Show Them Your Teeth First!

This paper investigates the choice of an interestgroup between lobbying (``words'') and pressure(``actions'') in order to influence a policymaker. Both lobbying and pressure are modeled asstrategic means of transmitting information that isrelevant to the policymaker. However, only pressure isdirectly costly to the policymaker. The interactionbetween the interest group and the policymaker isframed as a repeated signaling game. In equilibriumpressure – in contrast to lobbying – only occurswhen the interest group's reputation is sufficientlylow, and always improves its reputation. It is shownthat (repeated) lobbying cannot completely substitutefor pressure, and that the interest group may beforced to sustain its reputation through lobbying. Weconclude that pressure is typically used to build upa reputation, lobbying to maintain a reputation.     

Reputation and Interstate Conflict

In international politics, states learn from the behavior of other nations, including the reputations states form through their actions in the international system. This article presents a model of how states process this information and examines how this learning affects international conflict. The model builds off of cognitive balance theory and foreign policy learning models and breaks new ground in its ability to provide a contextual assessment of reputation in world politics. The article then investigates whether a dyad is more likely to experience conflict if at least one state has a reputation for hostility. This hypothesis is tested empirically across all dyads in the international system from 1817 to 2000. The results indicate that states do engage in this learning behavior and that the information generated by extra-dyadic interaction of states has a significant bearing upon the likelihood of dyadic conflict .     

Voting, Rationality and Reputation

Why do people vote? This paper presents a solution to the voting paradox in rational choice theory, based on the interaction between two concepts: externalities (James Coleman) and reputation (Einar Overbye). Elaborating on the idea that voting is an investment in one's reputation, I will argue that there are two concepts of reputation: reputation-of-power and reputation-of-trust. The solution to the voting paradox can be found in the reputation-game between social actors holding these two different forms of reputation. During an electoral campaign, powerful opinion leaders can employ their reputation-of-power (power to impose sanctions) in order to get mere voters to vote in a certain way. The aim of the powerful opinion leaders is not to influence the outcome of the election but simply to acquire or maintain their reputation, while mere voters have an interest to vote as told in order to appear trustworthy (reputation-of-trust) to powerful opinion leaders. The act of voting is an unintended consequence of this power game.     

国际贸易谈判的政治经济分析:一个初步的框架(6)

加入WTO将给中国的改革开放进程带来深远的影响,也将会对中国的经济管理体制改革和政府管理体制改革带来巨大的挑战。对国际政治经济学有关贸易与国内政治的研究、国际贸易理论关于贸易政策之形成的研究、国际关系理论和博弈论关于国际谈判的研究进行了评述,并从国际政治经济学的角度提出分析国际贸易谈判的一个初步的分析框架。通过强调国内政治、策略行为和国际规则的重要性,并从公民政策偏好的形成、利益集团集体行动、两国贸易谈判之间的双层博弈、国际规则的制约因素等多方面讨论了如何分析贸易谈判。     

Constitutional Prohibitions in a Rent Seeking Model

I extend the standard rent seeking model to allow lobbying fora constitutional prohibition on wealth transfers. I examinetwo issues: (1) the ability of special interests withsignificant political capacity to block constitutional change;and (2) the effect of adding a constitutional stage on totallobbying expenditures. Defeating a prohibition on wealthtransfers is a public good for rent seekers; success inconstitutional politics merely allows them to lobby for wealthtransfers. The resulting collective action problem for rentseekers in constitutional politics offsets the generalinterest's free rider problems, reducing the probability oftransfers and expected total lobbying expenditures compared tothe traditional rent seeking contest. Introduction of aconstitutional stage also reverses several comparative staticsresults from the rent seeking game. An increase in the numberof rent seekers or the general interest's (consumers') abilityto organize increase lobbying in the rent seeking game butgenerally reduce expected lobbying in the constitutionalprohibition game.     

博弈问题的哲学分析

自纳什以来,非合作博弈理论已经广泛应用于经济学、政治学、社会学、生物学等领域.本文从哲学角度分析了博弈中的理性和合作问题,试图指出,博弈论关于理性和合作的理解是非常单薄的,基本上局限于经济学的理解,而这可能误解人类行为.     

Beyond Heterodoxy: Dwight Waldo and the Politics–Administration Dichotomy

Dwight Waldo (1913–2000) is commonly known as a “heterodox” critic of the dichotomy between politics and administration. But is this reputation supported by his writings? It seems to be primarily based on The Administrative State (1948) and other early publications, in which he conceptualized politics/administration narrowly as deciding/executing and, indeed, sharply criticized it. Waldo’s later publications, by contrast, offer much broader conceptualizations and a more ambivalent, even positive appraisal of the dichotomy. Such conceptualizations are also found in an important unpublished book Waldo worked on during several phases of his career. On the basis of these published and unpublished writings, we should reconsider Waldo’s reputation and, pursuing his line of reasoning, reconceptualize the politics–administration dichotomy as a layered construct and reappreciate it as a constitutional doctrine.     

The death of conservative Ireland? The 2018 abortion referendum

The outcomes of two recent Irish referendums - on marriage equality in 2015 and abortion in 2018 - have placed contemporary Irish voters in sharp contrast with their long-standing conservative Catholic reputation. These referendums also stand out internationally because of an associated deliberative innovation. This paper aims to explain the watershed abortion vote drawing on theories of generational change, issue-voting, cue-taking and deliberative democracy, using data from an exit poll at the 2018 abortion referendum. We show that cleavage and age effects are key to understanding the referendum outcome. These results offer insight into how societal processes such as rapid secularisation, generational replacement and democratic innovations shape politics. Moreover, voters who were aware of the deliberative innovation were more likely to support the liberal referendum option. To increase willingness to deviate from the status quo, engaging citizens actively in the debate is a fruitful approach.     

The reputational basis of policy success in comparative perspective: Evidence from the education sector in Peru and Bolivia

This article, building on the emerging theoretical corpus of “reputation theory” provides an alternative explanation about how successful policies are obtained in contexts of bureaucratic weakness and volatile politics. The argument is that politicians choose to intervene in delivering successful policies based on how contributable such policies are to construct their political reputations. The findings suggest that in both countries, less tenured politicians face higher incentives to build their reputations, so they choose to deliver better policies to accumulate “successful experiences” as vitae for electoral purposes. Tenured politicians, in turn, opt for inaction or strategic delivery, to preserve their already won political reputations. The present article brings evidence from the education sector of Peru and Bolivia, a sector that has been at the core of these countries' priorities for decades. Through a mixed methods approach involving a panel regression and in-depth interviews, results obtained largely confirm this article's claims.     

Political parties and political shirking

Using ADA roll call voting scores for the 1947–2006 period, I find that senators shirk in their last term. The degree of shirking is limited by political parties, which constrain the politician in his last term, and varies by post-Senate career choices. The results highlight the importance of political parties in the repeated game that is electoral politics.     

Persuading Caesar: A new interpretation of Farquharson's problem

Merely because voting takes place in a real-life social decision system, we are not thereby confronted by a ‘voting game’. Often we are confronted by something that looks more like an advising game, in which voting is mainly important as a language by which policymakers render advice to other policymakers (possibly including their own future selves) who will act later. In this brief research note, the foregoing theme is illustrated by re-interpreting the same case from ancient Roman senatorial politics which inspired Robin Farquharson's seminal Theory of Voting. I stress that the contributions of this article lie entirely in the interpretation of allegedly gamelike situations, not in the formal analysis of games proper.     

Negotiating in stages: National positions and the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact

Abstract.  This article examines the politics of the 2005 reform of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). It distinguishes between two stages in the reform process. The first stage delimited the negotiation space – confining reform into an interpretation of the formal clauses that prescribe SGP functioning – and set the reform agenda. In the second, decision-making stage, Member States engaged in high politics bargaining, more sensitive to their short-term (fiscal deficit) and long-term (fiscal sustainability) macroeconomic conditions, attempting to upload country-specific 'expenditure exceptionalism'. The authors of this article find a crucial disjunction in some Member States between positions held across the two stages. Strategic considerations, comprising the broader constitutional/political game and the need to demonstrate national macroeconomic credibility, account for such discrepancy in the two negotiation stages.     

From politics to good management? Transforming the local welfare state in Italy

In light of recent welfare reforms associated with new forms of managerial and financial accountability, this paper analyses the significance for the construction of new legitimate forms of governance of the relationship between public managers of welfare provider units and local elected politicians. The shift from local government as democratic representative institutions to depoliticised efficient agent of welfare provision has created in Italy the opportunity for the emergence of a new cadre of managers, less subject to interference by the parties. The increasingly problematic relationship between managers and politicians reflects the dynamics of a shifting game, originally intended for sector-specific interests, that was later transformed into a struggle between political elites across territory and about territorial politics. Any set of alternatives juxtaposing efficient management and politics is best viewed by taking account of the significance of local welfare institutions for political legitimacy.     

BUREAUCRATIC DECENTRALIZATION AND THE REDISTRIBUTION OF URBAN SERVICES: THE CASE OF TEAM POLICING1

Two extreme positions dominate the decentralization debate in urban politics: one school consistently opposes decentralization, while the other maintains that only complete radical community control can solve the problems of politics and administration in the city. Positions and policies between these two extremes tend to get lost in rhetoric and argument, or receive only passing recognition. This paper is an attempt to carve out, theoretically and empirically, some space for an intermediate position. Following a brief exploration of the decentralization debate, we discuss and present some analysis from a team policing experiment, a type of ecentralization that falls in between the two extremes. The data suggest that this type of decentralization can be successful if the program is designed as a non-zero-sum game, and the paper concludes that intermediate programs represent attractive third choices to discredited or unworkable alternatives.     

Impaling Dracula: How EU Accession Empowered Civil Society in Romania

Europeanisation scholars increasingly debate when and in what ways the European Union influences domestic politics. This article adopts a ‘bottom-up’ design and the process-tracing method to examine the influence of the EU enlargement context over the political power of the new social movements in Romania between 2000 and 2004 when the EU acquis was being negotiated. It finds that domestic civil society empowerment resulted from the nexus of three interacting causal pathways: the Executive's desire to accede to the EU; a transnational advocacy network, which included domestic NGOs, reinforcing the Executive's anticipatory self-constraint; and to a somewhat lesser extent, the Executive's self-identification with certain elements of the advocacy network, reinforced by a general concern for their external reputation.     

Welfare state reforms and mass media attention: Evidence from three European democracies

The mass media is conventionally assumed to play an important role in welfare state politics. So far, however, we have very little systematic theorizing or empirical evidence of when and how the mass media reports on welfare state reforms. Building on news value theory and the welfare state reform literature, we develop a set of hypotheses about mass media reporting on welfare state reforms. We argue that mass media attention is conditioned not only by the direction of reforms, with cuts getting more attention than expansions, but also by the election platform that the incumbent party ran on in the last election as well as by the policy reputation of the government. Drawing on a new dataset including about 4,800 news articles in British, Danish and German quality newspapers from 1995 to 2014, we find supporting empirical evidence of our expectations.     

A Model of Spoils Politics

Accounts of state failure in the developing world frequently highlight a logic of "spoils politics" in which a government and an opposing faction vie for control of the state and the accompanying spoils. Attempts to buy the opposition off play a key role in this logic, and an informational problem often complicates these efforts. Because of limited transparancy, the government generally has a better idea about the actual size of the spoils than the opposition does. We formalize this aspect of spoils politics as a signaling game in which the government has private information about the size of the spoils and tries to co-opt the opposition by offering a share of the spoils. The opposition can accept the offer or reject it by fighting. Consistent with the strong empirical finding that the probability of civil war is higher when income is low, the probability of breakdown increases as the size of the spoils decreases. We also study the effects of uncertainty, the opposition's military strength, the cost of fighting, and power-sharing agreements on the probability of fighting.     

Elites and Regimes in Comparative Perspective: Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia

Because of the diversity that characterizes politics in Southeast Asia, area specialists hasve lacked a framework for comparative analysis. Drawing on some of the recent transitions literature, this article argues the worth of investigating political regime forms, the extent to which a country's politics are stable or unstable and democratic or authoritarian. It then focuses on three important Southeast Asian countries — Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand — analyzing stabilitylinstability in terms of state elites and their rules of the game, while considering democracylauthoriturianism in terms of societal audiences and legitimating "mentalities." Briefly, Indonesia's authoritarian regime (and its strong appearance of stability) is attributed to astute personalist leadership, muted elite rivalries, and control over societal audiences. In contrast, Thailand's unstable democracy emerges from uneven national leadership, perennial elite disunity, and episodic surges in societal pressures. And Malaysia's semi-democratic regime — in some ways bordered by the outcomes in Indonesia and Thailand — is explained by skilful national leadership and sustained elite unity, offsetting the country's ftuctuating levels of societal tensions and claims.     

How Can Deliberative Democracy Get a Grip?

One of the most exciting innovations within ‘practical democratic theory’ in recent years has been the emergence of deliberative democracy, as a theoretically refined ideal with by now some well‐honed mechanisms for its implementation on a small scale. Its greatest remaining challenge is to figure out some way to connect those highly controlled, small‐scale deliberative exercises to the ‘main game’, politically. I sketch some limited and indirect ways in which that might happen in national politics, before going on to propose a more novel way in which such deliberative events might be used literally to make international law of a certain sort.