Committed to Coordination? Intergovernmental Councils as a Federal Safeguard

In this research note, I suggest that the design of intergovernmental councils (IGC) accounts for the extent to which they are able to prevent the federal government from encroaching on subnational jurisdictions. IGC operate in areas of interdependence where the federal government faces incentives to restore to hierarchical coordination. The effect of the intergovernmental safeguard is measured by the absence or presence of federal encroachment. Two concepts are useful to explain it: the extent to which governments are committed to coordination and the dominance of the federal government of vertical IGC. I argue that different combinations of the two variables help to understand the safeguarding effect of intergovernmental councils. In particular, I contend that in any configuration in which federal dominance is present the federal government can encroach on subnational jurisdictions. The research note shows how the concept of federal safeguards can be applied empirically.     

Changes in the Partisan Composition of the Swiss Government. 1891, 1919, 1929, 1943, 1959, 2003, …?

After almost half a century of an unchanged distribution of seats among political parties in the federal government (Federal Council), the Swiss executive has experienced a new change in 2003. This change follows up on other changes in the past which occurred at irregular intervals. The question we wish to address in this paper is how these changes related to the electoral fortunes of the political parties. We find that electoral success does not translate directly into seat gains in the executive. A lag of up to two elections provides the best predictor. Thus, the rapid concession of a second seat to the SVP in 2003 is an outlier compared to the previous changes in the partisan composition of the Swiss government.     

Logics of action and models of capitalism: Explaining bottom‐up non‐liberal change

Recent institutionalist scholarship has theorized the liberalization or “disorganization” of capitalism as the result of shifts in economic actors' “logic of action” towards opportunism. Little attention has been given to the reverse possibility that shifts in economic actors' “logic of action” away from opportunism might contribute to “embedding” or “organizing” capitalism. This paper builds on recent scholarship to theorize this scenario and then demonstrate its empirical validity with an historical institutionalist study of the emergence of such a “non‐liberal” institution in Switzerland in 1961. The theoretical framework links three “logics of action” – opportunism, enlightened self‐interest and strong solidarity – to Höpner's typology of capitalist institutions – organized, coordinated, and liberal. It theorizes the interactions between these logics and the social mechanism – goal signaling – that can explain a shift from one logic of action to another, potentially leading to change from one type of institution to another.     

Do Provincial Governors Control National Legislators? Quasi-Experimental Evidence of Argentine Federalism

Do governors control the behaviour of legislators from their provinces and parties in the national congress? The aim of the article is to test gubernatorial subnational political influence on national legislators. I first discuss the problems of the logic behind empirical exercises that measure the legislative influence of governors. Then the study tests gubernatorial influence using quasi-experimental evidence from Argentina, a federalism that bears all the hallmarks for governors to be central actors in the legislative arena. The results support the hypothesis that governors influence the behaviour of legislators from their provinces and parties in the national congress.     

Die Ausgaben der Schweizer Kantone ‐ Eine Fuzzy Set QCA

The paper investigates the factors influencing the 26 Swiss Cantons' government expenditures. While the question has been subject to various statistical analyses, the present study has an alternative focus by adopting a configurative perspective. We take the findings of the 2002‐study by Vatter and Freitag, as our point of departure and re‐analyse their significant variables with regard to their combined impact using updated data from 2000 to 2006 and employing Fuzzy Set QCA. The results underline the important effect of monetary transfers from the federation thus corroborating the Flypaper Effect thesis from Economic Theory.     

Constitutional Barriers as Limitations to State Activity

The study deals with constitutional constraints and examines which constitutional limits or barriers set by ordinary law are effective against too much public policy. Are these limits useful to block the level and the growth of expenditures, taxation and public debt? Starting points of the analysis are historical considerations on past experiences with constitutional constraints. In a second step a typology of constitutional and legislative barriers will be presented and discussed. These barriers can be distinguished between quantitative and procedural constraints. Empirical findings for different countries as well as for the European Union will be presented. Finally, empirical results will be derived from a pooled cross sectional regression, where several factors are regressed on the annual deficit. It turns out that limits on taxation and expenditure limitations (TEL) as well as limits on public debt have pros and cons. These will be assessed on the basis of the empirical findings. A clear result of the comparative research points to the efficiency in blocking public policy, i.e. spending, taxation and the public debt. This entails that the main target of such rules is usually achieved.