缅甸华人身份认同与政治参与的代际变迁

在传统缅甸华人社会中,“在商言商”、“远离政治”的诤言与理念成为其族群生存与发展的重要准则。缅甸老一辈华人一直向后辈灌输参与政治的危险性,以及华人曾经卷入政治运动的惨痛记忆与深刻教训。这种角色定位与缅甸华人的身份认同密切相关。然而,在近年来缅甸云谲波诡的政治变幻中,缅甸新生代华人表现出与其父辈完全不同的政治风貌与政治姿态。特别是在2021年缅甸军人再次接管国家政权的背景下,许多新生代华人纷纷涌向街头,积极表达民主诉求。新生代华人的身份认同也出现了较为显著的变化。探讨缅甸华人身份认同和政治参与的变迁,是理解缅甸华人社会以及缅甸政治发展趋势的重要维度,并为进一步探究缅甸民族国家建构中新生代华人的身份与角色提供了理论空间。     

政治发展理论观照下的缅甸2009

本文从政治发展的角度对2009年缅甸发生的主要政治事件进行了简要的分析.本文认为,2009年缅甸军政府对果敢地区武装的强制收编为未来政府权力的规范运行扫清了一个主要障碍;军政府与昂山素季及其领导的全国民主联盟之间关系的缓和则为缅甸人民带来了福音.二者都有利于缅甸的政治发展.     

非政府组织和印尼的政治改革

非政府组织经常被看作是充满活力的公民社会的基础。对于发展中国家的政治、社会发展来说,非政府组织至关重要。关于这一点,印尼这个东南亚地区的最大国家体会得相当深刻。本文将通过探讨苏哈托政府时期印尼非政府组织的生存发展,展示非政府组织在发展中国家政治发展中的杠杆作用。     

身份认同视域下的缅甸“罗兴伽人问题”探析

缅甸若开邦罗兴伽人的生存与发展引起全球关注,而对罗兴伽人的介绍、分析绕不开一个话题——身份问题。作为一个群体,罗兴伽人存在族群身份和公民身份两种角色。从族群特征来看,罗兴伽人的族群特征是明显的,且族群认同较高。但从1982年《缅甸公民法》来看,罗兴伽人未被承认为缅甸本土少数族群,亦未被赋予公民身份。由此带来的问题是,原本广泛存在于世界上多族群国家的族群认同与公民认同之间的矛盾在罗兴伽人身上演变为另一对事实上的矛盾:罗兴伽人处于一个内部较高的"自我假定"的族群身份认同与未被"他者赋予"族群身份、公民身份之间的矛盾。这一矛盾使当前罗兴伽人身份认同陷入尴尬境地。     

缅甸非政府组织反坝运动刍议

近年来,缅甸政府大力推动水电开发,中国、泰国、印度等国也积极参与其中。然而缅甸非政府组织主导的反坝运动已成为缅甸水电开发的重要阻碍,也损害了各参与国的经济利益。本文对缅甸非政府组织反坝运动的基本观点及行动方式作了初步的描述和分析,并从中国的立场出发提出因应之策。     

精英互动与缅甸的政治发展:2011年缅甸的政治与外交

2011年缅甸政府与国内外精英的互动有力地推动了缅甸的政治发展。通过与政治反对派的互动,政府修改了政党登记法,赢得了政治反对派的初步信任,为更广范围分享政治权力扫清了障碍。通过与少数民族武装的互动,政府赢得了少数民族武装的信任,与绝大部分少数民族武装签订了和平协议,为更公平地在民族间分享资源创造了可能。通过与外国政要的互动,政府赢得了西方国家的信任,西方开始逐步解除对缅甸的制裁,为缅甸生产和提供更好的公共产品提供了条件。政府叫停密松电站建设可以看做是缅甸政府与国内外精英互动的一个顺理成章的结果。2011年缅甸的精英互动与政治发展表明:即使为结构所限,精英的认知和互动也可以推动一个国家的政治发展。     

缅甸政治“轮回”:合法性竞争与政治共识的瓦解

2021年2月1日军人接权后,缅甸国内出现了反抗者与军人政权竞争政治合法性的现象,对此既有文献尝试从“民主与专制的竞争”“社会革命夺取缅族精英政权”或“本质上的权力斗争”等角度进行分析,但解释力均存在不足。实际上,这种竞争源于缅甸建国后“先天不足”的政治共识缔造。三部宪法都未能通过宪政凝聚各方认同,两派缅族精英的政治共识不断瓦解,引发他们在国家权力与军事权力支配、政治经济与社会认同、国际认同与个人魅力上的竞争。2021年军人接权后,军政府与反抗者集团继承了历史上两派精英的合法性来源,反抗者集团虽然实力锐减,却仍具备与军政府在各领域竞争合法性的能力。只要缅族精英无法重塑政治共识,周而复始的合法性竞争将继续造成军人干政的“轮回”困境。     

缅甸族群冲突与族群和解进程探究

自执政以来,缅甸民盟政府尽管倡导并积极推进“21世纪彬龙会议”,但目前取得的成效有限。缅甸持续近70年的族群冲突问题是多种因素不断累积造成的。整体而言,这些因素主要包括根源性的历史一殖民因素,结构性的国家制度因素,不同时期累积起来并得以持续的族群政策,以及族群武装组织本身的一些因素。目前来看,缅甸尚未完全具备通过政治谈判来解决族群冲突问题并真正实现族群和解所需要的主客观条件。因此,采取有效措施实现对族群冲突的有效规制,创造各种支持族群和解的条件,对于继续推进缅甸族群和解进程具有重要的作用。     

国际身份危机与缅甸军人接权后的外交困局

缅甸在军方重新接管政权两年多来，国内危机持续外溢，在国际上遭受西方制裁等危机。既有文献从军方合法性、反对派动员和大国博弈的角度去解读，但仍难以系统诠释缅甸危机的僵局所在，也即缅甸内部政治互信与国际信任赤字相互叠加的结果。缅甸在政权更迭后，无法由内而外塑造“我群”共识，与国际行为体产生难以调和的认知歧异，继而生成了多重身份危机，包括遭受制裁、难以“重新融入国际社会”的转型身份危机，难以继续融入“东盟大家庭”的地区身份危机，以及与大国关系失衡的中立身份危机。缅甸的国际身份在2011—2020年的转型十年间逐步明晰，而在2021年转型受挫后，外交困局也随之而来。通过案例分析发现，缅甸看守政府改善外交处境的前提是努力确保国际身份清晰化，同步争取外部共识。鉴于中短期内缅甸难以确证转型身份和中立身份并回归“正常国家”,通过“东盟方式”重塑地区身份仍是最不坏的选择。     

网络政治意识形态身份认同及其路径选择

网络政治意识形态身份认同是身份政治认同的组成部分,又具有自身的特性。网络政治意识形态身份认同包括两部分:网络主流政治意识形态身份认同和网络非主流政治意识形态身份认同。网络主流政治意识形态与非主流政治意识形态都存在着解构与重构、共识与断裂、信任与质疑的可能性与现实性,增加了网络政治意识形态身份认同的复杂性。网络政治意识形...     

Political opposition and the challenges of a dominant party system: The democratic alliance in South Africa

The African National Congress enjoys a position of leviathan-like dominance in South Africa. In official opposition stands the Democratic Alliance whose support has risen considerably since South Africa's first democratic elections in 1994. The white electorate strongly favours the party over its main rival, the Freedom Front Plus. The coloured community in the Western Cape has also given the Democratic Alliance its support. Although the party has done well in attracting the support of ethnic minority groups it has not been so successful among the African electorate. In accounting for the success of the Democratic Alliance this article considers three themes: firstly, the reasons why white voters, especially Afrikaners, shifted their support to the party; secondly, the brand of South African patriotism now used by the party to promote the primacy of a non-racial South African identity; and finally, the party's understanding of political opposition and the obstacles that exist to it making further electoral progress.     

Imperialism and Democracy: Convergence and Divergence

This article explores two models of non-state education provision in Myanmar (Burma), in order to draw conclusions regarding templates for ethnic education regimes in this fast-changing country. Ethnic Armed Groups in Myanmar have developed education systems in the context of long-running armed conflicts. This paper examines two such regimes. Karen communities struggle with few resources to educate their children. Despite great difficulties, the Karen National Union has developed a curriculum based upon one Karen dialect, which is employed in about 1,000 schools. Graduates of this education regime are mostly unable to speak fluent Burmese, or to integrate with the Myanmar tertiary education system; they are orientated towards a Karen national identity, rather than Myanmar citizenship. However, with the beginnings of a substantial peace process, Karen educators will need to re-think their implicitly separatist agenda. A comparative case study is offered by the Mon ethnic minority. The New Mon State Party has had a fragile ceasefire since 1995. Some 270 Mon National Schools provide Mon language instruction at elementary levels, shifting to Burmese at middle school. As the Mon Schools follow the government curriculum, with extra classes in Mon language and history-culture, graduates are able to matriculate and enter the nationwide tertiary education system. We argue that the Mon experience can be a useful model for education reform in a transitional Myanmar, as political and civil society leaders negotiate a more decentralised state.     

From Rebels to Rulers: The Challenges of Transition for Non-state Armed Groups in Mindanao and Myanmar

This article presents a critical comparison of the ongoing peace processes in the southern Philippines and Myanmar (Burma). It does so by examining two key armed groups: the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) on Mindanao, and the Karen National Union (KNU) in Myanmar. We identify common elements that help to explain the relative – albeit incomplete – success of these two groups in navigating their respective peace processes. The MILF and KNU are ethnonationalist armed groups struggling for self-determination against states that are experienced by ethnic minority communities as culturally alien, and economically and politically dominant. Both conflict actors are characterized by complex combinations of “greed” and “grievance” factors but nevertheless enjoy significant (albeit contested) political legitimacy among the communities they seek to represent. We explore the complex relationships between armed ethnic groups, conflict-affected communities, and civil society actors. We argue that engagement with civil society is a key element of success in the Mindanao peace process, which could be replicated in Myanmar. We examine the roles and changing nature of the state in the Philippines and Myanmar, and contrast the degrees of international involvement, as key variables in these peace processes. We observe that negotiations of comprehensive peace settlements are threatened by “the tyranny of elections” in Myanmar (2015) and the Philippines (2016), and observe the importance of including national parliaments in peace processes in a timely manner. The peace process between Manila and the MILF represents a rare example of a Muslim minority pursuing its political objectives through structured dialogue. The article focuses on the challenges faced by armed groups moving from insurgency to reinvent themselves as credible political actors and governance authorities. Our analysis draws on peace-building literature, specifically the phenomenon of “rebel governance.”     

Inside the Karen Insurgency: Explaining Conflict and Conciliation in Myanmar’s Changing Borderlands

Since 2012 Myanmar’s oldest ethnic rebel group, the Karen National Union (KNU), has sought for considerable rapprochement with the government. To many, this seemed to be the direct outcome of wider political transition in Myanmar. This article proposes an alternative explanation. Based on extensive field research and an emerging literature on armed groups, it demonstrates that the group’s rapprochement with the government was driven by leadership struggles between two rival factions within the KNU. At the core of this contestation are shifting internal power relations, which resulted from military pressures and geopolitical transformations in the Myanmar-Thai borderlands. These findings point to significant shortcomings of Myanmar’s peace process. They also contribute to the field of Conflict and Security Studies with much needed primary source data on the internal politics of insurgency, which shows how dynamics of civil war are driven by an interplay between forces on different levels of analysis.     

The Transition from Armed Opposition to Electoral Opposition in Central America

After the third wave of democratization swept much of the world during the late twentieth century, many armed opposition groups disarmed and transformed themselves into political parties. This paper explores the electoral performance of four Central American parties that have roots in armed opposition movements. It finds that the Sandinista National Liberation Front in Nicaragua and the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front in El Salvador, which achieved the greatest success during their revolutionary periods, have also had the most success in electoral competition. The Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unit and the Democratic Unification Party of Honduras, which trace their roots to relatively less successful armed opposition groups, have struggled in elections. Organizational factors, especially the number of combatants and popular support during the conflict, tend to provide a better explanation than institutional factors for the initial success of these groups as political parties.     

SPLM–NCP asymmetrical power relations jeopardise the implementation of the CPA and the future of the Sudan

ABSTRACT

The political instability that has characterised Sudanese politics since independence is attributable to political exclusion, economic neglect and marginalisation. Discrimination based on religion, language and culture has constituted the main contradictions between the masses of the Sudanese people (periphery) and the politically dominant Arabised Nubians (centre) in all the different politico-ideological hues experienced by the nation. Attempts to resolve this contradiction have left the structural imbalances inherited from the colonial administration of the Sudan intact. This explains the resurgence of war, particularly in Southern Sudan. The recent peace agreements between the National Congress Party (NCP), namely the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A); the Darfur Peace Agreement with the Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLM) (Minawi); the Cairo Agreement with the National Democratic Alliance and the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement with the Eastern Sudan Front, have left the NCP still in firm control of the oppressive state machinery. The CPA power-sharing protocol awarded the NCP a majority which institutionalises a power asymmetry that the NCP utilises to obstruct implementation of the CPA and delay the process of democratic transformation.

This article analyses the asymmetry in the NCP–SPLM partnership and power relationship. It assumes that the tragic death of Dr. John Garang de Mabior is a major cause of the political weakness demonstrated by the SPLM since 2005. This power imbalance jeopardises the CPA implementation and the future of the Sudan as a state.     

Addressing Myanmar’s Citizenship Crisis

Among many problematic issues surfacing in reformist Myanmar is a citizenship crisis with four main dimensions. First, in a state with fragile civil liberties, skewed political rights and limited social rights, there is a broad curtailment of citizenship. Second, Rohingya Muslims living mainly in Rakhine State are denied citizenship, and other Muslims throughout the country are increasingly affected by this denial. Third, designated ethnic minorities clustered in peripheral areas face targeted restrictions of citizenship. Fourth, the dominant Bamar majority concentrated in the national heartland tends to arrogate or appropriate citizenship. The result is growing social tension that threatens to undermine the wider reform process. To examine this crisis, the article sets Myanmar in a comparative context. In particular, it considers how multicultural states in the developed world have sought to manage a political switch from racial or ethnic hierarchy to democratic citizenship. Drawing on global experience with multiculturalism and enabling civic integration, it advances a series of policy options focused on rights, duties and identity. It argues for domestic political leadership, backed by global political support, to address Myanmar’s citizenship crisis.     

KONY'S MESSAGE: A NEW KOINE?THE LORD'S RESISTANCE ARMY IN NORTHERN UGANDA

The article offers a sketch of Joseph Kony's Lord's ResistanceArmy (LRA) both in historical perspective and in a wider frameworkof the world system. The authors discuss the different stagesand content of Acholi nationhood, from vague notions in pre-colonialdays, through the building of an ethno-military identity duringthe colonial period, until the Acholi heyday after Obote II.The second period can be described as Acholi-hood on the defensive.Initially, the campaign of resistance fought by the Acholi-dominatedUganda People's Democratic Army (UPDA) still fits into standardconceptions of political resistance. However, social collapseeventually gave birth to Alice Lakwena's Holy Spirit Movementand finally to the LRA. Possessed of a charisma bordering onthe prophetic, Kony has forged a new vision of Acholi-hood,based on individual salvation and purity. This ‘biblical’vision of political redemption, at first sight an inward-lookingstrategy, is making this movement extremely vulnerable to outwardmanipulation.     

Putting violent armed conflict in the center of the Salween hydropower debates

Regional economic integration has become the dominant development pathway promoted, endorsed, and followed by many developing country governments in South East Asia and globally. Focusing on hydropower development, this article shows how forces of globalization manifested in the Myanmar government’s strategies to promote economic growth are shaping the Salween River basin’s development trajectory. Contesting the general belief that economic development would help the country’s transition to full democracy and achieve peace, it illustrates how hydropower development plans in the basin are closely interlinked with human rights issues. Well known for its long histories of violent conflict involving the Myanmar military and ethnic armed groups in various states, hydropower development in the Salween River is not only linked to the ongoing peace process in Myanmar but could also have direct implications on the actual significance of the process. Despite the signing of nationwide ceasefire agreements in 2012, hydropower dam projects could contribute to and trigger reoccurrences of violent armed conflict. Recognizing this conflict-prone and politically fragile condition as the main characteristics of Salween water governance is essential if we are to strive for sustainable and just development.     

Signs of life in Myanmar’s nationwide ceasefire agreement? Finding a way forward

This article focuses on peace-building efforts in Myanmar implemented under the Nation Wide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in 2013. It assesses the ways in which the recently elected government led by the National League for Democracy (NLD) has dealt with the NCA, and highlights opportunities and challenges. I argue that while the NLD government and Myanmar military remain crucial to the success of peace efforts, implementation of the NCA is impossible without the support of the eight current NCA signatories, in particularly the Karen National Union (KNU). Neglecting the importance of these actors not only provides an incomplete picture of ongoing peace-building efforts, but could also undermine efforts to promote national reconciliation that have thus far focused exclusively on the Myanmar government and the military. These signs of life emanating from the NCA signatories, however, have increasingly been undermined by an official failure to implement the agreement and to adhere to the agreed process and by ongoing hostilities between the military and four of the country’s ethnic armed groups.