The reservation wages of Social Security Disability Insurance beneficiaries

There exists a lot of research on the reservation wages of the unemployed as a determinant of unemployment duration. Little is known about the reservation wages of those who are not in the labor force but might be potential labor force returnees, such as Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) beneficiaries. The main objective of this article is to assess what can be learned from the subjective reservation wages of DI beneficiaries. Using the New Beneficiary Data System (NBDS), the article assesses the magnitudes of reservation wages compared to the last wage earned and the benefit amount, as well as the determinants of reservation wages in a regression framework. The NBDS is unique in that it provides the reservation wages and the work history of DI beneficiaries before and after joining the DI rolls. The article has several noteworthy results and policy implications: *Data show that a significant portion of beneficiaries report being likely to accept a job if offered one. Based on the NBDS, 13 percent of DI beneficiaries who did not work since joining the rolls in 1981-1982 reported in 1991 that they would be willing to work if offered a job and provided their reservation wages. *DI beneficiaries do not appear to price themselves out of the labor market. Half of them would want a wage that is 80 percent or less of the last wage earned before receiving DI. It is estimated that approximately 7 percent of long-term DI beneficiaries may potentially return-to-work if they search for jobs and have a wage offer distribution with a mean at 80 percent of their last wage. *The nonlabor income in addition to the benefit is positively and significantly associated with the reservation wage, while the benefit amount per se is not. However, this result needs to be treated with caution given that nonlabor income is endogenous to the model. *Heterogeneity exists between persons still under the DI program and those that have moved to the Old-Age program. The subsamples of persons who have shifted to the Old-Age program and those who are still under the DI program have median reservation wage to the last wage ratios of 0.69 and 0.93, respectively. A significantly lower reservation wage for persons who have moved to the Old-Age program was also found in a regression framework. This heterogeneity between the two groups may result in part from the different program characteristics both groups face, for instance, in terms of benefit termination and Medicare eligibility rules. *Subjective reservation wage data can be useful to study populations that are out of the labor force. This article is innovative in that it focuses on a group of persons who are typically considered as being out of the labor force, and therefore are not asked reservation wages in general household surveys such as the Current Population Survey. It would be of great interest to collect more reservation wage data for DI beneficiaries in a longitudinal data set to expand this analysis, for instance, to assess conclusively the effects of changing program characteristics on reservation wages and return-to-work outcomes as beneficiaries transition to the Old-Age program or as new return-to-work programs are put in place.     

The impact of changing financial work incentives on the earnings of Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) beneficiaries

SSDI beneficiaries lose their entire cash benefit if they perform work that is substantial gainful activity (SGA) after using Social Security work incentive programs. The complete loss of benefits might be a work disincentive for beneficiaries. We report results from a pilot project that replaces the complete loss of benefits with a gradual reduction in benefits of $1 for every $2 earned above an earnings disregard level. Beneficiaries who volunteered to participate in the project were randomly assigned to a group receiving the new program or to a control group. The policy led to a 25 percent increase in the percentage of beneficiaries with earnings above the annualized SGA amount, or $11,760 in 2009 dollars. It did not result in a reduction in benefit payments. © 2011 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Expanding access to health care for Social Security Disability Insurance beneficiaries: early findings from the accelerated benefits demonstration

Most Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) beneficiaries must complete a 5-month waiting period before they become entitled to DI cash benefits and an additional 24-month waiting period before Medicare benefits begin. The Accelerated Benefits (AB) demonstration is a randomized experiment designed to test the effects of providing newly entitled DI beneficiaries who do not have health insurance with a generous health benefits package during the Medicare waiting period. This article presents early findings on the prevalence of health insurance coverage among newly entitled beneficiaries and the characteristics of those without health insurance. It also examines the effects of AB on health care utilization, the extent to which AB reduces unmet medical needs, and the costs of providing the AB health benefits package.     

How policy variables influence the timing of applications for Social Security Disability Insurance

This article analyzes the impact of policy variables--employer accommodations, state Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) allowance rates, and DI benefits--on the timing of an application for DI benefits by workers with a work-limiting health condition starting when their health condition first begins to bother them. The analysis uses a rich mixture of personal and employer characteristics from the Health and Retirement Study linked to Social Security administrative records. We find that most workers do not apply immediately for DI benefits when they are first bothered by a health condition. On the contrary, the median working-age man with a work-limiting condition waits 7 years after that time before applying, and the median working-age woman waits 8 years. Although the risk of applying for benefits is greatest in the year following onset, only 16 percent of men and 13 percent of women in our sample apply within the first year, and the risk of application falls thereafter. That finding suggests that institutional factors, in addition to health factors, may play a role in the timing of DI applications. Using kernel density estimates of the distribution of application and nonapplication ordered by state allowance rates (the rate of acceptance per DI determination in each state), we find that both men and women who live in states with high allowance rates are disproportionately more likely to apply for benefits in the first year after their condition begins to bother them than are those in states with low allowance rates. Using life-table analysis, we also find that men and women who are accommodated by their employers are significantly less likely to apply for DI benefits in each of the first few years after their condition begins to bother them than are those who are not accommodated. On the basis of this evidence, we include these policy variables in a model of the timing of DI application that controls for other socioeconomic variables as well as health. Using a hazard model, we find that workers who live in states with higher allowance rates apply for DI benefits significantly sooner than those living in states with lower allowance rates following the onset of a work-limiting health condition. Workers who are accommodated following the onset of a work-limiting health condition, however, are significantly slower to apply for DI benefits. Using the mean values of all explanatory variables, we estimate the relative importance of changes in these policy variables on the speed with which workers apply for benefits after onset. We find that the mean time until application for men is 10.22 years. Universal accommodations following onset would delay application by 4.36 years. In contrast, a 20 percent decrease in state allowance rates would delay application by only 0.88 years. For working-age women, the average expected time until application once a condition begins to bother them is 10.58 years. Universal accommodations would delay that by 3.76 years, and a 20 percent decrease in allowance rates would delay it by 1.47 years. A complication in this analysis is that the policy variables are to some degree endogenous. Accommodation is probably offered more often to workers who want to continue working. Allowance rates are chosen by states on the basis of federal policy and local choices and probably in part on the health condition of workers in the state. Therefore, our estimates are upper bounds of these policy effects. Still, we believe we provide evidence that the social environment faced by workers with work-limiting health conditions can significantly influence their decision to apply for DI benefits, holding their specific health conditions constant.     

The Effect of Lower Transaction Costs on Social Security Disability Insurance Application Rates and Participation

Transaction costs pose significant barriers to participation in public programs. We analyze how Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) application behavior was affected by iClaim, a 2009 innovation that streamlined the online application process. We use a difference‐in‐differences design to compare application rates before and after 2009 across counties with varying degrees of access to high‐speed internet. We estimate that counties with internet connectivity one standard‐deviation above the mean experienced a 1.6 percent increase in SSDI applications, and a 2.8 percent increase in appeals after the reform. We estimate that the increase in applications due to iClaim can explain 15 percent of the overall increase in applications between 2008 and 2011. Higher exposure to the online application led to a slightly larger increase in SSDI awards, meaning there was a small but significant increase in the overall award rate. Application rates increased the most in rural areas, while appeals and awards had more significant increases in urban areas. These results suggest that the online application reduced transaction costs to applicants, and the lower costs improved the overall targeting efficiency of the application process.     

Workers' compensation, Social Security Disability Insurance, and the offset: a fact sheet

This article offers a brief summary of the workers' compensation and Social Security Disability Insurance programs. Information highlighted includes the differences between the two programs' types and terms of coverage. It compares the differing patterns in workers' compensation and Social Security disability benefits as a percentage of wages over the past few decades and considers the potential causes for such trends. The article also explains the offset provision included in the 1965 Social Security Amendments, the intention behind the offset, and how and when offsets are applied.     

Projections of economic well-being for Social Security beneficiaries in 2022 and 2062

Policymakers considering potential changes to the Social Security program need to be able to assess how such changes would affect the economic well-being of future retirees. The first step to understanding these effects is to determine the well-being of future retirees under the current Social Security system. To this end, this article projects the retiree populations aged 62 or older in 2022 and 2062 using the Social Security Administration's MINT (Modeling Income in the Near Term) model and assesses their well-being. Because no one measure can fully capture whether future retirees will have adequate resources to meet their needs, we employ several indicators to assess retirement prospects. In addition, because current-law Social Security promises cannot be financed from current-law taxes, we project an alternative 2062 baseline that adjusts Social Security benefits downward to reflect the amounts that current-law taxes can support. Our results illustrate the importance of using several measures when assessing the well-being of future Social Security beneficiaries. When using absolute measures, retirement well-being will improve for Social Security beneficiaries in 2062 compared with those in 2022. Median per capita income of Social Security beneficiaries is projected to increase by a third (in real terms) between 2022 and 2062, with a corresponding decline in projected poverty rates. In addition, median financial wealth will increase between 2022 and 2062. Relative measures of well-being, however, suggest a decline in well-being between Social Security beneficiaries in 2022 and those in 2062. The share of beneficiaries who have low income relative to their peers, measured as the share whose income-to-needs ratio is less than half of the median ratio, will increase over time. In addition, income replacement rates are projected to fall between 2022 and 2062, indicating a decline in how well-being during retirement compares with that during the working years. And although median financial wealth will increase between 2022 and 2062, it will actually fall relative to economy-wide average wages. Projected improvements over time would lessen, and declines would be exacerbated, if instead of assuming the payment of currently scheduled Social Security benefits we assumed that benefits would be reduced according to what is payable under current-law taxes. Regardless of which measure of well-being is used, certain groups fare worse than others, including beneficiaries who never married, nonwhites, beneficiaries without a high school degree, and those with fewer years of labor force experience and low lifetime earnings. These vulnerable groups are likely to be more dependent on Social Security benefits for their retirement income. As a result, they fare particularly poorly under the assumption that Social Security benefits are reduced to reflect what is payable under current-law taxes.     

Income and assets of Social Security beneficiaries by type of benefit

The SIPP data have provided a first look at the relative economic status of various types of Social Security beneficiaries. They have shown that the different types of Social Security beneficiaries face very different economic circumstances. Retired workers and wife beneficiaries have the highest family incomes adjusted for family size. Aged widows and minor children have the lowest family incomes, with high proportions of poor or near poor. And disabled workers are in between, but also have high proportions of poor or near poor. Retired-worker and wife beneficiary households also have considerably more asset holdings than disabled-worker or widow beneficiary households. Beneficiaries with high family incomes are very likely to live with relatives and to rely heavily on the relatives' income. The high-income families tend to have non-means-tested sources of family income other than Social Security amounting to substantial proportions of their total income and to have high asset holdings. Conversely, beneficiaries with low family incomes are very likely to live alone or with nonrelatives, to rely heavily on Social Security and means-tested benefits, and to have low asset holdings. A majority of ever-poor beneficiaries (with the exception of widow beneficiaries) are poor in only some months of a year. This situation is not consistent with the stereotype of beneficiaries living on fixed incomes. But the change in poverty status is often due to a change in the income of other family members rather than of the beneficiary. And in some cases, a change in poverty status occurs with little or no change in income as the cost of living rises.     

The Impact of Rehabilitation and Counseling Services on the Labor Market Activity of Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) Beneficiaries

We use data from a social experiment to estimate the impact of a rehabilitation and counseling program on the labor market activity of newly entitled Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) beneficiaries. Our results indicate that the program led to a 4.6 percentage point increase in the receipt of employment services within the first year following random assignment and a 5.1 percentage point increase in participation in the Social Security Administration's Ticket to Work program within the first three years following random assignment. The program led to a 5.3 percentage point increase, or almost 50 percent increase, in employment, and an $831 increase in annual earnings in the second calendar year after the calendar year of random assignment. The employment and earnings impacts are smaller and not statistically significant in the third calendar year following random assignment, and we describe SSDI rules that are consistent with this finding. Our findings indicate that disability reform proposals focusing on restoring the work capacity of people with disabilities can increase the disability employment rate.     

Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984: legislative history and summary of provisions

This article describes the legislative history of the Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984 (Public Law 98-460), and contains a summary of the provisions in the new law. Major provisions include: standards for continuing disability reviews (CDR's) of disability insurance (DI) beneficiaries and supplemental security income (SSI) recipients who get payments based on disability or blindness; the right of a DI beneficiary or an SSI recipient to have payments continued during appeal of a CDR decision to an administrative law judge that disability or blindness has ceased; and suspension of CDR's of mentally impaired persons until the evaluation criteria for mental impairments are revised. The new law was enacted in response to problems that arose as a result of the implementation by the Social Security Administration (SSA) of a provision in the 1980 disability amendments that required periodic CDR's. In enacting the new law, Congress intended to assure more accurate, consistent, and uniform disability decisions at all levels and equitable and humane treatment not only to beneficiaries who must undergo CDR's but also to new applicants for DI benefits or SSI payments based on disability or blindness.     

人口老龄化与农村老年医疗保障制度

人口老龄化导致老年人医疗服务需要增加。然而,经济因素制约了老年人医疗服务需要向需求的转化,阻碍了老年人健康状况的改善。为实现世界卫生组织(W H O)提出的“健康老龄化”目标,促进全面建设小康目标的实现,必须为老年人尤其是收入低且几乎没有任何医疗保障的大量农村老年人建立医疗保障制度。建立制度面临筹资来源少、技术难度高、医疗卫生条件落后等制约因素,需要采取“低水平、广覆盖、采用多种模式、利用各方力量、加强配套设施”的发展策略。通过建立农村老年医疗救助、合作医疗、“时间储蓄”等多种制度,提供完善的医疗供方体系,保障农村老年人的基本医疗需求,促进其健康状况的改善。     

The development and use of industry data by the Social Security Administration.

Over the past few years the Social Security Bulletin has published a series of technical articles that describe various Social Security Administration (SSA) data files. This article provides an overview of SSA's industry-related data files and statistical systems from both a current and a historical perspective. The author begins by explaining how SSA first collected business data from employers (starting in 1937) as a by-product of the requirement that employers report employee wages for benefit computation purposes. She describes the administrative methods by which the data are collected, SSA's coordination of its activities with other agencies, the data collection forms used, the scheme by which the data are coded, and the employer files into which the data are classified. In her closing, the author provides examples of the various uses of the industry data and the ways that these data relate to SSA's statistical program needs and to those of other agencies as well.     

Adjudicating reasonable and necessary funded supports in the National Disability Insurance Scheme: A critical review of the values and priorities indicated in the decisions of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal

Beyond the initial euphoria of the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS), tough choices will be needed for sustainability. Although the spirit of the NDIS is to deliver choice and control, the Australian government's objective is to ensure that rights and aspirations are proportionate to expectations of best practice, aptness of mainstream services and cost effectiveness. The position in this paper is that this test of ‘reasonable and necessary’ when determining funded supports, raises value dilemmas for government and citizens. The objective is to demonstrate this through a critical scrutiny of the reviews and decisions regarding reasonable and necessary funded supports of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). In this paper, a synthesis and critique of 35 appeals to the AAT and one Federal Court Appeal are used to make explicit the decisional ambiguities and contestations in the scheme and the values and priorities that are currently dominant in the allocation of reasonable and necessary support. This in turn is used as a basis for a discussion about the operation of rights in the scheme and what counts as legitimate support. The benefit is for scheme transparency and fairness but also broader debate about core principles and values to inform decisions about scarce resources in society.     

社区残疾人保障的现状分析与政策建议

残疾人社会保障离不开社区,社区是残疾人社会保障的重要载体。从社区残疾人保障的主要内容出发,分析了现阶段我国社区残疾人保障存在的问题,并在此基础上提出了完善社区残疾人保障的几点建议:建立完善的社区残疾人保障的组织管理机制是推进社区残疾人保障的首要环节;大力发展社区非营利组织是推进社区保障的依托;健全社区残疾人服务网络,培养专业的社区残疾人工作队伍是发展社区残疾人保障的必要保证。     

The long‐term effects on children and adolescents of a policy providing work supports for low‐income parents

New Hope, an employment‐based poverty‐reduction intervention for adults evaluated in a random‐assignment experimental design, had positive impacts on children's achievement and social behavior two and five years after random assignment. The question addressed in this paper was the following: Did the positive effects of New Hope on younger children diminish or even reverse when children reached the challenges of adolescence (eight years after random assignment)? Small positive impacts on school progress, school motivation, positive social behavior, child well‐being, and parent control endured, but impacts on school achievement and problem behavior were no longer evident. The most likely reasons for lasting impacts were that New Hope families were slightly less likely to be poor, and children had spent more time in center‐based child care and structured activities. New Hope represents a model policy that could produce modest improvements in the lives of low‐income adults and children. © 2011 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

关于社会保障制度中权利义务关系的思考

社会保障是社会成员依法享有的社会权利,它实质上体现了国家与公民、社会与社会成员之间的权利义务关系。从西方社会保障制度发展的历史看,对社会保障权利义务关系的认识不同,影响着社会保障责任的承担;在我国现阶段建立社会保障体系,国家的主导义务依然重要,个人的自我保障责任和意识要强化,同时在兼顾公平与效率的基础上,切实实现一切社会成员在社会保障权利上的平等。     

The effects of an employer subsidy on employment outcomes: A study of the work opportunity and welfare‐to‐work tax credits

Employer subsidies such as the Work Opportunity Tax Credit (WOTC) and the Welfare‐to‐Work Tax Credit (WtW) are designed to encourage employment by partially reimbursing employers for wages paid to certain welfare recipients and other disadvantaged workers. In this paper, I examine the effects of these subsidies on employment, wages, and job tenure using unique administrative data from Wisconsin. My ability to precisely identify the subsidy‐certified workers allows me to distinguish the effects of program participation from mere eligibility. Using propensity score matching estimation, I find some evidence of short‐term improvements in labor market outcomes, but little evidence of sustained benefits. © 2008 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.