Revelation or revolution: a Gramscian approach to the rise of political Islam

This article seeks to conceptualise the contemporary phenomenon of ‘political Islam’, or Islamic fundamentalism as it is usually classified in the West. This paper takes the view that those movements that utilise the ideology of political Islam are not primarily religious groups concerned with issues of doctrine and faith, but political organisations utilising Islam as a ‘revolutionary’ ideology to attack, criticise, and de‐legitimise the ruling elites and the power structure on which their authority and legitimacy is based. Since the one‐party authoritarian state is the norm in most of the Middle East, only Islam has been able to provide the marginalised, alienated, and disgruntled masses with an oppositional force capable of articulating their specific grievances and general displeasure with these regimes. A Gramscian framework helps to demonstrate that these organisations classified as ‘political Islam’, and promulgated by the core Islamic scholars of the twentieth century, are authentic counter‐hegemonic movements focussed on the overthrow of these despotic regimes and the acquisition of political, economic, and social power.     

The origins of sectarianism in Egypt and the Fertile Crescent

This paper differs from previous studies in arguing that sectarianism has overwhelmingly been created consensually by/or as a result of the elites’ behavioral patterns. Religious or communal pluralism does not categorically lead to political sectarianism; The development of pluralism into political sectarianism can thus be adduced as dependent upon other factors—first and foremost the behavioural patterns of the elite. While the imperial legacy, theological controversies, and socio-economic gaps feed political sectarianism, in and of themselves they are insufficient to cause it. A survey of the history of Egypt and the other countries in the Fertile Crescent reveals that the development of political sectarianism or sectarian violence has been organically linked to elites' political behaviors and interests. sectarianism takes the form of the instrumental exploitation of a religious or communal identity or framework in order to enable political organization, the gaining of political legitimacy, the promotion of political change, or the preservation of the control held by interest groups. While in the eyes of many critics, sectarianism forms a striking example of the elites' intrinsic weakness, sectarianism is first and foremost a product of the elites’ quest for power.     

Planteamiento teórico y evidencia del desplazamiento gradual del Estado autoritario al Estado pragmático en México: la transformación de las élites

Analyses of political change in Mexico since the government shift achieved in July 2000 have been undertaken with a focus on the democratic political transition that led to the so-called alternation, that is, from the stance of a classical approach about State transformations that led from an authoritarian stage to democratization. Analytical approaches in Mexico concerning political change are focused on the undeniable democratic practice at the ballot boxes; however, the outcomes' transparency, the adoption of a new regime, and the procedural condition of the young Mexican democracy make it appropriate to consider this shift from the realist view of the exercise of power and major mechanisms for the establishment of élites' political-governmental decisions. Thus, pragmatism is put forward as an alternative political approach. This article intends to establish that political change in Mexico has gradually changed from its past condition as an authoritarian State to become a pragmatic State, favored by the advent of governmental technocracy, globalization, the market, the us hegemonic ideology, and the obvious involvement of corporate elites contained in State power institutions.     

The ideology of development and legitimation: beyond ‘Kazakhstan 2030’

The paper analyses the multifaceted discourse of development and nation-building in post-Soviet Kazakhstan. It addresses the regional clan–central elite relations and Nursultan Nazarbayev regime's legitimating agenda through the Kazakhstan 2030 Strategy for development. The economic developmental component in Nazarbayev's ideological discourses is primarily an exercise of control over regional economic and political elites and that helped building further legitimacy for the regime in various socio-ethnic constituencies on both the regional and central levels. Kazakhstan 2030 was deployed by the regime to substitute the Soviet version of ideology, legitimize the regime among various ethno-lingual audiences, and discipline the behaviour of regional elites. The paper shows how the study of elites’ interests can best explain the nature of national ideology and development projects.     

精英互动与缅甸的政治发展:2011年缅甸的政治与外交

2011年缅甸政府与国内外精英的互动有力地推动了缅甸的政治发展。通过与政治反对派的互动,政府修改了政党登记法,赢得了政治反对派的初步信任,为更广范围分享政治权力扫清了障碍。通过与少数民族武装的互动,政府赢得了少数民族武装的信任,与绝大部分少数民族武装签订了和平协议,为更公平地在民族间分享资源创造了可能。通过与外国政要的互动,政府赢得了西方国家的信任,西方开始逐步解除对缅甸的制裁,为缅甸生产和提供更好的公共产品提供了条件。政府叫停密松电站建设可以看做是缅甸政府与国内外精英互动的一个顺理成章的结果。2011年缅甸的精英互动与政治发展表明:即使为结构所限,精英的认知和互动也可以推动一个国家的政治发展。     

Nationalism and modernism in the East Turkestan Republic, 1933–34

This study explains the intellectual history and ideology of the Turkic insurgency and the East Turkestan Republic in Kashgar in 1933–34. Texts in periodicals from the period suggest that the insurgency was defined by its intellectual elites more as a nationalist enterprise than as a religious one. The insurgency's ideologists established important national attributes of the East Turkestani nation, particularly its national name, homeland, symbology, and history, and they also articulated East Turkestani national interests, particularly political independence, representative government, and modernization. Regardless of the arguably low degree of social penetration of the ideas of the elites among common society and the small extent to which policy was actually implemented, the intertwining of East Turkestani national identity and interests with political self-government and modernization was an ideological concept that had a profound impact on all subsequent administrations in Xinjiang.     

Re-confessionalising the Shi‘ites and the Druzes: The Failure of Secularism in Lebanon

This paper examines the history of the relations between the Shi'ite and Druze communities in independent Lebanon. Suggesting that these have turned on the issue of secularism, it argues that the attitude towards the state and its political structure has always taken front stage. Three stages in the relationship can be discerned: mobilization, cooperation, and political dissension. The defeat of the Left and the failure of the secular project constituted a historical watershed in the political behavior of both communities, leading to a regression to primordial loyalties and exclusivism. While this development reflects structural weakness and vulnerability amongst the Druze, amongst the Shi'ites it is indicative of increasing communal consciousness, growing empowerment, and the adoption of new strategies in the attempt to change Lebanese political reality. At the same time, the historical circumstances the two communities have experienced within independent Lebanon demonstrates that the confessional system continues to serve as an obstacle to the creation of a coherent and crystallized political community in Lebanon.     

Anomalous authoritarianism: what,which, why?

Research on autocracies has gained new momentum in the last decade. One element of this research is the observation that some autocracies are characterised by structural conditions that are normally conducive for democracy. These ‘anomalous autocracies’ have high levels of socioeconomic development and democratic neighbour countries. The study of these cases might expose factors that are decisive for autocratic stability and studying them might give us a better understanding of barriers towards democratisation. This paper contributes to the growing literature on autocracies by mapping anomalous autocracies during the third wave of democratisation, thereby paving the way for systematic case selection in future studies. A large-N analysis of 159 cases (1975–2008) identifies Belarus, Chile, China, Cuba, Morocco, North Korea, Peru, Singapore, Swaziland, Togo and Zimbabwe. In a second step, the paper lays out a theoretical framework that centres on actors and institutions. Rulers must establish elite–elite and elite–mass interaction, and this papers argues that they can do so through quasi-compliance of elites and the masses based on traditional institutions woven into a dominant party. The paper uses the framework to tentatively examine the resilience of authoritarian rule in Swaziland and Morocco, two most-different anomalous cases. In both cases, an elaborate traditional institution has co-opted government, business and rural elites and coordinated interaction within elite circles and with the masses, in turn enabling the remarkable regime resilience.     

Rural Transformations and Democracy in Northeast Thailand

ABSTRACT

This article analyses the underlying economic, social and political processes that contributed to democratic progress in the rural areas of northeast Thailand. After the 2006 military coup villagers in the region played an important role in anti-coup activities and actively demanded for democratic rule. To defend democratic rule, villagers not only opposed military intervention but also challenged elites, who they considered had masterminded the coup. The coup was a landmark change in terms of the relationship between the highest authority in Thailand and the rural masses. According to the Thai hierarchical order, villagers are regarded as inferior who must obey the elite. Any action that does not conform to this rule is considered morally wrong and to be punished. Why did rural dwellers dare to engage openly in political action that defied the hierarchical order? To comprehend such actions the article examines structural changes in Thailand’s countryside that released villagers from traditional bonds and enabled them to engage in a new form of political mobilisation. It is argued that the emergence of a democratic movement in the rural northeast is a result of two important processes: rural socio-economic transformations and political democratisation.     

FRAGMENTED COMMUNITY AND UNCONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENTS

Abstract

Since the beginning of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the Chinese have taken major steps toward repudiating accepted ideas of the superiority of western technology and the neutrality of science. In the West, the development of science and medicine within the capitalist system has led to the monopolization of science by elites. This is not an automatic result of scientific and technological advancement, as some western sociologists will have us believe. Rather it results from capitalist relations of production. In part, the Cultural Revolution was a great struggle to put human needs in control of science and technology, including medicine. The Chinese sought to tear down the system of hierarchical relations which developed with industrialization in the West and in the Soviet Union and which threatened to overwhelm China's socialist experiment as well. This cultural revolution promoted a political ideology in which acupuncture and other form's of traditional medicine could be studied and practiced as a science on par with western medicine because they meet the needs of the people—the basis for medicine within China's socialist context.     

Political culture,state elites and regional security in West Africa

This article analyses the dominant patterns of political culture among West Africa's state elites in an attempt to understand what standards, beliefs and principles they cherish. We suggest that although there are significant differences across the region's states, the dominant political culture can be characterised as neopatrimonial, that is, systems based on personalised structures of authority where patron–client relationships operate behind a façade of ostensibly rational state bureaucracy. In order to explore these issues the article proceeds in four parts. After providing a definition of political culture and why it is an important topic of analysis, we examine the central characteristics of the political culture held by state elites in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) region. The section ‘The Nigerian factor’ briefly discusses some of the malign effects that this culture has had upon governance and political economy issues in the regional giant, Nigeria. The final section explores whether the region's elites are living up to their own claims that they are embarking upon a serious attempt to engage in state reconstruction or are instead simply searching for alternative ways to sell their more traditional concern with regime protection. We conclude that, without a fundamental recasting of the political culture guiding the region's elites, a security culture that prioritises democracy and human security is unlikely to emerge within ECOWAS.     

Las élites neoliberales en México: ¿cómo se construye un campo de poder que transforma las prácticas sociales de las élites políticas?

The recomposition of Mexican political elites during the 1980s overlaps with the transformation of a development model that shifted from a basically protectionist and nationalistic model to a neo-liberal and open-oriented one. Such a switch has implied far-reaching changes in the social practices of political elites. Based on a record that contains each high-rank official during the 1988–2014 period, the mechanisms having established a transnational power network crossing from one presidential term to the next are reviewed, as well as those factors that favored the organization of a power field increasingly focused on the border between the national, regional and global spaces. Some of those mechanisms include the international historical context; the creation of working teams with a basically neo-liberal worldview; the trajectories of the high-rank officers; the reforms that have been driven; the fluent transit among public and private positions, and the highly varied relationships established between this group of officials and transnational actors and organizations. It is concluded that the elites’ new social practices do not only hamper and challenge the creation of public goods and autonomous structures with the capacity of planning according to the general interest, but they also encourage institutional depredation.     

Anti-Americanism and Public Attitudes toward Transatlantic Trade

The recent debate about the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) has triggered widespread opposition to the trade agreement in Germany. It is not clear, however, what factors drive public attitudes toward transatlantic trade. This article explores the role of anti-Americanism in predicting attitudes toward TTIP among the German public. It argues that the impact of anti-Americanism depends on the extent to which political elites frame the TTIP proposal as a basic conflict between American and European values. Using data from two national representative surveys, it is found that attitudes toward America strongly predict support for the TTIP agreement. The results further demonstrate that the effect of national resentment is moderated by issue awareness, with citizens with a strong anti-American sentiment being significantly more likely to oppose the agreement if they follow the elite debate more closely. Taken together, the results suggest that national resentments are more important for the explanation of TTIP preferences than traditional factors such as partisanship, ideology and material concerns.     

Ripe for Cooperation or Rivalry? Commerce,Realpolitik, and War Memory in Contemporary Sino-Japanese Relations

Abstract

Sino-Japanese political relations, fraught with disputes and tension during the Koizumi years, only began to recover after Abe came to power. This article investigates the driving forces shaping recent and future bilateral relations. Using evidence from the Koizumi era, I argue that 1) bilateral commercial links prove a weak stabilizing factor for political relations; 2) the current distribution of power between China and Japan does not dictate their strategic rivalry, but they may still treat each other as rivals if they perceive the danger of long-term power transition and mutual hostile intent; 3) the frequent flare-up of bilateral history disputes can exacerbate mutual threat perceptions among elites and generate popular emotional pressure for hard-line government policy toward the other country. The future of Sino-Japanese cooperation heavily depends on their efforts to resolve the negative historical legacy.     

台湾海归与台湾政治

对20世纪80年代以来台湾历任最高领导人及各部委第一负责人最高学历的分析统计显示,在美国、欧洲地区各国及日本名校获得高学历之海归人士,已经构成台湾政坛的精英主体。本文梳理台湾政坛海归的基本构成、比例及影响,剖析台湾海归在台湾政治中具有的特殊软实力,同时也指出他们的政治软肋,评介台湾当局成文与不成文的相关政策法规,深化对海归参政之现实意义的认识。     

Is Irrigationalism a Dominant Ideology in Securing Hydrotopia in Mekong Nation States?

ABSTRACT

For over six decades, grandiose proposals calling for significant expansion of public irrigation schemes have been commonplace throughout the Mekong region, irrespective of the political configuration or developmental stage of each state. From Pol Pot’s Democratic Kampuchea to Thailand’s military and quasi-democratic regimes, irrigation has figured prominently on development agendas. Mainstream narratives around irrigation are embedded in a technocentric, developmental and nationalistic discourse, incorporating socially pre-conditioned beliefs and values that closely reflect the rhetoric of state-linked elites. This article critically examines some of the narratives employed by key actors and groups to justify ongoing practices and processes of irrigation development, focusing on Thailand and Cambodia. It seeks to look beyond conventional econometric and instrumental drivers, to consider other socio-political factors that may account for irrigation’s critical role as a “technology of control,” but which are rarely examined across comparative national contexts. Further, it proposes a dominant ideology of irrigation developmentalism or “irrigationalism” as a useful concept in explaining certain aspects of contemporary social power in these nations. State-led irrigation may be perceived as a utopian intervention that aids in the emergence of an effective monopolistic authority and control by bureaucracies and other powerful groups over development decision-making processes and silencing opposition.     

乌克兰民粹主义的特征及影响(2000-2019年)

乌克兰自独立以来,政治民粹主义伴随其政治经济转型进程不断蔓延加剧。进入21世纪,虽然民粹主义政党和运动出现仅十几年,但乌克兰已然成为后苏联空间中遭遇民粹主义浪潮席卷的突出案例。在经历了2014年的政治危机和持续的顿巴斯冲突后,乌克兰政治逐步进入了民粹主义全面盛行的新阶段。乌克兰民粹主义相较整个欧洲区域具有一些显著的特征,主要表现在:反精英和反建制的极端化,强烈的反民主属性和家长制政府偏好,分裂矛盾的意识形态,过度渲染和营造社会危机,以及盲目的区域一体化期待。究其成因,可归结于该国历史上对统治精英"外来化"的认知,独立后缺乏新的民族国家认知与主流意识形态,"团结主义"的政治文化传统,以及整个社会对阶层分化和等级制度的共识。这种特殊的民粹主义,将对乌克兰政治持续产生一系列负面影响。     

新加坡人民行动党政府的社会控制方式

本文从制度环境、制度安排、政策和策略等方面对新加坡执政的人民行动党及其政府如何处理与其它政党、社群组织和普通选民的关系和社会控制方式进行了分析。指出在制度设计上,它是一个存在一定程度多元制衡的一党独大的以行政为主导的软权威主义的政体。在处理与反对党的关系方面,执政党的基本原则是一方面对其严格限制和控制,采取一切“合法的”手段把其摒弃在国家权力之外,另一方面则保证其在一定程度上的发言权,以对执政党进行一定程度的监督、反映不同的利益和政见。在处理与社群组织和选民的关系方面,其基本原则是通过推行国家合作主义的政策把人民群众纳入执政党所设定的政治发展进程之中;实行一种具有多元利益表达和一定民主性的、提倡体制内合作的自上而下的制度;人民行动党在联系群众方面已经形成了高度制度化的联系机制,尤其是这种机制不是一味迎合人民群众的眼前需要,而是着眼于其长远利益。     

Half measures and incomplete reforms: the breeding ground for a hybrid civil Society in Ukraine

Abstract

In the space of 24 years, Ukraine has experienced three ‘revolutions’: the revolution for independence, the ‘Orange Revolution’ and the ‘Dignity Revolution’. On each occasion the event has been lauded as a triumph of democracy over authoritarianism and as evidence that Ukraine will soon be able to assume its rightful place as a free, democratic state in Europe. On two out of three occasions the reverse has occurred; while the people have taken to the streets to protest against flagrant corruption and abuse of power, the oligarchs have responded with only minor changes to the political system. The reins of political and economic power have remained firmly in their hands, and Ukraine’s prospects for political and economic development have deteriorated. The Dignity Revolution of 2014 is seen as different from preceding revolutions because civil society appeared to be much more active and it has succeeded, in part, in maintaining pressure on government for reform. It is important to understand, however, that despite periodic and dramatic demonstrations of outrage over the corrupt and authoritarian practices of the political elites, civil society has generally been classed as apathetic, weak and ineffectual. Thus, the current challenge for Ukrainian civil society is to overcome its own limitations so that it can better hold government to account.