Characteristics of successful and unsuccessful insanity pleas

Thirty men acquitted not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) were matched on type of violent crime and compared to 30 men who unsuccessfully raised the insanity defense. Demographic, legal process, and psychological variables were compared. Eighty percent of successful acquittees previously had been found incompetent to stand trial, compared to only 33% of those found guilty and sentenced to prison. Ninety-six percent of NGRI acquittees opted for trial before a judge rather than a jury; 76% of cases raising an unsuccessful defense were heard in front of a jury. Unsuccessful attemptees also had significantly higher IQ scores and personality profiles characterized by acting-out potential and intact reality testing compared to profiles of NGRIs. The ability of the legal system to identify those meeting criteria for the insanity defense is discussed.     

A comparison of insanity defense standards on juror decision making

Following the Hinckley acquittal, 17 states and the federal government made changes to the insanity defense, including revising the standard, reassigning the burden of proof, and altering the standard of proof. Two studies were conducted to determine whether the specific insanity standard (including the assignment of burden of proof and standard of proof) employed had a significant effect on mock jurors' verdicts. Participants' comprehension of insanity defense instructions was measured and the factors jurors used to decide whether to find the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) were also assessed. Participants' comprehension of insanity defense standards was very low. When asked to identify the factors they considered important in determining whether to find a defendant NGRI, only three elements of insanity defense standards were identified as significant. The results may have important implications for policy decisions regarding the insanity defense.     

Forensic psychiatric inpatients served in the United States: regional and system differences.

This research note presents data about regional and system variations in psychiatric inpatient services for forensic patients provided in state operated psychiatric inpatient programs in the United States in 1986. Patient census by legal status and service provision information were collected from state forensic directors. In 1986, about 5,400 patients found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) and 3,200 patients found incompetent to stand trial (IST) were being served in state operated inpatient units. About 70 percent of both groups were being served in designated forensic beds. There were wide differences among the states in the volume and rates for NGRI, IST, forensic exams, and dangerous civil patients (DCP). The regional analyses revealed large variability among states within each region.     

Decision making and examiner bias in forensic expert recommendations for not guilty by reason of insanity

Source of nomination (prosecution, defense, judge) was varied in a fictional not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) case distributed to 180 community forensic evaluators in a state employing theM'Naghten rule. Differences among examiners by appointment for the final NGRI judgment was not significant; interrater reliability for psychopathological symptomatology was .73. Discriminant analysis revealed significant differences in the decision-making process between evaluators recommending sanity and those endorsing insanity, as well as between psychiatrists and psychologists.     

Demythologizing inaccurate perceptions of the insanity defense

Public opinion data show that the most prevalent concern expressed regarding the insanity defense is that it is a loophole through which would-be criminals escape punishment for illegal acts. This article examines the extent to which the public's perceptions of the insanity defense are consistent with newly collected empirical data. Specifically, it compares perceptions of the use, success, and outcomes associated with the insanity defense to data derived from a large-scale study of insanity pleas in eight states. The analysis reveals that the public overestimates the use and success of an insanity defense and underestimates the extent to which insanity acquittees are confined upon acquittal. The role of selective media reporting in the formation of public perceptions is discussed.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1992 meetings of the Society for the Study of Social Problems. Special thanks go to John Monahan and Joel Dvoskin for reviewing an earlier draft and to Sharon Steadman for providing editorial comments.     

Implicit theories of criminal responsibility

Three questions relevant to insanity decisions were examined: (a) What informational cues are weighed most heavily in the attribution of criminal responsibility? (b) How do verdict forms influence these attributions? And (c) How do individuals' beliefs about insanity and responsibility influence decision making? Undergraduate subjects (n=181) responded to vignettes portraying an act by a mentally disordered defendant. Psychiatric jargon was avoided, so that attributions were not a function of diagnostic terminology. It was found that, under the traditional scheme of not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) vs. guilty, level of mental disorder (schizophrenia vs. personality disorder) was the primary determinant of insanity decisions. Also, insanity judgments were more likely to be made for acts performed without planful intentionality. Under the alternative scheme of NGRI vs. guilty but mentally ill (GBMI) vs. guilty, mental disorder still controlled NGRI verdicts; a bizarre act increased the likelihood of a GBMI over a guilty verdict; and the GBMI verdict option reduced markedly the proportion of psychotic defendants found NGRI and the proportion of personality disordered defendants found guilty. There were no significant differences between diagnostic groups in the likelihood of being found GBMI. Most subjects preferred to utilize the GBMI option as a compromise verdict even in the face of very severe mental illness. Attitudinal data revealed considerable variation in agreement with the classic moral logic of the insanity defense and accounted for a significant amount of the variance in insanity decisions. The implications for both social policy and future research are discussed.     

Not guilty by reason of insanity: a research note

The question of the insanity defense centers around the moralist-determinist debate. Insanity defense laws are premised on the assumption that individuals choose between right and wrong, and are responsible for that choice. Mental disease, however, can overpower, and thus, not of their own volition, insane persons become out-of-control. Hence, they cannot be held responsible for their behavior or subject to criminal punishment. It is the purpose of the insanity defense, of course, to distinguish between offenders in need of punitive disposition and ones where a medical-custodial disposition is best. The research presented here indicates that defendants who successfully raise the plea of NGRI do not beat the rap. In other words, they do not spend fewer days in confinement via an NGRI plea than had they been convicted and sentenced. Thus, for the reasons of justice, equity, and fairness the insanity defense should be kept intact. The wave of public fear and reaction to the decision in a few highly publicized cases is insufficient grounds for eliminating the plea. Not only is the use of the insanity defense infrequent, but defendants who select it give up important safeguards. Namely, they are unable to plea bargain, are stigmatized as "mad and bad," have no access to probation or parole, and are confined for an indeterminate amount of time. That some would call this leniency we find surprising. And, of course, we should not forget the findings reported here. NGRI acquittees spend more time being locked up. Defendants who successfully raise the NGRI plea are confined until professionals say they are no longer dangerous.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)     

Punishment or treatment?

Although there is strong support among the general public for providing insanity acquittees with mental health treatment, it is also believed that insanity acquittees should be punished when they break the law. Prior studies of the lengths of confinement of insanity acquittees have yielded inconsistent results. This article draws upon a large-scale, multistate study of insanity pleas to explore the question: Is society able to withhold punishment against persons acquitted of criminal charges due to insanity? Results indicate that offense seriousness is a more important factor than mental disorder in determining the lengths of confinement of persons foundNot Guilty by Reason of Insanity and that persons found guilty are more likely to be released without ever having been confined than persons acquited by reason of insanity. Implications for invoking offense seriousness as a primary criterion in assessments of dangerousness are discussed.     

Detention Patterns of Successful and Unsuccessful Insanity Defendants

This study examines the detention patterns of the insanity defendant who is successful with the plea and hospitalized, or unsuccessful and incarcerated. Further comparisons are made with felony defendants who never entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI). From existing data it is unclear to what extent detention may vary if the plea is successful as compared to if it is not successful. Of all defendants who entered a plea of NGRI in Erie County, New York (Buffalo) between 1970 and 1980, 128 were institutionalized as a result of their disposition. Sociodemographic, institutionalization histories, arrest, and disposition information were collected and analyzed for all 128 individuals. The research evaluates differences in the likelihood and length of either institutionalization or incarceration and in the rates of release between successful NGRI defendants, those who entered the plea unsuccessfully, and those who did not plead NGRI. From the findings reported here the authors conclude that pleading NGRI in Eric County may not be quite as advantageous for a defendant as commonly is believed.     

Measuring the effects of the guilty but mentally Ill (GBMI) verdict

We studied effects of guilty but mentally ill (GBMI) legislation on use of the insanity defense in Georgia using data on all defendants entering an insanity plea before (1976–1981) and after (1982–1985) the introduction of the GBMI verdict. In contrast to earlier studies, our results indicated that GBMI did decrease the likelihood of an insanity verdict and affected the composition of those found not guilty by reason of insanity. Defendants pleading insanity and found GBMI were typically white males with a serious mental disorder, charged with murder or robbery in which an unrelated female victim was involved. The data also indicated that defendants who pleaded insanity and were found GBMI received harsher sentences than their guilty counterparts. We conclude that the GBMI verdict will make the insanity plea a less appealing option for mentally ill defendants.     

Defendants pleading insanity: an analysis of outcome

The authors examined the cohort of all defendants pleading not guilty by reason of insanity over a 12-month period in Baltimore City's superior trial court. During that time, 143 of the 11,497 defendants indicted (1.2%) pled not criminally responsible. Fourteen of those defendants (10%) were subsequently found not guilty by reason of insanity. The authors found marked agreement between the prosecution and defense with only two cases leading to full trials where the issue of insanity was argued. The evaluating physician's opinion as to criminal responsibility and Axis I diagnosis, and the most serious underlying charge discriminated between those defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity and those defendants found guilty or not guilty by the court. Other demographic factors such as age, number of dependents, educational level, severity of illness, and criminal background did not discriminate between the two groups.     

The social construction of criminal responsibility and insanity

This study examines the effects of judicial instructions (traditional American Law Institute [ALI] not guilty by reason of insanity [NGRI] instructions contrasted with ALI instructions supplemented with the guilty but mentally ill [GBMI] alternative) and case information cues (delusional content and planfulness) on student and community subjects' attributions of responsibility. GBMI instructions substantially reduced the probability of NGRI and guilty verdicts in response to vignettes portraying highly psychotic defendants and altered the pattern of variability in responsibility construal ratings. Variation in delusional content cues (self-defense versus non-self-defense) influenced ratings of criminal appreciation but did not affect the verdict distributions. Less planfully commited crimes resulted in higher proportions of insanity verdicts. However, individual differences in responsibility construals of the defendant and in attitudes toward the insanity defense were stronger predictors of verdicts than the design variables, suggesting that individual differences in social-moral cognition are at least as relevant to the attribution of responsibility as are case cues or legal frames of reference. Contrary to previous studies,Witherspoon death penalty attitudes were not related to verdicts, but people without conscientious scruples toward the death penalty were more likely to render guilty verdicts.     

Criminal defense counsels,district attorneys,and the insanity plea: A modest difference of opinion

This research examines differences between samples of 166 city and county prosecutors and 118 defense attorneys from Virginia, Tennessee, and Kentucky concerning their views toward the insanity plea in felony cases. Currently, tests for insanity used by the states are the M’Naghten rule, the ALI Model Penal Code test, and the Smith “irresistible impulse” test or combinations thereof. Defense counsels greatly favor the prosecution bearing the burden of proving a defendant’s sanity, while a majority of prosecutors believe that this is the defense counsel’s responsibility. Twenty-five percent of the prosecutors surveyed believed that it is the prosecutor’s responsibility to show by clear and convincing evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendants are sane and capable of bearing the responsibility for their crimes alleged. Philosophical and practical arguments about the burden of proof issue are examined. Preferences of defense counsels and prosecutors for different insanity tests are explored, finding that a majority of attorneys favor the more recent ALI test.     

Insane Sex Offenders: Psychiatric and Legal Characteristics of Sexual Offenders Found Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity

There is little known about sexual offenders hospitalized under forensic commitment statutes such as not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI). We conducted a chart review to delineate the demographic, clinical, and legal characteristics of NGRI sexual offenders (n = 68) committed to the California Department of State Hospitals—Napa, including 41 found NGRI for a sexual offense and 27 found NGRI for a nonsexual offense. The two groups did not differ significantly in their demographics, psychiatric diagnoses, victim characteristics, or recidivism risk as measured by the Static‐99R. Those found NGRI for a sexual offense were older at the time of their first criminal and first violent offense, younger at the time of their committing offense, and had fewer prior total convictions and sexual offense convictions. These findings may indicate that sexual offenders found NGRI for a sexual offense are less antisocial than those found NGRI for a nonsexual offense.     

Insanity plea

Examining 484 consecutive criminal cases in which the NGRI plea was made, it was found: (1) a high degree of interexaminer agreement existed on the issue of the defendant's mental state in a nonadversary examination procedure; and, (2) court verdicts were highly congruent with the opinions expressed by examiners on the issue of insanity.     

How jurors construe “insanity”

Historically and currently, jurors who have rendered verdicts in insanity cases have themselves been criticized and maligned-accused of being simplistic and biased, of lacking understanding, and of disregarding or nullifying the judge's instructions. Are the critics right? In this study, 263 mock jurors (141 adults and 122 students) were asked to decide four insanity cases without instructions, using their own best judgment, and to identify the determinative facts for them, and the meaning of those facts. Those determinative factors were then categorized, using a seven construct schema for NGRI and guilty verdicts. The results show that jurors do make discriminations among cases in terms of constructs, and that these constructs are relevant, complex, and flexible; furthermore, the jurors' lay constructs of insanity are more complex than the legal constructs of insanity. The “simplism,” it seems, lies not with the jurors but with the insanity tests.     

Military combat, posttraumatic stress disorder, and criminal behavior in Vietnam veterans

Although data are inconclusive, popular perception has linked military combat, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and criminal behavior. This paper discusses the multifactorial elements of this association that include both conscious and unconscious parameters of psychologic functioning. Testimony on combat-related PTSD has been presented in the courtroom to support veterans' claims of not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) and diminished capacity and for consideration during judicial sentencing. Because there is a known connection between the degree of combat involvement and PTSD, verification through collateral sources of the veteran's report of combat experiences is an important component of forensic assessment. The DSM-III-defined diagnosis of PTSD and the presence of a dissociative state have particular relevance in NGRI determinations. In other aspects of the judicial process demonstration of the absolute presence or absence of PTSD is often irrelevant and should be replaced by efforts to establish plausible links between provable combat experiences and the circumstances of the crime.     

The insanity defense: effects of abolition unsupported by a moral consensus

The insanity defense reflects the moral judgment that some criminal defendants do not deserve criminal sanctions because of mental incapacity. This Note examines the alternative formulations, such as guilty but mentally ill and diminished responsibility, that some states have enacted in the face of growing controversy over the insanity defense. It observes that the alternatives, if used in lieu of the insanity defense, distort the criminal law and do not comport with the legal doctrine of responsibility, which eschews punishing mentally ill defendants. The Note concludes that the insanity defense should not be abolished unless the moral consensus changes regarding the criminal responsibility of mentally ill defendants.