New Zealand. Analyses are undertakenof the cooperative policy designs, government agencies' implementationefforts and styles, and local government officials' perceptionsof intergovernmental cooperation. Bringing about intergovernmentalcooperation is not automatic, nor does it appear to be easy.An empirical modeling shows that high levels of agency commitmentand capacity are required in order to foster facilitative implementationstyles. The design of policy mandates is important in signalingcooperative desires and structuring implementation to fosterappropriate agency implementation styles.     

The Interface management frontier: Modernizing local government. Part three

At the beginning of the 21st Century, local government faces the major challenge of restructuring and managing a new interface with its social, economic, and political environment. The devolution of public tasks to society requires a redefinition of the role of local government. The shift from producing to guaranteeing the remaining services requires at least the adoption of best practices from private-sector strategic marketing, production, and purchasing management. The restructuring of local government for customer satisfaction and decentralized decision-making requires careful attention to the demands of democratic political control, as well as to legitimate public interests that may not be included in the customer-satisfaction model. Thus, public management of local government cannot be content with internal modernization, but must redefine its relationships with its environment.     

Understanding Cooperative Behavior in Labor Management Cooperation: A Theory-Building Exercise

This article proposes a theory of how mandated institutional cooperation transforms into individual cooperative behavior. Using qualitative strategies, we draw insights about cooperation in three public-sector efforts of labor-management cooperation (LMC). We report an association between critical shifts in the roles of stakeholders and the change from adversarial to cooperative labor relations. While managers became team players along with their employees, labor representatives assumed managerial responsibilities. These changes were also associated with a service-oriented perspective, better understanding of the other's experiences, and a view of cooperation as partnership. At the heart of these transformations, we found critical changes in communication patterns associated with incrementally growing levels of trust. We propose a model that depicts the links between collective and individual levels of organizational action related to LMC. We conclude that the positive shifts in mental models regarding work and the value of cooperation justify the promotion of LMC efforts.     

社会资本视阈下两种农村民间组织比较研究——以湖南四县民间组织为例

目前活跃在农村的民间组织形式可分为两种不同的类型,传统型民间组织和合作化型民间组织.传统型民间组织多由农民自发组织起来,通过传统的宗族组织模式吸纳资源,以填补农村公共领域的缺失;合作化型民间组织的构成大多出于利益的驱动,部分是在当地政府的帮助下建立起来的,与当地政府之间有良好的合作关系.上述两种类型组织在农村治理模式变迁时,各自面临不同的发展瓶颈.在调查湖南省四县的农村民间组织的基础上,运用社会资本理论,通过分析这两类不同组织的社会资本构成,可知这种发展上的瓶颈来源于它们自身社会资本构成方式所导致的先天缺陷.传统型民间组织通过社会资本的叠加能很好地增益组织社会资本,对成员个体社会资本的增益较少;合作型民间组织虽可以更好地增益个人的社会资本,但在组织社会资本的聚合与增益方面有欠缺.     

Competitors and Cooperators: A Micro‐Level Analysis of Regional Economic Development Collaboration Networks

Predispositions and orientation toward cooperation or competition with other jurisdictions can play a critical role in implementing regional collaboration. By examining collaboration at the micro level, this article investigates how individual factors, including perceptions of cooperation and competition, as well as institutional and environmental factors, are related to regional collaboration. In particular, the authors assert that competitive motivation may support the emergence of regional governance mechanisms. This article explores the relationships between competitive/cooperative motivations and interlocal collaboration networks based on a network survey conducted in the Orlando, Florida, metropolitan area. The authors apply a quadratic assignment procedure regression analysis to examine how dyadic conceptual ties of cooperation and competition, along with the effect of community characteristics, affect policy network structures for economic development. By comparing estimated coefficients with sampling distributions of coefficients from all of the permuted data sets, the regression results indicate the influences of perceived competition/cooperation on the network exchange.     

Green Tape and Public Employee Rule Abidance: Why Organizational Rule Attributes Matter

Ever since Max Weber identified formal rules as one attribute of bureaucratic organizations, scholars have uncovered a range of cooperative and uncooperative behavioral responses to organizational rules. The question for public management theory and practice is how to design and execute organizational rules in ways that elicit cooperation rather than resistance. Green tape, a theory of effective rules, provides one answer to this question. Green tape theory argues that the cooperation of stakeholders—individuals who comply with, explain, or enforce rules—depends on the presence of five rule attributes. This article tests the relationship between these attributes and stakeholder rule abidance using mail survey data obtained from the employees of four cities in a Midwestern state. The results indicate that employee perceptions of four of the five theoretical green tape attributes are correlated with higher rule abidance. Thus, stakeholder perceptions of organizational rules appear to matter because they alter the extent of cooperation in rule implementation.     

以行政契约作为跨域治理之法制基础--以台北和基隆垃圾处理合作案为例

在地狭人稠的台湾,有关大众运输、环境保护、水资源、河川管理等跨域治理的议题,正显现其重要性与急迫性。整合跨域治理与行政法的理论,以“北基垃圾处理合作案”为例,分析行政契约作为跨域合作的基础,分析其所涉及的相关法制问题,例如契约之合致、订约过程（成立要件）、契约应有之内容、契约之进展（如情势变更、政策变迁等）、履约责任、强制执行、救济方法等,希望能建构行政契约在跨域治理的应用模式,以为未来各级政府间在跨域事务中的合作提供法制经验。