Looking Out for Our Indigenous People: The Canadian Experience

Respected Elders Djerrkura and Dodson, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon. My Aboriginal name is Pad8gi Pai8, which means 'Coming Thunder' in the Abenaki language and I am a member of the Odanak Band of the Abenaki First Nation. I want to acknowledge and thank the traditional caretakers of the land we stand on today, the Larrakia People Meegwetch. I am truly honoured to be here with you today and want to take this opportunity to thank the Institute of Public Administration Australia (IPAA) and the Commonwealth Association for Public Administration and Management (CAPAM) for inviting me.     

More on measuring budget-related rent-seeking: A comment

We wish to thank the Israel Center for Social and Economic Progress, Jerusalem, for supporting our work on this topic.     

Modeling government behavior in collective bargaining: A test for self-interested bureaucrats

This paper tests for self-interested behavior by local-government bureaucrats engaged in collective bargaining with public employee unions. A theoretical model is developed that shows the effect of Niskanen-style bureaucratic self-interest in the two standard bargaining models: the demand-constrained model and the efficient-bargain model. These predictions are then tested using national cross-section data on unionized police, fire, and sanitation workers.We wish to thank the Institute for Government and Public Affairs at the University of Illinois for its support of this research. Also, we thank Larry Kahn, Fran Blau, and Pablo Spiller for useful comments. Errors, of course, are ours.     

Lobbying and the measurement of conventional welfare cost

I would like to thank Michael Ormiston, Janet Smith and Scott Smith for several helpful discussions.     

Rent seeking and hidden in-kind resource distortion: Some empirical evidence

We wish to thank John Jackson, Robert Hebert, Gordon Tullock and an anonymous referee for helpful comments on earlier draft of the paper.     

Superdissipation

I thank James M. Buchanan for a helpful discussion. The usual caveat applies.     

Political competition and the Roman Catholic schools: Ontario,Canada

I would like to thank E.G. West and an anonymous referee for their careful criticism of an earlier draft of this paper. The usual disclaimer applies.     

The elements of candidate reputation: The effect of record and credibility on optimal spatial location

We build a model of two-candidate elections in which voters judge candidates on the basis of how well their announced campaign positions correspond with their records. Given different records, the candidates will adopt different campaign positions. Two types of reputational advantage are analyzed: proximity of the candidate's record to the median voter's ideal point, and the range of campaign positions that a candidate may adopt and still retain some credibility with the voters.An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the annual meetings of the Public Choice Society, Tucson, Arizona, 17 March 1990. The authors thank William Dougan and Brian Roberts for some helpful comments in the formative stages of this paper, and express our gratitude to Jay Dow for providing admirable research assistance. We also wish to thank Henry Chappell and William Keech for their discussant comments at the Public Choice meetings.     

A comparison of incumbent security in the House and Senate

The authors would like to thank Charles Bullock, Evelyn Fink, Kevin Grier, Paul Johnson, Benjamin Page, Brian Roberts and Eric Schonsberg for their assistance. Any remaining errors are the sole responsibility of the authors.     

Temporal regulation and intertemporal substitution: The effect of banning alcohol at college football games

We would like to thank Art Blakemore, Stuart Low, Dennis Hoffman, Robert McCormick, David Laband, John Lott and Skip Sauer for helpful comments; Arizona State University Director of Athletics, Charles Harris, for providing game data; and Bill Crowder for research assistance.     

An expanded approach to analyzing policy-minded candidates

A random pivot model is used to expand the theory of policy-minded candidates. Previous results (Wittman, 1977, 1983; Cox, 1984; Hansson and Stuart, 1984) are derived under weaker assumptions. New results about candidate strategies in multiple elections are also obtained. The thrust of these results supports Calvert's (1985) finding that office-seeking and policy-mindedness are countervailing forces in election contests.Delivered at the 1989 Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, GA, 31 August–3 September 1989. An earlier draft of this paper was delivered at the Public Choice Society Meetings, Orlando, FL, 17–19 March 1989. I would like to thank Chuck Cameron, Don Wittman, and Henry Chappell for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I am greatly indebted to Gary Cox for his helpful suggestions in revising this paper. I would also like to thank three anonymous referees.     

City Officials and General Revenue Sharing: Attitudes, Perceptions and Implications for Future Intergovernmental Policy

This article describes the 1972 State and Local Fiscal AssistanceAct(General Revenue Sharing), its perceived impact on city expenditures,its impact on the attitudes of city officials, and GRS's implicationfor future intergovernmental policy. Using data from nine yearsof an annual survey to chief executives in cities with over50,000 population, we conclude the program's most importantcontribution was in the general attitudes it fostered amonglocal officials. Our analysis indicates that GRS remains extremelypopular with urban chief executives and that its impact variesamong expenditure categories and cities. We conclude that theReagan administration may be able to develop viable policy alternativesbecause of the lack of consensus among many city officials whoalso exhibit varying degrees of support for the president'sproposed policies. In addition, the consensus which characterizedthe public interest groups in prior years may be eroding, andthis could create greater possibilities for policy change. ^* We would like to thank Tracey Gladstone and Eila Pakkanenfor their coding assist-ance. Ilese Hoyniak provided data processingassistance. We would like to thank Purdue University for providingcomputer time and other assistance.     

Governmental policy preferences and foreign capital allocation: The case of China

This paper compares the determination of foreign direct investment and World Bank loans in China, with a focus on the role of its government. The statistical analysis reveals that World Bank loans responded sensitively to the major regional policy changes since the mid-1990s, but foreign direct investment did not. These findings pose an analytic challenge to the “strong” version of the state-centered approaches to the politics of economic development represented by the developmental state literature. However, they lend support for a “weak” version of the state-centered approaches developed by American political scientists Stephen Krasner and Theda Skocpol. He has taught comparative and international politics in Nankai University, China, Kent State University, and Walsh University. He is currently working on his dissertation about the political economy of foreign aid in China. The author wishes to thank Dr. Dennis Hart and Dr. Steven Hook and the three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on early versions of this paper. The author also wishes to thank Brian Juliao for his linguistic help.     

Competition in procurement

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Twelfth Annual Research Conference, Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management, October 18–20, 1990, San Francisco, California. I would like to thank Richard Stubbing, Patrick Larkey, and an anonymous referee for many useful comments. All errors are the responsibility of the author.     

Citizens’ Perceptions of Governance in Rural and Urban China

This article presents three main findings from a purposive stratified survey of urban and rural residents. First, Chinese citizens “disaggregate” the state with high levels of satisfaction for Central government that fall dramatically as government gets closer to the people. Satisfaction levels are noticeably lower for those in rural China. Second, attitudes about the way policy is implemented by local governments raise concerns. Irrespective of place of residence, respondents feel that when implementing policy local officials and governments are mainly concerned with their own interests, are more receptive to the views of their superiors rather than those of ordinary people, favor those with money, and are formalistic in implementing policy rather than dealing with actual problems. Third, the areas of work that citizens would really like government to concentrate on are job creation and providing basic guarantees to protect against the shocks of the transition to a market economy. Tony Saich is the Daewoo Professor of International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University and Director of the Harvard University Asia Center. His recent research focuses on the development of social policy in China, particularly on the provision of public goods by local governments. His publications include Governance and Politics of China by Palgrave and edited volumes on Financial Sector Reform in China (with Yasheng Huang and Edward Steinfeld) and AIDS and Social Policy in China (with Joan Kaufman and Arthur Kleinman both by Harvard University Asia Center. He would like to thank Edward Cunningham for his great help in preparing this article. He also wants to thank Victor Yuan (Horizon Market Research Company) for his tremendous help in designing the survey and implementing it. In addition, I would like to thank Anita Chan, Martin King Whyte and two anonymous reviewers for their extremely helpful comments on an earlier draft.     

Rationality between the maximizers and the satisficers

It is argued that by explicating rationality in terms of benefits balancing or outweighing costs instead of in terms of maximizing or satisficing something, a more adequate view of rationality is obtained.I would like to thank Myles Brand, Hugh Lehman, Michael Martin, Ian Mitroff, Michael Ruse and Gordon Welty for their thoughtful comments and encouragement.     

Voting for ‘Sin’ in Kansas

We would like to thank our colleagues Nancy Snyder and William Terrell for comments and suggestions. The assistance of Ron Farha and Michael Webb is gratefully acknowledged, as is the patience of the staff in the Elections Office of the Office of the Secretary of State, Topeka, Kansas. Any errors or omissions are, of course, the responsibility of the authors.     

Can it start small, but end big? expanding social assistance in South Africa

Generating heated politics in South Africa is a proposal to introduce a universal basic income grant, known as “BIG”. The “gaps” in the existing system of social assistance grants have caught the attention of activists and politicians across the political spectrum. Most concur on the need to expand the system, but the issue of how its “gaps” should be closed is a matter of great political divergence. To cast light on the significance of these debates, I show how the system's “gaps” are more complicated than measurements of poverty and inequality may suggest. Following the social and economic relations that develop around social grants, my analysis foregrounds a tension in the existing assistance system. Social grants provide a critical source of income for recipients and their kin, assisting them to confront the challenging realities of current labor market conditions. At the same time, social grants act as conduits for historical forces to articulate with local conditions and reshape relationships between citizens, the state, and the market. This tension points to the ambiguity of the BIG proposal and of its potential to engender a larger transformation. My research in South Africa was supported by grants from the Human Rights Program and the Richter Fund at the University of Chicago. I would like to thank the South Africans I interviewed at welfare offices and legal advice centers about the social assistance system and the experience of receiving grants. I also thank Makhotso Pholosi, Tebogo Segale, Pumi Yeni, the staff at the Legal Resources Centre in Pretoria, and my advisors, Jean Comaroff and Jennifer Cole. A version of this paper was presented at the 2002 conference of the U.S. Basic Income Guarantee Network and I thank the members of the panel on the South African Basic Income Proposal for their input.     

Circumventing formal structure through commitment: Presidential influence and agenda control

Although the formal institutional structure that defines the temporal order of play in a policy game between the Congress and President ought to provide Congress with agenda power, the President is traditionally treated as the dominant player in this relationship. We show that if the President can make clear-cut commitments, presidential commitment can counter the dominance hierarchy and the complexion of equilibrium outcomes. Thus, the details of political interactions (in particular, the possibilities for commitment) may be as important as the formal specification of institutional structure.We thank Peter Aranson, David Austen-Smith, Ed Campos, Gerry Faulhaber, Art Frank, Ken Koford, William Riker, Janet Pack, the anonymous referees, and seminar participants at the University of Delaware, the University of Pennsylvania, and the University of Rochester for helpful comments, subject to the usual caveat. We also thank Joel Friedlander and Harold Dichter for research assistance.     

Perestroika and public choice: The economics of autocratic succession in a rent-seeking society

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Public Choice Society Meetings, Tucson, AZ, March 1990, and at the Austrian Economics Colloquium at New York University, September 1990. We would like to thank the participants at our session, and those at the Colloquium, for their comments and criticisms. In addition, Hal Hochman, Israel Kirzner, Mario Rizzo, Charles Rowley, Robert Tollison, Gordon Tullock, and an anonymous referee provided useful comments and criticisms. The usual caveat applies.