Objectivity versus outrage

He wrote a background paper for the Committee on Health Care for Homeless Persons, “The Dynamics of Homelessness.” He has studied both the needs of homeless persons and the development of shelters and services for the homeless; he codirected a training tape for service providers; and he is coauthoring a book for shelter staff. He is author of Organization in a Changing Environment.     

Populism versus Democracy

This article provides a comparative conceptual analysis of the logic of populism and the logic of (constitutional) democracy. Populism is defined as a thin-centered ideology which advocates the sovereign rule of the people as a homogeneous body. The logic of this ideology is further developed in reference to the work of Carl Schmitt and is shown to generate all the characteristics typically ascribed to populism. The logic of democracy is analyzed on the basis of the work of Claude Lefort and defined as a regime in which the locus of power remains an empty place. This analysis replaces the widespread model of constitutional democracy as a paradoxical combination of a constitutional and a democratic pillar. This two-pillar model fails to appreciate the internal coherence and some of the main features of the (constitutional) democratic logic. Thereby, the two-pillar approach gives rise to an understanding of populism as continuous with the democratic promise of constitutional democracy. In contrast, our analysis explains populism as the closure of the empty place of democracy. This highlights the antagonistic discontinuity between the logic of populism and the logic of democracy.     

Neo versus new isolationism

the latter was published by Transaction.     

Polarized preferences versus polarizing policies

Much of contemporary political debate in the United States focuses on the issue of polarization: specifically, its causal antecedents and its consequences for policymaking and political conflict. In this article, we argue that partisan preference polarization—conventionally defined as the difference in the favored policy positions of legislators from the two major parties—is not a sufficient statistic for potential political conflict in national politics . Rather, a well-defined measure of potential conflict must take into account (1) the locations of status quo policies and proposed alternatives; and (2) the shape of underlying utility functions. We propose measures of the likely contentiousness of a given status quo policy and of a proposal to move that policy. We then demonstrate the usefulness of these measures using estimates of utility function and final passage vote parameters on enacted legislation from the 111th US Senate (2009–2011).     

Being tough versus being fair

Among his books are The Social Psychology of Social Movements; Violent Men; Reforming Human Services; Living in Prison;and, with Kenneth Adams and J. Douglas Grant, Coping: Maladaptation in Prisons.     

Issue management: process versus progress

• Of all the tools and techniques applied within the field of public affairs and corporate communication, Issue Management is undoubtedly the one which most often attracts excessive process at the expense of real progress. Understanding the causes and sources of this over‐emphasis on process is important to the long‐term success of issue management as an effective tool.
• That understanding is also important to the development of Issue Management models which promote an optimal balance between following a disciplined approach and formulating creative and original solutions.

Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Collective versus unilateral responses to terrorism

Global terrorism presents collective action issues for targeted nations. Proactive measures (e.g., preemptive strikes) against terrorists create external benefits for all at-risk nations. In contrast, defensive actions deflect attacks to softer targets, thereby giving rise to external benefits to protected foreign residents and external costs to venues abroad. Coordinated antiterrorism measures are particularly difficult to achieve when many nations must participate and nonparticipants can undo the efforts of others. Thus, freezing terrorists’ assets or abiding by a no-negotiation pledge pose difficult collective action problems. These same concerns do not plague decisive action against domestic terrorism.