Employment among Social Security disability program beneficiaries, 1996-2007

We use linked administrative data from program and earnings records to summarize the 2007 employment rates of Social Security disability program beneficiaries at the national and state levels, as well as changes in employment since 1996. The findings provide new information on the employment activities of beneficiaries that should be useful in assessing current agency policies and providing benchmarks for ongoing demonstration projects and future return-to-work initiatives. The overall employment rate--which we define as annual earnings over $1,000--was 12 percent in 2007. Substantial variation exists within the population. Disability Insurance beneficiaries and those younger than age 40 were much more likely to work relative to other Social Security beneficiaries. Additionally, substantial regional variation exists across states; employment rates ranged from 7 percent (West Virginia) to 23 percent (North Dakota). Moreover, we find that the employment rates among beneficiaries were sensitive to the business cycle and persistent over time.     

How raising the age of eligibility for Social Security and Medicare might affect the disability insurance and Medicare programs

The normal age of retirement is scheduled to increase to 67 by 2022, and several proposals to increase it to age 70 are being considered. The Medicare eligibility age is not scheduled to increase under current law, but proposals to raise it in step with the retirement age were recently considered by the National Bipartisan Commission on the Future of Medicare (1999). This article examines how raising both the normal retirement age and the Medicare eligibility age would affect Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) eligibility, Medicare eligibility, and Medicare expenditures under two hypothetical policy scenarios. The first (the 2022 age-67 scenario) assumes that the eligibility age is raised to 67 by 2022, in step with the scheduled increase in the normal retirement age. The second (the 2040 age-70 scenario) assumes that the eligibility ages are increased to 70 by 2040. The findings are based on a summary of two reports. The earlier one (Wittenburg and others 1999) describes a series of microsimulation models developed from data in the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) and the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS). The base simulations in that report assume that the normal retirement and Medicare eligibility ages had already been increased in 1993, when the SIPP and MCBS respondents were observed. In the later report (Wittenburg, Stapleton, and Scrivner 2000), adjustment factors were developed to reflect future increases in Medicare expenditures, population growth, and increased participation in DI. The base simulations were then adjusted by those factors, yielding a final set of annual projections under the two policy scenarios. The hypothetical policy scenarios illustrate that the major cost reductions from jointly raising the Medicare eligibility age and the normal age of retirement would not be realized until after 2020, when the increases are fully phased in and a large portion of baby boomers have reached age 65. Although the projections provide important cost estimates, the equity and efficiency of those policies must be studied before the desirability of any specific proposal can be evaluated fully.     

Older workers' progression from private disability benefits to Social Security disability benefits

People with medical conditions that limit their ability to work tend to receive short-term disability benefits initially and may then move to long-term and eventually to permanent disability benefits. The progression of older workers (those aged 55 to 64) along that continuum of benefits is documented here with data from a large disability insurance company. The data show that older workers who receive short-term medical disability benefits are three times as likely as younger workers to progress to receipt of Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits, although a slight reversal of that trend occurs as workers pass age 62. Musculoskeletal conditions are the most frequent basis of short-term disability claims among older workers, with circulatory conditions running a close second. Furthermore, although all medical conditions are more likely to lead to SSDI benefits among older workers, circulatory conditions do so most frequently. This article discusses industry standards for the management of disability claims at each level of severity. It also addresses common and emerging disability management practices that may reduce the likelihood of impaired workers developing long-term or permanent financial dependence on disability benefits programs.     

Social Security disability beneficiaries with work-related goals and expectations

This study examines working-age Social Security Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security Income beneficiaries who report having work goals or expectations, referring to these individuals as "work-oriented." The study uses data from the 2004 National Beneficiary Survey matched to administrative data spanning 2004-2007 to identify work-oriented beneficiaries and to analyze their sociodemographic, health, and employment characteristics, as well as their earnings-related benefit suspensions and terminations. Relative to other disability beneficiaries, the 40 percent classified as work-oriented were younger and more educated, had been on the disability rolls a shorter time, had lower income from public assistance, and were healthier. Just over half had recently engaged in work or in work preparation activities at interview, about half had earnings at some point during 2004-2007, and 10 percent left the disability rolls because of earnings for at least 1 month during that period. The findings show that a large share of beneficiaries have work goals, most are attempting to work, and many experience some success.     

Long-term disability programs in selected countries

In 1985, the Social Security Administration commissioned an 18-month research project to study disability in eight industrialized countries: Austria, Canada, Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The study focused on three key areas: (1) the initial determination of disability, (2) the methods of monitoring disability, and (3) the incentives to return to work. Although the study revealed great variations among the countries in the definition of long-term disability, the approach followed in providing benefits, and the organization and features of the programs, some basic similarities were also found. Among the similarities are: (1) most countries have several income-maintenance programs to protect workers in the event that they are disabled, and (2) the disability test to determine whether a person is eligible for a disability benefit is ambiguous in that the various programs each have different eligibility criteria, different definitions of disability, different considerations given to labor-market conditions, and so forth. This article examines the diversity among the countries and attempts to highlight unique approaches to adjudicating disability, providing linkages to rehabilitation, and creating incentives for returning to work.     

中国民生的两大主题:社会保障与促进就业

就业与社会保障是中国面临的最重要的民生问题,它们应当是一个不可分割的有机体,但现实中却处于相互分割状态,这种状态直接影响了两大宏观政策体系的综合效能。就业是最好的社会保障的观点是不正确的,这是割裂两大密切相关的政策体系的误区,应将两者放在同等重要的位置并协同考虑。中国的未来发展既需要长期坚持积极的就业政策,亦需要一个健全的社会保障体系,只有两者协同发展,才能实现中国健康与持续发展的目标。     

残疾人就业问题与就业保障政策思考

残疾人群体是就业弱势群体,长期以来,有劳动能力(包括部分劳动能力)的残疾人主要通过在福利企业就业、分散按比例就业等几种有限的途径和形式实现就业。在社会转型期,残疾人群体面临新的挑战,形势严峻,本文着重分析了当前残疾人就业存在的主要问题,并对调整就业保障政策提出若干建议。     

"Fast-track" strategies in long-term public disability programs around the world

Long-term public disability programs in the United States and several other countries have incorporated fast-track (FT) procedures that share a common goal of accelerating applicants through various stages of the disability determination process--generally for those with severe disabilities, blindness, or terminal illness. This article identifies a variety of FT procedures either implemented or under consideration in public long-term disability programs operated in the United States and other countries; compares FT procedures in those disability programs with respect to specific program features, differences with respect to the administrative components involved in those procedures, and the level of technology used; examines more generally why countries may consider implementing FT procedures; and describes how FT procedures may be employed to improve overall processing of claims and contribute to disability case management.     

失地农民就业保障制度研究

近年来,随着我国工业化、城镇化、农业现代化进程的快速推进,一些农民失去土地进入城镇社区,成为城镇居民。然而,失地农民虽然在形式上顺利转为城镇居民,但是在实际就业上则存在诸多困难。就目前来说,解决失地农民的就业保障制度已经成为一些政府部门工作的重点,也是难点。途径如下:提高失地农民的职业素质与技能;完善失地农民的就业权益保护制度;鼓励自主创业;完善失业保险和救助制度;消除制约就业的排斥因素。     

社会保障立法的价值取向

一个没有完善的社会保障法律制度的社会,不可能是一个和谐的社会.社会保障法律制度在构建社会主义和谐社会中的价值是巨大的,具体表现在:维护社会安全,追求社会公平,保障基本人权,促进社会和谐等方面.     

构建中国的就业保障体系

本文提出,依据失业保障自身特点、保障目的、制度演变规律、现实状况和未来挑战等多因素,中国失业保障体系未来发展的目标是建立就业保障体系.从如何保障就业的角度出发,设想未来的就业保障体系由就业预备、就业预告和就业保险三部分组成.就业保障体系的建立需要科学的规划和系统的过程,具体可分为突出就业导向、完善就业制度和整体协调运转三个阶段.     

论内保工作发展趋势——走社会保安服务之路

传统内保工作体制受到市场经济的挑战,改革这种体制是大势新趋.本文认为内保工作走社会保安服务之路是社会化分工的需要,是经济发展的趋势,是西方发达国家政府鼓励发展的方向,它比传统的内保工作具有明显的优势,走社会保安服务之路是今后内保工作发展的趋势.     

Social Security privatization in Latin America

The new, partially privatized social security system adopted by Chile in 1981 has attracted attention in many parts of the world. Since then, a number of Latin American countries have implemented the Chilean model, with some variations: either with a single- or multi-tier system, or with a period of transition to take care of those in the labor force at the time of the change. The single-tier version consists of a privatized program with individual accounts in pension fund management companies. Multi-tier systems have a privatized component and retain some form of public program. This article describes each of the new programs in Latin America, their background, and similarities and differences among them. Much more information is available for Chile than for the other countries (in part because Chile has the oldest system), enough to be able to evaluate what, in most cases, is the most accurate information. That is often not the case for the other countries, especially when dealing with subjects such as transition costs and net rates of return (rates of return minus administrative fees). No country has copied the Chilean system exactly. Bolivia, El Salvador, and Mexico have closed their public systems and set up mandatory individual accounts. Argentina has a mixed public/private system with three tiers. In Colombia and Peru, workers have a choice between the public and private programs. Uruguay created a two-tier mixed system. Costa Rica has a voluntary program for individual accounts as a supplement to the pay-as-you-go program and has just passed a law setting up mandatory accounts containing employer contributions for severance pay. All of the countries continue to face unresolved issues, including: High rates of noncompliance--the percentage of enrollees who do not actively and regularly contribute to their accounts--which could lead to low benefits and greater costs to the governments that offer a guaranteed minimum benefit; Proportionately lower benefits for women and lower earners than for men and higher earners; A minimum required rate of return among the pension fund management companies (in most of these countries) that has resulted in similarity among the companies and the consequent lack of meaningful choice; and High administrative fees in most of these countries, which reduce the individual's effective rate of return. To what extent these issues can be mitigated or resolved in the future is not yet clear. In general, a definitive assessment of the Chilean model and its Latin American variations will not be possible until a cohort of retirees has spent most of its career under the new system.