Preventing construction deaths: The role of public policies

Are stronger direct financial incentives or regulatory enforcement effective in reducing fatalities in the construction industry? We examine two important policies—state workers' compensation (WC) programs and federal and state Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) activities—which embody those strategies. We examine their impact by looking at state-level fatality rates in the construction industry from 1992 to 2016. Setting aside highway crashes and violence, the majority of employee deaths occur in construction. We find that states which exempt small firms from the requirement to buy WC insurance have higher fatality rates. When eligibility for compensation is restricted by longer waiting periods, fatality rates are substantially higher. More frequent federal or state OSHA inspections and, especially, consultation visits are associated with lower fatality rates, but higher average penalties are not. Limited variation in these policies over our sample period, especially for WC, makes these results suggestive rather than definitively causal.     

Workers' compensation and the governance of pain

This article examines the medico-legal systems of workers' compensation. It is divided into three parts, the first taking an historical perspective to locate the first workers' compensation laws, the circumstances which led to their implementation, and their consequences in terms of the shift from individual fault to industrial risk. In the second part, the discursive practices of medico-legal knowledge-power typically found in workers' compensation systems are examined, especially the principles and clinical practices that are deployed to 'police' the boundaries of such schemes and to mitigate costs. Part three then summarizes the effect of neo-liberal governmentality and its underlying economic rationality as it attempts to regulate, by means of the artifice of liberty, the behaviours of firms and workers. Workers' compensation deserves analysis for the special technical and insurantial problems it entails, given its complex triangular insurance relation (involving the insurer, the firm, and the worker), its deployment of medical, economic and actuarial knowledges, and its production of special problems and uncertainties surrounding the governing of a class of persons incapacitated for productive work.     

Governing kidnap for ransom: Lloyd's as a “private regime”

Kidnap for ransom raises significant governance challenges. In the absence of formal regulation and enforcement, insurers have created an effective private governance regime to facilitate smooth commercial resolutions. Controlling ransoms is paramount: “supernormal” profits for kidnappers create kidnapping booms and undermine the market for insurance. Ransom control requires cooperation, but there are high transactions costs in enforcing a collusive agreement. The Coasean prediction is that a single firm will form to internalize the externalities arising from lax insurance and mismanaged ransom negotiations—or a government must order the market. There is indeed a single source of kidnap insurance: Lloyd's of London. Yet, within the Lloyd's market several insurers compete for business. Lloyd's is a club providing private governance: Its members issue standard contracts, follow the same regime for kidnap resolution, and exchange information to stabilize ransoms. Lloyd's, therefore, combines aspects of Coase's “single firm” and “government” solution to the externalities problem.     

Self-regulation and the enforcement of professional codes

This study examines society's choice of inputs for the creation of trust in professional services. Professional codes and their enforcement are only one possible input that society has at its disposal for the production of this trust. Other inputs include civil and criminal codes. If society is modeled as a multi-input “firm,” then it will tend to use less of any input as that input grows less productive or more costly. To identify factors that might impact society's future use of professional self-regulation as a trust-producing input, the productivities and costs of enforcing professional codes are modeled. The effectiveness of professional enforcement is seen to have its origin in the losses members face if they leave the profession. These “exit costs” are analyzed in detail. Other factors affecting professional enforcement are also evaluated. A mathematical model of society's choice problem, contingent on exit costs and other factors, permits formal derivation of several results. Among these are the ideas that monopoly rents and specificity of skills are important in creating the conditions that make professional enforcement possible. As these deteriorate, society's reliance on professional enforcement will decline, and its dependence on courts will rise.     

“Carve‐outs” from the workers' compensation system

Decentralized regulation has become increasingly important in many areas; examples range from school vouchers to workplace safety committees to alternative dispute resolution procedures replacing courts. Consistent with this trend, in 1993 California permitted construction unions and employers to “carve out” their own workers' compensation system. This study examines California's early experience with carve‐outs by analyzing two case studies, a survey of all carve‐outs in existence during the study period, and preliminary data on costs and dispute frequency at one carve‐out. Overall, carve‐outs do not appear to harm employees, and sometimes they help. At the same time, data analysis of one carve‐out showed it had no effect on costs and dispute rates. Moreover, the low involvement of union officials and the many issues that overlap other parts of workplace regulation raise concerns about decentralizing workers' compensation. Lessons can be learned for other spheres of regulation. © 2002 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Varying Costs to Change? Institutional Change in the Public Sector

Many scholars have argued that social programs are marked by a logic of “increasing returns” that makes change difficult. Yet over the past decades, reformers across industrialized countries have introduced substantial administrative reforms in these services, even as entitlement reform remains politically difficult. This paper explains these shifts by breaking apart the logic of “increasing returns” into three distinct “costs to change”: technical, political, and expectations. Decreases in a particular type of costs produce different logics of institutional change—back end, informal, and front end—that privilege the state, professionals or private, or political actors in distinct ways. I support these claims by reexamining three cases that were considered exemplars of stability but that ultimately had major entitlement reform: health care in the United Kingdom and United States and welfare programs in the United States. I show that even before radical reforms occurred, reformers introduced distinct logics of administrative change that underpinned later changes.     

Benefits and costs of the 55 mph speed limit: New estimates and their implications

The national 55 mile-per-hour speed limit was in effect from 1974 to 1987, and over the years many analysts have attempted to measure and compare its costs (enforcement and travel time) and benefits (safety and fuel economy). In 1984 a committee of the National Research Council completed a major study of the speed limit. The following article completes the committee's calculations; summarizes the results in units of money, lives, and travel time; and divides these effects between rural interstates and all other roads. Over a range of plausible dollar values for extra travel time, the cost of saving a life is estimated to be much higher on rural interstates than on other affected roads—and higher than the cost of saving a life by other highway safety measures as well. Hence, proponents of higher speed limits on the rural interstates have a strong case in the debate, which continues in the state legislatures.     

On the political economy and limits of crisis insurance: the case of the 2008–11 bailouts

The bailouts of 2008–10 are the most recent in a long series of insurance-like policies designed to limit the losses of those harmed by a crisis of some kind—but enacted after a crisis is under way. This paper analyzes the economics and politics of “crisis insurance” programs. The analysis helps explain why ex-post insurance is popular, why it tends to be undersupplied by private markets, and why governments may be better able to provide it. The analysis also points out that there are limits to what losses can be covered. The routine adoption of new programs to limit losses from crises tends to require greater expenditures through time because of moral hazard problems and the nature of crises. Eventually, this trend may produce “uninsurable” crises. The analysis of this paper suggests that such problems can be moderated, although not eliminated, through appropriate standing polices for ex-post funding of crisis insurance.     

Regulatory enforcement against organizational insiders: Interactions in the pursuit of individual accountability

The UK Financial Conduct Authority has developed and implemented policies targeting individuals for regulatory non-compliance in the post-2008 crisis period. This article develops a tripartite framework that differentiates between individual–firm, regulator–individual, and regulator–firm interactions to capture the complexity of these enforcement proceedings. Drawing on interviews with stakeholders, administrative decisionmaking observations, and documentary analysis, it outlines the process of individualizing responsibility for non-compliance and finds that this approach poses evidential and investigative challenges for the regulator as a result of individual and corporate responses. The evidence shows that individuals are more likely than firms to engage in an adversarial response to an investigation rather than to settle. At the same time, through an inverse process of “corporatization” of the enforcement proceedings, firms may employ resources and strategies aimed at obscuring individual responsibility or binding together more closely the corporate and the individual case. The article concludes that the prospects of a successful outcome in investigating individuals depend not only on regulators' activities but also on corporate responses and on which managers are considered assets to the firm and which may be thrown to the wolves.     

Testing responsive regulation in regulatory enforcement

The policy ideals of responsive regulation have been developed on the basis of substantial empirical evidence. The overall formulation of responsive regulation theory itself, however, has rarely been empirically tested. This article sets out the theoretical concept of responsive regulation in the context of business regulation enforcement and discusses how we might operationalize and empirically measure it. We develop two alternative theoretical interpretations of responsive regulatory enforcement: “tit for tat” responsive regulation and “restorative justice” responsive regulation. We then measure business firms' perceptions of the reactions and counter‐reactions of a regulatory enforcement agency throughout the investigation and enforcement process. We find little evidence of tit for tat responsiveness actually occurring in practice. To the extent that tit for tat responsiveness does exist, we find a small amount of evidence that it has the hypothesized effects on behavior but not on attitudes. We find clearer evidence of restorative justice responsiveness having the hypothesized effects on attitudes but not on behavior.     

Focal Points in Public Policy: Evidence from Voluntary Regulation

Numerous studies argue that law affects behavior “expressively”—such as when states create focal points that overcome the coordination difficulties firms face. We argue that governments help firms overcome coordination dilemmas by explicating a preferred strategy for firms weighing investment in voluntary regulation. Firms would prefer to coordinate on a common strategy as a way of reducing the costs of voluntary regulation and increasing its benefits. We test our hypothesis about the efficacy of focal point selection with the European Union's (EU) advocacy of the Eco‐Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS) over a rival environmental management system, International Standards Organization (ISO) 14001. EU nations have statistically significantly lower rates of ISO 14001 certification than comparable countries at least in part due to their advocacy of EMAS. These results emphasize the role the state plays in coordinating business behavior even when such policy is simply expressive.     

FHA in the Great Recession: Rebalancing Its Role

The Federal Housing Administration's (FHA) Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund has a negative net worth as of FY2012, partly because of the weak economic recovery and partly because its policy has been directed to supporting homeownership at the risk of incurring more defaults. Although recently announced reforms should reduce losses, higher insurance premiums and lower loan-to-value ratios will still be necessary. But FHA faced and survived similar situations before, and should be able to do so again, without draconian limitations on its authority.     

Frontline worker compliance with transparency reforms: Barriers posed by family and financial responsibilities

Significant development funding flows to informational interventions intended to improve public services. Such “transparency fixes” often depend on the cooperation of frontline workers who produce or disseminate information for citizens. This article examines frontline worker compliance with a transparency intervention in Bangalore's water sector. Why did compliance vary across neighborhoods, and why did workers exhibit modest rates of compliance overall? Drawing on ethnographic observation and an original data set, this article finds that variation in workers' family responsibilities and financial circumstances largely explains variation in compliance with the intervention. Furthermore, workers often prioritize long‐standing responsibilities over new tasks seen as add‐ons, leading to modest rates of compliance overall. Perceptions of “core” jobs can be sticky—especially when reaffirmed through interactions with citizens. This article represents one of the first multimethod companions to a field experiment, and illustrates how the analysis of qualitative and observational data can contribute to impact evaluation.     

HEALTH CARE POLICY IN THE GERMAN SOCIAL INSURANCE STATE: From Solidarity to Privatization?

Statutory health insurance is a centerpiece of the German welfare state, which considers itself to be a “social insurance state.” At the same time, due to a large volume of interpersonal redistributions that occur in health insurance, it is the most ambitious branch of the country's social insurance system. The stability of the health scheme thus depends on a “culture of solidarity” to maintain the legitimacy of these redistributions. This article analyzes recent changes in the legislative framework of the statutory health insurance. It asks whether these changes which predominantly aim to contain employers’ nonwage labor costs by making the insured bear a larger share of total health care spending, are possibly weakening the moral infrastructure of the welfare state. To this end, findings from qualitative interviews with insured persons are evaluated in view of recently approved and currently proposed legislative changes to the health scheme. The analytical focus is the question whether the two equity principles of this scheme, delivering health care according to medical need and financing it according to the “ability‐to‐pay,” are becoming endangered.     

Managing Employee Motivation: Exploring the Connections Between Managers’ Enforcement Actions,Employee Perceptions,and Employee Intrinsic Motivation

A number of studies show that the use of external interventions such as command systems and economic incentives can decrease employee intrinsic motivation. Our knowledge of why the size of “the hidden cost of rewards” differs among organizations is, however, still sparse. In this article, we analyze whether local managers—the primary enforcers of external interventions—affect how employees perceive a command system and thereby affect employee intrinsic motivation. Using a multilevel dataset of 1,190 teachers and 32 school principals, we test whether principals’ use of “hard,” “mixed,” or “soft” actions to enforce a command system (obligatory teacher-produced student plans) is associated with teacher intrinsic motivation. Results show that teachers experiencing “hard” enforcement actions have lower intrinsic motivation than teachers experiencing “soft” enforcement actions. As expected by motivation crowding theory, part of this association is mediated by teachers’ student plan requirement perception. These findings support the motivation crowding argument that employee intrinsic motivation depend on the employees’ need for self-determination.     

Explaining the size of the public sector

This paper aims at providing an explanation for the size of the public sector based on the idea of “social insurance”. The main assumption made is that the public sector is less efficient but also less volatile than the private sector. The “demand-driven” level of the public sector that is derived as the one that maximizes the utility of the representative employed consumer depends positively on the variance of private output. An increase in the size of the public sector has a positive effect on expected employment and a negative effect on expected consumption. The size of the public sector set by the government which maximizes the probability of being re-elected will be higher than the “demand-driven” level if voters' preferences for employment is higher than the consumption loss associated with public employment.     

Beyond Smokestacks and Silos: Open‐Source,Web‐Enabled Coordination in Organizations and Networks

What accounts for coordination problems? Many mechanisms of coordination exist in both organizations and networks, yet despite their widespread use, coordination challenges persist. Some believe the challenges are growing even more serious. One answer lies in understanding that coordination is not a free good; it is expensive in terms of time, effort, and attention, or what economists call transaction and administrative costs. An alternative to improving coordination is to reduce its costs, yet there is little guidance in the literature to help managers and researchers calculate coordination costs or make design decisions based on cost reductions. This article explores two cases—the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s Peer‐to‐Patent pilot program and the online relief effort in Haiti following the devastating earthquake there in 2010—to illustrate the advantages and constraints of using Web 2.0 technology as a mechanism of coordination and a tool for cost reduction. The lessons learned from these cases may offer practitioners and researchers a way out of our “silos” and “smokestacks.”     

Does Compliance Pay? Social Standards and Firm‐Level Trade

What is the relationship between trade and social institutions in the developing world? The research literature is conflicted: Importing firms may demand that trading partners observe higher labor and environmental standards, or they may penalize higher standards that raise costs. This study uses new data on retailers and manufacturers to analyze how firm‐level trade responds to information about social standards. Contrary to the “race to the bottom” hypothesis, it finds that retail importers reward exporters for complying with social standards. In difference‐in‐differences estimates from over 2,000 manufacturing establishments in 36 countries, achieving compliance is associated with a 4% [1%, 7%] average increase in annual purchasing. The effect is driven largely by the apparel industry—a long‐term target of anti‐sweatshop social movements—suggesting that activist campaigns can shape patterns of global trade.     

Government Reform,Political Ideology,and Administrative Burden: The Case of Performance Management in the Bush Administration

This article examines how ideological differences between political officials and agencies may have affected the implementation of an ostensibly nonpartisan, government‐wide administrative initiative: the George W. Bush administration's Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) review of federal programs. The analysis reveals that managers in agencies associated with liberal programs and employees (“liberal agencies”) agreed to a greater extent than those in agencies associated with conservative programs and employees (“conservative agencies”) that PART required significant agency time and effort and that it imposed a burden on management resources. Further analysis reveals that differences in reported agency effort can be explained partly by objective differences in the demands that PART placed on agencies—liberal agencies were required to evaluate more programs and implement more improvement plans relative to their organizational capacity—and partly by the ideological beliefs of employees—on average, liberal managers reported more agency effort, even after accounting for objective measures of administrative burden.     

Information disclosure and environmental regulation: Green lights and gray areas

This research examines the potential of information disclosure for environmental regulation. The research attempts to answer questions of what impact information disclosure has on corporate environmental practices and what interferes with its effective use. A case study of Indonesia's pioneering informational environmental regulation reveals (i) both indirect (e.g. anticipation of external pressure) and direct (e.g. internal learning support) informational effects that enhance environmental awareness at the top management level and stimulate changes in production processes and (ii) detrimental effects of disclosed information that maintain or strengthen the extant power of regulated firms over environmental groups and local communities affected. Regulatory efforts can be leveraged by public disclosure of information regarding firms' environmental performance, especially where the state monitoring and enforcement capacities are weak. However, the introduction of policies of this kind without consideration of different market conditions and political and administrative culture may impede the effectiveness of this potentially useful regulatory method.