Try Federalism

The present article follows up a previous study (Anckar 1998) which showed a strong association between size and party system fragmentation. The aim of the article is to see whether the explanatory power of size can, in fact, be attributed to a federal form of government. 77 countries with free party systems constitute the research population. The dependent variable has three components: number of parties, electoral support for the leading party, and the 'effective number of parties' calculated according to the Laakso-Taagepera formula. Preliminary tests reveal that federal states have a more fragmented party system than unitary states. However, when controlling for size, electoral system, the 'effective threshold,' and presidentialism, the results clearly show that federalism is overshadowed by size and also, to a lesser extent, by the effective threshold.     

Federalism and Decentralization: Ownership Rights and the Superiority of Federalism

The benefits and costs usually ascribed to federalism are benefitsand costs of decentralization; they are, therefore, presentin unitary states that are in fact all decentralized. The benefitsand costs specific to federalism pertain to ownership rightsin constitutional powers. Federalism is superior to confederalismand unitarianism because the ownership rights peculiar to thatsystem of government are such that they ensure the perduranceof competition when one or more competitors are unsuccessful.They do so because under federalism, powers cannot be repossessedunilaterally. Ownership rights have to be enforced; as a consequence,there are also costs that are specific to federalism.     

Collaborative Federalism

Famously, federalism combines self-rule with shared rule or unity with diversity. Typically, the mix is achieved by creating or preserving two levels of government, each with a direct relationship with the people, and by dividing power between them. Traditionally, unity is achieved through the exercise of power by the central government, in relation to the polity as a whole. Diversity is the consequence of the exercise of power by sub-national governments over a portion of the population, generally territorially identified. The boundaries of power between the two spheres are secured by entrenching them in a written Constitution established as fundamental law, which is interpreted and applied by a court or courts.     

Federalism and Consociational Regimes

Federalism and consociationalism are useful means of understandingpolitical systems. Federalism and consociationalism are bothbased on compound majoritarianism rather than simple majoritarianism,and both represent modern attempts to accommodate democraticcomplexity and pluralism, but the two systems are not quitesymmetrical, and territorial organization is not the only characteristicthat differentiates them. Instead, it can be said that federalismrelates to the form of a polity, while consociationalism relatesto the character of a regime. To the extent that federalismmay also function as the character of a regime, then federalismand consociationalism may be more symmetrical. One of the ambiguitiesof federalism is that it is often both form and regime. Consociationalism,however, relates only to regime.     

Pragmatic Federalism: Australian Federalism from Hawke to Howard

The article explores the nature of Australian federalism by examining four major themes in the period from Hawke to Howard. The investigation of these themes – Australian conceptions of federalism; the role of party in shaping federalism; the way problems and politics have influenced policy‐making and thereby federalism; and the nature of federal judicial review – suggests that Australian federalism can most accurately be characterised as pragmatic. It appears as a federalism shaped by pressing problems, specific policy agendas and the prevailing political dynamic, rather than by overarching conceptions of federalism derived from political theory or articulated in party ideology. This pragmatic federalism explains important aspects of Australian federalism, especially the trend towards centralisation of authority.     

Sense on Federalism

Debate on the relevance (or otherwise) of federalism to the development of the European Union is often characterised by mutual incomprehension on either side. Close inspection, however, reveals that the high temperature of argument may not be solely due to differing visions of the finalite politique. For the precise meaning of the federal concept in political science remains unsettled. This article looks back to the earliest origins of federalism, in order to establish a firm basis for suggesting improvements. The idea of divided sovereignty, ‘invented’ in America and now thought to lie at the heart of the federal concept, is identified to be a false construction. On these grounds, it is proposed that the definition of federalism be clarified today as not ‘a division of sovereignty between two levels of government’, but instead ‘a division of the powers flowing from sovereignty between two levels of government of equal status’.     

Devolutionary Federalism and Elazar's Typology: The Arkansas Response to Reagan's New Federalism

This article examines the relationship between the federal andstate governments with regard to the Reagan administration'sNew Federalism. The underlying concern centers on the financialrelationship among governments portrayed by Elazar's typologyof federal aid. The focus of this investigation is directedtoward the adjustments being made by the states to accommodatethe financial and administrative changes occurring on the nationallevel, as illustrated by the case of Arkansas. The analysiscenters on two questions: 1) Has the New Federalism initiativeachieved Reagan's goals of decentralizing governmental authorityback to the states? 2) Has a major redirection in the federalsystem been achieved by reducing the federal financial obligationin the intergovernmental system? The changes being made in thefederal system, as reflected by the adjustments occurring amongthe states, may signal an important realignment of federalism.     

Democracy and socialism

This paper shows that Marx's theory of agricultural rent is not an adjunct to his theory of capital at the level of distribution but is inseparably developed from it. The forms of differential and absolute rent are shown to correspond to the formation of market value and price of production in the agricultural sector respectively, these in turn depending upon the barriers posed by landed property to intensive and extensive cultivation. In appendices, Marx' critique of Ricardo's theory of rent, differential rent on the worst land, a critique of other interpretations of Marx, and the ‘historical transformation problem’ are each considered briefly.     

Canadian Federalism Revisited

The crisis in Canadian federalism is examined in its historicalcontext, with particular emphasis on regionalism, provincialand national assertions of power, the institutional framework,and intergovernmental consultation. Current problems are consideredin relation to the new Constitution.     

The Federalism Debate

These papers examine current Australian federalism from the perspectives of an academic and a practitioner. Both acknowledge the opportunities arising from the current White Paper process, as well as challenges in the face of substantial cuts of proposed funding from the Commonwealth to the States. They insist upon the need for renewed commitment to the idea of federalism, and the importance of sustainable fiscal arrangements within the federation. Challenges in Reforming Australian federalism reminds us of the kind of federalism operative in Australia – concurrent, not coordinate – and develops reform proposals accordingly. Ten Steps to a Better Federation offers a range of ideas from a former state premier, drawing on his experience as both a participant at Council of Australian Government (COAG) and, later, Chair of the COAG Reform Council.     

New Federalism and Environmental Policy

This article examines the degree of correspondence between theconceptual underpinnings of President Reagan's New Federalismand the willingness and capacity of states to assume a largershare of environmental responsibilities. The findings indicatethat many of the states have not replaced federal aid reductionswith own-source revenues. Replacements that did occur were limitedto a single year and primarily in the area of hazardous wastemanagement grants. The implications of these findings are that"decentralization and defunding" of federal programs in theenvironmental area may have had an adverse effect on the states'ability to provide solutions to pressing environmental problemsin the first half of the 1980s.     

Federalism and Workforce Policy Reform

Workforce development policy encompasses a broad array of federaland state programs designed to foster improved workforce utilization,maintenance, and development. Federalism in U. S. workforcepolicy is examined in terms of the Workforce Investment Actand the Carl D. Perkins Vocational and Technical Education Act,laws enacted in 1998 authorizing two of the more important componentsof national workforce policy: job training and work-relatededucation. Coercive federalism in workforce policy began inthe late 1970s and is expected to persist into the future, evenas states serve as "laboratories of democracy." Whether enhanceddiscretion for workforce policy is forthcoming from Washington,states and localities will continue to demonstrate new, andpossibly better, ways of delivering workforce services. Workforcepolicies and programs will also feature an even more prominentrole for market-oriented service delivery. The comprehensivenessof national workforce policy, including broad concerns overefficiency, has yet to be addressed fully.     

Federalism and the shadow economy

This paper analyzes the relationships between federalism and the shadow economy. The theoretical analysis leads to the conclusion that the shadow economy is smaller in federal countries than in unitary states. The mobility of individuals among competing jurisdictions leads policy makers to adopt policies that are more efficient in terms of taxation and public good provision. This increases the return for activities in the formal sector relative to those in the informal one, thus reducing activity in the shadow economy. A cross-sectional empirical analysis of a sample of 73 countries confirms this theoretical prediction.     

Federalism and America's Public Works

On 24 February 1988, the National Council on Public Works Improvementsubmitted its final report on the nation's public works to thepresident and the Congress. The report concluded that America'sinfrastructure is not in ruins, as charged by the landmark bookentitled America in Ruins. The report did say, however, thatthe nation's infrastructure is only barely adequate and gettingworse. The council urged the nation to reverse course and givegreater attention to infrastructure renewal and expansion. Inthe council's view, federalism will be a major factor in thesuccess of the needed turnaround. Such change will require sharedresponsibilities involving the federal, state, and local governmentsplus the private sector. Significant changes in the relationshipsamong these actors have made the 1980s a decade of transition,diminishing federal influence on infrastructure issues.     

Congress and Reagan's New Federalism

This article analyzes the congressional response to the Reaganadministration's New Federalism proposals in terms of party,region, and constituency during Reagan's first term. While theCongress approved various spending cuts in grants to local andstate governments and in means-tested benefit programs to thepoor, even in 1981 when New Federalism initiatives enjoyed themost success, Congress terminated only one program, CETA publicservice jobs. A stalemate developed in 1982. The Reagan administrationand the congressional Republicans could not impose further majorspending cuts or program terminations, and the congressionalDemocrats could not restore the 1981 cuts or add new aid programs.Although the stalemate continued on New Federalism's dismantlingof aid programs as a grand scheme even into 1985, after PresidentReagan's reelection, Congress continued to approve incrementalcuts in overall spending, and the $200 billion budget deficitremained as a lever to force even greater cuts and program terminationsin the years ahead.     

Federalism and the European Parliament

The European Parliament has been a source of controversy sinceits inception. Its direct election was seen as endorsing a federalstructure and political future for the European Community (laterEuropean Union). Changes in its authority and legislative powerswere seen as symptomatic of creeping federalism and the emasculationof member states' national sovereignty. The European Parliament'sconscious contribution to developing federalism and constructinga federal Europe relate to its direct election, its powers,and its proposals to hold a constitutional convention. The Anglo-Saxonmisconception of federalism is analyzed, the role of a billof rights examined, and the failures of democratic legitimacyexposed with a view to see what contribution federal bargainsmay make to close the democratic deficit and to impel a reviewof the current institutional arrangements.     

Democracy,creeping socialism,and ideological socialism in rent-seeking societies

Rent-seeking societies suffer from a serious distortion of incentives. Incentives to engage in distributional struggles, to seek contrived transfers are strong, but incentives to engage in productive work are too weak. Stagnation and some unemployment should be expected. Long lasting democracies within unchanged borders create a permissive environment for rent-seeking. The provision of rents very much depends on government. The stronger the governmental involvement in the economy, the higher social security spending, the more rents the government is likely to generate. Therefore, creeping socialism understood as increased government control of the economy should reinforce the rent-seeking society and the corresponding negative effects on growth and employment. Whether such creeping socialism is backed by ideological socialism or not should make little difference for growth or employment. These ideas have been tested and partially supported by a 19 nation sample of industrial democracies, using data from the sixties and seventies. By and large, the rent-seeking approach is fairly successful in explaining national differences in economic growth rates, but receives ambiguous support or less for unemployment. Olson's (1982, 1983) proposition about the negative impact of long lasting democracy within unchanged borders on economic growth is much better supported than the growth-retarding effects of government revenues or social security spending are.