Characteristics of successful and unsuccessful insanity pleas

Thirty men acquitted not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) were matched on type of violent crime and compared to 30 men who unsuccessfully raised the insanity defense. Demographic, legal process, and psychological variables were compared. Eighty percent of successful acquittees previously had been found incompetent to stand trial, compared to only 33% of those found guilty and sentenced to prison. Ninety-six percent of NGRI acquittees opted for trial before a judge rather than a jury; 76% of cases raising an unsuccessful defense were heard in front of a jury. Unsuccessful attemptees also had significantly higher IQ scores and personality profiles characterized by acting-out potential and intact reality testing compared to profiles of NGRIs. The ability of the legal system to identify those meeting criteria for the insanity defense is discussed.     

The insanity defense

Changing thelegal test definition of insanity remains the remedy of choice when insanity outcomes appear problematic, despite empirical studies showing no significant differences among tests. An alternative strategy suggests changing theverdict schema, although critics contend that jurors will reach compromise verdicts that are unconscionable and incoherent. Undergraduate subjects (N=179) rendered insanity verdicts and ratings for four insanity cases using one of four different verdict schemas: a traditional two-choice schema, a three-choice schema (DR) without instructions, a threechoice schema (GBMI) with instructions, and a sequential schema proposed by Finkel (1988) that separately assesses different types of culpability. When internal consistency measures between verdicts and broad ratings and specific construct ratings of the defendant were examined, the sequential schema produced the highest internal consistency, reducing the most error variance and yielding the highest prediction criterion of any of the schemas.     

The military insanity defense

This article describes the military insanity defense. The success of the litigated insanity defense is explored through the number of insanity acquittals over a 28-month period. A questionnaire distributed to all United States Army psychiatrists provided information on the number of forensic evaluations performed, the number of not criminally responsible (NCR) opinions made, and the disposition of noncontested NCR opinions. The questionnaire also tested the Army psychiatrists' knowledge about recent changes in the military insanity defense. This pilot study raises interesting questions about the military insanity defense that further research can address.     

The insanity defense to suicide

The certification of suicide as the manner of death can result in either the complete loss or a significant reduction in life insurance benefits to the victim's survivors. It is, thus, not uncommon for these beneficiaries to contest suicide as the manner of death. Insanity is a recognized defense in law against suicide. It is recognized in law that, in some cases, an insane man cannot intentionally destroy himself. However, it is also recognized that life insurers can exclude suicide by an insane man from coverage. This article discusses the common law doctrines upon which the insanity defense to suicide is based, with references to judicial opinions from cases which involve contested suicides and the issue of insanity.     

The death-qualified jury and the defense of insanity

We predicted that people who are excluded from serving on juries in capital cases due to their opposition to the death penalty (excludable subjects) tend to place a greater value on the preservation of due process guarantees than on efficient crime control, and therefore are more likely to accept an insanity defense in criminal cases than are people who are permitted to serve on capital juries (death-qualified subjects). Subjects who had previously been classified as death-qualified or excludable read four summaries of cases in which the defendant entered a plea of insanity, and made judgments of guilt or innocence. In the two cases involving nonorganic disorders (schizophrenia), death-qualified subjects were significantly more likely than excludable subjects to vote guilty; in the two cases involving organic disorders (mental retardation and psychomotor epilepsy), there were no differences between the two groups. In addition, excludable subjects gave significantly higher estimates than death-qualified subjects of the proportion of defendants pleading insanity who really are insane.     

The insanity defense: asking and answering the ultimate question

The authors address the main questions in the insanity defense debate: Should it be abolished? Should psychiatrists participate as expert witnesses? Is the profession damaged by such testimony? Is there a logical leap between providing psychiatric findings and providing an opinion to the ultimate question? Because the free will/determinism model underlying the current insanity defense positions can be used to argue either side of the debate, it does not supply any rational answers. The authors reframe the discussion, using a systems approach, and suggest answers to these questions that are in line with the clinical realities and on a firmer philosophic ground.     

精神分裂症患者病理性“正当防卫”行为的研究

目的探讨病理性防卫对精神分裂症患者凶杀行为的影响及相关犯罪学的特征。方法以61例具有病理性防卫行为的精神分裂症患者凶杀案为研究组,以73例无病理性防卫行为的精神分裂症患者凶杀案为对照组,采用犯罪学调查表进行调查分析。结果具有病理性防卫行为的精神分裂症患者凶杀案中幻觉（χ2=5.69,P〈0.05）及被害妄想（χ2=28.87,P〈0.01）多见;作案动机以病理动机突出（χ2=50.22,P〈0.01）,很少出现现实动机（χ2=15.57,P〈0.01）,案发时行为的紧迫性十分明显（χ2=63.17,P〈0.01）;刑事责任能力评定为无责任能力者明显多于对照组（χ2=16.12,P〈0.01）;疾病诊治情况,研究组未经诊治情况较多见（χ2=5.09,P〈0.05）。结论病理性防卫与正当防卫理论存在某些相同点,在具有病理性防卫行为的凶杀案中,借鉴正当防卫理论,对评定刑事责任能力具有一定的参考价值。     

The insanity defense in Shelby County,Tennessee

The purpose of this investigation was threefold: to document the number of cases in Shelby County, Tennessee where an insanity defense was possible: to follow cases through to disposition to determine what percentage of defendants use the defense successfully; and to examine the type of charges for insanity cases. Of the 25.000 individuals processed through the Criminal Courts. 685 (2.7%) were referred for insanity evaluations and 45 defendants (6.6%) were returned to the court with a recommendation from the Midtown Mental Health Center's Forensic Team that an insanity defense was possible. Of the 45 insanity defendants identified, 49% (n=22) pleaded guilty, 31% (n=14) went to trial, and 20% (n=9) were dismissed. Overall, 22% (n=10) of the insanity defendants were adjudicated not guilty by reason of insanity. Thus, of all defendants processed (25,000), 04% (n=11) were adjucated not guilty by reason of insanity. While no one type of offense predominated, two general categories were observed: murder and related offenses (33%) and property crimes (27%). The findings are discussed with reference to procedures for handling insanity cases in Tennessee and the position that extreme caution should be exercised before investing substantial resources to effect sweeping changes in laws that effect so few criminal defendants.     

Myths of the insanity defense: Inherent and procedural obstacles

Often societies perceptions can be shaped by the media not only by what it reports but by how it is reported. This article discusses the impact that the American media has had on the social perception that the insanity defense is too often successfully used to avoid legal and criminal culpability. Many of the procedural obstacles associated with the assertion of an insanity defense are poorly understood or ignored. The article further address some of the less attractive characteristics associated with the assertion of the insanity defense that are not procedurally founded but nonetheless serve as an impediment the wide spread use of the defense. In conclusion the insanity defense is submitted as an unavoidable necessary evil in a civilized society that incarcerates its criminals.     

Schizotypal personality disorder and the insanity defense

What constitutes a "mental disorder" for purposes of the insanity defense? Does mental disorder denote any diagnosable condition listed in the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders? Is a mental disorder a disturbance wherein the functional criteria of the appropriate insanity law appear to be met? Or does insanity law define mental disorder apart from functional criteria of insanity? The answer to the last question is that some insanity laws attempt to define or qualify mental disorder, but many do not. Unclarities in the law leave room for unnecessary disagreements between expert witnesses even before the functional criteria for insanity are to be addressed. The potential for confusion is compounded when the defendant's disturbance is ambiguous, amphibious, or both. Schizotypal personality disorder is offered as an example of such a disturbance, and inferences are discussed.     

The insanity defense: effects of abolition unsupported by a moral consensus

The insanity defense reflects the moral judgment that some criminal defendants do not deserve criminal sanctions because of mental incapacity. This Note examines the alternative formulations, such as guilty but mentally ill and diminished responsibility, that some states have enacted in the face of growing controversy over the insanity defense. It observes that the alternatives, if used in lieu of the insanity defense, distort the criminal law and do not comport with the legal doctrine of responsibility, which eschews punishing mentally ill defendants. The Note concludes that the insanity defense should not be abolished unless the moral consensus changes regarding the criminal responsibility of mentally ill defendants.     

Demythologizing inaccurate perceptions of the insanity defense

Public opinion data show that the most prevalent concern expressed regarding the insanity defense is that it is a loophole through which would-be criminals escape punishment for illegal acts. This article examines the extent to which the public's perceptions of the insanity defense are consistent with newly collected empirical data. Specifically, it compares perceptions of the use, success, and outcomes associated with the insanity defense to data derived from a large-scale study of insanity pleas in eight states. The analysis reveals that the public overestimates the use and success of an insanity defense and underestimates the extent to which insanity acquittees are confined upon acquittal. The role of selective media reporting in the formation of public perceptions is discussed.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1992 meetings of the Society for the Study of Social Problems. Special thanks go to John Monahan and Joel Dvoskin for reviewing an earlier draft and to Sharon Steadman for providing editorial comments.