反洋教斗争:文化冲突乎?排斥进步文化乎?

所谓“‘义和团反洋教活动起因是中西文化冲突’,是‘排斥进步的西方文化’”的观点,既无史实依据又无理论根据.基督教等西方宗教并不是当时西方国家的进步文化;少数传教士以“传教”为幌子,推行的是本国政府的对华文化侵略政策;传教士强迫中国民众接受西方宗教文化由此引发的“文化冲突”,实质上是中国民众对西方殖民文化的反抗;传教士在华开办学堂、创办报纸等活动确实传播了某些西方进步文化,但这并非传教士的主体活动,且“教案”冲突也并非因此引起.     

A dangerous game: Deng and the intellectuals

This article examines one aspect of China's “second revolution” led by Deng Xiaoping: the relationship between the post‐Mao leadership and the intellectuals, who were the most persecuted during the “Cultural Revolution.” When Deng took power in 1978, one tough challenge was to mobilize China's well‐educated men and women for the nation's modernization. New policies toward them were introduced to rekindle their enthusiasm in creative and critical academic activities. The anticipation of a new period of cooperation between the authorities and the intellectuals was, however, dashed by the bloodshed in Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989. Why did Deng, who sought the support of Chinese intellectuals for his modernization program, side with the Party's hard‐liners to order the military crackdown on pro‐democracy demonstrations? Will China's post‐Mao leadership no longer need the intellectuals’ help? This article argues that the Communist Party of China has been playing “a dangerous game of cooperation” with the intellectuals. Despite the tragic events, the game is likely to continue as long as the CCP proceeds with its modernization program and the intellectuals maintain their sense of mission. What remains uncertain is how the next round of game will be played out and who will emerge as the winner.     

老病新医:近代中国乳腺癌的治疗变革、知识传播与社会认知

乳腺癌是一种女性容易罹患的恶性疾病。在西方医学传入中国之初,外科手术的安全性和疗效有限,中国人"不敢损伤身体"的传统观念影响西医侵入式疗法在中国的推广。传统中医在乳腺肿瘤诊疗方面的悠久历史和丰富经验仍在发挥作用。西医治疗手段要被中国民众接纳,不仅取决于技术本身,还取决于社会文化因素的嬗变,特别是传统身体观念的突破。20世纪30年代后,伴随对"乳房"的关注和各种渠道对于乳腺癌知识的传播,部分民众建立起乳腺癌"早发现,早治疗"的意识。加之手术和放疗技术的发展,西医治疗逐渐为民众接纳。但在中国不同地区,乳腺癌认知和治疗依然呈现巨大差异。近代中国乳腺癌的治疗变革和知识传播接受,为理解当代中国癌症防治的成就和局限提供了历史视角。     

Dispelling misconceptions about the red guard movement: The necessity to re‐examine cultural revolution factionalism and periodization

This paper argues that the Chinese Communist Party's 1981 official definition of the “Cultural Revolution” was a gross distortion of historical reality. In presenting the “Cultural Revolution” mainly as one of power struggle among the ruling elite, the official version denies that there were serious conflicts within society. It also covers up the fact that a main thrust of the violence in 1966–69 was directed against what the Rebel Red Guards called “the bureaucratic class” or the “red capitalist class”. The re‐periodization of the “Cultural Revolution” from three years (1966–69) to ten years (1966–76) was a conscious attempt to try to obfuscate what actually happened in the years from 1966 to 1969.

By manipulating historical facts, even today the CCP is able to continue to suppress members of the Rebel Faction, who had led in challenging the ruling authorities in the Sixties. The last major suppression of rebels took place in the mid‐Eighties in the political campaign to “Weed Out the Three Types of People”. The Party was able to do so with ease because Chinese society has accepted its distorted version of Chinese history.

The article ends by poiting out how this distorted history of the Cultural Revolution has had a pernicious effect on the democracy movement in China.     

A “greater China“?

This paper sees “Greater China” as a would‐be reunited China that includes the present PRC, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao. The coming into being of a “Greater China” hinges on future domestic politics in the PRC and Taiwan and among the triangle of Beijing‐Taipei‐Hong Kong. It also hinges on American, British, and Japanese policies addressing the current trends of economic integration and political accommodation among the three Chinese entities. Of the external variables, future U.S. politics toward the PRC, and toward the evolution of political exchanges on the Beijing‐Taipei trajectory will be the most decisive. Economic and political developments in the past fifteen years have brightened the prospect of Chinese reunification, but national reunification remains a complicated and protracted process.     

The maid of Chinese politics: Mao Zedong and his philosophy of struggle

The basic law of dialectics is the unity of opposites. It is natural for Marxists to stress opposites rather than unity, for it advances the doctrine of class struggle. Mao adopted Lenin's proposition that the unity of opposites is transitory, while the struggle of opposites is absolute. However, both Lenin and Mao failed to see the logical inconsistencies between this proposition and the law of the unity of opposites.

Stalin, who disagreed with the concept of “identity of contradiction,” asserted that the process of development is achieved through combat rather than harmony. Mao at first disagreed with this philosophy and advocated the unity of opposites. This accounted for the polemic of “the identity of thinking and being” in China, from 1959 to 1962.

However, in 1964, Mao launched a campaign to criticize “two combined into one “ and to propagate his own idea of “one divided into two.” The chief reason for this was that Mao needed an ideological legitimization for the schism with the USSR. This was a turning point in Mao's philosophy, for it implied the abandonment of the “unity of opposites” and a retreat towards Stalin's viewpoint. Ultimately Mao devised his “philosophy of struggle” to serve as the guiding philosophy for the Cultural Revolution.     

China's human rights development in the 1990s

The literature on human rights in China is dominated by incriminating documentation of abuses and a lack of theoretical consensus. But China's continuing economic reform has meant the need for Western industrialized countries to adjust their human rights policies on China. Emerging is the shift from the “sanction/isolation” approach to what some would call “positive engagement,” which is aimed at improving China's human rights situation through more international contact. In China, human rights development in the early 1990s can be characterized by the increasing use of Chinese law, and within that legal limit, a more open exercise of dissent and free speech as a basic human right, together with its adverse consequences.     

“人民至上”对共产党人初心使命三个向度的诠释

共产党人的初心使命是为中国人民谋幸福,为中华民族谋复兴,它以马克思主义理论为思想起点,以人民立场为价值取向,以共产主义为目标归宿。新时代“人民至上”从这三个向度对共产党人的初心使命进行了进一步的深刻诠释,以不断与时俱进精神坚守马克思主义,实现马克思主义中国化的丰富和发展;以不负人民印证初心使命,凸显全心全意为人民服务的宗旨;以人民利益为先贯彻落实治国方略,不断推进实现民族复兴的伟大梦想。“人民至上”使共产党人初心使命的思想起点更加深厚科学,价值取向更加明确清晰,目标理想更加庄重赤诚。解析“人民至上”是明确共产党人初心使命本质的一种阐释,也让我们对百年来共产党人初心使命的坚守与传承有了更加透彻的领悟,有助于未来道路上转化为强大动力,使中国共产党始终得到人民拥护,永远立于不败之地。     

民族先进精神与中华民族的伟大复兴

民族先进精神是中华民族取得民族独立的精神支撑,同时也是建国后60年社会建设的内在精神力量。在民族解放历史进程中,以中国共产党为代表的民族先进集体带领全国各族人民创造了长征精神、延安精神、沂蒙精神等一系列精神典范,集中体现了中华民族在民族危亡时期敢于斗争、敢于牺牲奉献的民族先进精神。在建国后的社会建设中,铁人精神、＂九八＂抗洪精神、载人航天精神、＂5·12＂抗震精神等精神典范集中体现了中华民族的无私奉献精神,为我国现代化建设提供了强大精神动力。在未来中华民族全面复兴的历史进程中,民族先进精神将得到进一步深化,为社会建设继续提供强大精神支持。     

现代中国女性作家与生成的现代性

本文以精卫鸟这一氤氲贯穿于现代中国女性作家由"尽心力"以"创人生"开启书写的具体意象出发,探讨了她们在风格多样的跨界转换中孕育生成的现代本体驱动和寓意形态。文中以秋瑾、冰心、卢隐、萧红、丁玲等作家书写为例,分析其对于生物族裔政治及其建构逻辑的"结构性潜意识"如何与其以"尽心力"而移动结构性限制、改写历史命运的"日常胆识"相互交织融合。这样的意识与身体互融,以不同的形式渗透并推动着这些女性书写,在认知与情感、伦理与审美的结合融通中,进一步催生了跨界诗学的变革动能。本文旨在示意蕴含其中有待阐释的历史信息,与常规西学自现代以来的两分法及其既定内容呈现出的差异对照。精卫鸟与现代中国女性作家所承载的"生成的现代性"为叩问、改写、融会、扬弃由这些族裔、性别、物种范畴暨分类逻辑所规定的现代西学及其局限性提供了有力的思想资源。     

Toward a republic of Taiwan or republic of China: a hypothetical analysis

Two Taiwanese republics have been mentioned in this paper, namely, the Republic of Taiwan (ROT) and the Republic of Taiwan (ROT). The ROT briefly existed in 1895, and the ROT is yet to be created. Two Chinese republics have also been discussed, the Republic of China (ROC), which was created by Dr. Sun Yat‐sen in 1912, and the Republic of China (ROC) or Zhonghuagongheguo, which may be created by the Chinese Communists with the blessings of Deng Xiaoping. If Beijing, indeed, changes its national title from the People's Republic of China (PRC) to the ROC, Taipei's formal ties with other capitals may have to come to an abrupt end. Such a move will also shatter the hope of those Taiwan independists in creating a new country in Taiwan or frustrate those who are for the Taiwanization of the ROC. However, it will also mean the “end” of Communism in China, if one does not believe in Marxist Utopia.     

从“家庭”走向“社群”——“都市中产全职妈妈”社会参与的路径与价值探析

两百年来的妇女解放道路一直强调妇女要走出家庭、参与生产,但却并未真正回应现代社会养育责任私人化所带来的双重负担问题。本文通过对四川省成都市一个以全职妈妈为主体的志愿者服务队的成立背景、发展路径、积极影响与限制因素的考察,剖析了现代社会城市女性面临的孕产和育儿困境,以及她们如何借助外部环境和资源优势走出私人家庭内部空间,在社区层面上进行支持与互助。这类群体的社会参与和自我成长也为我们反思"家庭—市场"二元悖论下的女性困境及其突破提供了新的可能与方向。     

1971年美国与台湾当局在联合国中国代表权问题上的有限“合作”

1971年第26届联大,由于判断即便全力支持,台湾当局也将在短期内失去联合国席位,美国以基于“两个中国”设计的“双重代表案”作为因应中国代表权问题的蓝本,并主张将安理会席位交归中华人民共和国政府的代表,以此换取国际社会对美案的支持;但台湾当局的代表将能否继续保有安理会席位视为应否继存于联合国的底线,双方围绕代表权问题经历了一段长期交涉。出于秘密运作与中华人民共和国改善关系的需要,同时也为迫使台湾当局接受“双重代表”安排,美国在对台交涉上采取了拖延策略。随着基辛格两次访华消息的相继公布,台湾当局在代表权问题上完全陷入被动,最终选择了对美国所主张的“复合双重代表案”持消极默认态度。     

社会主义核心价值体系构建中的核心价值范导主体

中国共产党28年的革命史,既是根据中国国情和革命发展的需要,不断调整核心价值体系,调动和激励广大人民革命热情的历史,也是中国共产党及其领导的军队靠真信、真行,引导和影响人们的理想信仰和道德水准的历史。社会主义核心价值体系与资本主义核心价值体系的根本区别,在于各自与人的自然本能、自然需要、自然价值取向的关系不同。从价值范导机制上看,社会主义核心价值体系的不同层面对应着不同的社会群体,需要有对应性范导主体;在全社会范围内,社会主义核心价值体系的建构则离不开核心范导主体。     

我国“绿卡制度”完善研究——以吸引海外高层次华人人才回归为视角

21世纪国家之间综合国力的竞争归根到底取决于人才的竞争。经济全球化趋势下,世界经济尤其是西方经济发展放缓,而人才正处于全球自由流动和竞争激烈的状态。中国是一个人口大国和非传统移民国家,中国经济的发展是不是可以更充分发挥本土人才的优势呢?本文就将站在如何吸引我国去国外留学人员、专家、学者等海外高层次华人人才回归的视角,探讨完善中国的"绿卡制度"的对策,从而吸引更多"海归",使他们能为中国的经济和社会发展做出相应的贡献。     

Reform ideology,political commitment and resource transfor: An alternative model for the explanation of China's economic reform∗

One of the most intriguing ironies of our era is the result of recent changes in the former communist world. Whereas the “democratizing” Russia and Eastern European countries are caught in repeated political as well as economic crises, the “unrepentant” authoritarian China and Vietnam are seeing their economies booming and more market‐oriented. Such an irony poses many important questions. One of the questions is how China has managed to get where it is. This paper represents an attempt to address this question. Firstly, it will briefly outline where economic reforms have brought China so far. Secondly, it will discuss two popular models used to explain China's economic performance. And finally, it will develop an alternative model that combines politics and economy in accounting for China's reform experience.     

“文革”时期周恩来民生思想初探

在"文革"的极左氛围下,周恩来对民生积极探索,形成了极具特色的民生思想。他重视农业的基础地位,将农业作为民生之本;他注重交通,将交通建设作为民生之脉;他注重医疗卫生事业发展,将群众生命健康作为民生之魂;他高度重视环境保护,是那个时期党和国家领导人中环境保护的首倡者。周恩来民生思想具有如下的特点:既强调"抓革命"又突出"促生产",从政治高度认识民生重要性;具有很强的实践性特点;具有创新性和探索性的特点;具有内容上的丰富性和系统性的特点。     

The role of western media in the environmental agenda setting of Hong Kong

This study focuses on the role of foreign media in agenda setting. It undertakes a comparative content analysis of the Chinese and English daily newspapers in Hong Kong with the objective of assessing the true nature of environmental sensitivity in the territory's “native” and “exposed” populations. The news coverage of the time period directly preceding and during the adoption stage of major environmental ordinances reflects that the pressure to act was as much native as foreign. It came as much from within as from outside. Consequently, the study makes a case for the need to acknowledge the indigenous character of policy problems and to search for intrinsic solutions. The myth of environmentalism as being a western concept may limit the range of possibilities open to policy makers in non‐western countries.     

China after Deng: Some perspectives∗

Deng Xiaoping's succession arrangement is different from the typical practice of the supreme leader of a dictatorship. Instead of occupying the highest leadership position himself until his death, Deng has let his “successor” assume office as the supreme leader while he is still alive and influential. Such an arrangement will help avoid a succession crisis and political upheavals upon Deng's death. In addition, the current market‐oriented economic reforms are very unlikely to be reversed in post‐Deng's China because of four factors: (1) public support of the reforms; (2) the vested interest of the “prince party” in the reforms; (3) the new leadership's commitment to the reforms; and (4) the constitutionalization of the reforms. However, there are three major sources of social unrest, which may lead to some political turbulence in the post‐Deng period. These sources are the “June 4th Incident” of 1989, public demand for an end of corruption and for political liberalization, and some socio‐economic problems brought about by the on‐going economic reforms. Although there will be periodical events of socio‐political turbulence, they are unlikely to drag China into a long period of instability or lead to a split of the nation.     

论第三条道路思潮向西方青年的传播

西方第三条道路思潮作为一种政治思潮,主要是以青年政策为中介向青年传播的。这主要体现在提出与现时代社会青年相适应的政治行动思路;倡导与青年“新个人主义”相应的积极责任观;充分利用现代科技手段唤起青年的政治热情;配套实施相关的就业、教育、经济和社会政策促进青年发展等方面。第三条道路向西方青年传播对我们的启示在于;需要重视并创新性地去巩固党执政的青年基础;需要有效地向当代中国青年传播马克思主义。